

STATEMENTS BY ARAB AND ISRAELI  
LEADERS RELATIVE TO THE MIDDLE  
EAST CONFLICT: JUNE 9-JULY 23, 1967.

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A SUMMARY OF

UNITED STATES POLICY AND DIPLOMACY IN THE

MIDDLE EAST CRISIS

MAY 15 - JUNE 10, 1967

DECLASSIFIED



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Chapter I

Friction between the Syrian Arab Republic and Israel during the months of April and May 1967 precipitated a major crisis in the Middle East. The impasse which quickly developed from scattered acts of violence into a grave international problem was described by U.N. Secretary-General U Thant as more disturbing and menacing than at any time since the fall of 1956.

The background of the crisis involved fourteen Syrian-Israeli border incidents during the time-span of April 9-May 8, 1967, culminating in two key incidents regarded as particularly serious by the Israelis. Israel was particularly concerned with the increasing sophistication of the methods being used by the terrorists. Using Lebanese territory, the Syrians had launched a mortar attack on Kibbutz-Manara on May 5, and an automobile was blown up on the Tiberias-Rosh Pinna road on May 8. Preliminary judgments on the part of the Department of State agreed with the estimate of the Israeli Government that the Israelis would be under increasing pressure in days to come to take counter-action. The United States almost immediately counselled restraint upon the Government of Israel, urging the view that reprisal would not solve the difficult situation.

On May 11, Gideon Rafael, Israeli Ambassador to the U.N., U.S. Ambassador asked Arthur Goldberg to support Israel's diplomatic offensive by appealing to Secretary-General U Thant for actions which would tend to calm the situation. Goldberg agreed to speak with Ralph Bunche, <sup>Under</sup> U.N. Secretary for Special Political Affairs, or the Secretary-General about the matter of urging a détente. The same day, Thant issued a strong statement, calling the <sup>Israeli-Syrian</sup> ~~El-Fateh~~ incidents "deplorable" and "insidious". During the evening, Israeli Ambassador Avraham Harman called on Assistant Secretary Battle at the Department <sup>of State</sup> to register the Israeli Government's serious concern over the terrorist issue.



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Syria's reply to the Israeli charges was an unequivocal denial of them. The <sup>Syrian</sup> Foreign Minister met with <sup>in Damascus</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>American</sup> Ambassador Hugh Smythe on May 13, and reiterated the standard Syrian Government position of non-responsibility for <sup>Arab</sup> Palestinian guerrilla raids into Israel, whether they were mounted from Lebanon, Syria, or Jordan. In Washington, Syrian Chargeé Kayali asserted to Assistant Secretary Battle that Syria was taking defensive measures against Israeli attempts to swallow up demilitarized zones, and said that an Israeli assault on Syria would be possible only with the approval of the "great powers".

At the United Nations, Ambassador Goldberg felt that U Thant's remarks of May 11 could not be interpreted as condoning resort to force by any party to the incidents of the previous week. Goldberg met on the afternoon of May 15 with Ambassadors Seydoux and Caradon of France and the United Kingdom, respectively, for a full discussion of the Middle East tension. All three men agreed to consult urgently with their respective governments on the desirability of asking Secretary General Thant to call a meeting of the Security Council. In Washington, Under Secretary Rostow, British Ambassador Sir Patrick Dean, and French Ambassador Charles Lucet met on May 15. Rostow expressed the hope that the United States could reassure the Israelis and relieve pressure on them to take unilateral action.

During the evening of May 15, Israeli Ambassador Harman informed <sup>of State</sup> the Department that there were no military concentrations on Israel's side of the Syrian border, and that the Government of Israel hoped infiltration from Syria <sup>had</sup> ~~was~~ ended. Harman said that his government <sup>believed Syria</sup> hoped to involve the United Arab Republic in the situation as it existed. <sup>9</sup> For nearly 24 hours, from late in the evening of May 15 until 10 p.m. the following evening, the Middle East crisis remained unchanged. During the day of the 16th, Caradon



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met again with Goldberg and agreed that the situation was somewhat less dangerous but still serious. Caradon made plans to see U Thant in order to tell him that the United States, <sup>the</sup> United Kingdom, and France were consulting on the problem, and to ask the Secretary-General for his comments.

Suddenly and unexpectedly, events took a significant turn.

At 10 p.m. on Tuesday, May 16, the Egyptian Chief of Staff, General Fawzi, sent a telegram ~~containing a request~~ <sup>in</sup> for the withdrawal of all United Nations troops in observation posts patrolling U.A.R. borders, to the Commander of U.N. F.F., Major General I.J. Rikhye

There was at first no direct communication between the Egyptian Government and appropriate channels at the U.N. Secretary-General Thant called in the permanent U.A.R. representative, Ambassador El-Kony, late on the 16th in order to obtain an explanation of the U.A.R.'s intent with respect to the continued presence of U.N.E.F. in the area. <sup>At Thant's request,</sup> El-Kony informed the Egyptian Government that a partial withdrawal of the U.N. Emergency Force was impossible. <sup>Egyptian President</sup> Nasser had to request either the complete withdrawal of U.N.E.F. or else allow it to remain in its existing positions. The Egyptians decided to demand the withdrawal of the entire force as soon as possible. U.A.R. take-over of the U.N.E.F. posts swiftly moved the Middle East crisis into a second and more serious phase.



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## Chapter II

President Johnson, deeply concerned about the maintenance of peace in the Middle East, addressed a letter to Israeli Prime Minister Eshkol, on May 17, in which he announced that the United States Government was well aware of the strain being placed on Israel's patience; but that the U.S. had counselled against any Israeli initiatives which would add further to the tension. Eshkol replied to the President's letter on May 18, maintaining that ample legal basis existed for the Secretary-General to insist that he could not <sup>after</sup> ~~accept~~ the status quo ~~concerning~~ the U.N. force in Sinai without a mandate from the General Assembly.

On the morning of May 18, Israeli Ambassador Avraham Harman telephoned Under Secretary Rostow to say that ~~Foreign~~ Minister Eban proposed that the Secretary-General visit Cairo and Damascus in order to attempt to quiet the situation. Rostow's initial reaction was favorable, but he stated that he still felt there was always a possibility that the Secretary-General could "bobble the job". <sup>(poc. 1)</sup> ~~During~~ <sup>achieving</sup> the day of May 18, a program of consultations with an aim toward a ~~démarche~~ had begun between American Ambassadors and top-level officials of Middle Eastern governments. Ambassador Burns had an interview with King Hussein in Amman, during which Hussein stated his belief that Israel's long-range military and economic goals could only be satisfied by altering the status of Jordan's west bank. The Jordanian King asserted that, if attacked, his country would retaliate, since not to counterattack would mean the end of his régime. Ambassador Barbour met with <sup>Foreign</sup> Minister Eban in Tel Aviv, and heard Eban say that the most important fact in the situation was the necessity to convince the U.S.S.R. that <sup>the Soviet Union</sup> ~~it~~ could not control the escalation of the potential conflict in the Middle East. In other meetings, Under Secretary Rostow <sup>to Ambassador Harman</sup> and Assistant Secretary Battle emphasized that the United States Government would not wish to see the Gulf of Aqaba <sup>by Egypt</sup> closed, but that nothing should be done unless and until closure was attempted.

On May 19, Ambassador Harman pleaded with Assistant Secretary Battle for direct U.S. efforts to reverse the U.A.R. buildup in Sinai and called for a new public statement of U.S. commitment in the area. Battle replied that the United States commitment, through the U.N. or otherwise, would require



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careful deliberation at the highest levels of the U.S. Government. Battle added that the Russians wanted no trouble in the area. Then both men expressed considerable puzzlement as to precisely what was motivating the Egyptians. During the evening of May 19, Secretary Rusk rejected an Israeli request for a U.S. destroyer <sup>(the Israeli port of the head of the Gulf of Aqaba)</sup> visit to Eilat, saying that, in view of existing circumstances, such a display would provide a propaganda horse for the Arabs to ride, and, at worst, it could mean the increase of Arab uncertainties. The Secretary also felt this action might serve as a red flag to the U.A.R. ~~on the Straits of Tiran question.~~

The important issue of the precise extent of U.S. commitment to Israel brought key Israeli and American diplomats together for a conference on Sunday afternoon, May 21, in Tel Aviv. Ambassador Barbour, <sup>Foreign</sup> Minister Eban, and <sup>the</sup> Israeli Director General of American Affairs, Moshe Bitan, discussed ways in which the Israelis felt that the U.S. Government could be the most helpful. Eban pressed for articulation of U.S. commitments to Israel not only to the Israelis but also to the Russians, the Egyptians, and to friends of the United States. Barbour replied that a case could be made for refraining from revealing <sup>to Egypt</sup> the extent of any <sup>U.S.</sup> commitment to Israel. Bitan and <sup>Eban?</sup> Barbour rejoined that clarity was of the utmost importance. <sup>Eban?</sup> Barbour then continued on the subject of <sup>to Israel</sup> the importance of <sup>freedom of</sup> navigation <sup>through the Straits of Tiran into the Gulf of Aqaba</sup> to Israel, describing the question of the Straits of Tiran as no longer <sup>being</sup> a juridical matter as it <sup>had been</sup> was in 1957, but rather as a geopolitical fact of the first magnitude for Israel. During his presentation, Eban was interrupted by a report that one-third of the U.A.R.'s naval forces as well as a unit of infantry were on their way to the Gulf of Aqaba. Eban then reiterated his request for reaffirmation of the "solemn commitment" that the U.S. Government had made in 1957, as well as <sup>at</sup> President Eisenhower's <sup>at the mouth of the Strait of Tiran</sup> assurances that if Israel ~~would~~ pull out of Sharm-el-Sheikh it would never have cause for regret. Eban also said that U.N. personnel would be welcome in Israel as "tourists," but not as Israel's protectors. Referring to President Johnson's letter of May 18 as too "consultative", Eban said the U.S. Government should take steps to see that its commitment was believed. (DOC. 2)

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Abba Eban had stressed Israel's desire for encouragement from President Johnson, in his meeting with Barbour, On May 21, the Department sent a letter from the President to Prime Minister Eshkol. Secretary Rusk instructed Embassy Tel Aviv, in delivering the President's letter, to stress that the U.S. was certain Israel agreed <sup>not</sup> the U.N. machinery in the area must be revitalized. In this letter, President Johnson expressed his agreement with Eshkol that terrorism and lawlessness had to cease, and reiterated his hope that Israel would continue to manifest steady nerves in order to avoid further deterioration of a tense situation. The President continued that the Russians were under no illusion concerning the firmness of the U.S. commitment to counter aggression in the Middle East, a position which had been taken not only by four Presidents but also by the British, French, and the United States Governments in the Tripartite Declaration of 1950.

British Ambassador Sir Patrick Dean and Under Secretary Rostow on May 21, discussed the advisability of breathing "new life" into the Tripartite Declaration of 1950. Rostow took the position that the Declaration was the proper policy for the Governments of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, while Dean indicated that he would seek further clarification of the U.K. position. Dean said that, although the United Kingdom wanted close political consultations with the United States, the British did not want to become involved in military contingency planning at that point. It seemed unlikely to Rostow, however, that the United States could obtain Security Council action if hostilities did break out; hence, the United States could not ignore the risk of being required to honor previous commitments. Rostow also said that the U.S. Government was considering presenting a written paper to all the governments in the Middle East reiterating the U.S. position. On the basis of this discussion and a statement made by Prime Minister Harold Wilson in the House of Commons that the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 had "not been retracted", the Department continued to press for authoritative confirmation from the British and French Governments that this declaration remained the policy of those two governments.



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The Department prepared a statement on the Middle East situation together with a compilation of past U.S. commitments, and sent the statement and list to the White House on the afternoon of May 22. <sup>(DOC. 3)</sup> Secretary Rusk recommended to the President that he should issue the statement the same day, perhaps on television. The draft statement was ~~made~~ <sup>intended to</sup> in support of U Thant's <sup>scheduled to</sup> departure for Cairo on the evening of May 22. Calling attention to the persistent efforts of the U.S. to achieve peace in the area, the statement noted three dangerous aspects of the situation. These included (1) the fact that all of the governments concerned had not carried out their responsibilities under the General Armistice Agreements; (2) the dissatisfaction of the United States Government with the swift withdrawal of U.N.E.F. from Gaza and Sinai after a decade of effective service in keeping peace; and (3) the unfortunate existence and buildup of large troop concentrations in the area. The statement was revised by the White House staff and held pending release the following day, May 23.

In support of U Thant's visit to Cairo, President Johnson <sup>explained</sup> on May 22, sent a letter to U.A.R. President Nasser. The United States, ~~was~~ the President, was far from manifesting any unfriendliness toward the U.A.R., but was interested in efforts being made to modernize Egypt. Johnson said that it was a duty to Nasser owed to his people and the world to avoid hostilities. Late in the evening of May 22, a message from President Johnson was transmitted to Prime Minister Eshkol. The President referred to the fact that he and Eshkol had been in constant touch since the beginning of the crisis. He then told Eshkol he was addressing letters to the Prime Minister of Syria and to the President of the U.A.R., appealing to them to avoid hostilities, and expressing the great hope that the mission of Secretary General U Thant would be successful.

While messages from the President to Arab nations were being transmitted and the Secretary General was en route to Cairo, Ambassador Barbour <sup>in Jerusalem</sup> informed the Department <sup>of State</sup> that Abba Eban had called him to say, "There has been an announcement by Nasser that the Straits will be closed and that if Israel wants war she can have it." Eban told Barbour that at that point all he could do was <sup>to</sup> say that he thought the President should be informed.

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## Chapter II

Under Secretary Rostow held a discussion with U.A.R. during the evening of May 22 Ambassador Kamel in response to the announcement of the closure of the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping. Rostow expressed the hope that the Egyptian action could be reversed. Kamel recommended that distinguished Americans such as Robert Anderson, Eugene Black, and John J. McCloy fly at once to Cairo for talks with President Nasser.

on May 23, ~~the~~  
of May 22  
In Cairo, Ambassador Nolte delivered President Johnson's letter to President Nasser, on May 23. Nolte referred to Rostow's interview with Kamel the previous evening, and made the point that the U.A.R. Government should understand fully that the United States would make every effort to avoid war or stop one if it got started. Egyptian Foreign Minister Riad replied that the U.A.R. would stop Israeli ships and confiscate strategic cargoes of all other vessels in the Gulf of Aqaba. Rejecting the thought that his country would commit aggression, Riad maintained that the U.A.R. would resolutely defend itself against attack. Nolte concluded that this attitude placed the U.A.R. in direct confrontation with the United States. DOC

again met with  
Israeli Minister Evron and Rostow on May 23. Rostow stressed that the reported closing of the Gulf of Aqaba made it essential to have the closest kind of consultation between the Governments of Israel and the United States. Rostow felt it would be wise if the issue of the passage of Israeli ships through the Gulf could be avoided until the Security Council had met on the question. Evron replied that the Israelis had real doubts as to the efficacy of Security Council actions, and felt that recent U.S. assurances to Israel were weaker than President Kennedy's assurances. Rostow replied that unilateral action could be justified only after all peaceful avenues had been tried, and that the U.S. Government had no intention of weakening the assurances which had been made by Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson. (Doc. 4)

British  
At noon on May 23, Foreign Secretary George Brown told Ambassador Bruce in London that a British Cabinet meeting was to be held that afternoon at 2:30 p.m. Agenda for the meeting included consideration of whether or not to propose that the United States and other nations should join with the United



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Kingdom, ahead of U.N. action, in a declaration of intention to assure free passage in the Strait <sup>of Tiran</sup> and to concert naval actions to assure such passage.

After nearly four hours' discussion <sup>in the Cabinet</sup> of matters relating to preparing a maritime declaration, Foreign Secretary Brown and his party started out for Moscow.

<sup>Before leaving,</sup> Brown asked George Thompson, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, a naval expert from the Ministry of Defense, and a legal adviser from the Foreign Office to fly to Washington that night in order to tell U.S. Government authorities the results of the Cabinet meeting.

<sup>Meanwhile,</sup> In Washington, ~~on May 23~~ Under Secretary Rostow <sup>had</sup> informed <sup>British</sup> Ambassador Dean that the United States welcomed the British proposal for a declaration of maritime powers, but that the United States did not want to take the initiative by getting "out in front". Dean said the British were willing to "join with the Americans and other powers", and Rostow then commented that he thought the U.S. could work out the pattern of its cooperation on a "join with" basis. (DOC. 5)

Only hours before the public announcement of Nasser's blockade, the Department's statement which had been prepared for President Johnson's use went to the White House. In general, the Presidential statement released by the White House on May 23 <sup>(p. 6)</sup> followed closely Secretary Rusk's text, which had stressed official U.S. dismay over "potentially explosive aspects" of the Middle East crisis. A significant addition to the Department's text was a section concerning the President's reaction to the most recent element affecting the Middle East situation. Citing the fact that the purported closing of the Gulf of Aqaba had "brought a new and grave dimension to the crisis", President Johnson called the blockade "illegal" and "potentially disastrous to the cause of peace". The President stressed that the United States Government considered the Gulf to be an international waterway of vital significance to the world community. Announcing the firm commitment of the United States to "the support of the political independence and territorial integrity of all the nations of the area", President Johnson said that aggression by anyone in the Middle East, in either overt or clandestine form, had been strongly opposed by the past three Presidents, and such opposition continued to be the policy of the present incumbent.

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*From Jerusalem,*  
Ambassador ~~Wentworth~~ Barbour informed Under Secretary Rostow that at an Israeli Cabinet meeting on the evening of May 23, it <sup>had been</sup> decided to despatch Foreign Minister Eban to Washington, London, and Paris for consultations. A public announcement was to state that Eban's trip was being set up for the purpose of participation in U.N. deliberations, but the main purpose of the Eban visit was to consult at the highest levels of the U.S. Government before Israel embarked on unilateral action. <sup>He</sup> In the meantime, Ambassador Bohlen in Paris concluded, as a result of a conversation with <sup>the</sup> Secretary General of the French Foreign Office, Hervé Alphand, that the French were "playing a very careful game" by attaching considerable importance to their relations with the Soviet Union. French uncertainty as to the Soviet attitude made the French Government wary of taking many very active steps on their own <sup>in</sup> counseling moderation and restraint. <sup>Respecting the Soviet attitude, Ambassador Thompson</sup> ~~Also~~ on the same day, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko <sup>had</sup> ~~told Ambassador Thompson in Moscow~~ <sup>him</sup> ~~that~~ <sup>reported</sup> that "certain nations", including the United States, could exert a restraining influence on Israel. Thompson <sup>had</sup> replied that the matter of greatest importance was for both the United States and the Soviet Union to address themselves to the immediate problem, made especially acute by the Egyptian action with respect to shipping in the Gulf of Aqaba.

From conversations which Ambassador Burns and U.S. Embassy officials in Amman had held with top Jordanian leadership before the closing of the Gulf of Aqaba, there emerged the conclusion that Jordan was beginning to feel it was necessary to end her isolation and to close ranks with other Arab states, notably the U.A.R. The events of the previous ten days had taken Jordanian leaders by surprise, and <sup>as reported by Burns,</sup> they seemed greatly appalled by the fact that hostilities in the area could engulf them. Jordan felt Nasser was "playing for keeps" and probably had Russian backing. If the Egyptian-Israeli confrontation <sup>resulted in outright hostilities,</sup> ~~did not come to blows,~~ Jordanian thinking proceeded on the assumption that the impasse might endure for some time and leave one nation or the other the psychological victor. Quite probably, according to the Jordanian view, the winner would be President Nasser.

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N 8 9 Though U.S. Embassy officials in Jordan did not cease to importune the Government of Jordan to press for restraint, Ambassador Burns advised the Department <sup>on May 23,</sup> that U.S. overtures had had less effect in getting Jordan to stop "goading" Nasser than the Jordanian Government's own natural desire to avoid offending Nasser at that time.

~~While~~ the Government of Kuwait sent a message to Cairo by its Foreign Minister, Shaikh Sabah, pledging complete support for Nasser's action closing the Gulf of Aqaba, <sup>and</sup> Lebanon called up its 5000 reservists, even though they lacked training, and ~~was~~ prepared to hold them in readiness for further developments. At the same time, the Department <sup>of State</sup> ~~the American~~ informed Embassies at Damascus and Tel Aviv to order the evacuation of U.S. Government dependents when <sup>it was</sup> deemed necessary. Evacuation from these two cities was to occur simultaneously, with Rome being designated as a safe haven for refugees. The Department then advised Embassies Damascus and Tel Aviv that dependents should not be evacuated from Israel unless similar action was taken in at least one Arab country at the same time, but also indicated that the current situation in Syria, including stringent exit visa requirements, definitely warranted evacuation of U.S. dependents from the Syrian Arab Republic.

In separate interviews with Under Secretary Rostow and Secretary Rusk on May 24, British Minister of State for Foreign Affairs George Thomson developed the substance of the Cabinet meeting held in London on the afternoon of May 23 on the subject of the objectives, composition, and modalities of a Maritime Group. Thomson stressed the need for some kind of public declaration, as well as the necessity to contemplate military actions in the region of <sup>the Gulf of</sup> Aqaba and deterrent actions in the Eastern Mediterranean. This plan involved escorting of vessels through the Strait, <sup>of Tiran</sup> as well as some <sup>kind</sup> ~~type~~ of a show of force in the Mediterranean. The British plan also envisioned the development of ~~some kind of~~ a political proposal that would have a face-saving effect for both the Israelis and the U.A.R. After a discussion and further explanation of specific points, Rostow said he was authorized to tell Thomson that the U.S. regarded the British initiative as encouraging, was currently studying the questions involved, and was discussing the matter with U.S. political leaders. (Doc. 7)



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The Maritime Declaration was the principal topic for discussion in the meeting of Ambassador Harman and Under Secretary Rostow on May 25. After explaining the proposal, Rostow interjected that the United States felt it was quite unlikely that the U.A.R. would face up to naval patrols in the Gulf of Aqaba and would, therefore, be deterred from closing the Gulf. In further discussion, Harman emphasized that the time for words like "interest" and "concern" had passed. He asserted that, *during his forthcoming talk in Washington,* Foreign Minister Eban would want a very clear picture of what the United States was prepared to do. At one point, Harman asked if the United States could say it would do "x" when the situation worsened, and then work its way back from the point of maximum commitment. In answer, Rostow *explained* that the ultimate answer would have to come from the President. *on May 25*

In the course of a Washington discussion *Secretary Rusk and* with Under Secretary Rostow on the subject of a Presidential statement reaffirming U.S. commitments, Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban said he understood that it went beyond the Constitutional power of the President to pledge his country to a course of action which, under the American system, could only be made by treaty. Eban stated that his main ~~point of~~ *to avoid allowing the Arab-Israeli dispute to be* concern was ~~being~~ bogged down in an endless U.N. proceeding. He felt confident that the United States would never be challenged if it announced that it was going to exercise its undeniable rights ~~x~~ and left the onus of challenging those rights to the other side. Secretary Rusk replied by urging the view that a U.A.R. attack on Israel would be irrational before Secretary-General Thant's report on his trip to the Middle East had been submitted to the Security Council, since such an attack would impose enormous political burdens on Nasser *as self-appointed leader of the Arab world.* Eban then described the attitude in Israel as "apocalyptic", explaining that Israel could not long remain in her present situation, whether or not it was a question of surrender or action.

Foreign Minister Eban recapped the broad outline of Israel's attitude toward the Middle East crisis in a lengthy evening *discussion* on May 26 with President Johnson, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, and ~~other~~ officials of the Department of State and the Embassy of Israel. Eban's first question was to determine the extent of the U.S. commitment to keep the Gulf of Aqaba open. His second inquiry related to the nature of U.A.R.

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intentions. Even though the United States doubted Israeli assessments, what if they were correct? President Johnson replied first to the issue of commitments, saying that, if it became apparent that the U.N. was ineffective, <sup>those of</sup> Israel and her friends who were willing to be counted, including the United States, could then give specific indication of what they could do. The Secretary General's report, the Security Council's action, and the American Congressional reaction were uncertainties whose full effectiveness could not be measured at that moment. The President <sup>went on to say</sup> ~~reportedly continued~~ that the Government of the United States was fully aware of what three past Presidents had said, but their statements were not worth "five cents" if the <sup>American</sup> people and the Congress did not support the President. During the course of his subsequent remarks, in which he repeated that the United States would do all it could to relieve the situation, President Johnson ~~was reported to have~~ emphasized ~~the statement~~ that Israel would not be alone unless it acted alone. Having spoken with a number of Congressmen over the previous few days, President Johnson assured Eban that <sup>securing</sup> Congressional support for keeping open the Strait of Tiran <sup>asked</sup> was going well. An important point in the discussion came when Eban ~~addressed~~ President Johnson, ~~reportedly saying~~, "I would not be wrong if I told the Prime Minister that your disposition is to make every possible effort to assure that the Strait and the Gulf will remain open to free and innocent passage?" The President responded, "Yes". <sup>Q</sup> Since Eban had wondered why the United States did not accept Israeli intelligence reports of a possible imminent U.A.R. attack on Israel, Secretary McNamara explained to Eban in some detail that three separate intelligence groups had looked carefully into the matter, and that it was the U.S. conclusion that the Egyptian deployments were defensive. All estimates were unanimous, President Johnson added, <sup>in concluding</sup> that, if the U.A.R. attacked, Israel would "whip hell out of them". Avraham Harman then made an appeal for coordinated military activity, and the President told Secretary McNamara to get together with the Israelis and look into the problem. (DOC. 8)

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In an address on May 26, U.A.R. President Nasser ~~reportedly~~ said that Egypt was ready to destroy Israel. ~~The information regarding~~ Nasser's remarks fitted in with reports from Iraq and other Arab sources tending to raise the possibility for the first time that some Arab leaders were in the process of convincing themselves that the Arabs could defeat Israel in armed conflict if Israel did not receive U.S. military assistance.

~~submitted~~ On the morning of May 27, Secretary-General U Thant ~~released~~ <sup>his five-day tour of the</sup> a report to the U.N. Security Council after his return from Middle East. Besides the question of free navigation, Thant said that terrorist activities and rights of cultivation in disputed areas in the demilitarized zone between Israel and Syria, unless controlled, would almost surely lead to further serious fighting. ~~Thant's proposal for lessening of tensions depended on~~ <sup>calling for</sup> a "breathing spell" in order to allow pressures to decelerate from their explosive level, <sup>Thant</sup> asked the nations involved to permit the Security Council to deal with the underlying causes of the crisis and to seek solutions. <sup>It</sup> In the meantime, Ambassador Barbour in Tel Aviv, judging the situation to be critical, informed the Israelis of the substance of Foreign Minister Eban's conversations with the President, <sup>Secretary Rusk,</sup> and Under Secretary Rostow. Barbour reported that the Israelis remained unconvinced that Nasser would not strike first.

President Johnson transmitted an urgent letter to Prime Minister Eshkol on May 27, relating that the United States had information that the Israelis planned to take military action against the Arabs. This information <sup>had</sup> came to the President in a private message from the Russians, who had emphasized their commitment to restraint, <sup>who had</sup> but warned that, if Israel began military action, the Soviet Union would give aid to those countries which suffered attack. President Johnson repeated his statement of the previous day calling upon Israel not to initiate hostilities. <sup>In his reply of May 30,</sup> Prime Minister Eshkol told President Johnson, ~~in a letter of May 30,~~ that the President's letter to him, as well as Mr. Johnson's assurances to Foreign Minister Eban, had had significant influence upon the Israelis' decision to await developments for a further limited period before taking steps on their own. In the light of Nasser's



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aggressive intent, Eshkol continued, Israel was approaching a point at which counsels of restraint would lack any moral or logical basis. Eshkol made the point that an international naval escort should move through the Straits <sup>of Tiran</sup> within a week or two of his letter. The Israeli Prime Minister asserted that Secretary-General Thant should insist that Nasser's blockade and troop concentrations be cancelled, and he also called for immediate coordination between U.S. forces in the Middle East and Israeli Defense forces in order to examine how the United States could help to prevent or halt aggression.

During the weekend of May 27-28, <sup>the</sup> Department <sup>of State</sup> officials prepared ~~contingency reports which estimated the potential strengths of the Arab and Israeli armed forces, gathered data on the best possible U.S. moves in the event of an immediate declaration of war by either party, and attempted to estimate the immediate outcome of a war between the U.A.R. and Israel. Work continued after May 28 on such questions as the right of passage through the Gulf of Aqaba and the economic vulnerabilities of all of the principal Middle Eastern nations which were concerned. A Control Group and a Task Force were then set up on May 31 to deal with questions of organization and coordination in connection with the crisis.~~

From May 28 to May 29, <sup>submitted on May 29,</sup> the Bureau of European Affairs prepared a contingency paper dealing with available forces in the Middle East, descriptions of how military action could develop, possible Arab economic reprisals which could follow the outbreak of hostilities, Soviet capabilities and possible actions, outcomes and post-war bargaining positions, and a detailed checklist of actions for the United States to take during the first 48 hours of actual conflict. The projection yielded several conclusions. First, it was believed that it would be difficult to prevent any hostilities in the <sup>area of the Strait of</sup> Tiran ~~area~~ from leading to a major war; second, it was thought that the Israelis were likely to achieve air superiority and destroy Egyptian forces in the.

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Sinai within ten days to two weeks, but at a major cost in men and matériel;  
and third, it seemed either very difficult or else impossible to stop the  
fighting before Israel had seized a sufficiently great portion of Egyptian  
territory to command <sup>at issue</sup> the post-war bargaining <sup>advantage - (respecting passage into the Gulf of</sup> at least of Aqaba and probably on  
other points <sup>At the time</sup> of conflict. The paper was submitted, to Assistant Secretary  
<sup>it carried a covering memorandum which</sup> John M. Leddy on May 29 with the comment <sup>that</sup> that, fortunately, it appeared <sup>the paper</sup> as

<sup>the contingencies with which it was intended to deal would not arise.</sup>  
The drafter of the covering memorandum, Deane R. Hinton, <sup>(EUR/APP) however,</sup> noted that there  
was still the possibility of trouble arising out of efforts to maintain the  
right of innocent passage through the Gulf of Aqaba, and <sup>the Bureau had therefore</sup> it was decided that  
work would continue on possible Arab moves to interdict the Suez Canal and  
certain oil pipe lines. (DOC. 8)

<sup>on May 29, the Legal Adviser submitted a study</sup>  
Also during the week following Nasser's closure of the Gulf,  
the Office of the Secretary requested from the Legal Office an information  
memorandum pertaining to the subject of the right of passage through the  
Gulf of Aqaba. A document, entitled "Legal Status of the Strait of Tiran and  
the Gulf of Aqaba", dated May 27, together with a covering memorandum from  
<sup>which</sup> Leonard C. Mocker dated May 29, were submitted to the Office of the Secretary.  
The submitted documents discussed the legal status of the Strait and Gulf,  
the right of passage through these waters, the lawfulness of action by the  
U.A.R. to obstruct passage, and remedies which were available to maritime  
<sup>Adviser</sup> nations and Israel. The Legal Office concluded; first, that there was a  
right of free and innocent passage through the Gulf of Aqaba and Strait of  
Tiran for the merchant shipping of all nations; second, that the U.A.R. did  
not enjoy belligerent status or rights entitling it to close the Strait or  
Gulf; third, that innocence of passage was determined objectively according  
to the conduct of a transiting vessel, not by the character of its cargo;  
and fourth, that the U.A.R. was not entitled to suspend or obstruct such passage,  
whether through laying mine fields or other action by its armed forces. In  
addition, the memorandum concluded that, if the U.A.R. failed to remove ~~any~~

any mines actually laid, Israel and <sup>the</sup> maritime nations whose shipping used the Strait were entitled to take action by way of self-help to clear any mines from the Strait after reasonable efforts had been made to secure international action from the Security Council. <sup>9</sup> The conclusions of the legal memorandum cast doubt on the use of the word "aggression" to characterize the closure of the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba, since the United Nations Charter required the Security Council to determine the existence of any act of aggression, and it was not likely that the Council would make any such finding against the U.A.R. Beyond the remedy of self-help, the document continued, there was grave doubt that international law would give Israel any right to initiate the use of armed force against the U.A.R. in the absence of an armed attack by the U.A.R. on Israel. Closure of the Gulf and Strait and mining of the Strait did not of themselves constitute an armed attack, although it was not clear whether the actual explosion of a mine against a transiting merchant vessel <sup>could be construed as</sup> ~~would have been~~ an armed attack against the flag country. If, however, as part of the U.A.R. action to close the Strait and Gulf, U.A.R. armed forces fired upon a vessel transiting lawfully, a vessel lawfully engaged in mine-sweeping, or an escort vessel present to give protection to such a merchant vessel or mine-sweeper, the ~~act~~ <sup>act</sup> of firing would ~~have~~ constituted an armed attack on the flag state of the vessel fired upon. The affected state and others joining with it in collective self-defense would ~~have been~~ entitled to take such military measures as were necessary to repel the attack and as were proportionate to it. In the context of obstruction of the Strait of Tiran and Gulf of Aqaba, self-defense would ~~have~~ include military action against U.A.R. shore batteries, naval craft, and any other forces used to deny the right of passage; and it could ~~have~~ include occupation of Sharm-el-Sheikh if such action ~~was~~ proved necessary to assure passage through the Strait. Self-defense, however, did not cover more general hostilities against the U.A.R.

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Yet a third paper was requested by the Department's Executive Secretariat.

~~In May 29, a request came from the Executive Secretariat to some members of the Special Studies Branch of the Historical Office asking them to examine and report upon the subject of assurances which had been given by the United States Government concerning the Strait and the Gulf. The prepared in the Historical Office, the completed paper submitted to the Secretariat on June 1, was entitled, "U.S.~~

~~Assurances Concerning the Gulf of Aqaba and the Straits of Tiran, Feb.-Mar., 1957." As the result of an additional request from the Executive Secretariat, staff members of the Historical Studies Division also prepared detailed chronologies of consultations held with various Middle East countries, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union during the period of the crisis, and prepared a paper whose contents included the chronologies, an annex containing a chronology of press reports, and the texts of the key public statements issued by the United States from May 15-June 10, 1967.~~

~~On May 30, the legal adviser sent a memorandum to the Secretary assessing the arguments made the day before by the Egyptian Representative in the U.N. Security Council, U.A.R. Ambassador to the United Nations El-Kony, delivered a speech in the Security Council, on May 29, in which he set forth a series of legal arguments in support of the U.A.R. position concerning the Strait of~~

~~Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba. The legal office assessed these arguments in~~

~~a memorandum to the Secretary dated May 30. The U.A.R. contended that~~

~~Israeli forces occupied the town of Eilat and surrounding area at the head of~~

~~the Gulf after the conclusion of the Egyptian-Israeli Armistice Agreement of~~

~~February 24, 1949, and that Israel's possession of Eilat was illegal since it~~

~~was in violation of that agreement. According to El-Kony, Israeli possession~~

~~of Eilat did not give Israel any rights in the Gulf of Aqaba and the Strait~~

~~of Tiran. The legal office, however, maintained that Eilat and the Negev~~

~~was never Egyptian territory, but formed a part of Palestine under the British~~

~~mandate. The Israeli-Jordanian Armistice Agreement of April 3, 1949 showed~~

~~clearly that the coastal area comprising Eilat and the territory north of it~~

~~were in the Israeli zone, and that the lines drawn by this Armistice Agreement~~

~~had been followed for 18 years. El-Kony sought in his speech to show that~~

~~the United States had acquiesced as early as 1950 in Egypt's claims regarding~~



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the Strait and the Gulf, and he <sup>had</sup> quoted passages intended to support his view from an exchange of diplomatic correspondence. <sup>The legal adviser</sup> ~~Legal officers of the Department~~ <sup>(pointed out, however)</sup> ~~that the Egyptian~~ reply of January 28, 1950 to an inquiry by the United States <sup>(in its)</sup> ~~said that Egypt's~~ <sup>its</sup> ~~occupation of the islands of Tiran and Sanafir was~~ <sup>(the Egyptian Government had)</sup> "in no way conceived in a spirit of obstructing in any way innocent passage through the stretch of water separating these two islands from the Egyptian coast of Sinai."

X

While the Department of State undertook preliminary contingency planning in anticipation of the possibility of all-out hostilities in the Middle East and examined the legality of Egypt's closing of the Gulf of Aqaba, an event occurred which appeared to strengthen Egypt's military position vis-a-vis Israel.

by whom?

→ In what was termed a "sudden and unexpected move", King Hussein of Jordan flew his own plane to Cairo on May 30 to meet with Nasser and sign a 5-year joint defense agreement. Among other provisions, the pact stipulated that any armed aggression against Egypt or Jordan was aggression against both, and that each would assist the other, including the use of armed force. Although a joint defense council and joint chiefs of staff were to be established, Hussein agreed that in the event military operations began, command of both armies would be under the U.A.R. Each party was to pay the expenses of military operations on its territory, and the agreement was to last for five years with a provision for a five-year renewal. <sup>of the Department of State</sup> ~~The Department's~~ preliminary judgment that Hussein's visit to Cairo would help shore up the domestic position of his regime was strengthened and confirmed by later reports of Ambassador Burns, who stated that Hussein apparently had succeeded in obtaining additional insurance for Jordan and his regime. Burns concluded that Nasser, delighted to get the pact with Jordan, might further exploit his strengthened position.

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In an effort to listen and <sup>to</sup> feel out the position of the U.A.R., former Secretary of the Treasury Robert B. Anderson, a long-time friend of President Johnson, proceeded to Cairo on the afternoon of May 30 for a meeting with President Nasser. Anderson's mission, in part, was to attempt to make Nasser understand that the United States was determined to face its responsibilities in the Middle East, but at the same time was hopeful that the collision course between the U.A.R. and Israel could be avoided. The meeting between Anderson and Nasser took place as scheduled. Following Anderson's return, Embassy Cairo flashed the text of a letter to President Johnson from Nasser, presumably in reply to Johnson's letter of May 22 to Nasser. Nasser asserted that the U.A.R. would defend itself against any aggression "with all our means and potentialities", while at the same time the Arabs would continue to allow innocent passage "in our territorial waters". Emphasizing that the crossing of demarcation lines by some Arab individuals who had failed to secure their return to their homeland was a matter which was entirely outside the power of the U.A.R. to control, Nasser confirmed the belief of the U.A.R. that the Palestinian people had a right to return to their homeland. <sup>At</sup> the conclusion of his lengthy message, Nasser told President

Johnson that he would welcome listening to Vice President Humphrey at any time the Vice President chose to visit the U.A.R. Nasser promised to give Humphrey a picture of the Middle East situation as the Arabs viewed it, and said that he was ready to send U.A.R. Vice President Zakareya Mohieddin to Washington immediately to meet with President Johnson and to expound the Arab position. The Department <sup>of State</sup> informed Ambassador Nolte that President Johnson welcomed the idea of a visit from Mohieddin at his earliest convenience, and expressed the wish that, in view of the urgency of the situation, the visit might be arranged without delay. The Egyptian Foreign Office announced on June 4 that Mohieddin planned to fly to Washington on Wednesday, June 7, but with the outbreak of war ~~which occurred~~ on the morning of June 5, Nolte informed the Department that the Mohieddin visit seemed unlikely.

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By May 30, the United Kingdom had made soundings on the proposed Maritime Declaration with Italy, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, Greece, Panama, Liberia, and Japan. The United States had made informal approaches on the Declaration and the possible use of force with France, Belgium, Canada, the Netherlands, India, Italy, and Norway. The total number of nations to be approached by <sup>Britain</sup> ~~England~~ and the United States was 31, split between them so that the United States was to contact 18 maritime capitals and the United Kingdom, <sup>13.</sup> ~~thirteen~~. The Department <sup>(of State)</sup> made up a check list in tabular form of each capital in alphabetical order, and under headings of "incoming cable", "comment", and "Departmental approaches", the appropriate entries were made consisting of telegram numbers and remarks so that the status of the Maritime Declaration could be determined at a moment's notice. On May 31, the Department instructed Embassies in maritime capitals to solicit support for the draft Declaration after coordinating their efforts with those of the British. Departmental officials also indicated that Israeli ambassadors in the various posts would strongly support efforts made by the United States and Britain.

(within the Department of State)

In order to create as effective an organization as possible to deal with the Middle East crisis, a structure consisting of a control group and a task force was set up by order of Under Secretary Rostow on May 31. The Control Group was comprised of ~~the~~ Rostow as Chairman, <sup>John P. (Deputy Executive Secretary)</sup> Walsh as Executive Secretary, and six members. The Task Force consisted of <sup>Lucius D. Battle and</sup> ~~the~~ Davies as Chairman and Vice Chairman, respectively, <sup>(Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs)</sup> ~~Walsh~~ as Executive Secretary, and seven members. An operating staff for the Task Force was made up of 24 members under the Chairmanship of <sup>Alfred L. Atherton</sup> ~~the~~ The nine subcommittees of the Task Force included Contingency Military Planning, Evacuation, Economic Vulnerabilities, Political Aspects of Maritime Plans and Maritime Declaration, U.N. Aspects, Legal Problems, NATO Consultation, Political Settlement, and Briefing. All members of the Task Force were asked to submit papers prepared for the Control Group or any senior officer of the Department to Mr. Battle for consideration and signature. Substantive telegrams on policy or courses of action were offered to Mr. Battle or Mr. Davies for signature or clearance. As a pattern of meeting and discussion developed

Rodger P.

of the Department's Executive Secretariat

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during the crisis, it became necessary for the Task Force to insure that it was considering all important issues. In order to allow the Task Force minimum time to make considered recommendations to the Control Group, Mr. Battle asked the Task Force to meet daily at 10:30 a.m. in Mr. Davies' office. Battle also informed the Task Force that the Control Group would meet daily at 3:00 p.m. Members of the Task Force and Chairmen of the Subcommittees were asked to call in items for the day's agenda to ~~the~~ Lannon Walker, Secretary of the Task Force.

(Secretariat Staff, Executive Secretariat)

*An early report by the Task Force,*

*is*

~~Another memorandum~~ prepared by ~~the~~ "Working Group on Economic Vulnerabilities", was ~~also~~ sent to the White House on May 31.

~~by Executive Secretary Benjamin H. Read~~ The Working Group ~~on Economic Vulnerabilities~~ included representatives of the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Department of the Treasury, and the White House staff. Their study outlined a first look at the probable economic consequences of a U.S./U.K. decision to hold open the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli-bound shipping, by force if necessary. The Vulnerabilities Group found that the United States had little economic leverage on the Arab countries, and almost none on Egypt, since the food needs of Egypt and other Arab countries were less in 1967 than normally, and the Russians could supply them throughout the summer without difficulty. Denial of U.S. goods would have hurt the Arabs only <sup>in</sup> the implausible event of a worldwide embargo. On the other hand, denial of petroleum exports and expropriation of foreign holdings by Arab states would mean losses of billions of dollars to the U.S. and U.K. in foreign exchange earnings and in capital assets, and a crisis in sterling and the international money system. (DOC. 9)



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The question of Israel's promotion of and adherence to  
the proposed Maritime Declaration arose.

In a conversation held on June 1,  
~~however~~ between Christopher Everett, First Secretary of the British Embassy,  
Task Force  
and Deane R. Hinton of the Maritime Declaration Sub-Committee, Everett

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confirmed what he had told Deputy Assistant Secretary Roger P. Davies, that the British Foreign Office was strongly opposed to associating Israel and the Israeli ambassadors with diplomatic efforts to obtain adherence to the draft Maritime Declaration. The Foreign Office thought that Israeli efforts in conjunction with U.S. and U.K. approaches would change the character of the matter from one of principle to one of partisanship. Hinton told Everett that senior American officials had asked the Israelis to give the United States and Britain their support, and that U.S. instructions to the field had reflected this fact. ~~Hinton~~ <sup>Everett</sup> then said that as far as Israeli adherence was concerned, it was London's view that after others had signed up, Israeli adherence would be "all right".

By the evening of June 2, five countries had made known their position on the Maritime Declaration. Australia, Iceland, and the Netherlands stated their willingness to adhere to the Declaration, and the Dutch Cabinet agreed to support the United States and the United Kingdom in other capitals. Argentina informed the United States that it did not consider itself a maritime power, and would not participate in the Declaration, ~~while~~ <sup>own</sup> France indicated that its <sup>own</sup> proposal for a Four-power meeting was the best alternative, and that it did not believe that the Maritime Declaration would help the situation. Secretary Rusk estimated that before hostilities on June 5, seven countries were certain adherents, including Australia, Iceland, Israel, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Belgium and Germany, with minor wording changes, would have agreed. Other countries were hesitating. With more pressure, Rusk felt that perhaps six more, Canada, the Ivory Coast, Norway, Panama, the Phillipines, and Portugal, might have acceded to the Declaration, bringing the maximum total of signatories to no more than 20 countries *of the 31 approached.*

After a one and one-half hour discussion held at the White House on June 2 between representatives of the United States and British Governments, it was agreed that ~~there~~ <sup>there</sup> would be maintained a small group on overall matters ☒ on the U.S. side to keep in touch with a similar group on the U.K. side, and it was also decided that there should be no joint military contingency

planning at that time. In addition, it was understood that monetary and financial discussions were to be developed between the United States and United Kingdom through established official channels, including the two Treasuries, the Bank of England, and the New York Federal Reserve Bank. At that stage, there were to be no approaches to the private sector of the banking community because of the dangers of speculation.

Commenting favorably on the steadfastness of the Israeli people, President Johnson wrote to Prime Minister Eshkol on June 3 that the position of the United States in the Middle East crisis rested on two principles. The first, enunciated by four Presidents, was that the United States supported the territorial integrity and political independence of all of the countries of the Middle East. The second was freedom of the seas. The President continued that, in conversation with Abba Eban on May 26, he had pointed out the need for the United States to act in concert with other nations; and he indicated to Eshkol that the United States was moving ahead to secure a declaration by the principal maritime powers asserting the right of passage through the Strait and Gulf. President Johnson added, "As a leading maritime nation, we have a vital interest in upholding freedom of the seas, and the right of passage through the straits of an international character." He concluded by telling Eshkol that the United States was advancing in its cooperative efforts with Great Britain to secure the establishment of an international naval presence in the area of the Strait of Tiran, but he doubted that a number of other maritime powers would be willing to take such a step unless and until United Nations processes had been exhausted. He reiterated his point made on May 26 to Eban that U.S. leadership was unanimous in refusing to move in isolation.

Also on June 3, <sup>telegraphed</sup> Britain's Ambassador Dean <sup>of State</sup> called the Department to express his Government's dismay over news he had just received that the Israelis were about to force the Strait alone, and he requested that the U.K. be notified at once if the U.S. had any indications that the Israelis were prepared for such a move. Dean said the U.K. would not support Israel if the

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Israelis made a unilateral move to force the Strait. He also conveyed British agreement with the idea that the <sup>Maritime</sup> Declaration would best be issued simultaneously by the signatories of the various capitals, and that then all the signatories would forward it separately to the Security Council for circulation. Dean indicated that the U.K. felt it was acceptable to approach three Latin American countries, and said that the U.K. had instructed its Ambassadors to follow up in the capitals of those countries. Belgium wanted to insert a reference to the U.N. in the Declaration, and the British thought that the addition might help. Ambassador Dean concluded that it was most important to get the Germans to sign the Declaration, especially if the Italians and French did not sign.

Members of the Control Group on the Middle East Crisis became concerned about the apparent lack of success of the Maritime Declaration in gaining adherents. On June 4, Deane Hinton ~~(EUR/RPF)~~ drafted a memorandum to Assistant Secretary Battle in which he called attention to the fact that a <sup>Maritime Declaration</sup> change in the draft memorandum might bring in the Belgians and Italians. Belgium desired a paragraph apparently intended to put more emphasis on a U.N. solution, and Hinton felt that such an interpolation might help swing the Italians into agreement. "Opening the text for changes now after seven countries are agreed is tricky business, but on balance, might buy a couple more key adherents," Hinton added. During the early afternoon of the same day, Hinton again sent a memorandum to Battle setting forth his concern at "widespread signs of resistance and in some cases of negativism toward the draft Maritime Declaration". Hinton said there were no additional countries in the "certain" or "probable" categories since the afternoon of June 3. He recommended top-level approaches to certain key countries by the Secretary or by letter from the President, and he also suggested that Ambassadors of all "target" countries except those "clearly on board" or "already approached at high level here" should be called in the following day and met at the Assistant Secretary-level. (DOC. 10)

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*With*

~~In view of~~ the outbreak of full-scale fighting between Israel and the U.A.R. on Monday morning, June 5, the Department instructed all posts to suspend ~~all~~ Maritime Declaration activities. ~~At a morning meeting between Sir Patrick Dean and Under Secretary Rostow, the U.S. Under Secretary set forth his thinking concerning formation of a special Middle East Consultative Group in NATO in light of the changed circumstances in the Middle East. Rostow said that NATO countries needed to take more of an interest in the rest of the world, and that there was a definite need for Europe carefully to examine the political position of the Middle East and to determine the possible necessity for a naval screen in the Mediterranean and in the Red Sea. The Under Secretary agreed with Dean that it would indeed have been confusing, with the Maritime Declaration and the naval force operation under way, to have launched a Special Middle East Consultative Group, but he said the situation had changed.~~

~~On Tuesday, June 6, in a memorandum to the Control Group, Assistant Secretary Battle offered several arguments against pushing the Maritime Declaration at that time. He reasoned that there was a need not to~~

~~complicate the overriding objective of obtaining a cease-fire resolution in the Security Council, and said that pressure to gain acceptance of the Declaration~~  
*(2) given the appearance of*  
~~would have appeared to be a departure from the U.S. position of even-handedness,~~

~~Battle added that increased emphasis on the Maritime Declaration would be exploited by Arab extremists as evidence of U.S. hostility and as justification for nationalizing U.S. oil concessions. He also viewed U.S. possibilities~~  
*(and (3) played into the hands of)*  
*(who would cite the Declaration)*

~~of pressing for the acceptance of the Declaration as being definitely greater after a cease-fire had been achieved, although he was not prepared to say how many foreign adherents would then be available. Battle then concluded by~~

~~recommending that Maritime Declaration activities within the Department should be suspended and that the utility of the Declaration in the post-war bargaining situation should be reviewed after the end of hostilities. He cautioned members of the Control Group to do nothing to indicate any shift in the fundamental U.S. position on the Strait. As appropriate, in and around the U.N. context and in bilateral discussions, he urged officials to continue~~



Chapter IV

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On the outbreak of hostilities in the early morning hours of June 5, the President and his advisers in the White House; the Secretary of State, his advisers, and the Middle East Task Force; and the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, <sup>and his staff,</sup> all plunged into round-the-clock activities to restore peace. The U.S. Government was also occupied with two other objectives - protecting Americans and American interests in the area, and planning for political and economic development after the fighting had ceased.

At the United Nations, the President of the Security Council, at 5:15 AM, secured the agreement of the U.S., the U.S.S.R., the U.K., and France to a meeting at 9:30 that morning. The United States provided USUN with a simple cease-fire resolution which it was hoped the U.N. Security Council President would offer as his own.

The United States had also had constructive exchanges ~~with~~ of messages ~~with~~ since five o'clock that morning with the Soviets, including a mildly phrased Kosygin reply favoring Great Power cooperation to end the fighting.

X The White House had issued a statement calling for a cease-fire.

From Israel, the <sup>American</sup> ~~U.S.~~ Ambassador reported that the Israeli Foreign Minister was drafting a message to President Johnson tracing the developments of the last three weeks and giving reasons for Israel's action which was based on Article 51 of the U.N. Charter (the right of self-defense). The message would state further that Israel did not intend to enlarge its territory and hoped that peace could be restored within present boundaries. Israel also expressed hope that the conflict could be localized and asked for U.S. help in restraining the Soviet Union. A similar message was sent by President Eshkol to Premier Kosygin.

(At noon on June 5, Harry McPherson of the White House staff was briefed along the same lines by Israeli General Meir Amit.)

W. J. P.  
E. J. S. 12

Meanwhile, Secretary Rusk briefed the British Ambassador (at his request) ~~and~~ on the morning's developments, ~~and~~ he stated that the U.S. was working to get a cease-fire resolution from the Security Council. Under Secretary Rostow then saw Ambassador Dean, expressing to him the view that the United States and the United Kingdom should continue to work for a Maritime Declaration. Rostow wondered whether the two governments should abandon contingency plans for a Gulf of Aqaba naval force. He also felt there was great urgency in proceeding with economic talks about oil and finance, and the early establishment of a Special Middle East Consultative Group in NATO.

Rostow also met with Israeli Charge' Evron, informing him of developments and asking for information about how the hostilities originated. Evron undertook to find out. (Doc. 11)

At successive briefings of Arab, Western European, Latin American, and African Ambassadors, Under Secretary Rostow outlined U.S. understanding of developments in the Middle East. Rostow covered the genesis of the crisis, the background of recent U.S. diplomatic efforts, and the U.S. attitude toward the immediate conflict. Maintaining that the United States supported Israel's position that the Strait of Tiran was an international waterway, he stated that the United States, nevertheless, had urged restraint on Israel when the U.A.R. had closed the Strait. He did not know who fired first nor how the fighting was developing. He referred to the White House statement that the U.S. objective was an immediate cease-fire, an end to fighting, and a new beginning on more basic political, security, and economic development problems. Time would tell whether Soviet actions would correspond to the temperate exchanges the U.S. had had so far with Moscow. (Doc. 12)

In Paris, Ambassador Harriman saw the Shah of Iran. He urged him to use his influence, particularly with King Faisal, to counsel restraint.

The Shah doubted that he could influence Faisal. He said he felt the United States had failed to stop Nasser in the past and that the main problem was how to stop him in the future. The Shah said he could not oppose a Moslem cause even though Nasser was a dangerous dictator, but he hoped Nasser's forces would be humiliated. He insisted that Iran must be militarily strong enough to deal with Nasser and Iraq without U.S. intervention, and regretted that the United States had not done more for Iran. He agreed to help calm the situation.

On June 6, shortly after midnight, Jordan indicated it wished a de facto cease-fire to save what was left of the Jordanian Army and the Hussein regime. At the same time Hussein reported that Nasser was about to accuse the U.S. and the U.K. of being the main instigators of the conflict. A little later the U.A.R. made the accusation and <sup>Jordan</sup> ~~and~~ <sup>thereafter</sup> joined in the charge of U.S. collusion with Israel. The White House issued a strong denial, while the Department sent a message to all diplomatic posts to inform their host governments "at [the] highest appropriate level" that the U.A.R. charges were absolutely false.

The difficulty of persuading the Israelis to try to help save Hussein, arose, according to Ambassador Barbour, from the following developments: the Israelis understood Hussein's acceptance of the UAR defense pact, but the acceptance of a UAR commander, followed by Jordanian shelling of Jerusalem, and the shelling the day before of some 30 Israeli border settlements had disillusioned them of Hussein's ability or desire to be moderate.

In the meantime, while behind-the-scenes negotiating was going on at the United Nations in an attempt to secure a cease-fire resolution, Secretary Rusk had interviews with the Ambassadors of Iran and the United Kingdom, and with the Foreign Minister of Lebanon.

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- 4 -

Ambassador Ansary of Iran foresaw ill effects from the war that would last for some time and expressed the hope that the United States and the U.S.S.R. would be able to agree on a cease-fire resolution. The Foreign Minister of Lebanon warned that Arab-American friendship would be a casualty of the outbreak. He said Lebanon feared Soviet influence in the area and wished particularly to preserve Lebanese ~~friend~~- American friendship. Hakim thought Nasser was the only leader who could get the Arabs to agree on a solution and he hoped the United States would keep in touch with Nasser. Rusk replied that the United States would try, but was greatly incensed at Nasser's accusation of U.S. collusion with Israel.

Speaking with Sir Patrick Dean, the Secretary said he expected the Security Council to meet shortly to adopt a simple cease-fire resolution, but it would take some time for it to be effective. While he thought the Nasser-American rift went deep, he thought the big problems were the refugees and regional economic development, including water development. Dean thought the United Nations should return to the area and Rusk agreed. He told Rusk he had talked with Rostow concerning the ~~Russ~~ proposed Maritime Declaration. The British Foreign Office thought the Declaration should be kept in mind for the future, but ~~that~~ that canvassing should be dropped for the time being. The Foreign Office thought there would be serious discussion of the Middle East at the forthcoming NATO ~~ministerial~~ meeting. (Docs 13, 14)

Finally, <sup>during the evening of June 6,</sup> Ambassador Goldberg reported that the Russians had agreed to a simple cease-fire resolution calling on all the governments concerned to cease fire, and the Security Council had adopted the resolution unanimously after the Soviet Union had dropped its demand that Israel withdraw its troops from conquered territory.

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Following the adoption of the resolution Secretary Rusk urged Israel to arrange the cease-fire with Jordan immediately. Jordan, <sup>in turn</sup> ~~in turn~~, agreed.

At the end of the day (June 6) the Department informed all diplomatic posts of the situation in the Middle East up to that time. While information was still fragmentary, the Israelis seemed victorious. They had rendered Arab air power "virtually ineffective" and had occupied the Gaza strip. They had penetrated Jordan and claimed possession of the Old City of Jerusalem. The United Arab Republic had broken ~~xxxx~~ relations, <sup>with the United States</sup> alleging that the United States had provided Israel with air support, and had closed the Suez Canal. Algeria, Syria, Iraq, the Sudan, and Yemen had followed suit. Morocco had decided not to break, as well as ~~Kuwait~~ Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. Evacuation of American citizens from Wheelus Air Force Base in Libya and from Beirut was proceeding. The U.S. Consulate at Port Said and the Basra Consulate had been attacked. Demonstrators briefly penetrated the Embassies in Beirut and Damascus before being dispersed.

Finally, the Security Council had passed a cease-fire resolution and Ambassador Goldberg had again denied the false allegations that U.S. aircraft had supported Israeli forces. He had offered U.S. cooperation in an impartial investigation and invited U.N. personnel aboard U.S. aircraft carriers to interview air crews and inspect official logs.

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X On June 7 President Johnson announced the establishment of a Special Committee of the National Security Council, presided over by the Secretary of State, to coordinate the U.S. Government's work "to help build a new peace" in the Middle East. Other members were the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Chairman of the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, and Mr. Walt Rostow. The President revealed that he had called McGeorge Bundy to act as Special Consultant to the President and to be Executive Secretary of the Committee.

As a result of Israeli success on the battlefield, Ambassador Barbour reported that he thought the Israelis would now move to obtain a "peace document" rather than reinstatement of the armistice. He thought they would reach but not cross the Suez Canal, would secure the West Bank of the Jordan River, and hold on to Sinai and Sharm el-Sheikh. He thought the Israelis believed their action had created an opportunity to achieve full, unrestricted statehood and to safeguard their future security.

Meanwhile, difficulties attending the achievement of a cease-fire between Israel and Jordan continued. Unable to obtain a cease-fire observed by both sides, Jordan feared the fall of Hussein, and the American Ambassador to Jordan feared the 1200 Americans in the country would be subject to mob violence. The Jordanians blamed the United States for not being able to make Israel halt its military action.

The Russians threatened to break relations with Israel if they did not immediately cease their fire, to which the Israelis replied that they had welcomed the cease-fire on June 6 but Egypt and Syria had given no indication of acceptance. They were puzzled by the new call for a Security Council meeting by the Soviets.

From Cairo, as realization of the extent of the defeat became apparent, speculation was rife that Nasser was responsible for gross miscalculation and that he might be on his way out. The American Ambassador reported that the Egyptian Foreign Minister really believed the accusation of American collusion with Israel and was incensed that the United States had not recognized the "fact" of Israeli aggression.

In Washington, the Government tried to assess the damage to U.S. relations with the countries of the Middle East and to salvage its position by keeping on as good terms as possible with those countries which had decided not to break relations. In Lebanon, the Government was so paralyzed that it refused to deny U.S. involvement and ended by asking the American Ambassador to depart although it did not break relations. Kuwait, while subject to the same pressures as the other Arab states, still hoped for continued good relations with the United States. Saudi Arabia had decided not to break relations. From Morocco, the Ambassador reported that the Hassan Government wished to try to organize the Arab moderates along a course independent of Nasser.

While receiving these reports the Department was actively consulting its CENTO allies. The Iranian Ambassador thought Nasser was a troublemaker who would continue to make more trouble if allowed successes. He said that the Shah and his government would try to influence Faisal and Hussein to stand firm and not break relations. Assistant Secretary Battle told the Turkish Ambassador that the U.S. had ~~no~~ no plan but was trying to secure some "common-sense arrangement" that would secure equilibrium <sup>in</sup> with the Middle East. The Turkish Ambassador thought the refugee problem was the key, with the Tiran-Straits secondary, and the Jordan waters problem so technical that the Arab man-in-the-street could not understand it and accept a sensible solution.

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As a result of these conversations the Secretary sent a formal message to Turkey and to Pakistan requesting the help of these two countries in persuading Faisal and Hussein not to break relations with the United States.

Under Secretary Rostow briefed French Ambassador Lucet at his request on the latest developments, including Israeli willingness to negotiate a peace agreement. He believed Israel would accept its present frontiers "with some rectification", but would insist on free passage of the Straits of Tiran. Rostow also stated that the United States was considering a multilateral regional economic development project and arms limitation in the area. Lucet mentioned that Foreign Minister Couve de Murville had stressed the need for a four-power agreement concerning the area.

Rostow then outlined the basis for a solution of the problem which contained the following elements: cessation of terrorist infiltration, demobilization of armies, recognition of the Gulf of Aqaba as an international and the waterway, end of hostilities with positive programs for security and development of the area.

Summarizing the developments at the end of June 7, the Department informed all diplomatic posts that the UAR and Jordanian fronts had collapsed, the Israelis had almost reached the Suez Canal, Sharm el-Sheikh had been captured, and Israel controlled the West Bank of the Jordan River. The cease-fire between Israel and Jordan finally had been achieved and had been in effect since 8 p.m. GMT. The Department assumed that Israel would now revise its objectives, keeping some of the territory obtained by the quick victory and demanding recognition of Israel's right to exist.

Mauritania had broken relations, but Arab solidarity on this issue seemed to be cracking. However, Libya and Iraq had cut off oil supplies, and Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Algeria, and Bahrein had banned oil shipments to the United States and the United Kingdom. The U.S. Government Petroleum Policy Committee would meet June 8 and the OECD Oil Committee would meet in Paris June 12.

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All posts in Arab countries had been ordered to proceed with evacuation of dependents and non-essential personnel, except Morocco, Tunisia, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia.

The Middle East Task Force had met to discuss the following: evacuation problems, a paper entitled "An Approach to Political Settlement in the Near East", military supply policy, and public statements following the break in relations with several Arab states. (Doc. 15)

On June 8 the USUN mission reported that Arab Representatives were disillusioned by Soviet performances, feeling their support was one of words only. They were also concerned at the failure of certain Arab states to rally to the fight. Few in the United Nations believed the UAR accusation of U.S.-U.K. military involvement, but very few believed the United States to be neutral.

On the heels of this report came one indicating that Israel, victorious in the south, had now turned north to attack and seize the Syrian heights overlooking Israeli border settlements. The United States, deeply disturbed at this development, urged the American Ambassador to Israel to stress the necessity of complete cessation of military action except in self-defense. The Department also expressed concern at the deteriorating situation in Egypt and urged consultations in Cairo with friendly embassies in order to plan for the protection of foreigners in the wake of the humiliating defeat.

Reports from the field included the following: Lebanon did not want war with Israel; Kuwait cut off the oil shipments to prevent sabotage; King Hassan of Morocco reported that Nasser wanted him to visit the United States and Prime Minister Boumedienne of Algeria to go to the U.S.S.R. to determine whether the United States and the Soviet Union were seriously seeking a solution to the Arab-Israeli problem. Ambassador Tasca had pointed out to the King that the President had established a Cabinet committee headed by McGeorge Bundy. Hassan admitted that this was a serious step, but wished a solution to the refugee problem. Turkey was pleased with the Israeli victory and Nasser's defeat. In Belgium, Ambassador Harriman

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met with Foreign Minister Harmel who thought the NATO Ministers would discuss the Middle East and would try to work toward a long-range plan for maximum security. NATO should work together to settle the underlying issues, using the U.N. presence to the ~~maximum~~ maximum extent.

President Johnson, working to preserve U.S. interests, sent a personal message to King Faisal, explaining the U.S. position, and asking for Faisal's views on the situation.

Finally, from Tel Aviv came a report of a briefing of Harry McPherson of the White House staff by the Israeli Defense Force Intelligence Director. The latter told McPherson the U.S.S.R. still planned to ship equipment to the U.A.R., planes might come from Czechoslovakia and Algeria, and he expressed the hope that political changes would come about in Egypt which would end the present hostilities.

Informed of the attack on the USS Liberty, the Department kept in touch with the Soviet Embassy in Washington, and used the "Hot Line" to Moscow to keep the Russians informed of the event and the despatch of ~~the~~ U.S. aircraft from the Carrier Saratoga to the scene. <sup>The Russian, in turn, informed Nasser.</sup> Soon afterwards the Israeli Government advised that they were responsible and apologized.

In a discussion with the Norwegian Ambassador, the Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs described the Soviet role in the Middle East crisis. He said the U.S.S.R. had miscalculated both Nasser's action and the Israeli reaction, but it was unlikely that it would abandon long-range support of the Arabs. The U.S.S.R. apparently wished to avoid confrontation with the West. The United Nations lacked the force to make Israel withdraw to its previous borders, and the Israelis would insist on a permanent settlement before giving up any territory. Given Arab defeat, the Arabs would resist any permanent settlement. This meant, probably, long Israeli occupation of Arab territory. The United States had banned armed shipments to Middle Eastern countries, including Israel, and would probably suffer economically from the Arab military defeat. The Norwegian Ambassador stated that his country was pro-Israeli and regarded the Egyptians as the initial aggressors. (Dec. 16)

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The United Arab Republic accepted the U.N. call for a cease-fire at 10 o'clock in the evening, June 8. Meantime, President Johnson cabled a message to the Shah of Iran, stating he had just learned of the cease-fire between the UAR and Israel, and would welcome the Shah's thoughts on methods for bringing about a stable peace.

On June 9, considerable worry over the plight of Americans in Jordan persisted and the Ambassador advised he was still planning for evacuation on June 10, leaving a small staff behind to carry on.

With the cease-fire holding on the Egyptian and Jordanian fronts, efforts continued to end the fighting between Israel and Syria. At 3.30 p.m. on June 9, both accepted the cease-fire resolution passed by the Security Council, Israel adding "provided that Syria accepts it". However, fighting on the Syrian front continued, prompting Secretary Rusk to send a warning to Israel that it faced Security Council condemnation unless the fighting ceased.

The President, meanwhile, replied to King Hassan's offer to come to Washington. The President said he appreciated the King's willingness to play a constructive role, but pointed out U.S. uncertainty regarding the UAR's intentions and tactics and whether it sincerely desired to work out a realistic solution. How authentic a spokesman were the UAR leaders and what general support would the King's mission have? Also the United States questioned the real motivations of Nasser in selecting Boumedienne as an emissary to Paris and Moscow.

The United States wondered about the consequences of these uncertainties to the King's own position and pointed out that it had not yet developed its own ideas in final form. Therefore, the United States doubted that a visit at this time would achieve much, and wished to protect the King's relations with the Arab world as well as his image in the United States.



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From Paris Ambassador Cleveland outlined what he anticipated would come up at the North Atlantic Council meeting on June 13. He thought all the Ministers were looking to the Secretary to put in context East-West relations, the future tasks of the Alliance, and the need for improvement concerning consultative procedures, particularly concerning crises outside NATO. Most Europeans regarded as "not unwelcome" the events in the Middle East and Cleveland felt the events of the past few days had convinced almost all except France that maintenance of a strong NATO defense system was the first requirement of getting a detente with the Soviets in Europe.

At the end of June 9, the Department reported that the Syrian front had exploded, the Israelis having launched an offensive to get rid of Syrian artillery which had been methodically shelling Israeli settlements. In the United Arab Republic, Nasser had announced his resignation but later reconsidered, allowing the National Assembly (a rubber stamp) to decide. The latter unanimously rejected Nasser's resignation and the Department commented that the move looked like a "deliberate ploy" by Nasser to strengthen his position with a renewed popular mandate. Nasser again repeated his charges that the United States and the United Kingdom must have given help to Israel.

As a result of Nasser's speech, mobs had gathered in Cairo, Beirut, and Baghdad to threaten U.S. government installations. The UAR had provided adequate security protection.

At the United Nations the Security Council had adopted a resolution, confirming its previous cease-fire resolution and requesting the Secretary General to arrange compliance and report to the Security Council in two hours. Both sides professed their readiness to accept the cease-fire.

The USS Liberty was "limping" toward Crete. Casualties were reported as 9 dead, 22 missing, and 75 wounded.

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On June 10, Tehran reported that the Shah had received favorable replies from Faisal and Hussein. In a message to Tehran, the Department stated that the Iranian Ambassador had been briefed on June 9 and 10 by Under Secretary Rostow and Assistant Secretary Battle and had been particularly interested in U.S. plans for the future of the Middle East at the end of hostilities. Rostow had stated that the United States was watching Soviet actions carefully, and stressed three major U.S. concerns: long-term relations with Saudi Arabia, Morocco, and other Middle Eastern States; rebuttal of charges of U.S. involvement, and prevention of the oil situation from worsening.

The Ambassador stated the Shah thought recognition of Israel as a state and the refugee problem must be faced, but felt Israel should restrain its expectations. I

In conversation with Assistant Secretary Battle, the Iranian Ambassador learned that the United States had not reached any firm conclusions. There were a number of uncertainties: Nasser's fate, tremendous economic problems, the Soviet attitude toward assisting Egypt, Hussein's future, and Soviet influence in the area. Replying to the Ambassador's query as to the possibility of a conciliatory attitude toward Nasser, Battle thought the break in relations, Nasser's charges, and the Congressional attitude made conciliation at this time ~~impossible, most unlikely~~ most unlikely. Until some of these uncertainties were resolved, the Department thought it better to postpone discussions, although an emissary would be welcome to come provided no publicity was given to the mission.

In response to a request from King Hussein that the accusation of U.S. involvement with Israel must be cleared up, in view of Nasser's repeated accusation on June 9, the Department informed the American Ambassador to Jordan that the United States had categorically denied the charges and so had the British. In the Security Council, Ambassador Goldberg had offered to cooperate in an investigation by the United Nations. In view of these moves, the Department felt "any Jordanian initiative would be superfluous" and inimical to Jordanian interests vis-a-vis other Middle Eastern states.

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In view of the conflicting reports concerning the continued fighting, both Morocco and Tunisia urged President Johnson to try to persuade Israel to desist, fearing that their populations would become uncontrollable.

In the Sudan, the Ambassador reported the Sudanese were having second thoughts about the break in relations, wishing to continue economic, cultural, and consular ties. However, the Department informed the Embassy that a policy decision had been reached that no military or economic aid materials still controlled by the United States should be delivered to countries that had broken diplomatic relations. The only way the Sudan could qualify for continued aid would be for the Sudan to ~~re~~ redefine publicly its action against the U.S. Government.

Finally, from Tel Aviv, the Ambassador reported that Israel had stated there was absolutely no foundation to Syrian charges that Israel intended to advance to Damascus. Israel was trying to silence the guns bombarding its settlements and was prepared to implement the cease-fire on the present line. The U.S.S.R. had broken relations with Israel, but this move did not seem to have upset the Israeli Government as much as perhaps it should have. The Ambassador believed it was the deteriorating Security Council situation, the "clear signal" of U.S. anxieties, and the essentiality of extricating themselves from over-extension in Syria, which convinced the Israelis that they must implement the cease-fire immediately. The official end of the six-day war came at 1930 hours (7.30 p.m.) on June 10.



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TOP SECRET/NODIS

May 30 - Assistant Secretaries Sisco and Battle and Legal Adviser Leonard Meeker sent a suggested proposal to the Secretary, embodying basic ingredients of compromise settlement: Nasser to agree to let all third-country shipping, including oil tankers, pass to Eilat. Israel to agree not to test Gulf with Israeli flagship. Israel to maintain Gulf was closed to Israeli flags and under UAR sovereignty. Legal issue of Straits to be subject to referral to International Court of Justice. Israel to agree to adhere to Armistice agreement. US to affirm assurances to Israel of maintenance of territorial integrity and political independence. (Memorandum from Sisco, Meeker and Battle to the Secretary, Katzenbach and Kohler, May 30, 1967)

Department of State authorized statement that USG had no confirmation of press reports of firing on a US ship near Straits of Tiran. No ships of US registry were in that vicinity. (State 204851, May 30, LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

Rostow told Harman that, pending a Presidential decision, US not in position to advise Israel how movements of ships should be controlled. He expressed hope that, if Israeli-owned ships tested Straits and were turned back or seized, Israel would protest but not attack. Harman said Israel would not send ship to test Straits when next move would be only to protest. Israel could not adopt such a strategy in the absence of any certainty about US plan.

Regarding SYG's report calling for moratorium, Rostow reported US planning offer resolution on Para 14. Harman tended to discourage this attempt unless US could get nine votes. Rostow replied Secretary's view was that it was worth try. US might have nine votes plus public opinion outside SC. Harman stressed best tactic was concentration on three points made by Prime Minister Eshkol dealing with troop concentrations, infiltration, and Gulf. Let Nasser round up votes for right to belligerence. (State 204946, May 30, SECRET/EXDIS)

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Prime Minister Eshkol in message to President Johnson indicated that President's letter of May 28 had had important influence on Israelis' decision to await developments for a further limited period before taking measures on their own. Eshkol made point that international naval escort should move through Straits within a week or two. SYG U Thant must insist that Nasser's blockade and troop concentrations be cancelled. Eshkol also called for immediate coordination between US forces in the Middle East and Israel Defense Forces in order to examine how US could help to prevent or halt aggression. If present trends were to continue, Eshkol said, there would be further erosion of the Western position in the Middle East. Eshkol appealed to President to give effective response.  
(State 205045, May 31, SECRET/NODIS)

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May 31 - President wrote to Eshkol, commenting upon determination of Israelis and their love of country. He stated, "May God give us strength and courage to protect both liberty and peace." (State 206563, June 1, CONFIDENTIAL/EXDIS)

In conversation with Under Secretary Rostow, Harman asked specifically how long US would drag out action in SC. Rostow replied Ambassador Goldberg was pressing hard for disposition of his motion.

Harman desired to know how US planned to force Strait. Rostow told of two plans, one involving unescorted ship and the other involving escorted ship. Rostow reiterated US position of consulting international community on Gulf.

Harman said frankly that GOI not reassured by USG view of situation. Rostow stated there was no sign Nasser bent on enforcing announced blockade, and said two ships had passed through Strait of Tiran bound for Eilat.

Harman asked for military liaison arrangement with USG. Rostow said he would raise question with appropriate USG officials. Harman then requested specific armament. Rostow stated requests would be presented in detail to DOD. (State 206657, June 1, SECRET/NODIS)

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June 1 - Barbour reported that the signing of Nasser-Hussein pact heightened feeling that time working against Israel. Israel not comforted in recollection that similar pact in 1956 did not bring Jordan into fighting on side of Egypt. Most significant additional threat posed would be increment enemy air forces on Jordan border. (Tel Aviv 3884, Control 1487, June 1, SECRET/LIMDIS)

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June 2 - Selection of Moshe Dayan as Israeli Defense Minister gained widespread support of populace and political parties in Israel according to AmEmbassy. Ambassador Barbour stated pressure returning Dayan to Government based on popular anxiety over current crisis and concern over Eshkol's cautious handling of situation. (Tel Aviv 3903, Control 002690, June 2, SECRET/LIMDIS)

Ambassador Harman, departing for consultation in Israel within a few hours, asked to see Secretary to learn what he could tell GOI concerning US assurances of support. Secretary responded that at this juncture nothing could be added to what President had already communicated to Eshkol.

Rusk stated US attempting to get at least fourteen adherents to Maritime Declaration. Rusk said key issue in crisis was return to status quo ante on use of Gulf.

Rusk maintained US had not developed a multi-lateral context which would be acceptable to US Congress on question of naval force in Red Sea.

Harman asked if Israel had to tolerate ten thousand casualties before US conceded aggression had occurred. Rusk replied that question of who fired first would be significant since Soviets would aid Arabs if Arabs were attacked. Secretary added that Nasser was sending former Prime Minister and Vice President Zakariyah Muhi ad-Din to Washington on the coming weekend, and said US would inform Israel if Muhi ad-Din should say anything significant.

Harman stated farce in UN had to end. Israel was prepared to test Strait, and could not wait to react from a first strike by Arabs. If Israel lost air power, she will have "had it". Rusk again cautioned Harman regarding consequences of Israeli initiation of hostilities. Harman stated that he expected to return to US by Sunday evening, June 4. (State 207977, June 3, SECRET/EXDIS; Memorandum of Conversation, Secretary Rusk, Ambassador Harman, and others, June 2, 1967, TOP SECRET/NODIS)

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June 3 - Rusk asked Ambassador Barbour to check on unconfirmed report that Israeli ship Dolphin might be proceeding toward Strait of Tiran. Rusk asked Barbour to tell GOI that USG hoped report was not true. (State 207919, June 3, SECRET/NODIS)

Barbour checked whether Dolphin proceeding to Strait of Tiran and then reported that, to best of knowledge of GOI, this untrue. (Tel Aviv 3917, Control 3905, June 3, SECRET/NODIS)

President, in response to Eshkol's letter of May 30, reaffirmed US position in crisis. President wrote, that in conversation with Eban on May 26, he had pointed out need for US to act in concert with other nations; and he indicated to Eshkol that US was moving ahead to secure declaration by principal maritime powers asserting right of passage through Strait and Gulf. President asserted that US was exploring on urgent basis British suggestion for establishment of international naval presence in area of Strait of Tiran. (State 207955, June 3, SECRET/EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR)

In memorandum to Under Secretary Rostow, Assistant Secretary Lucius D. Battle made it clear that the appointment of Moshe Dayan as Israeli Defense Minister was very significant. Dayan's appointment increased the likelihood of an eventual decision to resort to military action. Eshkol would hesitate less to go to war with competent subordinate such as Dayan. (Information Memorandum, Battle to Secretary, June 3, SECRET)

In circular to US Ambassadors in Arab capitals, Rusk stated holy war psychology of Arabs was matched by apocalyptic psychology within Israel, and US should not assume Israel could be ordered not to fight in defense of its interests. Rusk suggested that USG had strong case for being even-handed with respect to political independence and territorial integrity of Near Eastern countries. He called for suggestions from the Ambassadors. (State 207956, June 3, SECRET/NODIS/EYES ONLY FOR THE AMBASSADOR FROM SECRETARY)

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June 4 - Barbour reported that a possible reason why certain levels in Israel publicly discounted military as only solution was that they hoped thereby to recapture element of surprise should use of military arm later be required. Another interpretation to which Barbour gave more credence was that it was at least worthwhile for Israel to bide time in hope for satisfactory peaceful outcome. Barbour felt continued US assurances to Israel would augment chances US success with Israelis. (Tel Aviv 3919, June 4, SECRET/EXDIS)

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June 5 - Reports of fierce fighting on Israel-Egyptian border were carried by FBIS and news services. Jerusalem radio stated Israel reacted to forward movement of Egyptian armored force. Cairo radio said Israel began action with air raids over Cairo and other parts of UAR. (State 208029, June 5, CONFIDENTIAL)

Egyptian armored forces advanced at dawn towards the Negev, and Israeli forces advanced to repel them. Israeli aircraft took to the air against enemy aircraft. Eshkol called an urgent meeting with a number of ministers. (Tel Aviv 2924, June 5, LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

Eban met with Barbour to inform him of latest Israeli moves. Early on June 5, Israelis had observed Egyptian units moving in large numbers toward Israel. Considerable enemy force had penetrated Israeli territory and clashed with Israeli ground forces. Only fighting thus far was with Egypt.

Eban was in process of drafting message to President rehearsing developments and declaring that Israel had no intention of taking advantage of situation to enlarge its territory. (Tel Aviv 3928, June 5, SECRET/EXDIS)

General Amit gave briefing for Barbour and McPherson, describing Nasser's buildup as having acquired such momentum it could not stop. Amit outlined Nasser's plans step-by-step, explaining coordination of Egyptian and Jordanian forces as culmination of Nasser's actions.

Amit said that, after considerable Israeli exercise of restraint, which had convinced Nasser to press his plan to dismember Israel, GOI had decided on June 4 to "punch all the buttons" in case of Egyptian aggression. US urgings of restraint had assisted Nasser in his plan of encirclement and would make Israel's task much more difficult. Amit stressed that his views reflected unanimous opinion of uniformed Israel defense establishment. (Tel Aviv 3937, June 5, SECRET/EXDIS)

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In morning Barbour received texts of letter sent that day Eshkol to Kosygin and of message from Kosygin to Eshkol delivered on same day. Kosygin message was not considered reply to Eshkol's letter. Eshkol recounted aggressions against Israel by Nasser which, he stated, were admitted by Nasser, and he called upon Kosygin to join in an effort to secure peace based on territorial integrity of all nations. Kosygin message condemned Israel for armed attack on UAR and insisted on immediated cease-fire. (Tel Aviv 3946, June 5, SECRET/EXDIS)

Secretary requested personnel in all posts emphasize changing nature of situation and urge Arab countries to adopt attitude of "wait and see". He expressed hope that attacks on American Embassy and other property as well as danger to American lives could be held to minimum. (State 208143, June 5, SECRET)

Rostow called on Israeli Charge Evron to inform him Soviets asked USG to use strongest good offices with Israel to achieve cease-fire. US had agreed.

Evron, in reply to Rostow's question, stated war resulted from UAR move to cut off Southern Negev, plus further buildup UAR armor in central part of southern border. Evron also commented there was no question GOI had no intention of enlarging Israeli borders.

Rostow wanted detailed statement of how events of morning had started, and Evron replied Israel was in position to do so because it had received first blow. (State 208222, June 5 SECRET/EXDIS)

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June 6 - Bitan informed Barbour that it seemed clear Jordan's military forces had disintegrated and that Jordanian firing in recent hours had apparently been uncoordinated and without tactical objective. (Tel Aviv 3952, June 6, SECRET/EXDIS)

Rusk instructed Barbour to inform Israel of Jordan's desire for immediate ceasefire, and to suggest that it would be best for GOI to make necessary arrangements immediately and directly rather than through UN. This action would split Jordan off from other states. (State 208438, June 6, SECRET/EXDIS)

Barbour urged that Lebanese Government should be informed GOI would not stand idly by if pogrom against Jews occurred in Beirut. (Tel Aviv 3917, Control 066044, June 6, SECRET/EXDIS)

Rusk asked Barbour to communicate his best judgment on type of political settlement Israelis might be willing to accept, based on Barbour's understanding of Israeli objectives and political pressures. Secretary wanted to know in particular if satisfactory settlement at Strait would be sufficient. He asked Barbour what GOI objective was in Gaza and toward West Bank. (State 208492, June 6, SECRET/NODIS)

Barbour communicated Jordanian desire for ceasefire to Eshkol. Jordanian concentration on civilian targets had occasioned some of bitterest fighting of first two days. Jordan's attacking Jerusalem, shelling of 30 Israeli border settlements and targets in northern Tel Aviv, and bombing of main street of coastal Netanya had completely disillusioned Israelis as to Hussein's ability or desire to maintain a moderate, stable stance. Barbour believed it was too late to arouse any interest in Israel for preservation Hussein and his regime. (Tel Aviv 3967, Control 006288, June 6, SECRET/EXDIS)

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Rusk desired Barbour forcefully to suggest to the Israelis that they arrange at least de facto ceasefire with Jordan. (State 208748, June 6, SECRET/NODIS)

Rusk conveyed USG gratification at learning of GOJ's prompt compliance with SC decision. US realized GOJ had to make own decision when to notify UN of acceptance of ceasefire. (State 208784, June 6, SECRET/EXDIS)

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June 7 - GOI reaction negative toward Jordan cease-fire. GOI believed Jordan's Government not serious in cessation, and was demonstrating deceptive interest. In view of condition of airfields in Iraq and Jordan at that moment, Iraqi airplanes could not be sent to Jordan. (Tel Aviv 3979, Control 006603, June 7, SECRET/EXDIS)

Barbour stated Israelis would require a peace document and would not accept merely the rein-statement of an armistice regime. Israel wanted firm frontiers. They would not accept any international supervisory organizations because such supervision implied restriction on their sovereignty. Perilous all-out military effort Israelis undertook created opportunity for Israel to achieve unrestricted statehood. (Tel Aviv 3988, Control 6730, June 7, SECRET/NODIS)

Barbour informed Department Israelis victorious in Sinai, and that their aircraft dominated skies. Advance units were not far from Suez Canal. Israelis had seized key points on west bank and in old city of Jerusalem. Press expressed hope that defeat of enemy would enable Israelis to live in peace and develop friendly relations with neighbors. Press sentiment was opposed to hasty Israeli acceptance of cease-fire. (Tel Aviv 3995, Control 007166, June 7, CONFIDENTIAL)

Department requested Embassy make strongest representation to GOI that rapid disintegration Jordan security forces constituted real threat to regime and to American and foreign community in Jordan. Department urged Embassy to make most vigorous plea for Israeli acceptance Jordanian cease-fire offer, and to give immediate public notice this action. (State 208985, June 7, SECRET)

Knesset member Abramov pointed out war had served US interests. US now "off hook" regarding elaborate Straits situation. Smashing Israeli victory had pricked Nasser's bloated pretensions and undercut Soviet ambitions in entire area. Minister without portfolio Saphir said USG and friends should do nothing to limit Israel's victory and fruits to be gained by both Israelis and US. (Tel Aviv 3998, Control 007269, SECRET/EXDIS)

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June 7 - In a news conference, Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan made the point that the objective of the campaign in the south was "just to secure free passage to Eilat". He stated that Israel had had a conflict with Jordan, Syria, and Iraq only because Arabs attacked Israel. "We have achieved our political and security objectives," Dayan maintained. (Tel Aviv 4019, Control 007891, June 8, LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

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June 8 - Department disturbed at new indication military action by GOI against Syria. USG regarded such action as casting doubts on Israeli intentions and creating gravest problems for USG representatives in Arab countries. Secretary Rusk called for complete cessation Israeli military action unless in case of clear-demonstrated need for self-defense. (State 209182, June 8, SECRET)

Israel tendered sincere apologies to AmEmbassy Tel Aviv over attack on "alleged" US flag vessel. Embassy Tel Aviv urged de-emphasis on publicity since proximity of vessel to scene of conflict was fuel for Arab suspicions that US was aiding Israel. (Tel Aviv 4014, Control 007776, June 8, SECRET/EXDIS)

Zeev Shek, Director of Western European Department in Israeli Foreign Ministry, gave tentative basis of settlement Israel would try to achieve with Arabs. Ideas included replacement of armistice agreements with treaties, demilitarization of Gaza Strip and Sinai border, and guaranteed access to Gulf of Aqaba. GOI also wanted new status for unified Jerusalem, guaranteeing all religions access to holy places. (Tel Aviv 4015, Control 007778, June 8, SECRET/EXDIS)

Israeli General Yariv said Soviet equipment still on way to UAR, and significant UAR armor remained in Sinai. Yariv discussed Israeli destruction of UAR air power and tanks. He indicated all casualties were below 1,000, with killed in action well under 500. Israel had lost 20 aircraft, whereas 60-70 percent of Syrian air force had been destroyed. No ground operations in Syria yet. (Tel Aviv 4020, Control 008002, June 8, SECRET/EXDIS)

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June 8 - At meeting preceding news of UAR acceptance of cease-fire, Under Secretary Rostow told Ambassador Harman withdrawal demand would likely be presented in SC very soon. US contemplated suggesting new resolution making point compliance with cease-fire resolution first step toward peace.

Rostow and Harman stated their beliefs that Soviets would not intervene. Harman noted Israel watching for signs of reinforcement UAR aircraft inventory. (State 209727, June 9, SECRET/EXDIS)

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June 9 - Embassy Tel Aviv reported Syrian artillery fire was keeping Israelis at bay, despite maximum Israeli air support of ground troops. Operation was taking longer than Israelis anticipated. (Tel Aviv 4026, Control 008656, June 9, SECRET/EXDIS)

Turkish Ambassador informed Department that Syrians had requested GOT assistance in halting Israeli attacks and had asserted they had already agreed to cease-fire. (State 209944, June 9, UNCLASSIFIED)

Rusk told Barbour to see Eban immediately and tell him Israel's position at UN deteriorating rapidly because of general impression Israel not throwing itself behind SC effort to achieve cease-fire. Secretary also stated Congressional leaders felt very strongly about incomprehensible attack on USS Liberty. (State 209964, June 9, CONFIDENTIAL/NODIS)

Israeli Prime Minister Eshkol stated to UPI that steadfastness of President of US on freedom of passage through Straits of Tiran was source of deep encouragement. (Tel Aviv 4052, Control 009205, June 10, LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

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June 10 - Ambassador Barbour delivered Rusk's message of June 9 to Eban. Eban replied he hoped actual cease-fire would be achieved in several hours. If Syrians refused to accept cease-fire, Israelis would demonstrate that it was Syrians who defied SC. Eban believed Syrian objective was to show that of all Arabs Syria was only state which inflicted serious damage on Israel. Eban emphasized Israel had no intention of going to Damascus. Problem of continued firing was Israeli difficulty in wiping out hidden Syrian gun positions practically impervious to air attacks. (Tel Aviv 4045, Control 9114, June 10, CONFIDENTIAL/NODIS)

Embassy Tel Aviv reported Israelis maintained there was no foundation to Syrian charges that Israel intended to advance on Damascus. Significance of Israeli action was to silence Syrian guns bombarding border settlements. GOI reluctantly decided to accept cease-fire at position they occupied despite fact halt at that point would not provide future protection for settlements. (Tel Aviv 4049, June 10, CONFIDENTIAL)

Department informed Embassy Tel Aviv it had received information Damascus under air attack and might fall; asked Embassy for comment in view of Embassy's statement that Israelis did not intend advance to Damascus. (State 210017, June 10, CONFIDENTIAL)

General Bull, Commander UN Truce Supervisory Organization, went from Jerusalem to Tel Aviv at Israeli request, confirming report that Israelis were going to ask him to see that cease-fire was implemented as quickly as possible. Israelis stated to Ambassador Barbour they believed firing had ceased "as of this moment", and said they did not contemplate any more operations. (Tel Aviv 4054, Control 009244, June 10, CONFIDENTIAL)

General Bull informed Israelis Syrians had proposed 1830 local time for cease-fire, which Israelis accepted. (Tel Aviv 4058, Control 009432, June 10, UNCLASSIFIED)

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June 10 - Embassy Tel Aviv stated GOI reaction to Soviet  
(Cont.) break of diplomatic relations did not cause as much concern as should have. GOI, confident of military victory, maneuvered to brink in SC. Every indication Israelis would hold to cease-fire. (Tel Aviv 4063, Control 009548, June 10, SECRET/EXDIS)

Ambassador Harman delivered note conveying renewed expression of deep regret for accidental bombing of USS Liberty, and stated GOI prepared to make amends for tragic loss of life and material damage. (State 210137, June 10, LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

Secretary Rusk informed Embassy Tel Aviv USG planned giving firm note of protest over Israeli attack on USS Liberty, stressing negligence of act and requesting preventive action taken assuring no repetition of incident. (State 210130, June 10, SECRET)

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CHRONOLOGY OF US-ISRAELI CONSULTATIONS  
ON THE MIDDLE EAST  
May 17-June 10, 1967

May 17 - President Johnson in a personal message to Prime Minister Eshkol expressed deep concern about the maintenance of peace in the Near East, and indicated that he could not accept any responsibilities on behalf of the United States for situations arising from actions on which the United States was not consulted. (State 196541, May 17, SECRET/NODIS)

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May 18 - US Ambassador Barbour discussed with Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban the military buildup in Israel. Eban referred to the numbers of Arab and Israeli troops in Sinai, and remarked that presence of 600 Egyptian tanks was of special concern. Three infantry divisions and the equivalent of one armored division had been counted in Sinai. Egypt had necessary support troops and the ability to maintain them.

Eban indicated he did not know what situation was regarding UNEF. If UAR ordered UNEF off soil, Israel's understanding was that UNGA would have to be reconvened. This would be severe test for UN.

Eban said GOI had done all possible to prevent tension, but in interest of precaution, he said, "... There will be a buildup here as well." There was no reason for Egyptian buildup. Eban advocated USG make clear to Soviets that USG involved in Middle East, and was looking for moderate USSR course. Eban urged US to impress on Cairo and Damascus there was no reason for buildup in Egyptian and Syrian military dispositions, and to return to "...not status quo ante but status quo ante plus cessation mining and sabotage".

Barbour asked Eban if GOI believed Egyptian buildup was essentially demonstration of solidarity and no more. Eban said that, whatever the original intentions, undesirable chain of events might result. Still not GOI view that UAR intent was to make war on Israel. Problem with buildup was fact that conflict might ramify widely.

Barbour stated that US knew GOI was acting with considerable restraint. Eban reiterated his main point to Barbour, that the most important fact in the situation was to convince the USSR that it could not control escalation, and it was in Moscow's best interest to diffuse tension. The major leverage to accomplish this objective was to impress the Soviets that they were not the only great power involved in the area.

Barbour reported that Eban and colleagues seemed reasonably relaxed and confident tension would abate. (Tel Aviv 3639, Control 018553, May 18, CONFIDENTIAL)

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Eban told Barbour he understood the President's message to the Prime Minister to mean Israel must not react militarily to any further Syrian aggressions without first consulting US. Eban concluded US could be assured Israeli Government did not intend any military action and was fully in control of the military. (Tel Aviv 3640, Control 18702, May 18, SECRET/NODIS)

Ambassador Harman told Under Secretary Rostow, in telephone conversation, that Eban had suggested having SYG fly to Cairo and Damascus to quiet situation. Rostow said this proposal was useful and US would look into it. (Telcon, Harman and Rostow, May 18, SECRET/EXDIS)

Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol replied as follows to President Johnson's personal message: (1) Syria was responsible for the present tension, as Ambassador Harman and Under Secretary Rostow had agreed. Every effort should be made to deter Syria from terrorist activities; (2) Egypt must return to the previous posture in Sinai. Full application of international influence should secure the end of abnormal troop concentrations; (3) UN must not give impression of irresolution in connection with presence of UNEF in Sinai; (4) Approach of US to USSR should be to assure Soviets of American commitment to Israel's independence and integrity; (5) There was an urgent need for US to reaffirm commitment to Israel's security, with a view to implementation should the need arise. (Tel Aviv 3648, Control 19193, May 18, SECRET/NODIS)

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May 20 - Secretary Rusk communicated to AmEmbassy Tel Aviv that an Israeli request for a US destroyer visit to Eilat would not contribute to a lessening of tension in present circumstances. Might provoke UAR on Straits of Tiran question. Rusk complimented Israeli restraint and hoped that in this delicate situation Israeli actions would be moderate. (State 198809, May 20, SECRET)

Ambassador Harman, in an urgent call on Under Secretary Rostow, reported a "disturbing" conversation between Foreign Minister Eban and Soviet Ambassador. The latter asserted that terror incidents on the Syrian border were work of CIA, adding, "we have warned you. You are responsible. You are responding to provocation by CIA." Harman said situation raised possibility of Soviet-Syrian-Egyptian collusion.

Under Secretary asked whether Israel knew French view on validity of Tripartite Declaration. Harman replied French were taking serious view of situation and intervening in Cairo. Rostow stated it would be useful if Israel could clarify French position, since, if the situation became bad, Tripartite planning would be useful. (State 198916, May 20, SECRET/NODIS)

Ambassador Harman wrote to Under Secretary Rostow, informing him that Israel would not move against Egyptian forces in Sharm-el-Sheikh unless and until Egyptians took action to close those straits. (State 199930, May 23, SECRET/NODIS)

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May 21 - Eban gave impression to Barbour that Israel seemed to be moving from a position of meeting military requirements to the point of building its diplomatic fences in order to cope with the new situation. The Israelis now felt they had sufficient forces in the South to cope with the Egyptian threat. Thant's accession to Egyptian demands was most regrettable. Eban's main point was that GOI lacked any expression of affirmation of USG support. Articulation of USG commitments to Israel was vital and its continuing absence could have only grave effects. Straits of Aqaba now a matter of first magnitude to Israel. If US commitment was to have real effect, it must be clearly enunciated.

Barbour asked Eban if GOI had given any thought to bringing UNEF over on Israeli side. Eban's reaction was strongly negative. Straits navigation and Gaza could not be coped with from the Israeli side of the line.

Barbour understood Eban's main points as follows: (1) Israel would not initiate direct action against Egypt, (2) would do everything in its power, whatever the risks, to open the Straits if Nasser moved to close them, and (3) believed it was entitled to a minimum of endorsement from US for position taken. (Tel Aviv 3692, **Control 21704**, May 21, SECRET/NODIS)

President stated in reply to Prime Minister Eshkol's letter of May 18 that he was encouraged by the tone of Soviet reaction to US approaches, and was certain that USSR understood US commitment to support measures in UN or outside to counter aggression or the threat of aggression in the Middle East. Continued UN presence in area desirable. The request which had been made to Ambassador Barbour for a public statement by the President was being weighed in connection with Secretary-General Thant's visit to Cairo. Nothing should distract attention from the Secretary-General's efforts. Highest officials of USG considering problems until resolved.

Rusk instructed Embassy Tel Aviv to stress when delivering President's letter to Eshkol, that US was certain Israel agreed UN machinery must be revitalized. Purpose of President's letter to help moderate Israeli refusal to envisage UN cooperation or peacekeeping activity on their side of the Armistice Line. (State 198955, May 21, SECRET/NODIS; State 198954, May 21, SECRET/NODIS)

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May 22 - Barbour expressed view to Bitan that Foreign Minister Eban's arguments opposing UN presence on Israeli side of border were singularly inept and unconvincing. Bitan replied that Israeli disillusionment with UN machinery was understandable. Barbour stated that he assumed Israelis would see some value in establishing some sort of arrangement which would facilitate reduction Nasser's military force in area, thereby permitting comparable reduction Israeli forces. (State 198554, May 22, SECRET/NODIS)

Prime Minister Eshkol, at Knesset summer session, gave views regarding nature of aggressions against Israel and pointed out that late SYG Dag Hammarskjold had informed Israel any withdrawal of UNEF would be carried out in consultation with advisory committee of UNEF. U Thant had not followed this procedure. Eshkol ended with statement of Israel's non-aggressive intent in taking defensive measures. (Tel Aviv 3713, Control 022698, May 22, UNCLASSIFIED)

President wrote Prime Minister Eshkol that he was addressing letters to the Prime Minister of Syria and the President of the UAR appealing to them to avoid hostilities. (State 199729, May 22, SECRET/NODIS)

Rostow in reply to Harman's letter of May 20 wrote that USG was convinced issue of Straits of Tiran must be handled as an international matter. (State 199930, May 23, SECRET/NODIS)

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May 23 - Under Secretary Rostow called in Israeli Minister Evron on receipt Nasser's statement on closing Gulf of Aqaba. Rostow noted UAR decision created need close consultation GOI and US. US inclined to summon Security Council meeting, hoping no incidents either side. Rostow indicated that Egyptian Ambassador had said situation was not irretrievable and that UK was taking strong position on freedom-of-seas principle.

Evron doubted efficacy Security Council actions. Rostow said all peaceful means must be exhausted before unilateral action justifiable.

Evron stated recent US assurances weaker than Kennedy's. Rostow replied no US intention of weakening assurances of Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson. Evron said USSR convinced US will not act, isolating Israel. Rostow replies UAR and USSR fully aware US commitments. All US efforts addressed to preventing war. (State 199741, May 23, SECRET/EXDIS)

Rostow informed Barbour that US views had been fully and forcefully brought home to Cairo and Moscow. Full consultations were in progress in Washington on British plan. (State 199836, May 23, SECRET/NODIS)

Eban telephoned Barbour to state Nasser had just announced that Straits would be closed and Israel could have war if she wanted it. (Tel Aviv 3715, Control 022982, May 23, CONFIDENTIAL)

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Prime Minister Eshkol, in statement to Knesset, called for powers to act for the maintenance of the right of free passage in the Gulf of Aqaba. He said that Israel stood ready to participate in an effort for the relaxation of tension and the consolidation of peace in the area. (Tel Aviv 3744, Control 023997, May 23, LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

Ambassador Barbour informed Rostow that Eban would be in Washington for talks. Main purpose Eban's visit to continue consultation which US requested should occur before Israel began unilateral action. Some time had been bought by US involvement in Israel's problem. (Tel Aviv 3746, Control 024031, May 23, SECRET/NODIS)

Ambassador Harman met with Under Secretary Rostow. Rostow cited efforts of US to work through UN for resolution asking all countries, including UAR, not to change situation regarding Gulf of Aqaba. Rostow further indicated Soviets had no interest in war in Middle East. Harman expressed concern over Tass report declaring Soviet support for Arabs.

Rostow stressed importance from public opinion standpoint of USG exhausting all UN recourse before taking unilateral action. He emphasized US official position that Gulf of Aqaba is international waterway. (State 200680, May 23, SECRET/NODIS)

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May 24 - AmEmbassy sent Under Secretary Rostow expression of GOI's current concerns. Egyptian deployment at Sharm-el-Sheikh and in Sinai was new and not fully organized. Prime Minister Eshkol stated that US purposefulness in tackling situation was a matter of doubt in Near East and, this concern could not be allowed to exist any longer if damage was to be avoided to US image, prestige, and position in Near East. Uneasiness of Israel had stemmed from further military conversations after Eban's departure. Barbour concluded this attitude did not presage departure from previous night's decision to hold up action pending Eban's conversations, provided later evidence of US momentum was obtained. (Tel Aviv 3763, Control 025317, May 24, SECRET/EXDIS)

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May 25 - Barbour reported Israeli Cabinet consultations were continuing. If fair declarations from West remained on paper only, while aggressive declarations from Arabs were implemented, Israel would have no choice but to act. (Tel Aviv 3775, Control 026275, May 25, SECRET)

Augmentation of Egyptian armor in Sinai and naval forces in Gulf of Aqaba prompted Israeli Foreign Office Director Levavi to say that attack by Egypt and Syria appeared imminent, and that it was imperative for the US to declare its intentions, abide by its commitments, and implement the declaration by appropriate movement US forces to Israel's support. (Tel Aviv 3785, Control 026941, May 25, TOP SECRET/NODIS)

Ambassador Harman called on Under Secretary Rostow to discuss situation before arrival of FonMin Eban. Rostow stated that UN should be approached without cynicism and pressure. US and UK were studying contingency plan of keeping Gulf of Aqaba open by naval patrols. Harman was anxious about time required to keep Straits open. Rostow stated that US view of Nasser's action in Gulf was that it was illegal, but President of US must carry public opinion with him and all peaceful measures within and without UN must be exhausted before USG could contemplate taking other steps. (State 202589, May 26, SECRET/EXDIS)

Foreign Minister Eban and Under Secretary Rostow met during the evening. Eban stated he understood that an Israeli-proposed Presidential statement reaffirming US determination to stand by commitments went beyond constitutional power of President.

Eban informed Rostow that what he would need from US to stabilize situation in Tel Aviv was as firm assurance as possible that US intended to participate in development of maritime plan. Rostow asserted that such a plan would undoubtedly undergo many changes before it assumed its final form. Eban felt that the point of the plan could be established by a relatively short exercise. (State 203752, May 26, SECRET/NODIS)

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Secretary Rusk, in a conversation with Foreign Minister Eban, indicated that American intelligence did not support the Israeli contention that an attack by the UAR and Syria was imminent. The Secretary emphasized that USG did not have authority to give assurance along lines of "an attack on you is an attack on us" without full Congressional approval of such an undertaking. Pre-emptive action by Israel would be most difficult for the United States.

Eban commented that for the previous two weeks "the reality has been consistently worse than the projections." Rusk interjected that this was precisely the reason why the US desired intensive material consultation.

Eban desired to know any possible action related to Strait problem. Secretary replied that President decided US should complain to non-permanent members of Security Council about "soggy attitude" on Middle East situation. Eban maintained it was important to take effective action with regard to Strait and then let others come to Council with complaint if they wished. (State 203793, May 26, SECRET/NODIS)

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May 26 - At his office in Tel Aviv, Army spokesman Shalev said Egypt might attack. Egyptians were making emotional appeals by radio, such as "attack Israel" and "death to Israel". Shalev felt the US had made a commitment regarding the Gulf of Aqaba in 1957 and should honor it. Shalev was very anxious to know what the USSR fleet in the east Mediterranean was doing, and was openly critical of the Israeli Government for waiting too long. (Tel Aviv 261300Z, May 26, SECRET)

In circular telegram, Department stated USG seemed to have two options in absence of any significant UAR concession on closure of the Gulf of Aqaba or Israeli readiness to accept closure.

1. Limiting US action to UN and diplomatic channels and statements of position on principle of open Straits, which action would almost certainly lead to an Israeli strike against UAR and perhaps hostilities with Syria.

2. Assuring Israel that Straits would remain open and taking all necessary deterrent measures with UK, or independently, to enforce this assurances if UAR did not heed US warnings.

Either of these options could include working toward joint declaration of maritime powers, followed by users association and international sea patrol.

First option would minimize risk against involvement of major powers and avoid initial US-Arab confrontation. Strongly probable, however, this would enhance Soviet influence in area, since Western Powers were regarded as pro-Israel, Soviets pro-Arab. Present estimate was that Israelis would win, though at heavy cost.

Second option also involved risks, including possibility of polarization occurring at an accelerated pace if deterrence failed and actual hostilities became necessary. Advantage of this option was it would win time and permit search for compromise solution.

Department stated it was exploring all courses, and continuing UN and bilateral consultations. (State circ. 202592, May 26, SECRET/EXDIS)

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May 27 - The Israelis extended an invitation to foreign military attaches to visit forces in the Negev Desert on May 28.

Secretary Rusk informed Barbour that President, in meeting with Eban, had repeated his assurance that Israel would not be alone unless it acted alone. Eban asked if he could convey to Prime Minister Eshkol that US would make every possible effort to assure that Straits and Gulf would be open to free and innocent passage. President responded, "yes". (State 203796, May 27, SECRET/NODIS)

Barbour conveyed agitation of Israelis, who believed they had conclusive evidence that Nasser would attack by air at any moment. Israeli concern related to their view that Nasser would strike first. If he did, GOI was convinced it had no secondary response capability and would likely be lost. Immediate dispatch of US military officer to talk in terms US estimates and capabilities might reduce tension. (Tel Aviv 3808, Control 028920, May 27, TOP SECRET/NODIS)

Netherlands Ambassador Schurmann called on Rostow to state that GON fully backed Israeli right of free passage through Straits of Tiran. If action was necessary to support that right, GON was ready to participate with ships. Rostow welcomed this information and stated President would be pleased. (State 203891, May 27, SECRET/NODIS)

President wrote to Prime Minister Eshkol that US had information Israelis were preparing to take military action against Arab neighbors and provoke conflict. This information came to President in private message from Soviets, who emphasized their commitment to restraint but warned that, if Israel began military action, Soviets would give aid to countries attacked. President repeated his statement of previous day, calling upon Israel not to provoke hostilities. Rusk noted that US and UK were working urgently upon military aspects of international naval escort plan, and that other nations such as Netherlands and Canadians had already joined before a text was presented to them. (State 203943, May 27, TOP SECRET/EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR)

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May 28 - Ambassador Harman asked Under Secretary Rostow if USG was firm on question of allowing Israeli flagships in Strait of Tiran. Rostow replied Harman had heard what US officials had said on this question during Eban visit. Rostow added that tentative scenario had been set up by US. Ultimate safety for force was US 6th fleet and vessels from other maritime powers stationed in Mediterranean. General US thought was to get maritime declaration out soon and continue planning to assemble naval presence but not to surface it until SC action perhaps three weeks later. Harman said two or three weeks' delay disturbed him, as actions were beginning on ground. (State 203966, May 28, SECRET/NODIS)

In a discussion with American Ambassador Barbour, Bitan of Foreign Office emphasized that crisis was not over. Solution would largely depend on how well USG and GOI communicated over next few weeks. Second major issue was posture of Nasser in Sinai, which had to be reduced. Israeli mobilization could not be maintained at top level without serious economic effect. Israelis were also concerned about SC developments and urged careful US attention to activities within the SC. (Tel Aviv 3834, Control 029541, May 28, TOP SECRET/NODIS)

Barbour enclosed draft of Eshkol's speech scheduled for delivery to Knesset on May 29. He stated that GOI was strongly impressed with President Johnson's unambiguous attitude and forceful determination to assure free passage in the Straits and the Gulf. This impression and assurances from other maritime powers reportedly made a strong influence on GOI's policy. (Tel Aviv 3835, Control 029540, May 28, SECRET/EXDIS)

Eban sensed widespread uninformed public in Israel was becoming increasingly uneasy as to just where Israel stood in the diplomatic arena. As Embassy Tel Aviv reported, while Eban did not advocate public revelation of the results of his Washington conversations, he did state that he would appreciate anything which could be done in the background, such as in the press of the United States, to re-emphasize the President's determination displayed

TOP SECRET/NODIS

May 29 - Barbour reported that Israelis refused to insert a reference to UN in the draft of Prime Minister Eshkol's statement to Knesset. (Tel Aviv 3844, Control 29827, May 29, SECRET/NODIS)

Prime Minister Eshkol's speech was highly dramatic but enigmatic. A sense of expectancy and determination gave way to widespread frustration and puzzlement in some in wake of vaguely-worded announcement that Israel would protect shipping rights "at the proper time".

Late in morning fire from automatic weapons and mortars in Gaza Strip opened on civilian workers.

Press in Israel stated emphatically that Israel would not tolerate Egyptian military concentration on its southern border. (Tel Aviv 3851, Control 030271, May 29, CONFIDENTIAL)

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in his statement of May 23. Eban urged US to avoid resolution on legal rights of free and innocent passage through Straits, since any effort to discuss such a resolution would give opponents opportunity to becloud and weaken impression of world support. (Tel Aviv 3857, Control 31105, May 30, TOP SECRET/NODIS)

Secretary Rusk informed Barbour that best posture for USG during next turbulent days, as well as best position with which to help GOI, would be to stand on principles enunciated in President's statement of May 23, particularly regarding international character of Gulf of Aqaba and Strait of Tiran and US defense of political independence and territorial integrity of all states in area. (State 204010, May 28, SECRET/NODIS)

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CHRONOLOGY OF US-UAR CONSULTATIONS  
ON MIDDLE EAST  
May 15-June 8, 1967

May 15 -

Department instructed charge in Cairo to inform Foreign Minister of US concern at increase in tension and resulting military movements. We were urging restraint on Israelis and Syrians, and believed that UAR could play useful role to stop Syrian terrorist incidents. We believed crisis could be avoided if all parties resisted provocation and used UN machinery to fullest extent. (State 194188, May 15, CONFIDENTIAL)

Department instructed Embassy to advise UAR of Israeli response to USG demarche. Bitan of Israeli Foreign Office had made following points, as reported evening of 15th by Ambassador Harman:

- 1) There are no military concentrations on Israel's side of border.
- 2) Israel hopes infiltration from Syria has ended.
- 3) As long as incidents prevented, no cause for concern with possibility of Israeli military action.
- 4) GOI believes Syrians have objective of involving UAR in present situation.
- 5) Present UAR military activity likely to be interpreted by Syrians as support and encouragement for resumption of terrorist attacks.
- 6) Israelis have no objections to US passing this assessment to UAR. (State 194639, May 15, CONFIDENTIAL)

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May 16 - UAR demanded withdrawal of UNEF from Israeli-UAR border. SYG indicated he would accede to the request.

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May 19 - UAR Ambassador Kamel called at Assistant Secretary Battle's request. Battle said present disturbing situation required careful handling. USG urging restraint, had no indication Israelis were planning attack. Essential that border raids cease to prevent incident which could start war. US deeply concerned at possibility of withdrawal of UNEF. Hoped it could remain as symbol of world interest in peaceful conditions between Arabs and Israelis and that UAR would reexamine its decision in this matter. Urged UAR to maintain close and effective liaison with UN in the hours ahead. Time was of the essence. (State 198635, May 19, SECRET)

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May 22 -

UAR announced decision to close Gulf of Aqaba.  
(State 199722, May 22, CONFIDENTIAL)

Under Secretary Rostow called in Ambassador Kamel at 9 p.m. in response to Nasser's reported announcement of closure of Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping. Said UAR should understand that USG would make every effort to avoid a war or to stop one if it should start. We were urging restraint on Israel, but this was an issue involving a vital national interest of Israel and a right assured her by international law. We believed that such a serious violation of international law would constitute aggression. If announcement from Cairo was true, we hoped it could be reversed.

Kamel replied that the present situation could have been avoided if the US had been responsive to his urgent appeals for help. Kamel suggested on his own responsibility that following steps should be taken: support for UN SYG and other UN action; urging of restraint on all Near Eastern nations; enlistment of support of India, Yugoslavia, Pakistan, Turkey, Italy, Spain, and perhaps some Latin American nations. Appeals could be directed to Arab countries such as Iraq. He also recommended that distinguished Americans such as Robert Anderson, Eugene Black, and John McCloy fly to Cairo at once for talks with Nasser. Kamel further urged restraint on US news media, to which Rostow responded that the President had decided against issuing a public statement. Kamel concluded by offering opinion that the situation was still controllable. (State 199731, May 22, SECRET/LIMDIS)

Department instructed Ambassador Nolte to deliver to President Nasser letter from President Johnson, dated May 22, reading, in part:

"Various of our common friends...have told me of your concern that the United States may have indicated an unfriendliness toward the UAR. This ...is far from the truth.... I do urge you to set as your just duty ... the avoidance of hostilities...."

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SECRET/NODIS

May 22 -  
(cont)

"I had expected that I might ask our Vice President to go to the Middle East to talk with you and other Arab leaders, as well as with the leaders of Israel. If we come through these days without hostilities, I would still hope that a visit by my most trusted friend could result immediately." (State 199704, May 22, SECRET/NODIS)

Nolte also instructed to deliver note verbale to Foreign Minister Riad to effect that USG was concerned over three aspects of situation:

1) Continuing terrorism being carried out against Israel with Syrian approval and, in some cases, from Syrian territory, contrary to the General Armistice Agreements. US hoped UAR would join in urging all parties to Agreements to observe their provisions.

2) Precipitate withdrawal of UNEF may make problem of maintaining peace along UAR-Israeli border more difficult. USG supports SYG Thant's mission to Cairo, hopes that UAR will explore fully with him possibilities for continued UN peacekeeping presence in some form along UAR-Israeli border.

3) USG considers it particularly important that the present cycle of troop build-up on both sides be arrested and reversed.

We also take this opportunity to reaffirm our continued adherence to principle of free access to Gulf of Aqaba for ships of all nations. Interference with international rights of free and innocent passage of these waters could have the gravest international consequences. US firmly opposed under four successive administrations to aggression in the area in any form. Hope that UAR will join in effort, in UN and outside of that body, to lessen tension and restore stability in area.

(State 199710, May 22, CONFIDENTIAL)

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May 23 - Ambassador Nolte believed President Johnson's letter of May 22 to Nasser was outdated by latter's speech on closure of Gulf of Aqaba. Recommended delaying delivery until UAR position on Aqaba was clarified, and that letter be revised accordingly. Believed confrontation between US President and Nasser on Aqaba issue should be avoided until issue is unmistakable, consequences fully considered, and course of US action clear. Our biggest gun should be saved for last; accordingly recommended dealing on foreign minister level for now. (Cairo 7831, Control 23018, May 23, SECRET/NODIS)

Ambassador Nolte met with Foreign Minister Riad. Nolte presented the note verbale of May 22 and complied with instructions received during the meeting to proceed with delivery of May 22 letter from President Johnson to Nasser. In presenting the note verbale, Nolte reiterated the US position put forward by Under Secretary Rostow in his conversation with Ambassador Kamel the previous evening. In response to Nolte's request for clarification of the UAR's intentions re Aqaba, the Foreign Minister said that the UAR would stop Israeli ships and confiscate strategic cargoes of all other vessels. The UAR would not commit aggression but would defend itself against attack. (Cairo 7868, Control 023452, May 23, SECRET/EXDIS; Cairo 7864, Control 023371, May 23, SECRET/NODIS; State 199751, May 23, SECRET/NODIS)

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May 24 - Ambassador Nolte requested, and the Department granted, authorization to begin withdrawal of official dependents to Athens. (Cairo 7894, Control 024506, May 24, CONFIDENTIAL/LIMDIS; State 200768, May 24, CONFIDENTIAL)

Department informed Nolte that he had been quoted by UPI as saying he told Foreign Minister Riad that US would use force if necessary to open the Gulf of Aqaba. UAR interference with free traffic in the Gulf would constitute an act of aggression and a violation of international law. Department proposed to withhold comment, stand on President Johnson's May 23 statement. (State 200749 and 200767, May 24, CONFIDENTIAL)

Belgian Ambassador called on UAR Foreign Office Under Secretary Fiqi, expressed concern over UAR action concerning Aqaba. Fiqi said problem was a political one, rather than legal, and could not be discussed. He further said that real cause of problem was interference in Middle East by Western powers. (Cairo 7968, Control 026343, May 25, CONFIDENTIAL)

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May 25 -

Embassy advised all non-official US citizens and official dependents to leave UAR. (Cairo 7940, Control 025855, May 25, CONFIDENTIAL)

Embassy officer called on FonOff to inform UARG of US decision to evacuate dependents. FonOff official, Hassan, replied US jumping the gun; action would be taken as indication USG had decided hostilities inevitable. US should wait until SYG makes report. Hassan said UAR ready for war though not seeking it, but admitted that closure of straits would be regarded by Israel as provocation and was directed at cutting off Israel's lifeline. Embassy officer pointed out that provocation seemed directed as much against US as against Israel and that it appeared to be well planned and thought out. Hassan said US was right in stating UAR plans had been carefully laid and did not argue with Embassy officer's thesis that one goal was elimination of US influence in Middle East. (Cairo 7975, Control 026370, May 25, CONFIDENTIAL)

Department forwarded to Cairo an Israeli report that UAR apparently assembling four infantry divisions, two armored divisions, and total of 800 tanks. UAR naval units, some with offensive rockets, steaming into Mediterranean. (State 202239, May 25, SECRET/EXDIS)

Ambassador Kamel paid previously scheduled farewell call on Assistant Secretary Battle. Kamel reiterated belief that situation still controllable and urged that UN be kept in forefront. Further stated that he had just been informed that Nasser would cooperate to fullest with UN. Kamel expressed concern over reports of 6th Fleet movements; said let fleet go where it wants but do not overpublicize its movements. Also concerned over fact that US decision to evacuate dependents came even before UN SYG's report on trip to Cairo.

Battle noted importance of Nasser's assurance, stated that decision to evacuate civilians from UAR followed standard procedures which had been applied in many situations in many areas of the world. (State 202565, May 25, CONFIDENTIAL)

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May 25 -  
(cont)

Kamel read to Department officer telegram from UAR FonOff reporting Nolte-Riad conversation of May 23. Riad's report referred in detail to five proposals made to UAR by US. Department officer told Kamel that there obviously was a misunderstanding and that authoritative US position was in note verbale handed to Riad on May 23. Nolte apparently had referred to proposals in US memo of March 15, 1957, to UN SYG. (State 202673, May 26, SECRET)

Later in evening Under Secretary Rostow called in Amb. Kamel to transmit message that Israel believed surprise attack imminent. Rostow assured Kamel we were continuing to restrain Israel.  
(Arab-Israel Sitrep, 0430, May 26)

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CHRONOLOGY OF US-JORDANIAN CONSULTATIONS  
ON THE MIDDLE EAST  
May 18-June 10, 1967

May 18 - Ambassador Burns reported interview with King Hussein, who observed that apparent target for an Israeli attack was Syria. Jordan would not act if Israel attacked Syria unless UAR did so. If Nasser did react, Jordan would have to take sufficient action to keep from being a scapegoat, but, even so, did not contemplate direct armed clash with Israel.

Hussein felt Jordan was likely target in the short run; inevitably, it was target in the long run. He felt Israel had long-range military and economic requirements not yet satisfied, and only way these goals could be achieved was to alter status of Jordan's west bank. Hussein remained unconvinced when Ambassador Burns stated there was no evidence Israel was planning to attack Jordan. If attacked, Jordan would have to retaliate or face internal revolt. In this case, what would be US reaction? Ambassador stated US stood by its declarations and would not acquiesce in changes of border by force, although type of action would have to be decided in light of circumstances.

Hussein replied that immediate assistance would be needed. The other Arab states would not help, and UN's reaction would be too slow. If Israelis remained for extended time, his regime would fall. The same would happen if Israel got concessions as price of withdrawal.

Ambassador Burns told Department that Hussein wanted no fight with Israel and would be prudent. In view of tense atmosphere and precedent of Samu, Israel might hit Jordan. In that event Jordan would retaliate, for not to counterattack would mean end of regime. Burns asked for any views of reassurances Department might wish to give Hussein. (Amman 3612, Control 019078, May 18, SECRET/LIMDIS)

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(cont.) Department instructed Amman to inform Jordanian Government that US urged restraint, relied on UNEF as "important instrument for stability", and asked Jordan to urge Cairo to support UNEF.

Main policy of US was to work through UN to preserve peace in the Middle East.

Department further instructed Embassy to emphasize the extreme importance US attached to maintaining free passage for all shipping in the Gulf of Aqaba, in view of reports that UAR forces were occupying Sharm el-Sheikh. (State circular 197664, May 18, SECRET)

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May 20 - Department approved Ambassador's approach of May 18 to Hussein. In addition to conveying the comments in the instructions sent May 18, the Ambassador should inform the King of US desire to reiterate assurances contained in the President's letter of November 23, 1966. Ambassador should also advise King USG stood by President's Kennedy's statement of May 8, 1963 and its estimate that Israeli intention toward Jordanian regime unchanged. (State 198899, May 20, SECRET/LIMDIS)

Department instructed Embassy Amman to inform Jordanian Government about a report from Israeli Ambassador and to express US concern. Israeli Ambassador's report was that Israel disturbed at continued radio and press stories out of Amman and Jidda goading Nasser and criticizing his failure to act. Israeli Ambassador convinced this prodding of Nasser by other Arab countries explained in part the present difficulties; he urged US to request the Arab countries not to take unnecessary risk by goading Nasser for propaganda purposes. (State 198902, May 20, SECRET)

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May 23 - Embassy Amman reported developments of past few days had disturbed Jordanian leadership, which feared hostilities that could engulf them. Jordanians felt Nasser's prestige had been dramatically restored, he was "playing for keeps", and he probably had Soviet backing. In this UAR-Israeli confrontation, even without hostilities, Nasser would probably be psychological victor. Jordan thus faced Nasser's hostility to its government, the Jordanian population's volatility, and the regime's image that it would never fight Israel because it was under US control

Ambassador Burns thought Jordan would make moves to reduce its vulnerability. Jordan might admit foreign Arab troops, presumably Saudi and Iraqi. Jordan continued to wish to avoid involvement, but risks of isolation were great. Burns had counselled restraint, but point could be reached when such counsel would be deemed too costly. Jordan had agreed to stop goading Nasser, probably not because of US counsel but because GOJ's desire not to offend Nasser further. (Amman 3690, Control 023277, May 23, SECRET/LIMDIS)

Embassy Amman reported Jordan had broken relations with Syria in wake of Ramtha bombing. King speculated Syria might have done this to compel Jordan to keep more military forces along the Syrian-Jordanian border. (Amman 2699, Control 23768, May 23, CONFIDENTIAL)

King Hussein reviewed with Ambassador Burns the report Chief of Staff Khammash had made after returning from Cairo May 22. Report stated United Arab Command completely cut out of crisis planning. All planning in hands of UAR-Syrian Joint Command. Khammash unable to ascertain involvement of Iraqis, and learned UAR no longer interested in sending troops to Jordan. Jordan was advised by UAR to look after its own defense and not "rock the boat".

King stated both Jordan and UAR had toned down their attacks on each other.

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(cont.) Hussein informed Ambassador he had issued instructions to bring his defenses up to maximum strength.

Hussein mystified at Nasser's moves. He thought USSR playing "major backstage role in game of brinksmanship." (Amman 3711, Control 023914, May 23, SECRET/NOFORN)

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May 25 - Embassy Amman reported no foreign troops had entered Jordan and none were contemplated. Jordan's interest would lie in keeping US fully informed; if situation concerning foreign troops changed, Jordan would immediately notify Embassy. (Amman 3747, Control 026248, May 25, SECRET)

Regarding Tel Aviv's request for all possible information showing defensive intent of Jordanian troop movements, Embassy Amman said US would be cut off absolutely from obtaining such information should it ever become known US passed detailed Jordanian battle orders to Israelis. Jordanians felt that, in event of terrorist incident, Israelis might attack them.

Burns suggested US tell Israelis independent assessment of US Defense Attache at Amman was that all Jordanian troop movements thus far were defensive. (Amman 3762, Control 026371, May 25, SECRET/EXDIS)

Department informed Embassy Amman it was unable to approve Tel Aviv's request that US pass to Israelis all information on Jordanian troop movement. Department requested Amman's recommendation on what should be passed. (State 201782, May 25, SECRET/EXDIS)

Burns reported to Department the deep concern of Jordan over its dilemma in Arab-Israel crisis. Jordan's actions had all been designed to show its true Arabism and its militant stand vs. Israel. Hussein's regime stood to lose whichever way confrontation was resolved. Nasser might well be interested in unseating Hussein because of his moderate policy toward Israel. If UAR should fail, populace would argue that Nasser lost only because US sided with Israel, and popular frustration would mount against the King.

Hussein felt his best change would be to make himself more acceptable to Nasser by forming a government of national unity, and getting rid of Chief of Royal Cabinet Tell, who had advised a tough line with Nasser. Disengagement from long-standing US-Jordanian intimacy would force Hussein to maneuver closer to UAR.

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Hussein was prepared for brinkmanship. He would risk possible annihilation by Israelis rather than internal revolt.

Although Jordan had been told UAR did not want foreign Arab troops in Jordan, GOJ has now announced it was prepared to receive Iraqi and Saudi troops.  
(Amman 3774, Control 027020, May 25, SECRET/LIMDIS)

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May 26 - Jordanian press reported Saudi Arabia had accepted Jordan's invitation to send troops. Burns commented that there was no change in former Jordanian position that these troops were not presently coming to Jordan.

Iraqis were reported as having declined Jordan's invitation because Iraq had to get consent of United Arab Command before sending troops to Jordan. Ambassador Burns remarked that many Jordanians viewed this as a slap in the face to Hussein by "true" Arab nationalists. (Amman 3788, Control 028118, May 26, CONFIDENTIAL)

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May 27 - Foreign Minister Touqan told Ambassador US statement supporting free navigation in Gulf of Aqaba was interpreted by all Arabs as US support for Israel. Aqaba was an Arab lake. Jordanians volatile, emotionalism was on upswing. He regretted Jordan's relation with US was approaching critical phase. Doubted Nasser would back down. There was 50-50 chance Israel would attack UAR. Israel might attack Jordan, calculating UAR and Syria would not come to Jordan's assistance. (Amman 3835, Control 292301, May 27, CONFIDENTIAL)

Embassy Amman said Nasser's speech of May 27 was "surprisingly conciliatory" toward Jordan. Jordan's Ambassador to UAR, Rifai, commented to Embassy officer this speech offered opportunity for improved relations. UAR's price for rapprochement was Tell's dismissal as Chief of Royal Cabinet.

Tell told US correspondents Schmidt and Dugas he was prepared to step down. Tell doubted seriousness of UAR's military purpose, which was to embarrass Saudi Arabia and Jordan.

Political circles saw need for King to form a government of national unity. Sacrifice of Tell believed not enough. (Amman 3837, Control 029288, May 27, CONFIDENTIAL)

Embassy Amman reported the Jordanian Director of Military Intelligence had asked if US Embassy knew S.S. Green Island had been diverted, and what cargo it had been carrying to Jordan. Embassy replied it would check.

Ambassador Burns commented he knew that ship was carrying ammunition, that it had been diverted to Assab for unloading, and that Jordanians knew the nature of cargo. He recommended ship be directed to proceed to Aqaba, and its cargo of ammunition unloaded as originally scheduled. His reason was that Jordanians and all Arabs had bitter memories of British diversions of ammunition ships during 1948 war. (Amman 3807, Control 028832, May 27, SECRET)

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May 27 - Embassy informed that Jordan sent message  
(cont) Saudi Arabia requesting troops as soon as possible. No reply received from Saudi Arabia. One infantry brigade might be sent, to be stationed in Southern Jordan north of Aqaba. (Amman 3747, Control 029305, May 27, SECRET)

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May 29 - Chief of Staff Khammash informed US Ambassador investigation of rumors of Syrian troop concentration on Jordanian frontier showed rumors not true. As of noon May 29 Syrian-Jordanian border open to all traffic: (Amman 3880, Control 030529, May 29, CONFIDENTIAL)

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May 30 Embassy Amman informed Department that Prime Min Juma and King Hussein departed Amman 09:00 for Cairo for secret meeting with Nasser at Cairo airport. (Amman 3898, Control 31013, May 30, SECRET/EXDIS)

Department informed Embassy Amman S.S. Green Island was diverted because of owner's concern that Straits were mined. Owners had final decision. Impossible to redivert vessel. Department stated Embassy might inform King of facts and that ammunition off-loaded at Assab would be trans-shipped to him. (State 204891, May 30, SECRET)

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May 31

Ambassador reported Hussein's flight to Cairo resulted from concern for his political and military positions. Hussein apparently had succeeded in obtaining additional insurance for Jordan and his regime. Hussein wanted US assurance that an Israeli attack on Jordan, for whatever reason, would bring US forces to his assistance in hours and that Israelis be so informed. He deemed US assurances insufficient and decided defense pact with Cairo necessary to insure military assistance.

The embraces Hussein exchanged with Nasser probably reinforced Hussein's position with his people. Nasser seemed delighted to get the pact with Jordan.

Burns concluded Nasser might further exploit his strengthened position. Hussein had unleashed pro-Nasserism and Arabism in Jordan. (Amman 3919, Control 032201, May 31, SECRET)

Ambassador met with King at latter's request. Hussein was convinced Nasser did not wish to unseat either him or Feisal. Nasser thought Israeli attack on Syria imminent and felt he had to react. There had been no Soviet masterminding. Nasser would neither back down on Straits issue nor attack, but was ready for war if it came. Nasser was convinced US could stop Israel. If Israel attacked, US Government would have given green light. Ambassador told Hussein he must disabuse Nasser of this notion. If Israel thought her survival was at stake, no US pressure could stop her. US was trying to prevent war, not to help Israel.

Hussein said Nasser's suspicions of US notions had been intensified for two reasons: diversion of S.S. Green Island and embargo on arms to the Arabs. Burns told Hussein reasons for diversion of Green Island. Hussein stated Nasser felt Wheelus Air Force Base was being used to ferry US military equipment to Israel. Burns said he knew of no such action.

Hussein stated that Nasser and all Arabs hoped USG in event of hostilities would not take any action which would be considered aggression against the

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May 31 - Arabs. If US committed aggression, Nasser would  
(cont) ask for Soviet assistance. Hussein thought Nasser  
was talking at that moment to Soviets. (Amman 3929,  
Control 032466, May 31, SECRET)

King proposed that President Johnson issue public statement clarifying US policy. Statement would include following points: 1) US would seek to be neutral between the parties to this dispute. Main US objective would be to preserve peace. 2) US Government would not be responsible for hostilities in Middle East and would not be party to them. US Government would also oppose any party who starts a war.

Hussein felt this statement would contribute to peace. (Amman 3932, Control 032497, May 31, SECRET/EXDIS)

Ambassador Burns reported he had agreed to King's request to withdraw USAF detachment at Mafraq. Burns not unhappy to dismantle operation.

Problem was what to do with F-104's to minimize political consequences to US. Only a few top Jordanian officials knew the planes, bearing RJAF markings, were really US Government property.

Burns suggested 1) taking the planes out, with Jordanians explaining these planes loaned for training purposes only, 2) leaving planes in Jordan by immediately selling them to Government at reduced price, because F-104's on order for Jordan would be more modern machines.

Burns asked for guidance, would meet with Chief of Staff next day to discuss matter. (Amman 3933, Control 032636, May 31, SECRET)

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June 3

In response to request for Jordan's views on US position, Prime Minister Juma stated Jordan appreciated US motives because Jordan also sought peace. The Jordanians, however, fully supported Nasser's action in closing Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping. They foresaw no possibility that Israelis would regain rights they had forcibly seized in 1956.

Embassy Amman commented that it had no reason to believe GOJ would be prepared to challenge any aspect of Nasser's position on Straits. (Amman 4029, Control 3885, June 2, SECRET/EXDIS)

Chief of Staff Khammash told US Embassy that Jordan had no intention to loosen close bond with US. Hussein and GOJ did not trust Nasser. There would be no Palestine Liberation Army troops in Jordan. Jordan did not want war. If war was avoided, Government hoped popular disappointment would turn on Nasser, responsible for whipping up war fervor in first place. He pointed to dangers of eruption in Jordanian Jerusalem and said Syria would accuse Jordanians of perfidy if Jordan allowed Israeli convoys through Jordanian Jerusalem.

Regarding the case of S.S. Green Island, which had snowballed into cause celebre, he said Jordan understood why ship was diverted, but rest of Arab world did not since ships of other flags were arriving daily at Aqaba. Khammash asked if US could have planes fly ammunition in. (Amman 4028, Control 3930, June 3, SECRET)

Embassy Amman stated Jordanians felt country well prepared for war. Some were apprehensive, but even these did not want US intervention. Youth enthusiastic about war.

A moderate, very pro-US senior official dumb-founded that US might consider opening Straits by force. Straits an all-Arab issue. Even Arabs desiring to see Nasser's decline were with him on his stand. (Amman 4030, Control 003934, June 3, SECRET/EXDIS)

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June 2

Burns said US must face fact that it had been out-maneuvered in Middle East "whether by accident or design".

His understanding was that if there was no UAR backdown US would be prepared to use force, alone if need be, to unblock Straits. Burns felt this plan promised far more dangers to US national interest than required.

To achieve US objectives, only hope was to declare US neutrality and get Israelis to back down. Israel could retreat by bowing to effort to avoid "dangers to international peace". If attacks on Israel continued after some months, US would not be as involved as it is now. (Amman 3984, Control 002443, June 2, SECRET/EXDIS)

Burns reported Jordan's pact with Nasser could have long-term detrimental effects on US position in Jordan. Thought Jordan's request that US remove F-104's and training mission was at UAR's request or in anticipation thereof. Hussein would probably not stop US aid projects because Nasser in no position to take over aid responsibility.

Jordanians normally moderate towards Israel and relatively isolated from Arab states. Burns questioned whether régime, after present crisis passed, would be able to return to moderate stance.

Embassy recommended no initiative to change existing relationship since this would have decidedly adverse effect on US position throughout Arab world. (Amman 3996, Control 2773, June 2, SECRET/LIMDIS)

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June 4      Ambassador Burns stated Gulf of Aqaba situation only symptomatic of basic confrontation. Real crux of matter was settlement of Palestine problem.

Burns recommended matter be settled in a convention to be convoked immediately. Believed it would be better not to honor past US commitments, if to do so would more seriously endanger overall US interest. (Amman 4040, Control 4150, June 4, SECRET/NODIS)

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June 6 - Hussein advised Embassy unless Israelis stopped attack Jordan would be finished and so would regime. Asked US to arrange immediate cease-fire. Said Israelis engaging in purely punitive attacks during past 12 hours. Fighting in Jerusalem; Holy places in danger. (Amman 4080, Control 005517, June 6, SECRET/EXDIS)

Embassy Amman learned King did not use actual phrase "cease fire". Instead, he said he must have immediate end to violent attacks.

Hussein's statement imprecise, and Embassy tried to reach him. Israelis should have realized Hussein was trying to save himself and to have de facto cease fire without its being de jure. (Amman 4081, Control 005497, June 6, SECRET/EXDIS)

King could not afford to accept unilateral cease-fire. Wished decrease in punitive destructive actions and reduction of own military effort. Could not do so unless Israelis responded. To best of King's knowledge, Jordanian forces were not hitting Israeli civilian targets.

King said Nasser, to whom he had talked, was about to issue statement accusing US of instigating conflict. Nasser would probably mention mysterious aircraft carriers as proof, and intended call for all-out war on "imperialism". King saw imposition of cease-fire by major powers as only solution. (Amman 4084, Control 005519, June 6, SECRET/EXDIS)

King called Embassy to say he had to have answer by 0600 to maintain control of situation in Jordan. (Amman 4085, Control 005518, June 6, SECRET/EXDIS)

Department instructed Burns to inform King and Prime Minister that US expected Jordan to give fullest protection to US citizens in light of Nasser's falsification of US involvement. US was moving to de-escalate fight with Jordan, and called on King to show good faith by puncturing

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June 6 - Nasser lie. US sympathetic to King's dilemma  
(cont) and was trying to end hostilities.

Department also instructed Embassy to consider problems of evacuation by military means if this became necessary. (State 208423, June 6, SECRET/EXDIS)

Embassy reported Amman radio had announced other powers were behind enemy. Broadcast stated undoubted proof available that aircraft were taking off from three carriers to bomb Jordanian forces. Jordan thus fighting imperialist Western powers as well as Israel.

Ambassador Burns urged US to make immediate statement clarifying fact that US was maintaining US commitments to all nations in area. Arabs saw in McCloskey statement tacit US admission of support for Israel.

Ambassador suggested US statement be limited to denial of participation of US forces. Said he was issuing personal statement along these lines and requesting it be broadcast. (Amman 4091, Control 005547, June 6, CONFIDENTIAL)

Department instructed Embassy Amman to inform King of US action urging Israel to agree to take steps moving toward cease-fire, and it instructed Embassy to urge King to take similar actions. Israel had been asked to slacken, and US urged Jordan to take all steps to make this possible. US urged Jordan to accept the "open city" appeal, and asked Burns to urge Hussein publicly to rebut charge concerning aircraft carriers. (State 208420, June 6, SECRET/EXDIS)

Hussein told Ambassador Jordan must stop fighting but Israel must not announce anything publicly or it would result in internal Jordanian anarchy. (Amman 4092, Control 005559, June 6, SECRET/EXDIS)

Hussein summoned Ambassadors UK, France, US, and USSR individually and informed them Jordan faced collapse or cease-fire. King begged these four, acting unilaterally or through UN, to arrange

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June 6 - cease-fire. He preferred cease-fire not be  
(cont) announced, but would do so jointly with Israelis if they insisted.

King stated UAR commander Riyadh told Hussein he had 3 alternatives: cease-fire, military evacuation of west bank, or continuation of fighting and lose west bank anyway.

After Burns returned to Embassy, Prime Minister called saying cease-fire must be arranged. If not done, Jordan Government would be unable to maintain law and order and protection of Americans or anyone else. (Amman 4095, Control 005662, June 6, SECRET/EXDIS)

Burns informed Department Jordan could have more difficulty maintaining law and order after cease-fire than before. He asked what would happen when shattered Jordanian army returned. What if Nasser called for Hussein's overthrow so that Jordan could continue the battle? (Amman 4099, Control 005701, June 6, SECRET/EXDIS)

Burns informed Department he would wait to tell Hussein the answer was "no" until instructed by Department. (Amman 4101, Control 006050, June 6, SECRET/EXDIS)

Department informed Amman that in addition to alternatives of automotive convoys to Beirut or Aqaba, it was considering using for purposes of evacuation, emergency air strips at Aqaba or H-3 if overflight clearances obtained from Saudi Arabia or Syria, and motor convoy to Yenbo or other Saudi port on Red Sea below Strait of Tiran where personnel could be picked up by ship. Department requested Embassy comments on above and on number of staff to be left behind, if any. (State 208553, June 6, SECRET/LIMDIS)

Hussein telephoned Embassy, desperate to know Israeli decision on cease-fire. Had to have decision within next 15 minutes. Burns felt no alternative but to tell him answer was no.

Hussein said no one had anticipated conflict would escalate so far and so fast. Nasser made

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June 6 - major miscalculation on timing of initial  
(cont) deployment into Sinai and closing of Straits.  
King acknowledged he could not maintain his  
forces had avoided civilian targets. Initial  
bombing of civilians done by Israeli. (Amman  
4108, Control 006306, June 6, SECRET/EXDIS/  
NOFOREIGN)

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June 7 - Embassy Tel Aviv informed Burns that, if necessary to evacuate American personnel, Israeli Government agreed Israeli Operational Command was to be instructed to do everything possible to assist Embassy Amman. (State 208787, June 7, SECRET/EXDIS)

Burns informed Dept. of intention to "standfast" in Amman. (Amman 4120, June 7, SECRET/EXDIS)

Hussein told Burns that what was thought to be a de facto cease-fire broke down when Israelis attacked along entire front. Hussein said they were converging on Jordan valley. King gave formal acceptance to cease-fire at 0400. (Amman 4121, Control 006555, June 7, CONFIDENTIAL)

Department instructed Burns to inform King U.S. urging Israelis to cease fire but that they stated Jordanian Army was still fighting and shelling of Jerusalem was continuing. If true, US urged Jordan to cease fire totally, especially attacks on Jerusalem in order to reinforce US efforts which were being undermined by continuing Jordanian fire. Ambassador asked to urge Jordan formally to notify SC of its acceptance of cease-fire. (State 208800, June 7, SECRET)

Jordan formally notified Security Council of its acceptance of cease-fire early June 7. Burns could not accept Israeli suggestion that King was following deliberately deceptive tactic.

Burns recognized Israeli Army goal might well be total destruction of Jordanian Army, an action which would have disastrous effects on the regime and on area stability as a whole. Burns gravely concerned about effect on public order and safety of the large American community. (Amman 4125, Control 006873, June 7, SECRET)

In connection with efforts to achieve cease-fire, Burns saw Chief of Staff Khammash in absence of King and Prime Minister. Khammash stated Army

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June 7 -  
(cont)

HQ had lost contact with Jerusalem units and was being bombarded.

Khammash urged immediate cease-fire to avoid meaningless massacre. Jordanian military position hopeless. (Amman 4127, Control 006951, June 7, SECRET)

Demonstrations urging Jordanian government to seek Soviet assistance had occurred. General Riyadh advised Jordanians that Soviet Union had told UAR it was prepared to give Israelis an ultimatum to cease attacks on all fronts or risk Soviet intervention. If true, USSR would win entire Arab world. Jordanian Prime Minister urged US make such a statement before USSR did.

Burns concluded that if US could not get Israel to halt and claim public credit for it, 500 Americans in Amman and 700 in West Bank could be subject mob violence, with regime in no position to offer protection. (Amman 4128, Control 007135, June 7, SECRET)

Dept. informed Embassy Amman it offered to supply emergency aid to refugees subject to availability of supplies and transportation. Dept. urgently needed official request from Jordanian Govt and authorized Burns to seek it. (State 208927, June 7, LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

Dept. informed Embassy Amman it was considering approving evacuation to take place June 8 if decision could be made by midnight. (State 209127, June 7, CONFIDENTIAL)

Embassy planned to try to evacuate 300 Americans to airport June 9, contingent on genuine cease-fire and maintenance of law and order.

To Embassy's knowledge, all potential East Bank evacuees were in Amman. West Bank Americans were presumably behind Israeli lines. Amb. Burns continued work on fall-back plans in event proposed plan infeasible. With genuine cease-fire, no need for security forces beyond usual minimum. (Amman 4131A, Control 007277, June 7, CONFIDENTIAL)

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June 7 -  
(cont)

Dept. requested best estimate and judgment on numbers and locations of casualties and displaced persons likely to result from conflict. Information needed in order to provide medical assistance, food, shelter, and clothing. (State 209141, June 7, LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

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June 8 - Amb. Burns reported Prime Minister had just informed him that an Israeli armored battalion of about 30 tanks crossed Mundessah Bridge, heading either for Amman or north to Syria. According to Wasfi Tell, route chosen indicated East Bank was target since there was better access to Syria by another route.

Israeli military activity dropped after cease-fire previous evening, but Israelis had been shelling Jordanian positions at Ramtha. King telephoned American Embassy to plead, "For God's sake get them to stop". (Amman 4134, Control 7399, June 8, SECRET)

SECRET/NODIS

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June 9 - Ambassador Burns reported plan to evacuate from Jordan all but 25 to 50 of about 130 Americans on staff. Recommended retaining the larger number if US wished to project image of no change in policies toward Jordan. Burns requested consultation in Washington at earliest possible moment. (Amman 41621, Control 008331, June 9, SECRET/EXDIS)

Jordanian Foreign Minister Touqan appealed to Ambassadors of four big powers to influence Israel not to send West Bank population out to be refugees. Jordan feared Israelis planned to keep West Bank, and that refugees would aggravate precarious internal security situation East Bank. (Amman 4180, Control 008608, June 9, SECRET)

Ambassador Burns met with King Hussein to ascertain whether Jordan intended to maintain tie with US or would have to go along with Nasser even if latter continued to blame US and UK for Arab loss. Nasser had sent Hussein word not to break with US and UK. Burns stated he would keep staff of 25. (Amman 4181, Control 8680, June 9, SECRET/EXDIS)

Department informed Ambassador Burns US did not want to change posture regarding Jordan any more than circumstances required. Final decision on evacuation of staff down to 25 or less would be up to Ambassador. (State 209746, June 9, CONFIDENTIAL)

Jordanian King asked Embassy Amman for clarification of Arab doubts concerning alleged US and UK intervention on side Israel. King suggested US invite UN to examine circumstantial evidence pertaining to issue, and render impartial verdict regarding Western involvement. Hussein would take initiative of making request for investigation to absolve US. If US wished to ask for examination, GOJ would not do so. (Amman 4190, Control 009085, June 10, SECRET)

SECRET/NODIS

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June 10 - Radio Amman carried message from King to Nasser urging Nasser's continuance in office. Broadcast came one-half hour prior to Radio Cairo's announcement Nasser had withdrawn resignation. Burns felt Hussein's cable was well-timed gesture of Arabism, made in full knowledge it would in no way affect Nasser's decision to resign. (Amman 4199, Control 009308, June 10, CONFIDENTIAL)

Department reported Goldberg had stated in SC on June 6 US would offer full cooperation to UN in investigation of charges US and UK involved in support Israel. Jordanians would realize on reflection not in own interest to take such initiative, which would be bound to antagonize other Middle Eastern states. (State 210141, June 10, SECRET/EXDIS)

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CHRONOLOGY OF US-IRANIAN CONSULTATIONS  
ON MIDDLE EAST  
May 25 - June 10, 1967

May 25 - "Official Iranian sources" denied Nasser's May 23 accusation of sale of Iranian oil to Israel, attacked Nasser's "policy of instigation, sabotage and fratricide." Foreign Ministry declined to confirm statement. (Tehran 4688, Control 26447, May 25, LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

US Embassy "reasonably confident" there would be no Iranian military contribution to Arab effort in event of Arab-Israeli hostilities. Shah suspicious that Nasser had created present crisis with deliberate aim of restoration of US aid in return for calming down. (Tehran 4698, Control 26646, May 25, SECRET/NODIS)

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May 28 - Kohler-Ansary meeting. Iranian Amb. Ansary would fly to Bonn for talks with Shah on Middle East. Shah concerned about Iran's increasingly isolated position and lack of forceful US position against Nasser's moves. Kohler appreciated Iran's position and fact it had not compromised itself in haste. (State 203992, May 28, SECRET)

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June 5 - Harriman-Shah meeting: Shah said all Arabs would be united on issue of conflict with Israel. Nasser must eventually be stopped, but some other issue must be found. Shah himself could not oppose Moslem issue, would have to give lip-service support. His primary concern, however, was with how Nasser's influence could be reduced and eventually destroyed.  
(Paris 19869, Control 5038, June 5, Secret/Exdis)

Dept. requested Harriman to tell Shah next day that President would like opportunity for personal discussions, especially on Middle East crisis.

(State 208388, June 5, Secret/Exdis)

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June 6 - Harriman reported Shah hoped to come to Washington at later date, but had to return to Tehran following day. Shah expressed earnest desire to continue close exchange of views, repeated that Nasser must be stopped. (Paris, 19914, Control 5803, June 6, SECRET/EXDIS)

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June 7 - Iranian Amb. Ansary called on Rostow. Ansary said GOI would help convey to Faisal and Hussein our strong desire maintain close relations. Ansary said Shah prepared to help. In discussion of post-war situation, Ansary said Arabs unlikely to accept existence of Israeli state. Rostow remarked that Israelis were in strong bargaining position. Ansary concluded by hoping Iran could be strong moderate force after war.  
(State 209086, June 7, Secret/Exdis)

Secretary's message handed to court minister for delivery to Shah. Shah approved despatch of messages to Faisal and Hussein.  
(Tehran 4868, Control 6179, June 7, Secret)

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June 8 - Message from President Johnson to Shah requesting his thoughts on means of attaining post-war prosperity and regional cooperation in Middle East.  
(State 209548, June 8, Secret/Exdis)

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June 9 - Iranian Amb. Ansary received briefing at Department. Ansary said Shah felt Israelis should show restraint in postwar expectations, although recognition of Israel as a state and problem of Arab refugees must be faced. Said fact that Arabs humiliated poses particular problem. Rostow said Shah could usefully point out to Israelis that it would be mistake for Israelis to drive Arab population out of west-bank area across Jordan River. (State 210119, June 10, SECRET/EXDIS)

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June 10 - In response to Under Secretary Rostow's suggestion of June 9, Shah sent message to attempt to persuade Israelis to provide for Arab population on west bank and not drive them across Jordan River. (State 210153, June 10, SECRET/EXDIS)

Iranian Foreign Minister informed US Amb. that Shah had received favorable replies from both Feisal and Hussein in response to his pleas that they should not break relations with US. (Tehran 4899, Control 9455, June 10, SECRET)

Ansary again briefed at Dept. Battle indicated Iran could play useful role in working for solutions to problems in Middle East. US wanted Iran's views. Mentioned uncertainties which existed, such as status of Nasser and position of Soviets. Ansary said major problem is credence being given in Arab world to charges US assisted Israeli military. (State 210119, June 10, SECRET/EXDIS)

In response to President Johnson's message of June 8 to Shah, latter proposed either US send special emissary to Iran or Iran send one to US. (Tehran 4900, Control 9451, June 10, SECRET/EXDIS)

Department replied that it would seem premature for U.S. to send special representative to Tehran, but would receive GOI representative for discussions provided no publicity attended this mission and that he realized top level of USG extremely busy at moment. Ansary would recommend postponing decision. (State 210152, June 10, SECRET/EXDIS)

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6/15/67

CHRONOLOGY OF US-UK CONSULTATIONS ON  
THE MIDDLE EAST  
May 15 - June 6, 1967

May 15 - Under Secretary Rostow called in British and French Ambassadors. Stated that we hoped by diplomatic approaches in Damascus and Cairo to reassure Israelis and relieve pressure on them to take unilateral action in response to recent terrorist attacks. We hoped British and French Governments would also use their influence in Cairo and Damascus. (State 194945, May 15, CONFIDENTIAL)

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May 18 - Under Secretary Rostow received the UK and French Ambassadors jointly for an exchange of views on the situation. He mentioned the possibility of a tripartite approach to the Soviets.

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May 21 - Amb. Dean called on Under Secretary Rostow. Discussed proposed letter from Foreign Secretary Brown to U Thant urging importance of maintaining UNEF and expanding UN presence in area. Dean stated that UK regarded Tripartite Declaration as being out of date, to which Rostow replied that US considered principles of Declaration still valid. Dean stated that HMG did not wish to become involved in military contingency planning at this time. Rostow indicated USG was considering presenting paper to all governments in area reiterating US position; US would like UK and France to join US in this.

Rostow subsequently called Dean to remind him of Prime Minister Wilson's statement of April 13, 1965, in support of Tripartite Declaration. Embassy London instructed to seek confirmation that Tripartite Declaration remained policy of British Government. (State 198959, May 21, SECRET/EXDIS)

SECRET/NODIS

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May 22 - Rostow informed Dean of our reactions to the UAR announcement closing the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping and to other shipping carrying strategic material to Israel. He said our primary reliance was on the UN but a situation might arise where we were required to carry out public commitments of both the US and UK to defend the territorial integrity and political independence of all countries in the Middle East. This was the continuing position of the US and we hoped of the UK.

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May 23 - Embassy London reported Cabinet was about to meet to consider proposing that US and others join UK, ahead of UN action, in declaration of intention to assure free passage in straits and to concert naval activities to assure such passage. Foreign Secretary Brown would like to talk with Secretary Rusk before Cabinet meeting. (London 9751, Control 23274, May 23, SECRET/NODIS)

Rostow informed Dean we welcomed the UK proposal for a declaration of maritime powers and for the organization of a naval force in the Red Sea. We did not wish to get out in front ourselves. Rostow suggested we organize naval talks.

Dean said his instructions did not indicate the UK should get out in front either. The British proposals were subject to Cabinet approval and nothing could be done until this approval was forthcoming. (State 200292, May 23, SECRET/NODIS)

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May 24 & George Thomson, British Minister of State at  
May 25 the Foreign Office, and advisers had talks with Rostow and others on proposed British initiatives which Thomson said had been approved by the Cabinet. The Cabinet had decided some initiative was necessary to head off impending hostilities. Talks resulted in tentative agreement on joint pressure for action at current SC meeting; also, US and UK diplomatic approaches in maritime capitals to raise support for maritime declaration; military advisors would explore actions necessary to assert freedom of passage. (State 203642, May 26, SECRET/NODIS)

SECRET/NODIS

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May 25 - Message from Prime Minister Wilson to President Johnson. Reported results of approaches to French and Soviets, and stated that Cabinet had decided to support French proposal for 4-Power Ambassadorial discussions. Thomson was authorized to continue talks in Washington on draft maritime declaration and eventual approach to other maritime powers. In meantime, French proposal should be given chance to prove itself, since there would not be sufficient support for maritime declaration until SC efforts had demonstrably failed.

Message from President Johnson to Prime Minister Wilson. President opposed 4-Power meetings outside UN. (State 202732, May 26, SECRET/NODIS)

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May 26 - Dean called on Rostow to inquire regarding the results of the Eban visit. Rostow said Eban had come to Washington to see if there were a third course between peace or surrender. The proposed maritime declaration and naval force in the Red Sea offered such a possibility. Rostow suggested that the US and UK move ahead on the maritime declaration at the same time as we moved into the Security Council. (State 203800, May 27, SECRET/NODIS)

Dean informed Assistant Secretary Battle that HMG opposed to allowing Israeli-owned Liberian tanker to test closure of Strait of Tiran until contingency plans developed. (Memcon, S/S No. 9197, May 26, SECRET/EXDIS)

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May 27 - Rostow informed Dean we had received a conciliatory message from the Soviets. He said we were sending a message to the Israelis urging them not to attack. He asked that Prime Minister Wilson consider sending a similar message. (State 203961, May 28, SECRET/NODIS)

Message from Prime Minister Wilson to the President. British Amb. in Israel had been instructed to urge restraint on Israelis, and Wilson planned not to send any additional message to Eshkol. HMG was committed to freedom of maritime passage and did not wish openly to take sides in the Arab-Israeli dispute, for fear of a confrontation of the great powers. Wilson repeated his conviction that efforts should be made in New York in accordance with French proposal, and indicated he was urging Kosygin to support this action. UK hoped to achieve in this way broad support for maritime declaration. (State 203986, May 28, SECRET/NODIS)

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May 29 - Rostow briefed Dean on the status of our consideration of the crisis. He said we hoped to have Presidential approval for our proposed policies shortly. (State 204573, May 29, SECRET/NODIS)

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May 30 - Rostow again briefed Dean. He said we hoped to start US-UK naval talks soon as well as consultation on plans for a test of the Straits. (State 204951, May 31, SECRET/EXDIS)

Embassy London reported that HMG concerned over economic consequences of loss of Arab oil if UK acted in manner interpreted by Arabs as hostile. (London 9931, Control 31281, May 30, SECRET/NODIS)

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June 1 - Rostow asked the UK to send a senior level team to Washington for policy discussions. The UK was also asked to send experts for consultation on oil, trade and financial questions. (State 206818, June 2, CONFIDENTIAL/EXDIS)

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June 2 - Embassy London reported that UK Foreign Office displeased over Dept. statement of June 1 which referred to "British initiative" on maritime declaration. (London 10100, Control 3140, June 2, SECRET/LIMDIS)

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June 3 - Embassy London was instructed to follow up with the Foreign Office on the procedures for handling the proposed maritime declaration. (State 207961, June 3, SECRET/LIMDIS)

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June 4 - Rostow told Dean we would inform the UK immediately if we had any indication that Israel intended to force the passage alone. He said we now had approval to go ahead with the proposed international naval force. Joint naval planning talks were scheduled for June 6.

Dean said the UK would not support a unilateral Israeli effort to force the passage because an unescorted probe was an invitation to the Egyptians to fire. (State 208026, June 4, SECRET/EXDIS)

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June 5 - The Secretary told Dean we hoped to get a cease-fire resolution from the Security Council. We had received no advance inkling from either side of the outbreak of hostilities. (State 208047, June 5, SECRET/EXDIS)

Dean reviewed situation with Under Secretary Rostow, who detailed actions taken by USG since outbreak of war. Dean suggested that might not be good idea to pursue Maritime Declaration, which Soviets might not favor, if USSR cooperating for cease-fire. Rostow set forth his thinking on formation of a Middle East Special Consultative Group in NATO. (State 208140, June 5, SECRET/EXDIS)

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June 6 - Amb. Dean told Secretary Rusk that Foreign Office felt work on proposed maritime declaration should be halted for time being, and that any decision on NATO consideration of Middle East should be foregone until Ministerial meeting. (Memcon, S/S No. 9624, June 6, CONFIDENTIAL)

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6/15/67

CHRONOLOGY OF US-USSR CONSULTATIONS  
ON THE MIDDLE EAST  
MAY 18 - JUNE 10, 1967

May 18 - Under Secretary Rostow expressed his concern to Soviet Charge Tcherniakov over Israeli-Syrian tensions and told him of Syrian Government rumors to effect that Syria had been promised unlimited military and political support by USSR. Rostow said he hoped rumors not true, and Soviet Charge stated he was not aware of such rumors. (State 197661, May 18, SECRET/EXDIS)

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May 19 - Department stated to Embassies Moscow, Paris, and London that if conflict occurred in Middle East, USSR would be in difficult spot. Russian temptation would be to aid Egypt and Syria, but USSR was reluctant to promote hostilities in Arab world as means to exert pressure on US over Vietnam. USSR realized Middle Eastern war would be difficult to control. They would make at least unilateral efforts to stop it if cooperation with US should prove embarrassing. (State 198146, May 19, SECRET)

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May 22 - Embassy Moscow reported Soviet propaganda regarding Arab-Israeli confrontation relatively low-key. In Embassy's opinion, shared by British, Soviet press coverage not inflammatory and did not offer incitement to Arabs. (Moscow 5055, Control 022246, May 22, CONFIDENTIAL)

In letter to Chairman Kosygin, President called for joint effort of USSR with USG to use full influence toward moderation, including influence over action by UN. (State 198583, May 19, TOP SECRET/NODIS/Literally Eyes Only For the Ambassador from the Secretary; letter delivered to USSR May 22)

TOP SECRET/NODIS

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May 23 - Department asked Embassy Moscow if USSR fully aware US commitments to oppose aggression in Middle East, and if possible need for firmer statements regarding US intentions. (State 199745, May 23, SECRET)

Secretary informed Embassy Moscow situation had seriously worsened. Instructed Ambassador Thompson to see Foreign Minister Gromyko to obtain USSR cooperation in reducing tension. (State 199746, May 23, SECRET/EXDIS)

Ambassador Thompson said President's letter to Kosygin under consideration Soviet Government. Gromyko told Thompson USSR considered war in Middle East unnecessary. Gromyko maintained Israelis followed course antithetical to peace in area. (Moscow 5078, control 023541, May 23, SECRET/EXDIS)

UAR Ambassador Ghaleb, in dinner party conversation with Ambassador Thompson, claimed USSR statement of support for Arabs had been important factor in leading to settlement in 1956 crisis. (Moscow 5106, control 025469, May 24, CONFIDENTIAL)

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May 24 - Pravda barely veiled charge US responsible Israeli aggression. Statement warned of decisive counter-action on part of USSR in event of aggression. Thompson felt USSR was currying Arab favor. If war was averted, Soviets could say that strong warning to Israel preserved peace. (Moscow 5101, control 24449, May 24, CONFIDENTIAL)

Chairman Kosygin told British Foreign Secretary Brown that unilateral declarations while U Thant and others in Cairo could prove injurious. Brown concluded Soviets genuinely worried by situation and alert to the dangers and had accepted a responsibility to try to keep events under control. (Memcon, David V. Bendall, Counselor of UK Embassy, and Malcolm Toon, Country Director, SOV, May 25, 1967)

TOP SECRET/NODIS

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May 25 - Ambassador Thompson reported conviction Soviets did not want become involved in Middle East war. Soviets not anxious become involved if major powers forced Straits. If powers did not act and war broke out, Soviets would not be much concerned about involvement. They would make statements which they could exploit later. Even if Israel won, resultant Arab hatreds of West would enable USSR to re-establish position in Arab world. (Moscow 5125, control 026728, May 25, SECRET)

British Foreign Secretary George Brown asked Gromyko if he had seen French proposal for quadripartite talks on crisis. Gromyko stated French had made no official approach to Soviet Government, and commented that those encouraging Israel seemed to be taking more reasonable attitude. Brown asked Gromyko let him know Soviet view. (Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, David V. Bendall, UK Embassy, and Malcolm Toon, SOV, May 26, 1967)

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May 26 - Pravda comment regarding status Gulf of Aqaba stopped short of explicitly endorsing UAR claim to possession of waters. Tenor of remarks implied UAR interference with shipping historically justified. (Moscow 5140, Control 27208, May 26, CONFIDENTIAL)

In conversation with Sedov, Second Secretary Soviet Embassy, Garthoff noted Federenko's request for US withdrawal of Sixth Fleet from Mediterranean made at UN on May 24. Garthoff suggested it seemed as though Soviets had been aware of coming Near Eastern crisis, since Brezhnev had first called for withdrawal of Sixth Fleet on April 24. Sedov termed earlier question of Sixth Fleet presence in Mediterranean a coincidence, and gave vague statement regarding manner of Soviet involvement should crisis erupt into conflict. (Memcon, Boris N. Sedov and Raymond L. Garthoff, G/PM, May 26, CONFIDENTIAL)

Referring to Department's circular telegram 202592 of same date (see Chronology of US-Israeli Consultations), Ambassador Thompson questioned statement that limiting US action to regular diplomatic channels would minimize direct involvement major powers. Thompson estimated danger US-USSR confrontation greater in event Arab-Israeli hostilities than in prompt action US, UK, and others to open Gulf of Aqaba. Stated action with dispatch would be less risky than prolonged hostilities with possibility of greater pressures. (Moscow 5155, Control 27841, May 26, SECRET/EXDIS)

Soviet Commercial Attaché Michael Frolov told Embassy Tel Aviv Soviets believed Nasser intended show of solidarity with Syrians by moving forces to Sinai. He stated, "we can stop Egyptian shooting--can you stop Israelis from running a ship?" Volunteered view Arab pilots not good--could only take off and land. Asserted USSR would not participate in Middle Eastern conflict, but would continue to support friends near borders. (USDAO Tel Aviv 0672, Control 028051, May 26, CONFIDENTIAL)

Soviet Ambassador to France Valerian Zorin volunteered to US Ambassador Bohlen that 1950 Tripartite declaration no basis for settlement current crisis. Zorin dismissed French proposal quadripartite talks because US bombing Vietnam. (Paris 19320, Control 029334, May 27, CONFIDENTIAL)

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May 27 - Chairman Kosygin told British Foreign Secretary Brown that President Johnson's letter on Middle East and other subjects contained nothing constructive. (MOSCOW 5169, Control 029221, May 27, TOP SECRET/NODIS)

President wrote Chairman Kosygin to emphasize need for joint US-USSR efforts at reduction tension in Middle East, and to urge prompt solution to issue of Strait of Tiran. (STATE 203963, May 28, TOP SECRET/NODIS/LITERALLY EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR)

Chairman Kosygin wrote British Prime Minister Wilson emphasizing danger of situation on borders of Syria and Israel, and indicating strongly that Israel would not act so boldly without encouragement of Great Britain. Kosygin maintained Arab states were taking defensive measures. If Israel committed aggression and military action began, Kosygin promised USSR aid to victims of aggression. (STATE 204008, May 28, SECRET/NODIS)

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May 28 - Secretary wrote to Foreign Minister Gromyko stating vigorous US representations in Israel had had effect hoped for. Nasser's reiterated commitment to closing of Strait of Tiran was central problem. Rusk called for two-week moratorium on UAR policy of closing Strait. Secretary termed moratorium proposal best way to achieve goal of no hostilities. (STATE 204027, May 28, SECRET/NODIS)

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June 5 - Secretary sent message to Foreign Minister Gromyko expressing US astonishment and dismay at outbreak of hostilities between Israel and Egypt, and stressed readiness of US to cooperate with all members of UN Security Council to end fighting as soon as possible. (STATE 208030, June 5, SECRET)

US Chargé d'Affaires Guthrie reported Foreign Minister Gromyko convinced great powers should do everything to guarantee cessation of fighting and liquidate military conflict. Gromyko maintained USSR had done and would continue to do all in power to bring about cessation. (MOSCOW 5349, Control 004688, June 5, SECRET)

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June 6 - Embassy Moscow reported that a First Deputy Foreign Minister, Vasily Kuznetsov, remarked many statements US press did not serve to calm situation. Kuznetsov repeated Soviet efforts were directed toward achieving cease-fire. (MOSCOW 5360, Control 005722, June 6, SECRET/EXDIS)

US Chargé d'Affaires Guthrie reported that Pravda claimed US not only knew, but also directly incited Israeli attack on UAR. Pravda also maintained that US was determined to open Strait. (MOSCOW 5361, Control 006085, June 6, CONFIDENTIAL)

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June 7 - French Ambassador Lucet and Under Secretary Rostow discussed Middle East crisis. Rostow stated it was encouraging that USSR capitulated on question of cease-fire and did not insist on withdrawal to positions held before hostilities. (STATE 209550, June 8, SECRET/EXDIS)

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June 8 - In two telephone conversations with Soviet Charge Tcherniakov, Deputy Under Secretary Kohler said eight military aircraft were being sent from US carrier Saratoga to investigate torpedoing of USS Liberty. Tcherniakov repeated his understanding purpose of mission was solely to investigate. (Telcon, Foy D. Kohler and Yuri N. Tcherniakov, June 8, SECRET)

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June 9 - In circular telegram Department said speculation Soviets schemed with Arabs to stage crisis as means of pressure in connection Viet-Nam not valid on basis evidence. US characterization Soviet behavior was that USSR unwilling confront US, and US-USSR efforts to bring cease-fire parallel. Almost certain disillusionment Moscow with Arabs. (STATE 209960, June 9, CONFIDENTIAL)

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#### FOREWORD

This paper was prepared at the request of the Executive Secretariat. It consists of an overall chronology of United States consultations with various Middle East countries, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union; separate detailed chronologies of consultations held with each of those countries; and an annex containing a chronology of press reports and the texts of the key public statements issued by the United States during the crisis.

The chronologies were drafted by H. Bartholomew Cox, Allen W. Locke, and Mrs. Cora H. Feld of the Historical Studies Division and Miss Eva Smetacek of the Office of Israel and Arab-Israel Affairs.



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6/21/67

CHRONOLOGY OF CONSULTATIONS  
ON THE  
PROPOSED MARITIME DECLARATION  
MAY 23 - JUNE 6, 1967

May 23 - Embassy London reported Cabinet was about to meet to consider proposing that US and others join UK, ahead of UN action, in declaration of intention to assure free passage in straits and to concert naval activities to assure such passage. Foreign Secretary Brown would like to talk with Secretary Rusk before Cabinet meeting. (London 9751, Control 23274, May 23, SECRET/NODIS)

Under Secretary Rostow informed Ambassador Dean that US pleased with proposed British initiative. We did not want to get out in front at the time, but UK might wish to approach other maritime powers to get things started. Dean said his instructions did not indicate that UK should get out in front either. British proposals were subject to Cabinet approval and nothing could be done until this approval was forthcoming. Rostow raised possibility of "join with" approach. (State 200292, May 23, SECRET/NODIS)

Ambassador Barbour authorized to float British idea of maritime group with Israeli Government. (State 199836, May 23, SECRET/NODIS)

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May 24 - Meeting of British delegation, headed by Minister of State Thomson, with US group led by Under Secretary Rostow. Thomson said HMG proposing discussions on maritime declaration to maritime countries. Foreign Secretary was in Moscow for discussions on this topic, and Thomson was in US for same purpose. Rostow said US welcomed British initiative, at which Thomson interjected that HMG did not wish to get too far in front on this subject. Rostow told UK representatives that HMG could inform other countries that US regarded British initiative as encouraging development and was currently studying matter. (Memcon, Rostow et al - Thomson, et al, May 24, SECRET/NODIS)

Thomson told Secretary Rusk he had been instructed to take back to London a practical scheme of action on maritime declaration to deter Israel and UAR. Secretary stated that UN must be used to maximum degree and any declaration should be supported by as many countries as possible. (Memcon, the Secretary, et al -- Thomson, et al, May 24, SECRET/NODIS)

Afternoon US-UK plenary session, at which draft maritime declaration, prepared by Leonard Meeker (Department's Legal Adviser) and Mr. Sinclair (UK) presented. Decided that US and UK would make joint diplomatic approaches in 27 selected capitals. Recommendations offered for revision of draft declaration and decision reached that final text to be submitted to US and UK Ambassadors to UN for review and comment. Rostow pointed out that USG might have to be supporter of UK initiative, rather than co-sponsor of declaration. Thomson said UK hoped US would be co-sponsor. (Memcon, US/UK Plenary Session on Near East Crisis, May 25, SECRET/NODIS)

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May 25 - Under Secretary Rostow discussed UK proposal for maritime declaration with Israeli Ambassador Harman. Explained proposal contained two elements: joint declaration embodying ideas expressed publicly by President and Prime Minister Wilson; contingency plans to keep straits open by naval patrols. US found proposal promising, but would have no firm position until final decision made at highest level. (State 202589, May 26, SECRET/EXDIS)

Prime Minister Wilson informed President that US-UK efforts on terms of proposed maritime declaration had been authorized by Cabinet. UK wished, however, to give French proposal chance to prove itself before details of declaration settled. (State 202732, May 26, SECRET/NODIS)

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May 26 - Department recommended that President take positive position, but not final action, on British proposal. Explained that plan consisted of four steps: effort in Security Council; maritime declaration; military contingency plan; UN presence between Israel and UAR. (Memo for President from Secretary, S/S No. 9125, May 26, SECRET)

In conversation with Dean, Rostow suggested US and UK continue work on maritime declaration. Question with declaration was how clear an implied commitment to use force if necessary could be made and still induce governments to sign. (State 203800, May 27, SECRET/NODIS)

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May 27 - Minister Thomson in message to Rostow  
detailed the military actions taken by  
HMG in support of contingency plan.  
(via letter from Dean to Rostow, S/S No.  
9654, May 27, SECRET/EXDIS)

SECRET/NODIS

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SECRET/NODIS

May 30 - Department informed President that UK had made soundings on proposed Declaration with Italy, Norway, Denmark, Netherlands, Belgium, Greece, Panama, Liberia, Japan. US had made informal approaches on Declaration and possible use of force with France, Belgium, Canada, Netherlands, India, Italy, Norway. Most nations prepared to support principle of Declaration, but not use of force to secure adherence to principle.

Department recommended that: President approve draft Declaration; authorize, after Congressional consultation, instructions to Ambassadors in selected countries to seek commitments to Declaration; authorize additional steps concerning contingency planning for use of force. (Memo for President, S/S No. 9320, May 30, SECRET/EXDIS)

SECRET/NODIS

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SECRET/NODIS

May 31 - Department instructed Embassies in maritime capitals to solicit, after coordination with British, support for draft declaration. Indicated that Israeli Ambassadors would strongly support US and UK efforts. (State Circulars 205690 and 205691, May 31, SECRET/LIMDIS)

SECRET/NODIS

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SECRET/NODIS

June 1 - Department spokesman at press briefing referred to US support of "British initiative as announced by Foreign Minister Brown yesterday."

Posts instructed to avoid public reference to existence of draft declaration, refer only to fact that US and UK consulting other maritime powers on principles of Aqaba situation. (State Circular 206639, June 1, SECRET)

Embassy London reported that British Cabinet insisted that other nations join US and UK in canvassing support for maritime declaration. UK did not want to make first approach to Scandinavians, preferred Dutch do it. (London 10027, Control 1264, June 1, SECRET/LIMDIS)

British Embassy official informed Department that Foreign Office strongly opposed to associating Israel and Israeli Ambassadors with diplomatic efforts to obtain support for declaration. Would change character of matter from one of principle to one of partisanship. (Memcon, Everett (UK) - Hinton (US), June 1, SECRET)

SECRET/NODIS

SECRET/NODIS

June 2 - Department spokesman informed press that US drafted maritime declaration was subject of discussion among number of governments. (State Circular 207786, June 2, LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

To suppress press leaks and speculation about declaration, Department instructed posts to limit comments to press to minimum. Might say only that consulting with government to which accredited on Middle East situation and general principles which might facilitate settlement. (State 206839, June 2, LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

Spanish Embassy official inquired of Department concerning declaration. Received verbal summary of main points, and was informed of criteria by which countries were selected for approaches. (State 207766, June 2, SECRET/LIMDIS)

Positions of five countries on maritime declaration made known:

Australian Government stated willingness to adhere to declaration. (Canberra 5850, Control 3203, June 2, SECRET/LIMDIS)

Dutch Cabinet approved declaration, agreed to support US and UK in other capitals.

Iceland agreed to support declaration.

Argentina informed US that it did not consider itself maritime power, would not participate in declaration.

France indicated it felt its proposal for Four Power meeting was best alternative; did not believe maritime declaration would help situation.

Discussion on proposed ~~Maritime~~ Declaration between US and UK representatives. Agreed that there should be no joint military contingency planning at that time, because of danger of leaks. (Memcon, Secretary Rusk, et al - Sir Burke Trend, et al, S/S No. 10261, June 2, SECRET)

SECRET/NODIS

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SECRET/NODIS

June 2 - Embassy London reported "acute unhappiness" of  
(cont) Foreign Office officials over Department's  
June 1 statement on "British initiative."  
Officials also complained about lack of  
instructions to US Ambassadors to secure broadest  
support for contingency planning, and about fact  
Israeli Ambassadors following up US and UK approaches.  
(London 10100, Control 3140, June 2, SECRET/LIMDIS)

Department expressed concern to UK that many UK  
Ambassadors still without instructions to concert  
with US colleagues on approaches to obtain support  
for draft declaration. Department agreed that  
preferable for Dutch to approach Scandinavians,  
but overriding consideration was that US and UK  
approaches should be made promptly. Should suffice  
if Dutch follow up initial US and UK approaches.  
Strongly urged against further British delays.  
British should also play down contingency planning  
for time being. (State 207008, June 2, SECRET/LIMDIS)

Assistant Secretary Battle recommended, and the  
Secretary concurred, that agreement be reached by  
the US and UK to eliminate conflicts between US and  
UK instructions to Ambassadors aimed at mobilizing  
support for draft maritime declaration. (Memo,  
Battle to Secretary Rusk, S/S No. 9522, June 2,  
SECRET)

SECRET/NODIS

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET/NODIS

June 3 - Department informed by Embassy London that U.K. had now issued instructions to its posts consonant with those of U.S. This result of Cabinet decision that, in view U.S. diplomatic actions, U.K. must fall in line with de facto situation. U.K. still desired early discussions of contingency planning with certain countries, and ~~remained~~ **opposed** to Israeli follow-up approaches on declaration; took "exceedingly dim view" of idea that Israel might sign declaration. (London 10108, Control 3857, June 3, SECRET/LIMDIS)

New Zealand publicly announced support for maritime declaration. (Wellington 2294, Control 3923, June 3, UNCLASSIFIED)

Department urged on posts in maritime countries importance of broadest possible adherence to maritime declaration at earliest possible moment. Posts told to estimate position of government to which accredited by c.o.b., June 5. (State 207932, June 3, SECRET/LIMDIS)

U.K. requested to make initial approach concerning maritime declaration to President of Malagasy Republic during his visit to London. (State 207952, June 3, SECRET/LIMDIS)

U.S. would approach Costa Rica, Colombia, Chile on maritime declaration. (State 207967, June 3, SECRET/LIMDIS)

Norwegian Embassy official inquired of Department about status of maritime declaration. Informed that Norway would be formally consulted shortly, if approach had not been made already. Official uninstructed to comment on declaration at this time, but **indicated** that Norway would be reluctant to support any declaration related to use of force. (Memcon, Vibe (Norway) - Hinton (U.S.), June 3, SECRET)

SECRET/NODIS

DECLASSIFIED



SECRET/NODIS

June 4 - U.S. and U.K. discussed formula to satisfy Belgium's desire for additional paragraph in maritime declaration intended to put greater emphasis on U.N. solution. Change suggested by U.S. to include Italian desires, as well. (Memo, D. Hinton to Assistant Secretary Battle, June 4, SECRET/LIMDIS)

Australia concerned over apparent discrepancy between U.S. and U.K. approaches on maritime declaration. U.K. specifically requested that Australia participate in contingency planning; U.S. had not. Department explained U.S. view that contingency planning should not be tied to efforts to secure adherence to declaration. (State 208010, June 4, SECRET/LIMDIS)

Ambassador Dean informed Department that British agreed that maritime declaration should be issued simultaneously by signatories in respective capitals, following which signatories would separately forward it to SC for circulation. British also felt that important for Germany to sign, especially if Italy and France did not. (Memo of telephone conversation between R. Grey (U.S.) and Ambassador Dean (U.K.), June 4, SECRET)

Concerned at widespread signs of resistance to draft declaration expressed by chairman of Department's Task Force Subcommittee on the declaration. Recommended high-level approaches to several key countries. (Memo, Hinton to Assistant Secretary Battle, June 4, SECRET/LIMDIS)

SECRET/NODIS

SECRET/NODIS

June 5 - Department instructed all posts to suspend all maritime declaration activities. (State Circular 208067, June 5, SECRET/LIMDIS)

SECRET/NODIS

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET/NODIS

June 6 - Assistant Secretary Battle recommended that Control Group on Middle East crisis hold MADEC operations in suspense until hostilities had ceased, and that utility of maritime declaration be again reviewed after end of hostilities. (Memo, Battle to Control Group, June 6, SECRET)

SECRET/NODIS

DECLASSIFIED



A N N E X

PRINCIPAL U.S. POLICY  
STATEMENTS ON THE MIDDLE  
EAST CRISIS, MAY 23 -  
JUNE 8, 1967

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

June 13, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR

NSC SPECIAL COMMITTEE

On the basis of last night's discussion, it seems likely that we will wish to stay with our existing policy statements for the next few days. For the convenience of all departments, I enclose copies of the documents which together constitute our on-the-record position today. They are:

1. The President's statement of May 23.
2. White House statement of June 5.
3. The President's letter to Senator Mansfield of June 8.
4. The Resolution introduced by Ambassador Goldberg on June 8.

*McGeorge Bundy*  
McGeorge Bundy



FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

MAY 23, 1967

OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY

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THE WHITE HOUSE

REMARKS OF THE PRESIDENT  
ON THE NEAR EAST SITUATION  
THE FISH ROOM

AT 6:10 P.M. EDT

In recent days, tension has again arisen along the armistice lines between Israel and the Arab States. The situation there is a matter of very grave concern to the whole international community. We earnestly support all efforts, in and outside the United Nations and through its appropriate organs, including the Secretary-General, to reduce tensions and to restore stability. The Secretary-General has gone to the Near East on his mission of peace with the hopes and prayers of men of good will everywhere.

The Near East links three continents. The birthplace of civilization and of three of the world's great religions, it is the home of some 60 million people; and the crossroads between East and West.

The world community has a vital interest in peace and stability in the Near East, one that has been expressed primarily through continuing United Nations action and assistance over the past 20 years.

The United States, as a member of the United Nations, and as a nation dedicated to a world order based on law and mutual respect, has actively supported efforts to maintain peace in the Near East.

The danger, and it is a very grave danger, lies in some miscalculation arising from a misunderstanding of the intentions and actions of others.

The Government of the United States is deeply concerned in particular, with three potentially explosive aspects of the present confrontation.

First, we regret that the General Armistice Agreements have failed to prevent warlike acts from the territory of one against another government, or against civilians, or territory, under control of another government.

Second, we are dismayed at the hurried withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force from Gaza and Sinai after more than 10 years of steadfast and effective service in keeping the peace, without action by either the General Assembly or the Security Council of the United Nations. We continue to regard the presence of the United Nations in the area as a matter of fundamental importance. We intend to support its continuance with all possible vigor.

MORE

(OVER)

Third, we deplore the recent build-up of military forces and believe it a matter of urgent importance to reduce troop concentrations. The status of sensitive areas, as the Secretary-General emphasized in his report to the Security Council, such as the Gaza Strip and the Gulf of Aqaba, is a particularly important aspect of the situation.

In this connection, I want to add that the purported closing of the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping has brought a new and very grave dimension to the crisis. The United States considers the gulf to be an international waterway and feels that a blockade of Israeli shipping is illegal and potentially disastrous to the cause of peace. The right of free, innocent passage of the international waterway is a vital interest of the entire international community.

The Government of the United States is seeking clarification on this point. We have already urged Secretary-General Thant to recognize the sensitivity of the Aqaba question and we have asked him to give it the highest priority in his discussions in Cairo.

To the leaders of all the nations of the Near East, I wish to say what three American Presidents have said before me -- that the United States is firmly committed to the support of the political independence and territorial integrity of all the nations of that area. The United States strongly opposes aggression by anyone in the area, in any form, overt or clandestine. This has been the policy of the United States led by four Presidents -- President Truman, President Eisenhower, President John F. Kennedy, and myself -- as well as the policy of both of our political parties. The record of the actions of the United States over the past 20 years, within and outside the United Nations, is abundantly clear on this point.

The United States has consistently sought to have good relations with all the states of the Near East. Regrettably this has not always been possible, but we are convinced that our differences with individual states of the area and their differences with each other must be worked out peacefully and in accordance with accepted international practice.

We have always opposed -- and we oppose in other parts of the world at this very moment -- the efforts of other nations to resolve their problems with their neighbors by the aggression route. We shall continue to do so. And tonight we appeal to all other peace-loving nations to do likewise.

I call upon all concerned to observe in a spirit of restraint their solemn responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations and the General Armistice agreements. These provide an honorable means of preventing hostilities until, through the efforts of the international community, a peace with justice and honor can be achieved.

I have been in close and very frequent contact -- and will be in the hours and days ahead -- with our able Ambassador, Mr. Goldberg, at the United Nations, where we are now pursuing the matter with great vigor, and we hope that the Security Council can and will act effectively.

END

AT 6:19 P.M. EDT



FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

JUNE 5, 1967

Office of the White House Press Secretary

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THE WHITE HOUSE

STATEMENT BY PRESS SECRETARY  
GEORGE CHRISTIAN

We are deeply distressed to learn that large scale fighting has broken out in the Middle East, an eventuality we had sought to prevent.

Each side has accused the other of launching aggression. At this time the facts are not clear. But we do know that tragic consequences will flow from this needless and destructive struggle if the fighting does not cease immediately.

The United Nations Security Council has been called into urgent session.

In accordance with his policy instituted earlier to keep the Congress advised of developments in the Middle East crisis, the President has asked Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara to brief the Senate and House leaders at 9:30 a.m. today. At 8:30 this morning the President will meet with Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, Walt Rostow and George Christian.

The United States will devote all its energies to bring about an end to the fighting and a new beginning of programs to assure the peace and development of the entire area. We call upon all parties to support the Security Council in bringing about an immediate cease fire.

# # #

Dear Mr. President:

As I said this morning, it would be a great help to me, and I think to the Senate as a whole if we could have your own current views on the situation in the Middle East. That situation has developed so rapidly in recent days, and the issues before us there are of such great importance, that the Senate would be grateful, I am sure, to have your own present assessment.

Sincerely,

/s/ Mike Mansfield

June 8, 1967

Dear Mike:

I am delighted to respond to your note with a brief statement on the current situation as we see it. I entirely share your view that it is good for the President and the Senate to be in close touch on this matter.

Our most urgent present concern is to find a way to bring the fighting in the Middle East to an end. We are deeply concerned that there has not yet been an effective response to the two unanimous votes by which the U N Security Council has called for a cease-fire. While the representative of Israel agreed to comply if other parties also agreed, only Jordan, among the Arab States, has agreed to the cease-fire.

Ambassador Goldberg, on my instructions, has requested the immediate convening of another Security Council session, to deal with the current situation, and we have presented a Resolution whose text I attach.

The fighting has already brought the suffering and pain that comes with all such conflict. These losses have included the lives of Americans engaged in the work of peaceful communication on the high seas. On this matter we have found it necessary to make a prompt and firm protest to the Israel Government which, to its credit, had already acknowledged its responsibility and had apologized. This tragic episode will underline for all Americans the correctness of our own urgent concern that the fighting should stop at once.

So we continue to believe that a cease-fire is the urgent first step required to bring about peace in that troubled part of the

- 2 -

world. At the same time we know, of course, that a ceasefire will be only a beginning and that many more fundamental questions must be tackled promptly if the area is to enjoy genuine stability. Our new Resolution begins to deal with some of these questions.

Let me emphasize that the U.S. continues to be guided by the same basic policies which have been followed by this Administration and three previous Administrations. These policies have always included a consistent effort on our part to maintain good relations with all the peoples of the area in spite of the difficulties caused by some of their leaders. This remains our policy despite the unhappy rupture of relations which has been declared by several Arab states.

We hope that the individual states in the Middle East will now find new ways to work out their differences with each other by the means of peace, and in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. We look beyond the current conflict to a new era of greater stability which will permit all the peoples of the area to enjoy the fruits of lasting peace. Our full efforts will be directed to this end.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Mike Mansfield  
United States Senate  
Washington, D. C.

P. S. While this letter was in the typewriter I learned of the announcement, in the proceedings of the Security Council, that the United Arab Republic accepts the ceasefire resolutions subject only to acceptance by Israel. Thus we seem at the edge of progress in the directions this letter indicates. You can be sure that this Government will continue its work for peace, especially in the Security Council where Ambassador Goldberg has done such brilliant and productive work in the last days.

The Security Council

Recalling its resolutions 233 and 234

Recalling that in the latter resolution the Council demanded that the Governments concerned should as a first step cease fire and discontinue military operations at 2000 hours GMT of 7 June 1967.

Noting that Israel and Jordan have indicated their mutual acceptance of the Council's demand for a cease-fire, and that Israel has expressed with respect to all parties its acceptance of the cease-fire provided the other parties accept.

Noting further with deep concern that other parties to the conflict have not yet agreed to a cease-fire,

1. Calls for scrupulous compliance by Israel and Jordan with the agreement they have reached on a cease-fire,

2. Insists that all the other parties concerned immediately comply with the Council's repeated demands for a cease-fire and cessation of all military activity as a first urgent step toward the establishment of a stable peace in the Middle East,

3. Calls for discussions promptly thereafter among the parties concerned, using such third party or United Nations assistance as they may wish, looking toward the establishment of viable arrangements encompassing the withdrawal and disengagement of armed personnel,

the renunciation of force regardless of its nature, the maintenance of vital international rights, and the establishment of a stable and durable peace in the Middle East,

4. Requests the President of the Security Council and the Secretary General to take immediate steps to secure compliance with the cease-fire and to report to the Council thereon within 24 hours,

5. Also requests the Secretary General to provide such assistance as may be required in facilitating the discussions called for in paragraph 3.

SECRET/NODIS

- May 26 - Haikal editorial on inevitability of war with Israel. Israel must resort to war, and would attack Egypt. Egyptian counterstrike was prepared and would be decisive. Embassy regarded article as accurate reflection of views of UARG. (Cairo 8000, Control 028401, May 26, CONFIDENTIAL)

Nasser addressed delegation from International Confederation of Arab Trade Unions. Recalled Arab action since 1956, stressing UNEF and Aqaba issues. Had always said that if wanted UNEF to quit, it would quit within half an hour; this is what happened. Stressed US full support to Israel which almost fused "the two into one single whole". Paid tribute to the great stand by USSR. Said UAR ready for total war with Israel, is confident of winning it, and objective will be to destroy Israel. (Cairo 8075, Control 029155, May 27, LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

Department felt that speech introduced serious element: some Arab leaders may be convincing themselves that Arabs can beat Israelis if latter not aided by US. (State 203788, May 26, SECRET)

Department informed Embassy of UAR FonOff account of Nolte-Riad conversation of May 23. Instructed Nolte to emphasize to UAR that his reference to US proposals of March 15, 1957 was for background only and did not represent the current US position. (State 202673, May 26, SECRET)

SECRET/NODIS

DECLASSIFIED



SECRET/NODIS

May 27 - Embassy Cairo reported that UAR would fight to reopen Straits of Tiran against any but major force applied by maritime powers. (Cairo 8046, Control 029075, May 27, SECRET/EXDIS)

Department informed Embassy Cairo that Ambassador Yost being sent to Cairo, probably leaving 28 May a.m., to get direct, first-hand impression of problems and to develop ideas toward developing an approach to the situation for guidance of Washington. (State 203930, May 27, SECRET/EXDIS)

On instructions of May 26 from Department (State 202673) to correct UAR misunderstanding resulting from Nolte-Riad talks on May 23, DCM in Cairo had conversation with FonOff official. DCM stated dismay that local press had been given and had published alleged details of confidential diplomatic conversation. Mentioned obvious fundamental misunderstanding of US position and restated that US views were as set forth in note verbale. Mention of March 15, 1957, proposals had been in course of referring to Ambassador Goldberg's letter to SYG of May 22, and were purely to cover background aspects of present US position. There was no intention at this stage to suggest that status of Gaza Strip could revert to the situation of ten years ago. (Cairo 8067, Control 029416, May 27, SECRET)

SECRET/EXDIS

DECLASSIFIED



SECRET/NODIS

May 28 -

Embassy "increasingly concerned by continuing divergence in assessments of likely UAR positions and actions between Department and this mission." Felt that UAR, with Soviet backing, would absolutely contest any UN resolution that opposed Nasser's Aqaba Gulf position, called for status quo ante closure, or endorsed any sort of international patrol. (Cairo 8093, Control 029457, May 28, SECRET/EXDIS)

Embassy Cairo repeated assessment that "Nasser is playing for keeps and thinks he can win" if US did not intervene. (Cairo 8080, Control 029478, May 28, SECRET)

Nolte suggested, to minimize aspects of US-UAR relations, that for duration of crisis US official dealings in Cairo be limited to routine matters. "Extraordinary approaches, even private, likely to be used to embarrass US, e.g., my departure from protocol in delivering Presidential message and note verbale and in presenting US position to Foreign Minister prior presentation credentials to President. This has special relevance to Yost visit: informal talks with UAR Foreign Office official may be well worthwhile, but we must expect UAR misuse. Visit likely to be portrayed as more US pressure on behalf Israel." (Cairo 8107, Control 029533, May 28, SECRET/EXDIS)

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SECRET/NODIS

May 29 -

Embassy Cairo decided against immediate departure of any official Americans in view of obvious adverse political repercussions which such action would generate in the UAR, as well as in view of complex administrative problems. Members of the mission were being alerted to possibility of evacuation on short notice should hostilities break out. (Cairo 8145, Control 030343, May 29, CONFIDENTIAL)

Cairo press reported "large-scale" US arms shipments to Israel from Wheelus AB, Libya. (Cairo 8128, Control 030365, May 29, CONFIDENTIAL)

Under Secretary Rostow told Israeli Ambassador that US had taken steps to put financial pressure on UAR. Believed they would suffer more than Israel from long mobilization. (State 204800, May 29, SECRET/LIMDIS)

SECRET/NODIS

May 30 -

Ambassador Yost reported from Cairo, agreeing with Embassy assessment that following course of taking all measures to keep straits open would gravely undermine, if not destroy, US position throughout Arab world. Embassy convinced that Nasser committed to course from which he cannot and will not retreat. (Cairo 8218, Control 31309, May 30, SECRET/EXDIS)

Department suggested that official US denial in Cairo of use of Wheelus AB to supply Israelis would be counter-productive. Representations made to UAR Ambassador in Washington. (State 204940, May 30, CONFIDENTIAL)

SECRET/NODIS

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET/NODIS

May 31

Embassy warned that our involvement in Middle East crisis could lead to decision by Nasser to break relations. Suggested contingency planning, with Spain or Switzerland as prospective protecting power. (Cairo 8253, Control 31996, May 31, SECRET/LIMDIS)

Former Treasury Secretary Robert Anderson flew to Cairo for conversation with Nasser. As long time friend of President Johnson, was available to convey any messages Nasser might wish to address to the President. (State 205476, May 31 SECRET/NODIS)

Department asked Yost, in Cairo, for his opinion as to whether Department's assumption was correct that passage of time without direct Israeli challenge to UAR or Arab positions would make more flexible situation, through decline of Arab unity, in which to work. (State 205157, May 31, SECRET/EXDIS)

Embassy warned that our involvement in Middle East crisis could lead to decision by Nasser to break relations. Suggested contingency planning, with Spain and Switzerland as prospective protecting powers. (Cairo 8253, Control 31996, May 31, SECRET/LIMDIS)

SECRET/NODIS

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET/NODIS

June 1

Ambassador Yost called on FonMin Riad. Riad had given up hope of US ever dealing impartially with Arab-Israeli issues and concluded that political pressures inside US would preclude USG support of measures in or out of UN which Israel opposed. Riad contrasted Israeli refusals to observe armistice agreements and repeated violations of UN resolutions with his own and other Arab efforts to revive EIMAC and UAR draft resolution just submitted to UNSC. . Heart of Arab-Israeli issue, he said, was refugee problem. UARG was resisting pressure from military for more vigorous action. Only way out might be short war, followed by UN call for ceasefire with which UAR would comply. Riad stressed UARG determination not to reopen straits to Israeli ships or strategic materials. Israel could present complaint to ICJ if it so desired.

Yost remarked on expressed apprehension that UAR would proceed from closure of straits to other unacceptable demands on Israel. Riad said UAR had no other demands. He believed very strongly that EIMAC should be reconstituted and UNTSO observers reactivated along Israel-Arab border. Riad expressed confusion as to US policy and intentions, to which Yost replied on basis of US high level public statements.

Yost closed with hope that Nolte would be able to present credentials soon. Riad said Nasser busy, but Nolte should carry on business as though credentials presented. Minister suggested another meeting with Yost. (Cairo 8349, Control 001812 and 001813, June 2, SECRET/EXDIS)

SECRET/NODIS

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET/NODIS

June 2

Yost, in Cairo, concluded that UAR could not and would not relax position on closure of straits, and that there was no prospect for success of present tactic of mobilizing maritime powers to reopen straits, other than by overwhelming military force which would be damaging to US position in Arab world. Suggested his return to US; Nolte now had easy access to Riad and could carry on from here. (Cairo 8362, Control 001912, June 2, SECRET/EXDIS)

Yost authorized to return to Washington. Department commented that very grave issues lay between USG and UARG. While Riad to some extent assured Department with his apparent desire to prevent further deterioration of our relations, he gave US little room in which to work, since issues at stake involved long-held major US policies. Over next few days we would have to ascertain what few common interests remained between US and UAR to find ways of enlarging on them. (State 207517, June 2, SECRET/EXDIS)

Letter from Nasser to President Johnson. Explained "briefly some of the basic features of the situation we now face in the Arab region." Assured President that UAR would welcome Vice President Humphrey any time he might wish to visit UAR. Was ready to send Vice President Mohieddin to Washington immediately. In conveying letter, Riad assured Embassy that up to President Johnson to decide whether to send Humphrey or invite Mohieddin; UAR had no preference. (Cairo 8397, Control 2987 and 2988, June 2, SECRET/NODIS)

In reply to Cairo's suggestion that contingency plans be prepared for break in relations, Department felt it advisable to retain US diplomatic and consular presence in UAR. Would offer same to UAR in US. Spain would be suitable protecting power. (State 206889, June 2, SECRET/EXDIS)

SECRET/NODIS

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET/NODIS

June 3 -

Embassy instructed to inform UARG that President would welcome visit from Vice President Mohieddin at his earliest convenience. Hoped he could come without delay. Answer to Nasser's letter would be made, and visit to UAR by "very senior representative of the President will be sympathetically considered if it appears useful." (State 207861, June 3, SECRET/NODIS)

Riad informed of foregoing. Mohieddin scheduled fly Kuwait June 4; definitive reply might not be received for day or two. (Cairo 8471, Control 4077, June 4, SECRET/NODIS)

Foreign Office informed Nolte that presentation of credentials was scheduled for 11:30 a.m., June 5. (Cairo 8424, Control 003411, June 3, LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

SECRET/NODIS

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET/NODIS

June 4 - In reply to Cairo's 8471, Nolte was instructed to advise President Nasser that Robert Anderson, who visited him on May 31, was awaiting his answer in New York and would proceed immediately to arrange visits agreed upon. (V.P. Mohieddin) (State 207994, June 4, SECRET/NODIS)

Nolte replied he would so advise Nasser on June 5 when he presented credentials. Indicated news of Mohieddin's visit may have been made public; UPI correspondent had queried the Embassy. (Cairo 8485, Control 004176, June 4, SECRET/NODIS)

Charge informed by Foreign Office and Presidency that Mohieddin planned leave for Washington June 7. Advance party leaving June 5. Indications that Mohieddin would wish to discuss entire Palestine problem. (Cairo 8483, Control 004168, June 4, SECRET/NODIS)

SECRET/NODIS



SECRET/NODIS

June 5 - Presentation of credentials cancelled at outbreak of hostilities between UAR and Israel. Unlikely that Mohieddin would go to US on June 7 as scheduled, given fact state of war now existed and his mission was search for peace. Embassy urged that visit cancellation not be made public, that option might be kept open. (Cairo 8504, Control 004343, June 5, CONFIDENTIAL)

FonMin Riad called Embassy at noon to make clear Israel launched attack first. Was keeping Mohieddin visit option open. Embassy urged USG to maintain strict and explicit neutrality for sake of US citizens in area and for sake of possible constructive US role in ending fighting. (Cairo 8511, Control 004373, June 5, SECRET)

FonMin called to offer evacuation by train to Libyan border of diplomats and families from all embassies in Cairo. (Cairo 8528, Control 004778, June 5, LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

Embassy felt that, in event of break in relations, UAR would not permit both Consulate General and US interests section in protecting Embassy. Recommended staffing for a US interests section only. (Cairo 8499, Control 004416, June 5, SECRET/EXDIS)

SECRET/NODIS

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET/NODIS

June 6 - Cairo radio reported that US aid to Israel established beyond doubt. Embassy burning all classified papers, preparing for demonstrations. (Cairo 8572, Control 5632, June 6, LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

Department official called Amb. Kamel to categorically deny and to protest vigorously Egyptian allegations and inflammatory broadcasts of Radio Cairo. Nolte instructed to make similar protest in Cairo.  
(Arab-Israeli Sitrep, 0430, June 6)

SECRET/NODIS

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET/NODIS

June 7 - Embassy Cairo reported disaffection of many Egyptians with Nasser regime. Reportedly widespread knowledge of heavy UAR losses in Sinai. Ministry of Interior directed Embassy to round up unofficial Americans for evacuation. (Cairo 8641, Control 6693, June 7, CONFIDENTIAL)

Chargé and Spanish Ambassador discussed representation of US interests. UARG refused to allow desired number US diplomatic personnel to remain; US was hostile and belligerent nation. (Cairo 8649, Control 6828, June 7, CONFIDENTIAL)

Afternoon discussion between Embassy and FonOff officials. US limited to 14 personnel, including diplomatic. UAR protocol officer said not to worry, US would be back in two weeks. (Cairo 8664, Control 6979, June 7, SECRET)

Nolte urged, if Nasser is overthrown, way might be open for reestablishment of relations. US should show sympathy for Arabs, mercy for victims of fighting, and concern to fashion just settlement of Palestine issue. (Cairo 8670, Control 6995, June 7, SECRET/EXDIS)

Ambassador Kamel asked for extension of deadline to leave country from seven to fourteen days. Embassy Cairo urged to support this by suggesting extension of time given US personnel to leave UAR in return for reciprocal US action. (State 208876, June 7, SECRET/NOFORN)

Nolte-Riad conversation. Nolte stressed fair-minded approach of US when all facts are known. UAR should continue to present its position in UN; consider sending Mohieddin and former Foreign Minister Fawzi to Washington for talks as previously planned; soften verbal attacks against US; apologize for obstruction of US property in UAR. Riad said UAR "might be disposed" to send Mohieddin and Fawzi; was noncommittal on other points. (Cairo 8612, Control 7262, June 7, SECRET/EXDIS)

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June 8 - Embassy Cairo reported it would close down June 9, and attempt to resume operations at end of week. Official and unofficial U.S. citizens who so desired being evacuated by ship from Alexandria June 10.  
(Cairo 8699, Control 7669, June 8, CONFIDENTIAL)

UAR notified SC in afternoon that it accepted cease-fire.

Dept. feared UAR's deteriorating military situation might lead to breakdown of public order, rioting against Europeans generally. Dept. sought cooperation of European powers for multilateral approach to convince UAR of importance to its own interests of maintaining order.  
(State 209293, June 1, SECRET)

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CHRONOLOGY OF PRESS REPORTS  
ON THE ARAB-ISRAELI  
PROBLEM, NOVEMBER 12 -  
JUNE 8, 1967

1966

- NOV 12 An Israeli command car on patrol in the northern Negev detonates a mine, killing three soldiers and wounding five.
- NOV 13 In retaliation for that incident, and for what is described as 12 other acts of sabotage, Israeli Army units cross into Jordan and destroy 40 homes in the village of Es Samu after removing the occupants. Fighting is fierce and Jordanian and Israeli planes clash in the sky.
- NOV 15 Israel charges that Syria bears the blame for the attack on Es Samu, saying that the Syrian Government encourages, maintains and organizes sabotage in Israel even though agents cross the border from other countries.
- NOV 16 US, Britain, France and the Soviet Union condemn Israel in the UN Security Council.
- NOV 25 Palestinian Arabs demonstrate against King Hussein of Jordan shouting "Down with the monarchy" and "Give us arms." They maintain that Hussein is afraid to strike back at Israel for the raid on Es Samu.
- NOV 28 Jordan's Premier, Wasfi al-Tall, charged that the mobs had been financed by "two outside Arab sources," apparently meaning Egypt and Syria.
- DEC 8 Syria urges Jordanians to overthrow King Hussein and his Govt.

1967

- JAN 2 An Israeli soldier is wounded in an exchange of fire across the Syrian border. Intermittent clashes continue for a week.
- MAR 17 Two Arab infiltrators are killed by Israeli soldiers, who have pursued them into Jordan.
- APR 6 Israel reports that six Syrian MIG's have been shot down in an air battle. Syria claims five Israeli jets.
- APR 11 Syrian gunners fire on an Israeli border settlement, where 200 American tourists take shelter in underground bunkers.
- MAY 6 Israel charges Syrian terrorists with having shelled a settlement from Lebanon.

MAY 12 Syrian attacks. Israel contemplating a strong show of force against Syria. UAR not expected to enter the hostilities. Mounting border violence.

MAY 13 Syria protests to U Thant over threatening attitude of Israel. George J. Tomeh, Syrian representative, says that statements since May by Israeli leaders "contain a very clear threat of the use of force against Syria."

MAY 15 UAR puts its armed forces on alert because of increased Syrian-Israeli border tension.

Gen. Mohammed Fawzi, UAR Chief of Staff, begins second day of talks with Syrian military leaders. No details disclosed. Military spokesmen say they deal with "certain important questions related to joint defense against Israel."

MAY 16 Israel reports 2 new sabotage incidents near the Jordanian border. Syrians are blamed.

Troop movements are reported in Cairo. They are viewed by Israeli officials as political rather than military acts.

Foreign Affairs Comm. of Parliament of the UAR meets and declares full support for measures taken by the Government and backing for "Syrian people against Israeli aggression" declared.

Iraqi Foreign Minister Adnan Pachachi calls in Syrian Ambassador, Bahaeddin Nakkar to assure him of "Iraq's readiness to extend every possible assistance to Syria in the face of Israeli threats and provocations."

MAY 17 Report that Cairo has advised removal of UNEF forces along the Israeli-UAR border.

U Thant calls off his plans for a European trip. He confers with the chief representatives of the 7 countries having men in the UNEF force. Thant says UNEF went into Gaza and Sinai with the consent of the UAR. Could not remain if that consent were withdrawn. Asks UAR for "clarification as to what the intentions of the Government are with regard to the continued presence of UNEF in the area."

US expresses alarm concerning the possibility of the withdrawal of UNEF and calls for an expansion of the activities of the UN force. McCloskey states that under the prevailing tense situation

the most conducive action to international peace would not be to diminish UN role in the area, but rather to increase the effectiveness of UNEF.

Israeli leaders still express the view that the apparent increase in military activity in the Arab states is more a case of political maneuvering than anything else.

MAY 18 Thant orders the withdrawal of UNEF from Egypt.

Amb. Goldberg states the US is strongly opposed to the use of force by any party in the Middle East.

Lebanon and Iraq announce support of Syria if it should be attacked by Israel. Iraq reportedly mobilizing its army. Jordan places its armed forces on alert.

MAY 19 UNEF completes its withdrawal from the border between Egypt and Israel.

MAY 20 UAR declares a state of emergency in the Gaza Strip. Makes a joint declaration with the representatives of 11 other Arab nations (Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Yemen, Libya, Sudan, Morocco, Kuwait and Algeria) that an attack against one would be considered an attack against all.

Further Egyptian troop movements.

U Thant announces he will go to Cairo Monday for talks with Egyptian leaders in an effort to ease Israeli-Arab tensions.

MAY 21 UAR announces mobilization of its military reserves. Naval movements also reported.

MAY 22 Nasser announces UAR has decided to bar Israeli ships from entering or leaving the Gulf of Aqaba. He contends the Straits of Tiran lie entirely within Egyptian territorial waters.

U Thant leaves New York for Cairo to talk with UAR officials.

MAY 23 Pres. Johnson makes a statement calling on Cairo to avoid a blockade of the Gulf. He asserts the US is committed to the territorial integrity of all the Middle Eastern nations. Calls it "illegal" and says the US considers the Gulf an international waterway.

U Thant arrives in Cairo in the midst of anti-Israel rally.



USSR issues a statement blaming Israel for the current crisis.

British Minister of State George Thomson flies to Washington and Foreign Secretary George Brown to Moscow for emergency talks with officials on the crisis.

MAY 24 Cairo says it has set out sea mines to enforce the blockade. Adds new tension.

British Prime Minister Wilson declares Britain would "promote and support international action" to keep the Straits of Tiran open to ships of all nations.

France calls for a high level conference of the Big Four - US, USSR, Britain and France to seek a diplomatic solution to the conflict.

Amb. Goldberg, in a Security Council meeting, says the US is prepared to work inside the UN - or outside it, in the framework of the Big Four - to preserve peace.

MAY 25 Security Council confers privately and waits for a report from U Thant on his three-day trip to Cairo.

Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban flies to Washington to seek assurances that the US will keep the Gulf of Aqaba open to international shipping.

U Thant leaves for New York a day early. His visit has brought no lessening of anti-Israeli militancy in Cairo.

Diplomatic sources report the USSR to be unwilling to join the US, Britain and France in 4-power action to prevent the outbreak of war in the Middle East.

MAY 26 Israel warns she will not wait indefinitely for an end to the Egyptian blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba.

Nasser declares that if war with Israel comes "it will be total and the objective will be to destroy Israel."

Saudi Arabia is reported to be stationing troops on her coast in the Gulf of Aqaba.

Johnson urges restraint upon Israel, particularly in attempting any immediate test of the blockade.

Soviet Government states it is considering French proposal for a 4-power conference on the crisis in the Middle East. Is the first official Soviet reaction to the French idea. Kremlin again blames Israel for the trouble.

MAY 27 Thant reports to the Security Council on the Middle Eastern situation. Stresses the importance of insuring a cooling-off period. Says the dispute over passage through the Straits is the most immediately dangerous point.

UAR reportedly withdrawing troops from Yemen for deployment on the Sinai peninsula.

MAY 28 Eban meets with the Cabinet to report on his mission to Paris, London and Washington. Premier Eshkol says, in a radio address, that the Israeli Cabinet has outlined policy lines intended to continue the search for a diplomatic solution to the crisis.

Nasser declares negotiated peace is out of the question in the Middle East until the Palestinian Arabs return to their homeland and exercise sovereignty there.

Nasser threatens to cut off the Suez Canal if outside nations interfere in a war between Israel and the Arabs.

MAY 30 UAR and Jordan sign mutual defense pact in Cairo.

Soviet Union granted authorization by Turkey to move 10 warships from the Black Sea through the Turkish Straits into the eastern Mediterranean.

MAY 31 US proposes Security Council resolution to get the "cooling-off" period that U Thant suggested.

Diplomatic sources report Britain, the Netherlands and Portugal have pledged support to the US proposal for establishment of an international naval force that could provide armed escort for Western ships attempting to test the blockade imposed by Nasser on the Gulf of Aqaba.

Iraq reportedly airlifting troops to aid the UAR in blockading the Straits of Tiran.

JUN 1 Maj. Gen. Moshe Dayan is appointed Israeli Minister of Defense.

US carrier Intrepid passes through the Suez Canal.

US endorses British proposal for a declaration by the maritime nations that the Gulf of Aqaba and the Straits of Tiran are international waterways that should be open to free navigation by ships of all nations.

JUN 2 Wilson, in Washington to confer with Pres. Johnson, warns the Middle East crisis could lead to a general war if steps are not taken soon to lift the Gulf of Aqaba blockade.

French Government declares it "is not committed in any way and on any subject" on the side of "any of the states involved in the Middle East crisis."

UAR Foreign Minister Riad warns the Suez Canal will be closed to ships of any country that tries to break the blockade.

JUN 3 Dayan states Israel could win a war with the Arabs without the help of soldiers from the US, Britain, or any other nation. Said, however, that he agrees with Israeli Government policy of seeking a diplomatic solution.

Wilson confers with U Thant in the UN.

Security Council meets for 3½ hours, but adjourns until Monday afternoon without taking any action.

JUN 4 Tension increases on Jordan-Israeli border. Gunfire heard in Jerusalem.

Hussein announces the defense pact he signed with the UAR would be extended to include Iraq.

Thant puts out a statement explaining the hasty removal of UNEF.

JUN 5 War breaks out between Israel and the Arab nations. Both sides claim land and air victories.

Israeli sources report that most of the air forces of the UAR, Syria and Jordan have been destroyed in the first day of fighting. Claim major victories in the Sinai and the Gaza Strip.

USSR accuses Israel of aggression and demands her forces withdraw immediately "beyond the truce lines." Reiterated Soviet support for the Arab world.

Britain declares her policy in the conflict is "not to take sides."

US seeks to maintain a neutral role in the Middle East without formally committing itself to neutrality.

JUN 6 War rages on as Israel sweeps ahead on all fronts.

Security Council unanimously adopts a resolution calling for an immediate cease fire.

UAR closes the Suez Canal to all shipping.

UAR breaks diplomatic relations with US over allegations of American support for Israel. Algeria and Syria do the same.

US denies Egyptian charge that American planes took part in the attacks on the UAR.

Kuwait and Iraq halt all oil supplies to Britain and the US.

JUN 7 Israel claims a complete victory in the Sinai Peninsula - Sharm el-Sheikh falls.

Most of the Jordanian territory on the west bank of the Jordan river is captured, including Jerusalem and Jericho.

Israel accepts call for cease fire in UN provided the Arabs comply as well. Jordan announces acceptance.

UAR states it will fight on.

USSR threatens to break diplomatic relations with Israel if she does not observe the cease fire.

Pres. Johnson pledges to do his best to help transform the Middle East situation into a more lasting settlement between Israel and the Arabs. Appoints McGeorge Bundy to head efforts to deal with the crisis and formulate future plans for the area.

Sudan, Yemen, Iraq and Mauritania sever relations with the US.

JUN 8 Israel claims complete control of all Sinai Peninsula approaches to the Suez Canal.

UAR announces its acceptance of the UN cease fire. Syria says it will fight on.

Israeli planes and torpedo boats mistakenly attack US communications ship approximately 15 miles off Sinai.

Pres. Johnson welcomes spreading acceptance of the cease fire agreement and urges all parties to move toward the "many more fundamental questions" bearing on a stable peace.





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4 Dec. '95 M. J. [signature]  
(Date and Reviewer's Initials)

The remaining material was declassified as of that date.

THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS

RESEARCH PROJECT

#877 June 1967

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The remaining material was declassified as of that date.

THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS

Chronologies of U.S. Consultations with Middle East Countries,  
the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union,  
May 15-June 10, 1967

Research Project No. 877  
June 1967

RECORD COPY

Historical Studies Division  
Historical Office, Bureau of Public Affairs  
Department of State

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May 19 - During a call on Assistant Secretary Battle, Israeli Ambassador Harman pleaded for direct US effort to reverse UAR buildup in Sinai, asked for USG to do what it could to end Jordanian and Saudi radio propaganda goading Nasser on passage of ships through Strait of Tiran, and called for new public US statement of commitment in area. Battle replied USG representations amounted to strong urging that UAR troops be withdrawn, agreed Jordanian and Saudi propaganda needed to be muted, and said US commitment through UN or otherwise would require careful deliberation at highest levels of USG. Battle added that the Soviets wanted no trouble in the area. Both Battle and Harman expressed considerable puzzlement as to what was motivating the Egyptians. (State 198893, May 20, SECRET/LIMDIS)

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CHRONOLOGY OF U.S. CONSULTATIONS  
WITH OTHER GOVERNMENTS ON THE  
MIDDLE EAST CRISIS  
MAY 15 - JUNE 10, 1967

- MAY 15 Rostow met with British and French Ambassadors  
(State 194945, Tab E)
- Embassy Cairo instructed to inform Foreign  
Minister of US concern at increased tension.  
(State 194188, Tab B)
- MAY 17 President Johnson sent message to Prime Minister  
Eshkol. (State 196541, Tab A)
- MAY 18 Rostow spoke with Soviet Charge Chernyakov.  
(State 197661, Tab F)
- Amb. Burns reported on his interview with King  
Hussein. (Amman 3612, Tab C)
- Amb. Barbour discussed Israeli military build-up  
with Foreign Minister Abba Eban. (Tel Aviv 3639, Tab A)
- Eshkol replied to President Johnson's message.  
(Tel Aviv 3648, Tab A)
- MAY 19 UAR Amb. Kamel called on Asst. Sec. Battle.  
(State 198635, Tab B)
- Israeli Amb. Harman met with Asst. Sec. Battle,  
asked for US effort to reverse UAR build-up in  
Sinai. (State 198893, Tab A)
- MAY 20 Amb. Harman called on Rostow to report on con-  
versation between Eban and the Soviet Ambassador  
and to discuss French views on the Tripartite  
Declaration. (State 198916, Tab A)
- MAY 21 Barbour reported on discussion of the crisis with  
FM Eban. (Tel Aviv 3692, Tab A)

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President Johnson replied to Eshkol's letter of May 18, assuring him USSR understands US commitment. (State 198955 and 198954, Tab A)

Amb. Dean discussed British policy with Rostow. (State 198959, Tab E)

MAY 22 President wrote to Kosygin. (State 198583, Tab F)

President Johnson wrote to Nasser, raising possibility of Vice Presidential trip. (State 199710, Tab B)

Rostow discussed US attitude on closing of the Straits with Amb. Dean of UK. (Tab E)

President Johnson advised PM Eshkol that he was addressing letters to Nasser and PM of Syria appealing for restraint. (State 199729, Tab A)

Embassy Tel Aviv reported Eshkol's address to Knesset. (Tel Aviv 3713, Tab A)

Rostow spoke with Amb. Kamel of UAR regarding closure of Gulf of Aqaba. (State 199731, Tab B)

MAY 23 Amb. Thompson met with Gromyko. (State 199746 and 199710; Moscow 5078, Tab F)

Nolte delivered note verbale to FM Riad pointing out US concerns. (Cairo 7868 and 7864; State 199751, Tab B)

UK proposed maritime declaration and a naval force. Rostow informed Amb. Dean that US welcomed UK proposal. (State 200292, Tab G)

Rostow met with Israeli Minister Evron. (State 199741, Tab A)

PM Eshkol called for the powers to act on behalf of free passage in the Gulf. (Tel Aviv 3744, Tab A)

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Amb. Harman met with Rostow. (State 200680, Tab A)

Amb. Burns met with Hussein. (Amman 3711, Tab C)

MAY 24 George Thomson, British Minister of State, had talks with Rostow on maritime declaration proposal. (State 203642, Tab G)

Embassy Tel Aviv reported current GOI concerns. (Tel Aviv 3763, Tab A)

MAY 25 Non-official US citizens and official dependents advised to leave UAR. (Cairo 7940, Tab B)

UAR Amb. Kamel called on Asst. Sec. Battle. (State 202565, Tab B)

PM Wilson sent message to President Johnson. (State 202732, Tab E)

In message from Johnson to PM Wilson, the President reported on his meeting with Pearson of Canada. (State 202732, Tab E)

Rostow met with Amb. Kamel. (Arab-Israel Sitrep, 0430, 5/26, Tab B)

Amb. Burns reported deep Jordanian concern over the crisis. (Amman 3774, Tab C)

Amb. Harman called on Rostow for discussion of situation before arrival of Eban. (State 202589, Tabs A & G)

Eban and Rostow met in the evening. (State 203752, Tab A)

Rusk discussed crisis with Eban. (State 203793, Tab A)

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MAY 26 Department stated USG options regarding the closure of the Gulf of Aqaba. (State circ. 202592, Tab A)

Nasser addressed ICATU delegation. (Cairo 8075, 5/27)  
Department interpreted the speech. (State 203788, Tab B)

Bohlen-Zorin meeting. (Paris 19320, Tab F)

Dean called on Rostow inquiring about Eban visit. (State 203800, Tab E)

MAY 27 Jordanian FM Touqan told Amb. US statement in behalf of free navigation in Gulf interpreted by Arabs as US support for Israel. (Amman 3835, Tab C)

Embassy Amman reported that Jordan requested troops from Saudi Arabia. (Amman 3747, Tab C)

Rostow informed Dean that US had received a conciliatory message from the Soviets. (State 203961, Tab E)

Wilson replied to a message from the President. (State 203986, Tab E)

Kosygin letter to the President delivered. (S/S No. 9288)

President wrote to Kosygin. (State 203963, Tab F)

Department informed Embassy Cairo that Amb. Yost leaving for Cairo May 28. (State 203930, Tab B)

Rusk informed Barbour that President had assured Eban US would make every effort to keep open the Straits. (State 203796, Tab A)

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Netherlands Ambassador Schurmann advised Rostow of full GON support for any action. (State 203891)

President wrote to PM Eshkol saying US had information that Israelis ~~were~~ preparing for military action. (State 203943, Tab A)

MAY 28 Amb. Harman inquired of Rostow if USG was firm on the question of passage for Israeli ships in the Straits. (State 203966, Tab A)

Rusk informed Barbour that best attitude, at present, for USG and GOI was to stand on principles enunciated by President on May 23. (State 204010, Tab A)

Kohler met with Iranian Amb. Ansary on Middle East crisis. (State 203992, Tab D)

Nolte suggested US official dealings in Cairo be limited to routine matters. (Cairo 8107, Tab B)

Rusk sent letter to Gromyko. (State 204027, Tab F)

MAY 29 Rostow briefed Dean on status of US consideration of the crisis. (State 204573, Tab E)

Rostow notified Israeli Ambassador that US had taken steps to put financial pressure on UAR. (State 204800, Tab B)

MAY 30 Sisco, Battle and Meeker sent proposal to the Secretary embodying ingredients for compromise settlement. (Memo to Secretary, Katzenbach, and Kohler, Tab A)

Eshkol indicated to President Johnson that latter's message of May 28 had important influence on Israeli decision to await further developments. (State 205045, Tab A)

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Yost reported from Cairo that taking all measures to keep the Straits open would greatly undermine, if not destroy, US position in the Arab world. (Cairo 8218, Tab B)

Rostow again briefed Dean. (State 204951, Tab E)

Emb. Amman informed Department of King Hussein's departure for secret meeting in Cairo. (Amman 3898, Tab C)

US and UK informally approached various governments for support of maritime declaration. (Memo, S/S No. 9320, Tab G)

MAY 31 Department instructed Ambassadors in maritime countries to seek support for a maritime declaration. (State Cir. 205690, 205691, Tab G)

Ambassador reported on factors behind Hussein's flight to Cairo. (Amman 3919, Tab C)

Ambassador discussed Nasser's intentions with King Hussein. (Amman 3929, 5/31) King proposed that President Johnson make a public statement clarifying US policy. (Amman 3932, Tab C)

Robert Anderson flew to Cairo for conversations with Nasser. (State 205476, Tab B)

President wrote to Eshkol. (State 206563, Tab A)

Harman inquired of Rostow how long US would drag out action in SC and how it planned to force the Straits. (State 206657, Tab A)

JUNE 1 Barbour reported Nasser-Hussein pact had heightened feeling that time was working against Israel. (Tel Aviv 3884, Tab A)

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Yost called on FM Riad for discussion of Arab-Israeli issues. (Cairo 8349, Tab B)

Rostow asked UK to send senior level team to Washington for policy discussions. (State 206818, Tab E)

UK reported opposition to Israeli efforts on behalf of maritime declaration. (Hinton-Everett Memcon, Tab G)

JUNE 2 Department advised all diplomatic posts that public comment concerning the maritime declaration should be kept to a minimum. (Cirtel 206839, Tab G)

Department expressed concern over delay in approaches to several countries. (State 207008, Tab G)

Yost concluded UAR would not relax its position on the Straits. (Cairo 8362, Tab B)

Nasser sent letter to President Johnson. (Cairo 8397, Tab B)

Barbour reported factors behind selection of Dayan as Defense Minister. (Tel Aviv 3903, Tab A)

Amb. Harman spoke with Rusk, prior to his departure for consultations in Israel, concerning US assurances of support. (State 207977; Memcon, Rusk-Harman, Tab A)

JUNE 3 President responded to Eshkol's letter of May 30 reaffirming US position in the crisis. (State 207955, Tab A)

Battle regarded appointment of Dayan most significant. (Information memo, Battle to Secretary, Tab A)

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Rusk asked US Ambassadors in Arab nations for suggestions on US policy. (State 207956, Tab A)

Embassy instructed to inform UARG that President would welcome visit from Vice President Mohieddin at his earliest convenience. (State 207861, Tab B)

PM Juma explained Jordanian view on the US position. (Amman 4029, Tab C)

US diplomatic posts advised of urgency for replies concerning government's reaction to declaration. Instructed to report reaction by June 5. (Cirtel 207932, Tab G)

Rostow and British Ambassador discussed manner and place for making public the text of the Maritime Declaration. (State 207961, Tab G)

JUNE 4 Replies from posts indicated resistance to the declaration. (Hinton memo to Battle, Tab G)

Burns stated his belief that it might be better not to honor past US commitments. (Amman 4040, Tab C)

Rostow told Dean US would inform UK immediately should there be indication Israel intended to force Straits alone. (State 208026, Tab E)

UAR Foreign Minister informed Embassy that Mohieddin planned to leave for Washington on June 7. (Cairo 8483, Tab B)

JUNE 5 Eban met with Barbour to inform him of the latest Israeli moves. (Tel Aviv 3928, Tab A)

Barbour received texts of letters exchanged between Eshkol and Kosygin. (Tel Aviv 3946, Tab A)

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Rostow called on Israeli Charge Evron. (State 208222, Tab A)

Harriman-Shah meeting. (Paris 19869, 6/5)  
Department requested Harriman to tell Shah that President would like personal meeting. (State 208388, Tab D)

UAR Foreign Minister Riad told Embassy that Israel launched attack. Embassy urged US neutrality. (Cairo 8511, Tab B)

Rusk told Dean US hoped to get cease-fire resolution from SC. (State 208047, Tab E)

All diplomatic posts informed activity in support of maritime declaration should be suspended. (State Cirtel 208067, Tab G)

Rusk sent message to Gromyko. (State 208030, Tab F)

JUNE 6 Hussein requested US to arrange an immediate cease-fire. (Amman 4080, Tab C)

Radio Amman announced other powers behind enemy. Burns urged US statement denying participation of US forces. (Amman 4091, Tab C)

Hussein spoke with UK, French, US and USSR Ambassadors individually. Jordan faced collapse or cease-fire. (Amman 4095, Tab C)

Cairo radio reported US aid to Israel established beyond doubt. (Cairo 8572, Tab B)

Harriman reported Shah had to return to Tehran. (Paris 19914, Tab D)

Rusk instructed Barbour to inform Israel of Jordanian desire for cease-fire. (State 208438, Tab A)

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Rusk requested Barbour to communicate on type of political settlement Israelis might accept. (State 208492, Tab A)

Barbour notified Eshkol of Jordanian desire for cease-fire. Believed it too late to arouse interest in Israel for preservation of Hussein and his regime. (Tel Aviv 3967, Tab A)

Rusk asked Barbour to suggest at least de facto cease-fire with Jordan to Israelis. (State 208748, Tab A)

USG protests against UAR allegations. (Sitrep, 0430, 6/6, Tab B)

JUNE 7 GOI reaction negative toward Jordan cease-fire. (Tel Aviv 3979, Tab A)

Barbour reported Israelis would require a peace document and not merely the reinstatement of an armistice regime. (Tel Aviv 3988, Tab A)

Department urged Embassy to make vigorous plea for Israeli acceptance of Jordanian cease-fire offer. (State 208985, Tab A)

Iranian Amb. Ansary called on Rostow. (State 209086, Tab D)

Nolte felt way may be open for re-establishment of relations with UAR should Nasser be overthrown. (Cairo 8670, Tab B)

Nolte stressed to Riad that UAR should consider sending Mohieddin to Washington as previously planned. (Cairo 8612, Tab B)

Jordan formally notified SC of acceptance of cease-fire. (Amman 4125, Tab C)

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JUNE 8 Department feared UAR's deteriorating military situation might lead to breakdown of public order. (State 209293, Tab B)

President Johnson sent message to Shah. (State 209548, Tab D)

Department disturbed at new indication of Israeli military action against Syria. (State 209182, Tab A)

Shek gave tentative basis of settlement Israel would try to achieve with Arabs. (Tel Aviv 4015, Tab A)

Israeli General Yariv said Soviet equipment still on the way to the UAR. (Tel Aviv 4020, Tab A)

JUNE 9 Rusk instructed Barbour to see Eban immediately to tell him Israeli position at UN deteriorating because of impression that Israel was not behind SC efforts to achieve cease-fire. (State 209964, Tab A)

Iranian Amb. Ansary received briefing at Department. Stated Shah felt Israelis should show restraint in post-war expectations. (State 210119, Tab D)

Amb. Burns met with Hussein to ascertain whether Jordan intended to maintain US ties. (Amman 4181, Tab C)

Hussein suggested US invite UN to examine evidence and render verdict on Western involvement in crisis. Would make request himself. (Amman 4190, Tab C)

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JUNE 10 Eban stated to Barbour his hope for achievement of actual cease-fire in a few hours; Israel had no intention of going to Damascus. (Tel Aviv 4045, Tab A)

Embassy reported Soviet break of diplomatic relations did not cause much concern. (Tel Aviv 4063, Tab A)

Battle indicated to Ansary that Iran could play useful role in working for solutions to problems in the Middle East. (State 210119, Tab D)

Shah proposed US send special emissary to Iran or vice versa. (Tehran 4900, 6/10) Department replied it would receive GOI representative for discussions. (State 210152, Tab D)

Israel sent note to US on Liberty incident. (State 210137, Tab A)

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SECRET/NODIS Attachments

July 27, 1967

WEEKEND

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY

Subject: Statements by Arab and Israeli leaders relative to the Middle East conflict: June 9-July 23, 1967

We have updated our compilations of statements by Arab and Israeli leaders relative to the Middle East conflict.

At tab A there are statements made by the Israelis to us privately concerning their intentions on a peace settlement; this compilation is SECRET/NODIS.

At tab B there is an UNCLASSIFIED compilation of public Israeli statements concerning territorial acquisition and other elements of a peace settlement.

Tab C contains statements by Arab and Israeli leaders relative to the Middle East conflict in general since June 9. Some of the items in this compilation are marked OFFICIAL USE ONLY.

This package as a whole should be handled as SECRET/NODIS. The individual studies if separated from the package should be handled according to their classification.

*John P. Walsh*  
John P. Walsh  
Executive Secretary  
Control Group

SECRET/NODIS Attachments

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A



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D C 20520

Sir:

10/23/67

S/S ~~Mr. Walsh~~

UK Emb. this morning provided attached account of George Brown's conversation with Eban Saturday evening. I'm sending it along on the chance no copy has reached the 7th Floor directly.

*W. We should have record of this Harry*

ALA

CONFIDENTIAL

4:00

OO WTON 13922 OO NEW YORK 68522

CYPHER/CAT A

IMMEDIATE FOREIGN OFFICE

TO TEL AVIV

TELEGRAM NO. 2198

22 OCTOBER 1967

CONFIDENTIAL.

ADDRESSED TO TEL AVIV TELEGRAM NO. 2198 OF 22 OCTOBER REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON, <sup>11139</sup>CAIRO, AMMAN SAVING TO BEIRUT.

MIDDLE EAST.

I MET THE ISRAEL FOREIGN MINISTER FOR AN HOUR AND A HALF LAST NIGHT.

2. MR. EBAN BEGAN BY SAYING THAT IT WAS NOT THE ISRAELIS' INTENTION TO STAND PAT FOR EVER. THEY THOUGHT THAT IN ABOUT SIX MONTHS' TIME THERE WOULD BE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ARAB WORLD, PARTICULARLY IN CAIRO AND JORDAN, WHICH WOULD INDUCE THE ARABS TO MOVE TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT. HE DID NOT ELABORATE. HE WENT ON TO ENUMERATE THE ISRAEL GOVT'S OBJECTIONS TO ACTION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. THE RUSSIANS WOULD NOT ACCEPT ANYTHING UNACCEPTABLE TO THE ARABS. THIS MEANT THAT NO EQUITABLE RESOLUTION COULD BE PASSED BY THE COUNCIL AND NO RESOLUTION PASSED WOULD BE EQUITABLE. THE APPOINTMENT OF A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL COULD BE USED BY THE ARABS AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR NEGOTIATIONS. BUT ISRAEL WOULD ACCEPT SOMEONE WITH THE ROLE BUNCHE PLAYED IN 1949. IN ANY CASE THE POSITIONS OF THE TWO SIDES WERE SO FAR APART THAT IT WAS DOUBTFUL IF MUTUALLY AGREEABLE LANGUAGE FOR A RESOLUTION COULD BE FOUND. IN VIEW OF ALL THIS THE ISRAEL GOVT THOUGHT IT RIGHT TO FACE THE ARABS WITH THE DIFFICULT ISSUES WHICH WERE BEING OBSCURED. THEY MUST ACCEPT FOR INSTANCE THAT ISRAEL WOULD NOT WITHDRAW TO THE 4 JUNE FRONTIER AND THAT FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION MEANT ISRAELI SHIPS PASSING THROUGH THE CANAL.

CHANCERY GENERAL  
Chancery Action  
486:CHY:gc

/3. I SAID

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- 2 -

3. I SAID I COULD NOT SEE HOW PROGRESS COULD BE MADE IF ALL THE ISSUES HAD FIRST TO BE CLARRIFIED. I WAS STILL CONVINCED THAT THE BEST COURSE WAS TO ESTABLISH A BALANCED SET OF PRINCIPLES AND LET THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S REPRESENTATIVE WORK OUT WITH THE PARTIES HOW THESE SHOULD BE IMPLEMENTED. THERE WAS A DANGER IN GETTING INTO ARGUMENTS TOO EALY IN THE PLAY. I HAD NEVER SAID WHAT LINES ISRAEL SHOULD WITHDRAW TO, SINCE I HAD ALWAYS CONSIDERED THAT THIS WOULD DEPEND ON WHAT THE ISRAELIS GOT OUT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. IF THE ISRAELIS INSISTED THAT A RESOLUTION MUST INCLUDE A SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION FOR ISRAELI SHIPS THROUGH THE CANAL, THE ARABS WOULD WANT THE RESOLUTION TO BE EQUALLY SPECIFIC ABOUT WITHDRAWAL. I ALSO SAID THAT I DID NOT SHARE EBAN'S PESSIMISTIC VIEW OF THE EFFECTS OF THE CLOSE LINK BETWEEN THE ARABS AND THE RUSSIANS. THE ARABS I HAD MET IN NEW YORK HAD SEEN VIRTURE IN THE FACT THAT THEY WERE NOT REPRESENTED ON THE COUNCIL. THEY COULD ACQUIENCE IN ANY RESOLUTION PASSED. I ADDED THAT I SAW NO REASON WHY THE APPOINTMENT OF A U.N. REPRESENTATIVE SHOULD EXCLUDE DIRECT TALKS. THE ADVANTAGE WAS THAT IF THE TWO PARTIES GOT BOGGED DOWN THEY COULD TURN TO HIM TO GET THINGS MOVING AGAIN.

4. IN ANSWER TO A QUESTION FROM THE ISRAEL AMBASSADOR I SAID THAT SIR H. BEALEY HAD HAD STRICT INSTRUCTIONS NOT TO RAISE THESE ISSUES IN CAIRO. HE WAS OF COURSE PRESSING THE EGYPTIANS TO LET THE STRANDED SHIPS OUT OF THE CANAL TO THE SOUTH. BUT I WAS NOT COOKING UP ANY DEAL. IT WAS SURELY IN BOTH OUR INTERESTS THAT BRITAIN SHOULD BE REPRESENTED IN CAIRO.

5. EBAN EXPRESSED HIS OPPOSITION TO ACTION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN MORE TENTATIVE AND DEFENSIVE TERMS THAN HE HAD USE IN NEW YORK. WHILE I AM SURE HE WILL CONTINUE BOTH IN WASHINGTON AND NEW YORK TO TRY TO FRUSTRATE A RESOLUTION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. THERE WERE SIGNS, E.G. HIS INTEREST IN A U.N. REPRESENTATIVE PROVIDING GOOD OFFICES AS BUNCHE DID IN 1949, THAT HE IS RECONCILING HIMSELF TO THIS.

SOSFAN

GPS. 560A

SENT .. 22/1608Z JJ

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ISRAELI STATEMENTS MADE TO US PRIVATELY CONCERNING  
THEIR INTENTIONS ON A PEACE SETTLEMENT

1. Eban - Barbour, June 5. Eban, describing to Barbour the contents of the letter which he was drafting for Eshkol to send to President Johnson, said that the letter would contain the statement that the GOI had no intention of taking advantage of the situation to enlarge its territory. (Tel Aviv 3928 - EXDLS)

2. Eshkol - Johnson letter. The letter, however, did not contain such language. It went only so far as to say "we seek nothing but peaceful life within our territory, and the exercise of our legitimate maritime rights." (Tel Aviv 3935 - NODIS)

3. Eban - Goldberg, June 8. Eban told Goldberg in New York that Israel was not seeking territorial aggrandizement and had no "colonial" aspirations. Eban also said Israel had no design on UAR territory. (USUN 5675, June 8).

4. Eban - Barbour, June 13. Eban told Barbour there should be direct discussions between Israel and its neighbors to achieve peace. He also said Israel completely rules out the possibility of redividing city of Jerusalem. (Tel Aviv 4118 - NODIS)

5. Harman - Battle, June 14. Harman said Israel would stay where it is in occupied territory on the legal basis of the cease-fire ordered by the Security Council if the Arabs prove unwilling to talk peace, though such occupation is not what Israel desires. Harman stated flatly that Israel would not go back to anything as tenuous as the 1957 Sinai settlement. (State 211472 - SECRET)

6. Eban - Rusk, June 21. In a meeting with the Secretary in New York, Eban summarized Israel's objectives in the following terms. (1) Egypt-Israel: Israel wanted a peace treaty on the basis of the present international frontiers. This would involve Israel's maritime passage through the Strait of Tiran and the Suez Canal and air passage over the Straits. Israel expected the demilitarization of Sinai. There should be a treaty which committed the Egyptians. Israel would be unwilling to accept another understanding on the basis of assumptions as in 1957. (2) Israel-Syria: Israel wanted a peace treaty on the basis of the international frontiers with some understanding that the Golan Hills would be demilitarized. Israel also wanted assurance that Syria would not divert the Jordan headwaters away from Israel. (3) Gaza: The "natural thing" was for Gaza to be in Israel. Perhaps some of the Gaza population could be settled elsewhere, e.g. the northern part of Sinai,

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"central Palestine", or the West Bank of Jordan. (4) West Bank: No final decision had been reached on disposition of the West Bank but there were two conceptions within the GOI: (a) one was based on the assumption that it would be possible to come to terms with the Hashemite regime and an agreed settlement on the basis of the demarcation line should be worked out; (b) there should be some kind of association between the West Bank and Israel on the basis of autonomy and economic union. (USUN 5845 - SECRET/EXDIS)

7. Evron - Walt Rostow, June 24. Evron indicated there is increasing thought in Israel about an economic link to Jordan. This would go beyond a separate West Bank state. It would leave the two states of Israel and Jordan politically independent but with open cooperative economic relationships. This would cost Israel in the short run and benefit Jordan but could be an excellent solution for the refugees and many other matters. (Rostow memorandum to President - SECRET)

8. Harman - Eugene Rostow, June 26. On Jerusalem, Harman said it was inconceivable that the city again become divided. Israel could be depended on to provide access to the Holy Places. (State 216309 - SECRET/EXDIS)

9. Harman - Battle, June 27. In response to Battle's query concerning the "administrative steps" taken by Israel to fuse the two sectors of Jerusalem, Harman said these did not constitute annexation. (State 217638 - SECRET)

10. Harman - Eugene Rostow, June 29. Harman emphasized Israel's intention to maintain full access to the Holy Places to the Christians and Moslems. He said that the question of the ultimate status and regulation of the Holy Places was still open. He insisted that the Israeli administrative measures did not constitute annexation but only "municipal fusion." (State 219964 - SECRET)

11. Harman - Eugene Rostow, June 30. Discussing the refugees, Harman said that regional cooperation would be essential if the refugee situation was to be solved. He pointed to the difficulty of Israel moving very far in the direction of refugee solutions so long as the basic future of the West Bank and Gaza remained undetermined. In Gaza particularly, it would be impossible to produce a solution without moving substantial numbers of people elsewhere. (State 311 - SECRET)

12. Eshkol - Barbour, July 1. Eshkol assured Barbour that there was no Israeli intention to extend the jurisdiction as authorized by the Jerusalem enactments to any of the occupied territories. (Tel Aviv 3 - SECRET)

13. General Yariv comment, July 2. In conversation with our Embassy's Military Attache, General Yariv confirmed Israel's intention not to relinquish occupied territory until the Arabs agreed to sign permanent peace treaties.

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On a personal basis he saw the minimum conditions for withdrawal as: (1) use of Suez Canal and free passage in the Straits of Tiran, (2) demilitarization of Sinai and the Syrian heights, and (3) elimination of the sources of conflict that existed last May. (USDAO 1009 - SECRET)

14. Eshkol to Safran, early July. According to Harvard Professor Safran, Eshkol told him that Israel would require water additional to that allocated under the Eric Johnston Plan in order to resettle the refugees on the West Bank. Eshkol also indicated that Israel would look for US support for a desalting project. (Tel Aviv 41 - CONFIDENTIAL)

15. Eban - Senators Gore and Bayh, July 9. Eban told the Senators that Israel was planning to resettle at least a token number of refugees on the West Bank. (Tel Aviv 114 - SECRET/EXDIS)

16. Carman Comments, July 10. Assistant Director of Military Intelligence David Carman told foreign Military Attaches in Tel Aviv that in his opinion Israel would be prepared to give up Sinai and portions of the Golan heights in Syria. Concerning the West Bank, he thought there would be another political solution, possibly an autonomous buffer state. (USDAO 1049 - CONFIDENTIAL)

17. Eban - Rusk July 15. Eban said there was a division of opinion among Israeli policy-makers on disposition of the West Bank. Some favored a "Palestinian" solution -- the creation of a semi-autonomous West Bank state with links to Israel; others felt this was unrealistic and favored a "Jordanian" solution -- i.e. return of most of the West Bank to Jordan. Eban said the latter would require "better and more viable boundaries" and also "economic association." Israel would be willing to compensate Jordan for the loss of Jerusalem by economic help and access to the sea. Eban indicated Israel and the Vatican were approaching agreement concerning "diplomatic status" for the Holy Places in Jerusalem in place of the old concept of an extraterritorial enclave. Eban said neither Israel or the Vatican wished UN control over any part of Jerusalem. (Dept. memcon - TOP SECRET/NODIS)

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18. Eban - Rostow, July 15. Concerning the possibility of a separate peace arrangement between Jordan and Israel, Eban indicated that the Government of Israel was flexible on most issues that would be involved in such a settlement. Current thinking supported a return of the West Bank to Jordan with Jordan being given rights with respect to the Moslem Holy Places in Jerusalem. On the notion on appointing a UN mediator, Eban said he did not rule out a mediator although the GOI strongly preferred direct negotiations. (Dept. memcon - TOY/SECRET/SANDSTORM)

19. Bar Haim Comments, July 18. Shaul Bar Haim, Director of Middle Eastern Affairs in the Israel Foreign Ministry, told one of our Embassy officers that annexation of the West Bank seemed "ruled out." He indicated however that if no Arab state would talk with Israel there was no real alternative to continued Israeli control of the West Bank. On Gaza, the purport of his comments was that the Strip should not be returned to the UAR and that population transfers would be an important part to the solution of the Strip's economic problems. (Tel Aviv 227, CONFIDENTIAL)

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PUBLIC ISRAELI STATEMENTS CONCERNING TERRITORIAL  
ACQUISITION AND OTHER ELEMENTS OF A PEACE SETTLEMENT

1. Eshkol speech to military units in Sinai, June 13. Eshkol said Israel had no intention of acquiring new territory as a result of the war. He went on to say "our stay in Sinai will continue until new arrangements are made which will guarantee us freedom of navigation in international waters and until practical measures are taken to prevent future threats to Israel's security." (FBIS)

2. Eban press conference, June 14. Eban said any discussion with the Cairo government must deal with all existing problems -- including free navigation in the Suez Canal and the Straits of Tiran as well as the future of the Gaza strip. He added that the Egyptians had never considered the Gaza strip as really coming under their sovereignty. He said there must be no repetition of the errors in 1957 when Israeli troops evacuated the Sinai and were replaced by UN units. (FBIS)

3. Statement by Minister Begin in Tel Aviv, June 17. Minister without Portfolio Begin said that without a peace agreement Israel would not move out of any area captured by its defense forces. (FBIS)

4. Ben-Gurion statement, June 19. In a letter circulated to newspapers in Israel, former Prime Minister Ben-Gurion suggested the formation, on the West Bank of the Jordan, of an autonomous Arab state, protected by Israeli troops and guaranteed access to the sea. (Press Reports)

5. Eshkol statement at Sharm el-Shaikh, June 20. Eshkol said "the clock cannot be turned back. When we talk of peace...we have in mind a permanent peace -- not the armistice agreements we have known before." (Reuters)

6. Galili statement, June 23. Information Minister Galili was quoted by Jerusalem radio as saying that Israel is firmly determined to maintain its hold on all occupied areas to strengthen Israel's efforts to reach a peaceful solution. Israel's aim is to attain peace agreements that will insure Israel's security and existence. (FBIS)

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7. Dayan statement, June 26. Dayan speaking in Tel Aviv said "Israel was reserving all territorial decisions and claims concerning the lands it conquered until after it had talked with the Arabs face to face." Dayan also said Israel would not commit itself on the future of the old city of Jerusalem until after peace talks began. (UPI)

8. Eshkol statement, June 27. Jerusalem radio quoted Prime Minister Eshkol as stating that "as long as our neighbors continue in their policy of belligerence and prepare plans to destroy us we will not return the areas now under our control." Eshkol said he favored direct negotiations with the Arab states and added "past experience has taught us that third party mediation is of little value." (FBIS)

9. Eshkol address to religious leaders, June 27. Speaking to religious leaders following Israel's administrative fusion of the two sectors of Jerusalem Eshkol said "...the Government of Israel has made it a cardinal principle of its policy to preserve the Holy Places, to insure their religious and universal character, and to provide free access to them....In this connection I should like to point out that it is our intention to place the internal administration and arrangements of the Holy Places in the hands of the religious leaders to whose communities they belong." (Tel Aviv 4325)

10. Eshkol statement, June 27. Speaking to foreign correspondents in Jerusalem, Eshkol said "...so long as our neighbors will persist in their policy of belligerence and will make plans for our destruction, we will not relinquish the areas that are now under control and that we determine necessary for our security and self defense." Eshkol also said "during the past two decades it has become abundantly clear that the so-called armistice regime that existed from 1949 to 1967 is not conducive to peace...." (Tel Aviv 4326)

11. Gideon Hausner statement, June 28. Hausner, at present a member of the Israeli delegation to the UN, is quoted by the New York Times on June 29 as having said he believed that the Sinai Peninsula with the exception of Sharm el-Shaikh could be turned back to Egypt as long as the Egyptians signed an agreement not to re-establish their military bases there.

12. Dayan statement, June 30. Defense Minister Dayan is quoted as having said in Tel Aviv that Israel would not abandon an inch of occupied territory until a peace treaty had been signed with Israel's Arab neighbors. (AFP)

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13. Peres press conference, July 1. At a press conference in Rome "Roving Ambassador" Shimon Peres suggested a three-phase plan of negotiations: (1) through negotiations with local Arabs, creation of an autonomous state on the West Bank of Jordan, which would have international representation, Israeli economic help, an outlet to the sea, and in which some Gaza refugees would be resettled; (2) establishment of a confederation of Israel, the West Bank, and the remainder of Jordan; (3) settlement with the UAR involving Israeli withdrawal from Sinai (excluding Gaza) in exchange for diplomatic recognition. Peres also indicated that Israel would expect demilitarization of Israeli-occupied Syrian territory. (Rome 049).

14. Dayan statement, July 5. In a statement that was broadcast over Jerusalem radio but later dropped, Dayan was quoted as saying "The Gaza Strip is Israel' and steps would soon be taken to annex it. (Press Report)

15. Eshkol interview to Die Welt, July 5. Eshkol told a correspondent of this German newspaper that the UN could play a useful role in solving the refugee problem. "Today, as before, Israel is ready to contribute its share to an international fund and thus solve this problem, once and for all." Eshkol also said he was willing to meet with any leader in the Arab world including Nasser to begin negotiations without pre-conditions.

16. Eban television interview, July 7. In an appearance on Hamburg Domestic Television Service, Eban said "Our objectives are peace and security. Sometimes that may include territorial changes. Sometime peace and security can be achieved without territorial changes." Eban summed up Israel's objectives vis-a-vis the UAR as being demilitarization of the Sinai Peninsula, freedom of navigation in the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba, and the maintenance of normal relations. Asked whether Israel had intended to establish an Arab buffer state west of the Jordan, Eban said "I know of such arguments by many of my friends in Israel. I can only state in this respect that the Israeli government has not adopted any such decision."

17. Eshkol interview in Der Spiegel, July 10. In an interview given to the publisher of this West German magazine, Eshkol said "the Gaza Strip must stay with Israel." Referring to the 250,000 refugees there he said "we must work out a plan to resettle these people." He suggested that Iraq should be able to resettle 100,000 Gaza refugees. Eshkol also said Israel is working on plans to industrialize and develop the West Bank area with the aim of encouraging the resettlement of the refugees. On Jerusalem, Eshkol said "Israel without Jerusalem

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is an Israel without a head," and indicated that no Israeli government could survive a decision to relinquish the old city. On the West Bank Eshkol said Israel had not yet decided on a final plan but indicated that there was some thought of giving Jordan access to the Port of Haifa. (FBIS)

18. Eban speech at UN, July 17. At the General Assembly Eban set forth as a condition for peace talks with the Arabs the recognition of Israel's "statehood, sovereignty, and international rights." (Press Reports)

19. Dayan statement, July 19. In a speech at a military ceremony, Dayan asserted Israel was able to defend the territories it had occupied pending complete revision of its relationship with the Arabs on its own international status. (Tel Aviv 236)

20. Government statement in Knesset, July 20. In response to a motion by Knesset member Avneri calling for Israel to set up a Palestinian Arab Republic federated to Israel, Chairman of the Knesset Foreign Affairs Committee Hacoen announced, in the name of the Prime Minister, that "the Government of Israel has no intention at this time of revealing its plans for the future of occupied territories." (Tel Aviv 236)

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C

STATEMENTS BY ARAB AND ISRAELI LEADERS RELATIVE TO THE  
MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT

June 9, 1967 - July 23, 1967

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ABD AN-NASIR SPEECH ANNOUNCING HIS RESIGNATION

Cairo Domestic Service in Arabic 1643 GMT 9 June 1967--M

(President Jamal Abd an-Nasir address to the nation--live)

(Text) Brethren, at the times of triumphs and tribulations, in the sweet hours and bitter hours, we have become accustomed to sitting together to discuss things, to speak frankly of facts, believing that only through this way can we always find the right way however difficult circumstances may be.

We cannot hide from ourselves that we have faced a grave setback in the last few days, but I am confident that we all can and, in a short time, will overcome our difficult situation, although for this we shall need much patience and wisdom, as well as moral courage and ability to work. Before this, brethren, we need to cast a glance back over past events in order that we might be able to follow developments and the line of our march leading to the present conditions.

All of us know how the crisis started in the Middle East. At the beginning of last May there was an enemy plan for the invasion of Syria, and the utterances of his politicians and all his military leaders were openly to this effect. There was plenty of evidence of the plan. Sources of our Syrian brethren were categorical on this and our reliable information confirmed it. Add to this fact that our friends in the Soviet Union warned the Parliamentary delegation which was on a visit to Moscow at the beginning of last month that there was a premeditated plan against Syria. We considered it our duty not to accept this silently. This was the duty of Arab brotherhood; it was also the duty of national security, (?because) whoever starts with Syria finishes with Egypt.

Our armed forces moved to our frontiers with a competence the enemy admitted to his friends. Several steps then consequently followed this. Among the steps was the withdrawal of the U.N. Emergency Force and the return of our forces to Sharm ash-Shaykh post, the controlling point in the Strait of Tiran, and which the Israeli enemy was using as one of the aftereffects of the tripartite aggression committed against us in 1956. The enemy's flag passing in front of our forces was intolerable, apart from other reasons connected with the dearest aspirations of the Arab nation.

Accurate calculations of the enemy's strength were precise and showed us that our armed forces with their attained level of equipment and training were capable of repelling the enemy and deterring him. We realized the possibility of armed struggle existed and accepted the risk.

Before us lay several factors: national, Arab, and international. A message from U.S. President Lyndon Johnson was handed to our ambassador in Washington on 26 May asking us to show self-restraint and not to be the first to fire. Otherwise we should have to face grave consequences. On the very same night, the Soviet ambassador asked to have an urgent meeting with me at 5:30 a.m. He informed me of an urgent request from the Soviet Government not to be the first to open fire.

On the morning of last Monday, 5 June, the enemy struck. If we say now that the striking blow came more strongly than we expected, we must also at the same time say with certainty that it was bigger than the potential it had. It became very clear from the first moment that there were other powers behind the enemy--they came to settle their accounts with the Arab National movement. Indeed, there were surprises worthy of note.

June 9, Nasser speech  
(cont'd)

First, the enemy, whom we were expecting from the east and north, came from the west--a matter which categorically showed that facilities enabling his ability and his calculated strength had been made available to him.

Secondly, the enemy covered at one go all military and civilian airports in the UAR. This means that he was relying on strength other than his normal strength to protect his skies against any retaliatory action from our side. The enemy was also striking other Arab fronts with other aids which he had been able to obtain.

Thirdly, evidence is clear of the existence of imperialist collusion with him--an imperialist collusion, trying to benefit from the lesson of the open collusion of 1956, which covered itself this time with baseness and wickedness. Nevertheless, what is now established is that American and British aircraft carriers were off the shores of the enemy helping his war effort. Also, British aircraft raided, in broad daylight, positions on the Syrian and Egyptian fronts, in addition to operations by a number of American (?planes) reconnoitering some of our positions. The inevitable result of this was that our land forces, which were fighting most violent and brave battles in the open desert, found themselves in this difficult time without adequate air cover above them in the face of the enemy's decisive air superiority, in such a way that it could be said, without any exaggeration, that the enemy was operating with an air force three times stronger than his normal force.

The same was faced by the forces of the Jordanian Army, who fought a brave battle under the leadership of King Husayn, who, for the sake of truth and honesty, I say, adopted an excellent stand; and I admit that my heart bled while I followed the battles of his heroic Arab Army in Jerusalem and other parts of the Western Bank on the night the enemy and his plotting forces massed not less than 400 aircraft over the Jordanian Front.

There were other honorable and marvelous efforts. The Algerian people, under their great leader Houari Boumediene, gave without reservation and without stint for the battle. The people of Iraq and their faithful leader Abd ar-Rahman Arif gave without reservation or stint for the battle. The Syrian Army fought heroically, consolidated by the forces of the great Syrian people and under the leadership of their national government.

The peoples and governments of Sudan, Kuwait, Yemen, Lebanon, Tunisia, and Morocco adopted honorable stands. All the peoples of the Arab Nation, without exception, adopted a stand of manhood and dignity all along the Arab homeland; a stand of resolution and determination that the Arab right will not be lost, will not be humiliated, and that war in defense of it is extending, regardless of sacrifice and setbacks, on the road to sure and inevitable victory.

There were also great nations outside the Arab homeland which gave us invaluable moral support. But the plot, and we must say this with manly courage, was bigger and fiercer. The enemy's main concentration was on the Egyptian Front, which he attacked with all his main force of armored vehicles and infantry, supported by an air supremacy the dimensions of which I have portrayed for you. The nature of the desert did not permit full defense, especially with enemy air supremacy.

I realize that the development of the armed battle might not be in our interest. I, with others, tried to use all sources of Arab strength. Arab oil played its role. The Suez Canal played its role. A great role is still required by the general Arab action. I am completely confident that it will be able to perform this. Our armed forces in Sinai were obliged to evacuate the first defense line. They fought fierce tank and air battles on the second defense line. We then responded to the cease-fire resolution, in the face of assurances in the context of the latest Soviet draft resolution put before the Security Council, and following French statements to the effect that no one can realize any territorial expansion on the basis of the recent aggression, and before world public opinion, in Asia and Africa in particular, public opinion that realizes our position and feels the ugliness of the forces of international domination which pounced on us.

June 9, Nasir speech (cont'd)

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Before us now are several urgent tasks. The first task is to remove the traces of this aggression against us and to stand by the Arab Nations resolutely and firmly. Despite the setback the Arab Nations, with all their potential and resources, are capable of insisting on the removal of the traces of the aggression. The second task is to realize the lesson of the setback. In this connection there are three vital facts:

1--Eliminating imperialism in the Arab world will leave Israel with its own forces. However, whatever the circumstances, however long it takes, the Arabs' own forces are greater and more capable of action.

2--Redirecting Arab interests in the service of Arab rights is an essential guarantee; the American Sixth Fleet moved with Arab oil; and there are Arab bases, placed in the service of aggression forcibly and against the will of the peoples.

3--The situation now demands a united voice from the entire Arab Nation; this, in the present circumstances, is an irreplaceable guarantee.

Now we arrive at an important point in this disclosure by asking ourselves: Does this mean that we do not bear a responsibility for the consequences of this setback? I truthfully, and despite any factors on which I might have built my stand during the crisis, tell you that I am ready to bear all the responsibility.

I have taken a decision in which I want you all to help me. I have decided to give up completely and finally every official post and every political role and to return to the ranks of the masses and do my duty with them like every other citizen.

The forces of imperialism imagine that Jamal Abd an-Nasir is their enemy. I want it to be clear to them that their enemy is the entire nation, not just Jamal Abd an-Nasir. The forces hostile to the Arab National Movement try to portray this movement as an empire of Abd an-Nasir. This is not true, because the aspiration for Arab unity began before Abd an-Nasir and will remain after Abd an-Nasir. I always used to tell you that the nation remains and that any individual, regardless of his role and regardless of how much he participated in the causes of his homeland, is a tool for the popular will and not the creator of this popular will.

In accordance with Article 110 of the Provisional Constitution promulgated in March 1964, I have asked my colleague, friend, and brother, Zakariya Muhyi ad-Din, to take over the post of president and that the constitutional texts on the matter be effected.

After this decision, I place all I have at his disposal and in the service of the grave circumstances through which our people are passing. With this I am not liquidating the revolution, but the revolution is not monopolized by one generation of revolutionaries. I take pride in the brothers of this generation of revolutionaries. It has realized the evacuation of British imperialism, has realized the independence of Egypt and defined its Arab personality, and has combatted the policy of the sphere of influence in the Arab world. It led the social revolution and created a deep transformation in the Egyptian reality which affirmed the realization of the people's control of the sources of their wealth and over the result of Arab action. It recovered the Suez Canal and laid down a power network over the whole of the north of the Nile Valley. It made oil resources gush out after a long wait. More important still, it placed on the leadership of political action the alliance of the people's working forces, the constant source of renewed leaderships carrying the banners of national and nationalist struggle one stage after the other, and building socialism, achieving and triumphing.



I have unlimited faith in this alliance leading national action: The peasants, the workers, the soldiers, the intellectuals, and national capital. Its unity and cohesion and creative reaction within the framework of this unity are capable of creating through work, serious work and difficult work as I have said more than once, colossal miracles for this country in order to be a strength for itself, for its Arab Nation, for the movement of national revolution, and for world peace based on justice.

The sacrifices made by our people and their burning spirit during the crisis and the glorious heroisms which the officers and soldiers of our armed forces wrote with their blood will remain an inextinguishable torch in our history and a great inspiration for the future and its great hopes. The people were splendid as usual, noble as their nature, believing, sincere, and loyal. The members of our armed forces were an honorable example of the Arab man in every age and every place. They defended the grains of sand in the desert to the last drop of their blood. In the air, they were, despite enemy supremacy, legends of sacrifice and offering, and of courage and willingness to perform their duty in the best way.

This is an hour for action, not an hour for sorrow. It is an attitude of ideals and not of any selfishness or individual feelings. All my heart is with you, and I want all your hearts to be with me. May God be with us all, a hope in our hearts, a light and guidance. Peace and the blessing of God be with you.

Later 9 June Statement

Cairo Domestic Service in Arabic 2010 GMT 9 June 1967--L

(Text) Brother citizens: The following statement has been issued by Jamal Abd an-Nasir:

The feelings which the masses of the people have shown since I broadcast my statement this evening about developments in the situation have overwhelmed me deeply. Tomorrow, God willing, I shall go to the National Assembly and discuss with it and in front of the masses of our peoples my decision which I announced in the statement. And, if I have to ask anything at this moment of the masses of our great, patient, and fighting people, it is that I call on them to wait until the morning.

Everyone of you must now be at his position. There are many tasks connected with more important and graver duties than anything else. They have priority over any other considerations. I call upon you all, for the sake of the homeland and for my own sake, to go to where you should be.

ASSEMBLY REJECTS ABD AN-NASIR'S DECISION

Cairo Domestic Service in Arabic 2231 GMT 9 June 1967--L

(Text) The National Assembly tonight held an emergency meeting at 0015. The meeting was presided over by Anwar as-Sadat. The assembly adopted a unanimous decision in which it announced on behalf of the united active forces of the people representing the millions of Arabs in Egypt that they reject the decision of the President and declare their insistence on Jamal Abd an-Nasir remaining as leader and President of the republic.

POLITICAL PRISONERS ARE ORDERED RELEASED

Damascus Domestic Service in Arabic 2355 GMT 9 June 1967--M

(Text) The national and regional commands of the Socialist Arab Bath Party, because of their faith that our people's current battle against the Zionist gangs and Anglo-American imperialism is a national battle which concerns all the people and requires that everyone bear the responsibility of citizenship and honor it, decided in a meeting on the evening of 9 June 1967 to release all political detainees so they may have the chance to defend their homeland in these difficult times. The decision was enforced immediately.

Damascus, 9 June 1967; (signed) The National Command of the Socialist Arab Bath Party.

ASSEMBLY PRESIDENT READS ABD AN-NASIR MESSAGE

Cairo Domestic Service in Arabic 0919 GMT 10 June 1967--L

(Live relay from the UAR National Assembly of speech by President of the National Assembly Anwar as-Sadat)

(Text) In the name of the God and the people I open the session. Since (early morning) the Arab people from the ocean to the gulf have come out to express their absolute adherence to their hero leader, Jamal Abd an-Nasir. (tumultuous applause) From the delta, upper Egypt, towns, villages, fields, shops, (word indistinct), universities, schools, and the armed forces, masses of the UAR people have marched in Cairo streets shouting their sacred call: We accept no one other than Abd an-Nasir as President of the republic, (applause) leader, struggler, and teacher.

In the streets the people are gathering, blocking the streets of Cairo and preventing us from reaching the President or him reaching us. At the same time these masses are a strong link between us and the leader. It gives me pleasure to convey to you and to the entire people, to the peoples of the Arab nation and the friendly peoples, that President Jamal Abd an-Nasir has decided, in response to the popular desire (stormy and prolonged applause with chanting of slogans) it gives me pleasure to convey to you and to the entire people, to the peoples of the Arab nation and the friendly peoples, that President Jamal Abd an-Nasir has decided, in response to the popular desire, to remain in (this) post as President of the republic. (applause) He announced this in a letter to the National Assembly which I have received, and it gives me pleasure to read it to you.

Text of Message

Mr. President of the National Assembly, I had hoped the nation would help me in carrying out my decision to step down. Only God knows that in taking this decision I was prompted by no other reason than my appreciation of responsibility in accordance with my conscience and with what I conceived to be my duty. I shall give this homeland, willingly and proudly, all I have, even my life to the last breath. No one can or is able to understand my feelings in these circumstances of the astounding stand which has been adopted by our people and the whole great peoples of the Arab nation in expressing their determination to reject my decision to step down which I had announced. I do not know how to (repay) this and how to express my gratitude. I fail to find words in this overwhelming feeling which completely fills me. I say to you (word indistinct) and I ask you to convey to the National Assembly that I am convinced of the reasons on which I based my decision.

At the same time the voice of the masses of our people regarding me is something which cannot remain ignored. For this reason I have decided to remain in my place and to stay where the people want me to stay until the end of the period in which we can all remove the traces of aggression. However, the whole matter after this period must be referred to the people in a general referendum. I feel the setback is bound to add to our experience new depth and is bound to spur us to cast a comprehensive, close, and (word indistinct) look at many aspects of our work. The first thing which we must assert with understanding and pride, which is now evident before our eyes, is that the people alone are the leader and teacher, and are immortal.

(Editor's note: It is not clear whether the following passage is part of the message or As-Sadat's words): And now, and now, brother citizens everywhere, join your hands with mine and let us begin our urgent task. May God grant us all His support and guidance.

#### ABD AN-NASIR GIVEN FULL MOBILIZATION POWERS

Cairo Domestic in Arabic 1200 GMT 10 June 1967--L

(Text) The National Assembly has approved the following resolution: The National Assembly, having been informed of the views of the working allied forces, who have been in continuous contact with the assembly and its president, conveys the will of the people to President Jamal Abd An-Nasir and decides to put in his hand all powers authorizing him to carry out an all-embracing mobilization of all the forces of the working people and the restoration of the political and military structure to be capable of facing all challenges.

#### ARAB FOREIGN MINISTERS ASKED TO HOLD MEETING

Kuwaiti Domestic Service in Arabic 1700 GMT 11 June 1967--M

(Text) His Highness the Amir presided over a cabinet meeting at As-Sif Palace at 0900 today to discuss the current Arab situation. The meeting was attended by the chief of the Amirate Cabinet. The cabinet later resumed its session under the chairmanship of Premier and Crown Prince Shaykh al-Jabir al-Ahmad al-Jabir. The cabinet decided the following:

1--To send a note to the Arab foreign ministers to convene an immediate meeting at a place they choose to agree on a unified policy toward the latest events in the Arab homeland and to decide on what should be done at present; the meeting will also discuss the possibility of holding another meeting at the highest level;

2--To authorize the health minister to notify the UAR, Syrian, and Jordanian governments that the ministry is prepared to receive and treat a number of men wounded and injured during the Jihad.

The finance and oil minister has acquainted the cabinet with his discussions with Saudi Petroleum and Mineral Resources Minister Zaki Ahmad al-Yamani and Iraqi Oil Minister Abd as-Sattar Abd al-Husayn. They had arrived today in Kuwait to study their countries' relations with the oil companies operating in their respective countries in the light of the current situation. They agreed to continue their contacts.

**TRIPARTITE ENEMY PIERCED FRONTLINE DEFENSES**

Damascus Domestic Service in Arabic 0937 GMT 11 June 1967--M

(Military Communique No. 71)

(Text) During the fierce battles which have taken place between our brave forces and the forces of the imperialist-Zionist tripartite aggression launched by the United States, Britain, and Israel, the enemy repeatedly tried to penetrate our first line of defense along the front, using his various weapons-- tanks, artillery, and numerous planes. Our heroic forces repulsed and crushed these onslaughts, destroying the enemy's concentrations, bases, and all his settlements in the occupied area opposite our frontline defense posts. Our brave soldiers and officers fought with rare courage and ferocity.

They withstood the enemy's mechanical supremacy and the dense, successive, and uninterrupted raids by his aircraft, which, as has been proved beyond doubt, belong to the states of the tripartite aggression and not to Israel alone. Our heroic army defended every part of the homeland during the fierce battles which have continued constantly since the beginning of the aggression. However, the inequality of forces between us and the tripartite enemy and particularly the enemy's use of abundant planes enabled the enemy to penetrate our first line of defense in the northern sector and try to surround the other sectors.

Our sectors opposed this with extraordinary vigilance and heroism, defended every inch of land under the hardest conditions, and foiled the enemy's plan. Our soldiers and officers fought with unprecedented courage against the forces of the tripartite aggression whose arms and aircraft were superior to ours. Some were martyred defending each grain of soil of the homeland. Our forces are now stationed steadfast on the second line of defense. With unlimited faith in the dignity of their nation and their homeland, they are ready to regain every inch of the homeland and to resist all the Anglo-American imperialist designs, which ultimately aim at defending the imperialist interests in the Arab homeland.

(signed) the defense minister.

#### SOVIET STAND DURING WAR VIEWED WITH REGRET

Damascus MENA in Arabic to MENA Cairo 1845 GMT 10 June 1967--M (FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

(Text) Beirut--A feeling of regret and disappointment prevails in Lebanese public opinion because of the Soviet Union's stand during the fighting. Some demonstrations staged today proceeded to the Soviet Embassy in Beirut, calling for the Soviet Union's actual interference and practical support for the Arabs and not to let them down in their battle of destiny.

Meanwhile, Lebanese Foreign Minister Georges Hakim told some Lebanese deputies that in the course of his discussions with the Soviet U.N. delegate he had felt that the Soviet Union had no intention of interfering militarily. He added that the discussion took place in the presence of the Iraqi foreign minister, who was also attending Security Council meetings.

#### MILITARY GOVERNOR FORBIDS DEMONSTRATIONS

Kuwait Domestic Service in Arabic 1200 GMT 11 June 1967--M

(Text) To give citizens the opportunity to express their feelings toward current events in the Arab world, the authorities have permitted public demonstrations and processions. However, realizing that the public demonstrations have not served the Arab cause but have disturbed the peace and hampered efforts by the state to preserve the higher Arab interest, we have decided in accordance with the powers vested in us under the martial law to ban public demonstrations and meetings forthwith, regardless of their form and purpose in all parts of the country.

Anyone contravening this decision will receive maximum punishment stipulated under martial law. We have authorized the authorities to implement this order immediately and firmly. (signed) Military Governor Gen. Jabir al-Ahmar al-Jabir, 11 June 1967.

ESHKOL: SYRIANS 'STARTED THE CONFLAGRATION'

Jerusalem Israel Domestic Service in Hebrew 2200 GMT 10 June 1967--M

(Excerpt) Prime Minister Levi Eshkol today visited the Hula Valley settlements hit by Syrian shelling during the past few days. In a statement to our correspondent Yeheskel Hamcari, Eshkol said the government and the entire country are proud of the firm stand of the inhabitants of the border settlements, which were seriously shelled this time. The Prime Minister pointed out that the government will act immediately to repair the damage, particularly in Gadot settlement, which suffered the most this time, too.

The Prime Minister said it was the Syrians who set off the conflagration, which spread to the other borders of the country. However, the Israeli Defense Forces courageously withstood the test imposed on them and came out victorious in the battle against the Syrians as well.

MINISTERS STRESS ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS INVALID

Information Minister Galili

Jerusalem Israel Domestic Service in Hebrew 1100 GMT 10 June 1967--M

(Speech by Information Minister Yisrael Galili in Eilat on 9 June--recorded)

(Text) Following the military struggle on the battlefields, a political struggle has now begun in the international sphere and in the U.N. lobbies--a struggle between Israel's friends and those who wish to harm it. During the past days the government and its ministerial committees have wrestled with difficult problems to insure what matters most: victory on the battlefield. So far no discussions have been held and no plans have been made concerning the future. Nevertheless, I think I can say a few simple and clear things about this matter.

It must be said, first of all, that Israel cannot agree to a return to the status quo ante--that is to say, the situation as it was before the fighting started. On no account can Israel agree to a return to armistice agreements, to the armistice regime, and to the armistice borders. (applause)

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I think we may simply say that the Egyptian, Jordanian, Syrian, and Iraqi tanks and planes have completely erased the armistice agreements and that the armistice regime with its borders and rules is dead and can no longer exist in our world. (applause) Israel cannot exist in a situation which in the beginning was intended to serve as a preliminary and a transition to peace but which has continued for 20 years as a state of war.

We shall not return to this transition stage in which we have spent 20 years of suffering, distress, and bloodshed. We can no longer content ourselves with partial solutions. We must present to our neighbors and to the world an emphatic demand for a peaceful solution.

Labor Minister Allon

Jerusalem Israel Domestic Service in Hebrew 1200 GMT 10 June 1967--M

(Text) Labor Minister Yigal Allon said that the armistice agreements between Israel and the Arab states today are invalid. The Israeli Government will no longer be satisfied with interim arrangements in its relations with neighboring countries and will demand, as a condition for any arrangement, mutual recognition in order to eliminate one of the main causes of war. Allon was speaking last night at an information forum in Haifa.

He stressed that the success of our political effort made the war effort easier and that Israel's Arab citizens showed loyalty to the state in time of crisis.

Abba Eban, Yigal Allon

Jerusalem Israel Domestic Service in Hebrew 1900 GMT 11 June 1967--M

(Text) Foreign Minister Abba Eban and Labor Minister Yigal Allon this evening spoke about the political battle Israel expects. In a joint session in Jerusalem of the central committees of the alignment parties, the foreign minister said: We resolved once and for all not to waste the victorious achievements of the Israeli Defense Forces but to translate them into a new reality of peace and security. Before the foreign minister began to speak, the committee members stood to honor the memory of those who died in the fighting.

New, original, and unusual thinking is required of us now, Eban said, to achieve a new disposition of relations in the area. This disposition of relations should be built by the area's state themselves, through direct negotiations and without mediators. The purpose of these negotiations, Eban said, is to solve some of Israel's historical problems and to insure for it stable conditions of existence.

Reviewing the military battle, Labor Minister Allon said there is much significance in the fact that we fought and were able to triumph alone. In regard to the future, he said we should never repeat past mistakes and agree to intermediate arrangements such as the armistice agreements, which in the meantime have been torn to pieces. We hold cards which will enable us to reject any settlement with our neighbors that is less than peace.

Allon added that the fact that almost the entire Palestinian population is now under our influence gives us a very good opportunity to solve the refugee problem in cooperation with them and with international powers.



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Transport Minister Carmel

Jerusalem Israel Domestic Service in Hebrew 0600 GMT 10 June 1967--M

(Text) Minister of Transport and Communications Moshe Carmel last night spoke at a public information forum in Holon and dwelt on the danger that attempts will be made to take from us what we have won on the battlefields. Past experience in 1948 and in the Sinai campaign, Carmel said, should teach us that cease-fire and armistice are not peace. The state of enmity and the arms race in the region should now be turned into a permanent peace based on mutual cooperation.

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USSR SEVERS DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL

Jerusalem Israel Domestic Service in Hebrew 1700 GMT 10 June 1967--M

(Excerpts) The Soviet Union has severed diplomatic relations with Israel. A Soviet note on the break of relations was handed today to Israeli Ambassador to Moscow Katriel Katz, and a similar note was handed this evening to Foreign Minister Abba Eban by the Soviet ambassador to Israel.

During his meeting with the Soviet ambassador, Eban expressed regret for this step by the Soviet Union and pointed out that Israel has always attached importance and weight to its relations with the Soviet Union. He refuted the charge in the Soviet Union that Israel has adopted or was adopting an aggressive policy. He also expressed the hope that diplomatic and other relations will be established in the future between Israel and the Soviet Union on the basis of a more balanced understanding by the Moscow government of Israel's problems in the face of the aggressive policy of the Arab states. Eban stressed that the struggle imposed on Israel was a struggle for its survival and that it had won the support of world progressive and peace-loving circles.

(Editor's note: In later broadcasts the radio reported that Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria had severed diplomatic relations with Israel.)

# ESHKOL, RABIN, EBAN SUBMIT REPORTS TO CABINET

Jerusalem Israel Domestic Service in Hebrew 1600 GMT 11 June 1967--M

(Text) The government today heard reviews of the events of the past few weeks from Prime Minister Levi Eshkol, Chief of Staff Maj. Gen. Yitzhaq Rabin, and Foreign Minister Abba Eban. The discussion also included an appraisal of current conditions. Eshkol reviewed the events from independence day until yesterday. He dwelt on political and military aspects and on the battles themselves.

At the conclusion of his review, the government sent condolences to the bereaved families and honored the memory of those who were killed. The government sent best wishes for a speedy recovery to the wounded and expressed thanks and appreciation to the Israeli Defense Forces and its commanders.

The chief of staff then reviewed the battles and the stages of the war in the past six days. The foreign minister reported on his last visit to New York, the talks he held there, and the U.N. Security Council debate. He also reported on the breaking off of relations between the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria and Israel.

## Cabinet Decisions

Jerusalem Israel Domestic Service in Hebrew 1700 GMT 11 June 1967--M

(Excerpts) The government today also discussed other aspects of the Israeli Defense Forces' victories. On a proposal by the justice minister, it was decided to promulgate, in honor of the event, a law granting partial amnesty to criminals. The ministerial committee for legislative affairs has been authorized to draft the law and submit it to the Knesset.

A special ministerial committee was elected and authorized to decide on economic matters connected with areas under the defense forces' control, such as questions of supply, production, and trade links. The committee is headed by the finance minister. It includes the ministers of defense, agriculture, and commerce and industry, as well as Minister Yosef Sapir.

During the discussion the question arose of changing the currency in the areas under the Israeli Defense Forces' control. It was pointed out that the law grants authority to the finance minister and the governor of the Bank of Israel to determine the rate of exchange for currency, in this case the Jordanian dinar and the Egyptian pound.

Tomorrow the government will submit to the Knesset two amendments to the budget law which would enable it to finance the security expenditures caused by the current situation. One amendment will enable the government to withdraw, for security needs, the income from the defense loan approved last week. Another amendment will permit the finance minister, with the authorization of the Knesset finance committee, to transfer funds from one budget item to another in order to make cuts in the budget as decided by the government.

## WAR LOSSES, GAINS, MILITARY ACTIONS REVIEWED

### Israeli Casualties

Jerusalem Israel Domestic Service in Hebrew 2100 GMT 11 June 1967--M

(Text) The Israeli Defense Forces spokesman announces that our losses in this war up to today, 11 June, are 679 dead and 2,563 wounded, of whom 255 are moderately and seriously wounded and the others slightly wounded.

#### Damage Compensation

Jerusalem Israel Domestic Service in Hebrew 2000 GMT 11 June 1967--M

(Text) Finance Minister Sapir and Commerce Minister Sharef agreed in a telephone conversation that the war damage throughout the country can be covered in full by state funds. This has been stated by the Finance Ministry. Property tax regulations do not oblige the government to pay full compensation throughout the country, but Sapir and Sharef take the position that compensation should be paid beyond what is stated in the law.

#### Israeli Navy Actions

Jerusalem Israel Domestic Service in Hebrew 2200 GMT 9 June 1967--M

(Text) This evening an Israeli Defense Forces spokesman summed up naval force activities in the battle against Egypt. On 5 and 6 June a naval force penetrated the port of Alexandria. The force approached the main anchorage of the Egyptian fleet, Ras at-Tin base, and hit war vessels. In this operation war vessels, including rocket ships of the (Ussak--phonetic) type, were hit and sunk. The Cairo radio admitted another rocket ship was sunk. On the night of 5-6 June a task force of destroyers and torpedo boats advanced to the approaches of Port Said and engaged rocket ships moving toward northern Sinai. The enemy units were forced to retreat within Port Said harbor after sustaining some damage.

Regarding action against submarines near Israel's shores, the military spokesman said that during the war the Israeli Navy discovered three enemy submarines near shore. On 7 June navy destroyers depth-charged an enemy submarine near Rosh Haniqra. Later an oil slick was seen on the surface. It is presumed the submarine was damaged.

The next day another submarine was discovered near the Gulf of Haifa. It, too, was attacked by navy destroyers. Immediately after the explosion of the first depth charges a large oil slick was seen on the surface. It is presumed the submarine was hit. A third submarine was discovered, attacked, and forced to retreat. None of the three submarines caused any damage. Their attack was repulsed without losses to our forces.

#### Surrender of Arms, Ammunition

Jerusalem Israel in Arabic to the Arab World 1610 GMT 10 June 1967--M

(Text) The military governor of the Western Bank orders all inhabitants of the old city of Jerusalem and the Western Bank to place all arms and ammunition in their possession on the roads outside their homes by 0500 tomorrow. Whoever is found to possess arms and ammunition after the deadline--0500 tomorrow--will be punished most severely.

#### Transfer of Residents to Jordan

Jerusalem Israel Domestic Service in Hebrew 1000 GMT 12 June 1967--M

(Text) The military government administration of the Western Bank today announced to the inhabitants of the old city of Jerusalem and the vicinity that anyone wishing to do so may move to the Kingdom of Jordan. The announcement said that every citizen interested in this should register at the city governor's office in the law courts building and that arrangements would be made for his transfer. The people who register must identify themselves by name and will not be required to submit other documents.

## BOUMEDIENNE: ARABS WILL WAGE A LONG WAR

Algiers Domestic Service in Arabic 1318 GMT 10 June 1967--L

(Broadcast to the nation by Houari Boumediene--live or recorded)

(Excerpts) Citizens, in these difficult times through which our greater Arab nation is passing, in these decisive days in Arab history, during which the Arab nation is passing through the most delicate moments of its life, and in which it is facing a great battle of destiny, I talk to you in the name of the Council of the Revolution and the government to express to you our deep appreciation for your solidarity with the people of the UAR, for your abundant feelings for the brotherly Jordanian people who displayed so much courage in the frontlines, and for the dear, defiant people of Syria who still continue at this moment to resist aggression and who are still being exposed to all kinds of concentrated destruction from the forces of crime which are allied against us.

I also greet in your name all our soldiers who hastened to go to our sister countries in order to defend our immortal nation. Yes, in these delicate moments in our glorious history, which is full of heroism and sacrifice, the outlines of this new crusade-war have become clear, this war which was waged against us by international imperialism, manifested in the United States and Britain, in alliance with international Zionism. This conspiracy has become clear, this base conspiracy the threads of which are woven in Washington, London, and somewhere else, and in which the little Zionist state of the gangs was used against our nation which is marching toward unity, dignity, and socialism. From the first moment we realized that this Zionist gang would not be alone in the field of battle and that they would not dare to commit their treachery by which they are characterized, if they did not have behind them criminal imperialist forces.

We expected this criminal act on the part of the imperialist powers who created the little state of the Zionists and made out of it a bridgehead to strike against the Arab nation--which is rich in resources, which is in the vanguard of the liberation forces in the world, and which is fighting in the vanguard of the liberation forces in the world, and which is fighting for the dignity of man and the realization of his progress through the destruction of all kinds of enslavement and all types of exploitation. The little state of the Zionists cannot be separated from the United States or Britain. It is closely tied in the field of international strategy to the United States and imperialism in general. This imperialism is the one which created it and fed it and still feeds it and develops it, and it is the one which is moving it at will. Therefore, we have no option but to widen the scope of our struggle against imperialism by demolishing its bases on our soil, wherever these bases may be, whatever they are, and whatever form they take, behind which they hide.

June 10 Boumedienne  
speech (cont)

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Yes, yes, citizens, the imperialism which is setting off from Washington and London and which has set into motion its gigantic potential in the way of fleets and aircraft carriers in the service of the Zionists, aims not only at striking the peoples of the Arab nation, but also at paralyzing the progressive movements and the struggle of liberation in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.

The imperialists are resentful against us, because we are in the forefront of the bitter struggle which is waged by the peoples of the third world. They want to liquidate the progressive movements in order to recover their lost bases, and in order to tighten the grip on the liberated peoples who aspire to restore their dignity and honor.

Compatriots, our brothers in the UAR, Syria, and Jordan and their brothers from Iraq, Algeria, and other Arab countries displayed much courage. And if today the hellish and gigantic means used by imperialism in alliance with Zionism have overcome and if we lost one battle, we will not lose the war, we will not lose it. The battlefield must not be confined to the canal or Sinai, but it should be the entire Arab world. It is a universal operation which has not yet ended and it will not end except with our victory over imperialism and Zionism.

Compatriots, we have now entered a long war which has wider dimensions, much more than the aggressors who waged it against us expected. The Arab nation has entered this war to face with its own potential the forces of Anglo-U.S. imperialism which are meanly hiding behind the cloak of the little state of the Zionist gang, and in order to defend gallantly its honor and dignity and in order to defend the cause of freedom, which is not subject to division and which concerns man wherever he may be. Citizens, the crisis through which the Arab nation is passing today makes it necessary for it to stand as one man and to mobilize all its forces and human energies and material potentials, not for the sake of Jerusalem and Palestine, not for the sake of Aqaba alone, but also to destroy imperialism and Zionism and all other types of racism.

Citizens, if we are struck today in the Arab east in Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Palestine, and if the force of arms in this area has failed us in a battle of unequal potentials and means, this will not undermine our determination, nor will it deter us or delay us in our march to demolish the fortresses of evil and aggression and to eradicate imperialism and Zionism in the regions of our greater homeland.

If the Security Council does not support right and places the aggressor and the one who was attacked on the same level, it is not new to find from it this inability and negligence. What can one expect from a council which has fully failed in defending freedom and peace in Vietnam and did not have enough courage to be just to us in a battle or in our battle against imperialism. We however warn the Security Council against the consequences of its biased behavior in favor of aggression. Today we can only remind it of the fate of other international organizations which also failed to support justice and which did not prove their effectiveness except in supporting the aggressors.

June 10, Baume-etienne  
speech (cont'd)

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Arab people, we are today facing grave circumstances which may be decisive in the history of our nation. This lesson demands from us all, wherever we may be, to mobilize all our potential in this decisive battle. The situation is very grave. History will record these days, its pages will record these days mercilessly without omission. Each one of us must do his duty as deemed necessary by the requirements of the battle of destiny.

We must be frank with ourselves and with our friends and indeed with our enemies. The Arab people, no matter how much they see of setbacks and crisis, suffer frustration of hopes, and suffered aggression from aggressors, the watching of spectators, and hesitation of friends, will remain standing on their two feet, firm in the face of events and rigid as a mountain in the face of the variety of dangers and disasters. This frankness demands that we say that no one can come tomorrow with the pretext of neutrality, for there is no neutrality between injustice and right, between aggression and defense, between enslavement and freedom, and between tolerance and racism. Neutrality means avoiding the taking of a stand. It means collusion with the treacherous aggressor and accepting the established fact which is imposed by force. It is cowardice itself, a great treason against the question of mankind, and a violation of all higher values.

Citizens, the war must go on. We must not lay down arms until right is restored to its proper place and the abnormal conditions are corrected, until aggression is destroyed, and until what has been imposed by brute force is eradicated.

The Arab nation is standing as one man, and behind it are gigantic human and moral forces manifested in all the peoples which support right in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the socialist countries. There are living energies which should today choose their path and appraise the situation with courage and objectiveness and bear their responsibilities in full and without twisting and turning. The Arab nation has known in its hard plight who are its enemies and who are its genuine friends. Its peoples have engaged in a battle of honor and dignity, and the history of the peoples liberation and those who have suffered aggression will record this chapter in inerasable letters of immortality.

Algerian people, you have surged forward from the first moment to repel aggression, defend freedom and record with your blood the unity of the Arab nation, the blood which you have shed for the sake of freedom and dignity, because you knew from your experiences and from the pages of your history that to succumb to injustice and accept aggression is one step to be followed by others, that this step represents the first chapter of a tragedy to be followed by others. You have witnessed how freedom can die gradually, and how other states fall one after the other when they surrender, for the first step of surrender--accepting the established fact--marks the final and decisive conclusion. Therefore you will not accept the established fact, but will rise from the depths with all your strength in order to repel aggression, support right, and hoist the banner of freedom and dignity you have always known throughout your glorious and long history.

Forward, immortal Arab nation, let every foot of your soil be a battlefield, let all the popular masses be your soldiers, and let your slogan be: Victory or Martyrdom!

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MINISTERS REVIEW U.S.-BRITISH 'AGGRESSION'

Cairo Domestic Service in Arabic 1730 GMT 12 June 1967--L

(Text) The Council of Ministers held a meeting at 1100 hours this morning under the chairmanship of Sidqi Sulayman, the Prime Minister.

The minister of national guidance, Muhammad Faiq, stated that the Council of Ministers reviewed the results the U.S.-British aggression, which is concealed behind Israel, and discussed the significance of Arab unanimity in working for resistance to the aggression and in obliterating, through all means, its results. The Council of Ministers expressed its appreciation of the heroic stands made by the Arab armies in their resistance to the treacherous aggression. The Council of Ministers also expressed its appreciation for the enthusiastic decisions taken by the Arab states to ban the pumping of oil to the aggressor states.

His Excellency added that members of the Council of Ministers studied the role being played by the United States and Britain at the Security Council to conceal and support the Israeli aggression, in refusing to adopt a frank resolution condemning Israel for aggression, and concerning the latter's return to behind the armistice lines. The council calls on the citizens to make further efforts to increase production in all sectors. The people's working power should set an example in self-sacrifice by dutifully and with self-denial accepting the sacrifices required by the circumstances of our long battle against the forces of aggression and imperialism. The council points out with gratitude the role of the friendly countries, nations, and governments which stood and are sincerely standing by our side, and which supported us morally and materially.

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DIASPORA JEWRY URGED TO 'IMMIGRATE EN MASSE'

Jerusalem Israel Domestic Service in Hebrew 1200 GMT 12 June 1967--M

(Text) Interior Minister Haim Moshe Shapiro said today that sooner or later the Arabs will understand that peace is in their own interest. Speaking at a session of the executive of the National Religious Party in Jerusalem today, the minister said that our youth did not disappoint us at the time of testing. He stressed that the national unity government which has been formed will be no less important in the coming political battle than it was in the military battle.

Minister of Social Welfare Yosef Burg called on Diaspora Jewry not to content themselves with financial contributions to Israel but to immigrate en masse and settle in Israel.

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GAZA MUNICIPAL COUNCIL MEETS: CURFEW RELAXED

Jerusalem Israel Domestic Service in Hebrew 1700 GMT 11 June 1967--M

(Excerpt) The Gaza municipal council today met for the first time under Israeli rule. During the meeting Israeli Military Governor Lt. Col. Yitzhaq Mudai said that plans are being made for the normal operation of health, water, and electricity services. Gaza Mayor Rajib Alami expressed thanks for the good treatment by the Israeli Defense Army and pledged the council's cooperation. The curfew in Gaza is gradually being terminated. Today citizens were permitted to leave their houses from 1000 to 1420.

# **BOURGUIBA: TUNISIA WILL HONOR COMMITMENTS**

Baghdad Domestic Service in Arabic 1100 GMT 12 June 1967--M

(Text) President Arif has received the following cable from Tunisian President Bourguiba: His Excellency the President of the Iraqi Republic Lt. Gen. Abd ar-Rahman Muhammad Arif, Baghdad: At a time when the Iraqi people are waging a battle against the oppressive Israeli aggression, the Tunisian Republic supports your efforts and struggle and places its material resources at your disposal in accordance with the commitments that we have made. We have ordered our army to be ready to respond to the needs of the Arab nation at this decisive time. We affirm our determination to strengthen Arab ranks until the Arab nation achieves a final victory in its holy jihad for the sake of dignity, justice, and true peace. May God grant us all success. (signed) President of the Tunisian Republic Habib Bourguiba. President Arif sent the following cable of thanks in reply: His Excellency President Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia, Tunis: Your Excellency's stand toward the consolidation of Arab ranks and placing of the resources of your fraternal state in the service of the Arab nation in the most critical phase of its history, at a time when this nation is waging a battle of destiny against Israel and its supporters, who aim at harming the dignity of this nation and at encroaching upon its rights in implementation of their criminal imperialist plots, is a stand of an Arab leader who is faithful to his nation. I thank Your Excellency for your support to the Iraqi people, who are waging a battle of honor. I wish you and the fraternal Tunisian people success. May God grant us success and may He grant victory to the Arab nation. (signed) President of the Iraqi Republic, Lt. Gen. Abd ar-Rahman Muhammad Arif.

## **GOVERNMENT DISCUSSES ARAB HIGH-LEVEL MEETING**

Beirut Domestic Service in Arabic 1700 GMT 12 June 1967--M

(Text) Foreign Minister Dr. Georges Hakim announced today that Lebanon favors every suggestion to hold an Arab meeting at any level to tackle the current situation.

He received Iraqi Ambassador to Lebanon Nafir al-Umari at noon today and discussed with him the current Arab situation and the efforts to hold an Arab summit.

## **INTERIOR MINISTRY CURTAILS FOREIGN TRAVEL**

Baghdad Domestic Service in Arabic 1900 GMT 12 June 1967--M

(Interior Ministry announcement)

(Text) On the strength of the powers vested in us under paragraph 8 Article 4, National Security Law No.4 of 1965 and considering the requirements of public interest, we have decided to ban Iraqis from traveling outside Iraq except in emergencies and on the agreement of the Interior Ministry. Travel on official business is exempted. (signed) Interior Minister Abd as-Sattar Abd al-Latif.



# KING HUSAYN RECEIVES CABLE FROM KING FAYSAL

Amman Domestic Service in Arabic 1600 GMT 12 June 1967--M

(Text) His Majesty King Husayn has received the following cable from King Faysal: My brother, His Majesty King Husayn of the Hashimite kingdom of Jordan: We support your wonderful heroic stand on the line of sacrifice and devotion together with your proud struggling people against the treacherous Zionist aggression launched by the enemy against the Arab nation. We have mobilized all our potentials to participate in this decisive battle of the entire Arab nation. (signed) Faysal.

# KUWAITI PREMIER DISCUSSES FUTURE ARAB ACTION

Kuwait Domestic Service in Arabic 1700 GMT 12 June 1967--M

(Summary) Crown Prince and Premier Jabir al-Ahmad al-Jabir has stated that steadfast nations confront difficult situations with more determination and belief in God. His Excellency was replying to a question by the Kuwaiti radio and television correspondent regarding the steps the government will adopt to meet the difficult conditions which are facing our Arab nation. His Excellency said: "The determination to proceed on the road is the factor which urged His Excellency the Amir to order the government to send notes to the Arab states for an emergency Arab foreign ministers meeting. This meeting would discuss the prevailing conditions and pave the way for an Arab summit conference which would prepare a careful plan with which the nation will face whatever is being hatched against it by its enemies."

The Premier added: I believe the war is still going on. This nation has potentialities and can stand a long war which will preserve its honor and sanctities and will retrieve its usurped rights. "Let all nations know that the Arab nation has economic and psychological weapons which it could throw into the battle until victory is achieved." His Excellency said: We are confident that many countries will understand the true nature of our battle. This is because these countries are trying to take the side of justice and share our feelings toward our usurped sanctities. "The others should understand that they have to decide between the friendship of the Arab nation and their interests in the region or being nice to the Zionist aggressors."

In reply to a question regarding the part which Kuwait will play in the battle of construction in the countries which suffered from the Zionist aggression, the Premier said: We all know the extent of harm which befell some of the Arab countries. It is the duty of every Arab nation to help and cooperate in the forthcoming battle of construction. Kuwait will perform its duties in this field. "The government is studying the question of imposing certain new taxes in order that all may participate in this duty."

On the responsibilities of the Kuwaiti people, the Premier said that the Kuwaiti people are part of the Arab nation. God willed that this people be tested at this time. It is the duty of each of us to participate in shouldering our responsibilities, it is the duty of each member of this country to exert more effort and work harder to preserve the economy of this country and to help the economy of the sister countries.

#### Further Proposal

Damascus MENA in Arabic to MENA Cairo 2035 GMT 12 June 1967--M (FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

(Text) Beirut--Former Lebanese Premier Sabib Salam today called all the Arabs to unite military and political commands without any delay.

In a statement issued today Salam said that we should declare that the United States and those who conspire with it are the number one enemy of the Arabs.

Salam called for military, economic, political, and social mobilization of the internal Arab front and the Arab peoples.

He further called for cutting off oil supplies to the states supporting Israel, in particular the United States and Britain. He also called for boycotting British and U.S. products and for paralyzing their communications across the Arab east.

#### TRICONTINENTAL ORGANIZATION CONDEMNS ISRAEL

Moscow TASS International Service in English 1816 GMT 12 June 1967--L

(Text) Damascus--"We express ardent solidarity with and resolute support for the Syrian people in their struggle against imperialist aggression," it is said in a telegram sent to the President of Syria, Nur ad-Din al-Atasi, by the Executive Committee of the Tricontinental Solidarity Organization.

"The Syrian people have scored big successes in the socio-economic field and scored several important victories over the imperialist monopolies. That is precisely why the imperialists, after failing in their intrigues and plots against Syria, have now unleashed, with Israel's help, an open armed aggression against Syria. We resolutely and wrathfully condemn this aggression," it is pointed out in the telegram.

## LEVI ESHKOL SPEECH TO KNESSET ON 12 JUNE

Jerusalem Israel Domestic Service in Hebrew 1411 GMT 12 June 1967--M

(Prime Minister Levi Eshkol speech to Knesset on 12 June--live)

(Text) Mr. Chairman, honored Knesset: One week ago the crucial battle began. Israel's existence, the hope of generations, the vision which became reality in our days was in the balance. Today, one week after the last Knesset session, which took place amid the shrieking of shells, we are meeting with tidings of victory. The enemy's aggression was repelled; the decisive and larger part of his forces was broken; his military (?preparations) were ~~destroyed~~; the aggressive bases were swept away; the threat of war was removed from our state; the skies over our heads were purged; and we are safe again.

The threat to Jerusalem, to the coastal plain, to the settlements in the north, to the settlements along the Gaza Strip, and the threat to the Negev and to Galilee were removed. The Israeli Defense Forces today control the Sinai Peninsula, the (?approach) to the Suez Canal, the Western Bank of the Jordan, and the heights of Golan. Passage through the Tiran Strait and the Gulf of Eilat is free. Jerusalem has been unified. For the first time since the establishment of the state Jews are praying at the Western Wall, the relic of our holy temple and of our historic past, and at Rachel's tomb. This is the first time in our generation that Jews can pray undisturbed at the cave of Machpelan in Hebron, the city of the patriarchs. Indeed, the Bible passage has become true: "There is recompense for your toil and your children will return to their land."

On this day of victory, we bow our heads in reverence in memory of the fallen. Many hundreds of Israeli soldiers and civilians sacrificed their lives for this victory.

I know that there is no consolation for the sorrow of the individual and the grief of the family. Every human being is a complete world, but the ~~bereaved~~ families should know that those who fell were fighting for a just cause, and that no cause is more important. They must know that in dying they commanded us to live.

I say on behalf of the entire nation, the government, and on behalf of myself that we share their deep sorrow. We shall remember our dear children, the soldiers and commanders of the Israeli Defense Forces, who with their lives and their deaths have sanctified our people and our land. They are joining the chain of heroism and sacrifice of those who sacrificed their lives (word indistinct) on the altar of Israel and Israel's land--a chain that will never be broken.

We wish the wounded rapid recovery and a return to an active life, to a healthy and useful life. Those who have seen our wounded in the hospitals--and I have seen them--cannot but look with emotion at their valor, heroism, and strength to bear suffering, almost with a smile on their lips. We are deeply grateful to the doctors, nurses, and workers in the hospitals, to the volunteers, including the doctors who volunteered to come to Israel at great sacrifice to assist in the sacred work of healing the sick.

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Honored Knesset members, these were days and events which our nation will remember forever. These were days when the spirit of the people was uplifted. The entire population was called upon to fight for their lives and hope. Everyone felt that we must do the work and everyone did his duty, each at his post.

In view of the permanent threat from our enemies, we were forced to build and we did build in the course of many years the defensive and deterrent power of the Israeli Defense Forces. We invested much effort and money to prepare and equip them. The Israeli Defense Forces are a mighty fighting power, as the world has realized. This is due to their high standards, because their commanders and soldiers are excellent, and--above all--because every soldier and commander is inspired by the mission of the nation in its land.

The defense forces are the forces of the people. When they fight, a whole nation is fighting. When they are fighting, they embody Jewish history in all its eras. When they fight, they fight not only for the life of the nation, but for its redemption.

The nation has stood firm in the test because it was united, because at a crucial hour it knew how to concentrate its efforts and to act as one man. The nation has passed the test. Hundreds of thousands of young people and new immigrants made their small or big contribution. I was very much impressed to see on my trips on roads, in villages, and in towns children filling and carrying sandbags and doing every other work they could do. Each of them, according to his age and ability, proved that his roots in this country are eternal roots.

It was proved that the spirit of the people is the result of the spiritual revival of the state. We saw clearly that we are not merely a mechanical, technical ingathering of the exiled communities but an ancient and new nation, a united nation which was created and forged in the crucible of fire into one Israel, a nation formed from all the Jewish tribes, remnants, and communities, from them and from their children who were already born in this country.

A nation has arisen that is ready for every effort and every sacrifice for its country and its unique mission. The state of Israel has stood firm in the test because it knows that it embodies the hope of the entire Jewish people. In these days, the unity of our people was reconfirmed. All groups of the people clearly felt their solidarity with the nation, with the heart of the nation. Thousands of Jews came to our aid, from near and far. Hundreds of thousands and millions are ready to assist us in our struggle with all means. They include Jews and gentiles throughout the world.

Those who were unable to help personally, their hearts were with their country in the battle. The (word indistinct) of the state was strengthened and steeled and the unity of the Jewish people was also forged. Jerusalem was unified, and its unification--as our ancestors said--made brethren of the entire Jewish people.

Honored Knesset, the past four weeks were a time of tension and test--the first three weeks marked by tension, expectation, reconnoitering, and searching of ways, and the last week a week of test and action--from Independence Day, 5 Iyar (15 May) until the evening of last Saturday, the great Saturday of 1 Sivan (10 June).

On Independence Day, Egyptian forces began crossing the Suez Canal and moving toward Israel's border. Three days later, Egypt's forces were deployed along our border. At this stage Abd an-Nasir demanded the withdrawal of the U.N. force from Sharm ash-Shaykh, from Sinai, and from the Gaza Strip.

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(cont'd)

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On Tuesday, 23 May, Egypt announced the closing of the Tiran Strait to Israeli and international ships carrying strategic commodities to Israel's southern port of Eilat. In doing this the ruler of Egypt violated the international declaration which had been in force during the past 10 years and declared publicly his intention to wipe Israel from the map.

As has now been disclosed, the Egyptian Air Force commander issued on 27 May a secret operation order to his airmen to be prepared for a sudden attack on Israel. On 30 May, Abd an-Nasir signed a military agreement with King Husayn. On 4 June, Abd an-Nasir signed a similar agreement with Iraq. These agreements, in addition to the agreement between Egypt and Syria, completed the encirclement of Israel--an encirclement designed to make possible a surprise attack on Israel from all sides.

On 3 June, the commander of the Egyptian force in Sinai at that time issued an order of the day in which he ordered his soldiers to be prepared for an attack on Israel and described the expected results. I shall cite only a few words of this order: "The (word indistinct) of this special moment are of historic importance for the Arab people." It is true that he made a prediction, but he did not know what he was predicting.

When the Egyptian forces advanced into the Sinai Peninsula, I ordered, with the government's approval, a partial callup of defense force reserves. As the threat became graver, mobilization was extended and our preparedness was increased.

In my speech in the Knesset on 29 May, I announced that the Israeli forces were deployed and ready to foil the enemy's designs on all sectors and all borders. On the same occasion, I turned to the Egyptian ruler and advised him to remember that this was not the first time that he was being carried away by his imagination and seeing himself as victor before he even set out for battle. And I told the Israeli Defense Forces--I am quoting myself--thanks to your strength to overcome the enemy in any situation, the Israeli Government can with confidence and firmness adopt the difficult decisions it is facing, as required by our supreme responsibility for the fate of the state and the fate of the Jewish people.

Last Monday, 5 June 1967, seven or eight Egyptian divisions, including two armored divisions, were deployed along our Sinai border. And 700 tanks were concentrated along the border, 200 of them opposite Eilat with the aim of cutting off the southern Negeb. On Israel's eastern border, 60,000 Jordanian troops and about 300 tanks were deployed. The Jordanian forces were placed under Egyptian command, and two Egyptian commando brigades arrived in Jordanian territory. Iraqi forces also arrived.

On our northern border with Syria, 50,000 Syrian troops were stationed, ready for attack. The entire border was like a field planted with guns and mortars up to a considerable depth from the border. These weapons were protected with concrete and steel, dug in and fortified--a work which was certainly carried out over many years.

A total of 600 Egyptian, Jordanian, Syrian, and Iraqi planes were ready to strike. During the days preceding 5 June, Egyptian planes flew over Israel. The decisive moment had come. In view of the movement of Egyptian forces to the Israeli border, our forces went out to repel the enemy aggression and air and armed battles began.

In a radio broadcast a few hours later, I warned: We shall not attack any state as long as it does not begin the war against us, but anyone who attacks us will meet our full strength to defend ourselves and to defeat his forces.

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Despite this warning, the Jordanian forces which were under Egyptian command began attacking and shelling along the entire line--especially in Jerusalem. Much blood was shed in the streets of Jerusalem.

At the same time, Syrians began attacking the northern settlements from their fortified positions on the Golan hills. By Thursday, 8 June, the Israeli forces had overcome and defeated the enemy in Sinai, in the Gaza Strip, in the entire city of Jerusalem, and on the entire Western Bank.

On this occasion, I would like to point out that despite the shelling of Jerusalem by the Jordanian forces, which caused losses in life and property, we prevented any shelling of the old city itself out of our consideration for the holiness of Jerusalem and in accordance with our policy to prevent harm to civilians.

With the liberation of the city, and before I went to the Wailing Wall, I convened the Christian and Moslem leaders and told them the following: You can rest assured that no harm whatsoever will be permitted to religious holy places.

I asked the minister of religious affairs to contact the religious leaders in Jerusalem to establish firm and good relations between them and our forces and to insure that they could continue their spiritual activities without interference. From Jerusalem, the Holy City, symbol of peace for many generations, I want you to share with them a call for peace for all nations of the area and the whole world. Arrangements were made immediately to insure that the Christian holy places would be entrusted to Christian priests and that Moslem holy places would be in the hands of Moslem religious leaders.

In view of Syria's heavy shelling of the northern settlements, the constant danger to people's lives--women and children--and the heavy damage caused to the settlements--and few of them were completely destroyed--we were forced to act to silence the Syrian position in the Haganah and Habashan hills. On Saturday, 10 June, we occupied the Syrian ridge. The bases of aggression which threatened, hit, and damaged the northern settlements for 19 years were destroyed.

During the fighting our forces destroyed about 450 enemy planes and several hundred tanks. The enemy forces were defeated in the fighting. Many of them fled or fell prisoner. This is the first time since the establishment of the state that the threat to our security has been entirely removed from the Sinai Peninsula, the Gaza Strip, Jerusalem, the Western Bank of Jordan, and from the northern border.

Mr. Chairman, honorable members: The Israeli Defense Army soldiers and their commanders fought in these battles with indescribable courage. They carried out their task devotedly and sincerely. They showed resourcefulness and initiative. Commanders led their units and sacrificed themselves at the front of severe battles. Many of the commanders were killed and many wounded while leading and commanding their soldiers and friends. The soldiers risked their lives to save their friends from death and from falling prisoner when they were already wounded. With such devotion and fighting spirit, we triumphed. Blessed is a nation whose army is like this. From this platform I want to congratulate the cabinet members, the defense minister, the chief of staff, the army commanders in the field and headquarters, the commanders of the army services, and all army officers and soldiers on land, sea, and in the air. I am confident that the entire nation and the army will welcome my special greeting to the air force and its present commander and former commander, who together with those who preceded them prepared this splendid force which (words indistinct).

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Together with the developments in the security field we faced an international political battle. In the first days of the crisis, from Independence Day until Thursday, 18 May (words indistinct) the deployment of Egyptian forces in Sinai was regarded in various countries of the world as only a show. Egypt's demand for withdrawal of the U.N. Emergency Force (UNEF) was accepted in haste by the U.N. secretary general, without the prior approval of the advisory committee on U.N. forces and without discussion by the Security Council. The withdrawal of UNEF aggravated the international battle and was viewed here with gravity. Nevertheless, no international institution acted to prevent the approaching aggression and to (word indistinct) the Egyptian Army near the Israeli border.

The helplessness of the United Nations may have encouraged Abd an-Nasir to continue in his aggressive way and block the Strait of Tiran. After the blocking of the strait as well, the Security Council did not ask Egypt to lift the blockade, even though some of its members described this action as illegal and dangerous. After the Strait of Tiran was blocked, the United States and Britain began political activity aimed at guaranteeing freedom of shipping in the strait. Israel attached much importance to this international action, which showed increasing international attention to one of the Egyptian aggression's (word indistinct). However, it quickly became apparent that Abd an-Nasir was not content with blocking the Strait of Tiran and that his objective was to destroy Israel.

Thus, while the great powers were trying to find a solution to the strait problem in accordance with international law, the fighting on land began. The three weeks which preceded the fighting--as the eyes of the world could plainly see, perhaps for the first time--revealed the true nature of the Arab hostile policy and the true aggressive intentions of the Egyptian ruler, about whom we had warned for many years.

In my speech in the Knesset on 25 May I pointed out how much we were encouraged by the increasing world support for Israel. A few days after that the support was like a great stream which encompassed states, governments, and nations other than our Israeli nation. This showed how much the revival of Israel has become part of the world civilization in our time. In the days which preceded the fighting the world's fear for Israel's existence was transformed into strong (word indistinct) which strengthened our stand and which will strengthen us in the political battle ahead of us.

Gentlemen, I do not intend to refute here the fabricated propaganda, but for the historic truth I want to state once again and unequivocally that while Israel was fighting for its existence, its sons fought alone. In this defensive war, we did not receive in any way whatsoever the assistance of any military force of any state.

I should point out that during all the period of preparation for the war by Egypt and its allies and during the fighting, there was one great power which not only failed to condemn the aggressive policy of Egypt and its allies, but assisted the aggressors in its political action. On 10 June 1967, the Soviet Union announced that it was breaking off diplomatic relations with Israel. It was followed by Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria. However, there is not much use in discussing this today. But for our international obligations we should ask the Soviet Union how it, as a U.N. member, can reconcile its declared policy that disputes should be solved through peaceful means? Does (the supplying of arms and other military) equipment to the states which have (pledged to) use (these) arms to destroy a sovereign state (words indistinct)? Who can it reconcile this policy with its open support for the aggressor during the fighting? Will the Soviet leaders now arrive at the

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conclusion that it is their duty to support efforts to restore true peace in the Middle East? In the last official contact between us, we expressed the hope that relations between our two countries would be established on the basis of deeper understanding by the Soviet Union of Israeli's problems.

Mr. Chairman, honorable Knesset: At the establishment of the state of Israel 19 years ago, the Arab armies, as you remember, wanted to stifle it at its birth. When the state stood against them and defeated them, the armistice agreements were signed. These agreements clearly stated that they were supposed to be a transitional period for peace. Israel, in fact, viewed them as such and others did too. However, through the years we realized that our neighbors see these agreements as means to gain time to prepare for a new aggression in order to defeat and destroy Israel.

The United Nations chose to ignore this Arab attitude. The U.N. Charter stipulates that U.N. members should not use force or threaten to use force, but solve disputes through peaceful means. Nevertheless, the United Nations failed to condemn Arab hostility against Israel. Thus this situation, which is unique and unprecedented in international relations, continued for 19 years. All the nations of the world and their leaders and representatives heard the Arab leaders' instigations against us. They heard, they saw, and they closed their ears.

We say to the nations of the world that they should not feel that Israel is ready to return to a state of affairs that existed up to a week ago. The state of Israel was established and exists by right. Therefore, it is ready to fight and struggle for its rights. By ourselves we will protect our existence and security. We alone have the right to determine what are the real and vital interests of our state and how its future will be safeguarded.

The state of affairs that existed up to now will not return. The land of Israel will no longer be exposed to acts of sabotage and murder. We have already declared to the nations of the world that we are not looking backward, but forward, and especially toward peace. We shall faithfully observe the cease-fire if the other side also strictly observes it.

Honorable Knesset members: A new situation has been created that can serve as a starting point for direct negotiations for a peace settlement with the Arab states. The historic contribution which the world nations, first of all the great powers, can make to bring peace to this region is clear and unequivocal: they should address their demands not to Israel, which has always been peace-loving and has always desired peace since the day it was established, but to the Arab states which have turned the Middle East into an area of tension and an arena of permanent enmity during the past 20 years. Justice, logic, and ethics demand that after these 20 years, the powers should muster the courage and tell the Arab states that the U.N. Charter obliges them, in the same manner it obliges every state, to settle disputes through peaceful means.

Our region today is standing at a crossroad: On the one hand lies true peace and cooperation based on the sincere desire of the peoples of the region and on their true interests; and on the other hand is the danger of continued hostility and enmity in the absence of a stable peace or because of the absence of stable peace. The international community is facing not only a moral test but also a test of political wisdom. To the extent the arms race comes to an end--and we saw what military preparations were made during these years in our neighboring countries--and to the extent that it will (word indistinct) peace in the Middle East, this will be a crowning contribution to easing international tension.



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To the Arab peoples I want to say at this moment: (word indistinct) the battle. We acted in self-defense and to defend our lives and rights. As you have rights to your countries, we also have rights to our country. The Jewish nation's roots in this country are as deep as ever. In all generations the Jewish people have preserved their spiritual and physical ties with this country. They were never cut off from it even while wandering in the Diaspora. The land also preserved for us our faith and never (word indistinct) to any foreign nation. Much has passed over this country, but it remained waiting for the gathering of its sons.

Today the world has come to know there is no power which can uproot us from this land. The unity of our people and their ties with the land are not merely an historical example. Perhaps our stand in three wars, which were imposed on us, will finally convince those who refused to acknowledge this basic truth that our ties with this land are as deep as ever and that without it our nation has no life.

In these days when futile attempts were made to destroy Israel, perhaps the Arab leaders will rethink their attitude toward Israel. Perhaps they will reconsider the great talent invested in war efforts instead of being used for the economic and social progress of their peoples. Perhaps they will think of the blessing which will come to all peoples of the area through cooperation. Only in this way will the Middle East take its appropriate place in world civilization and human progress.

Mr. Chairman: When the emergency situation reached its climax, the government was broadened and a national unity government was established. I want to point out that the government, including the ministerial committee for security affairs, has withstood and is withstanding the test of national leadership. I am confident that through national unity we can face the tests in store for us. We are prepared for the political battle and are working for peace.

The coming days will add and deepen the feeling of devotion, unity, spiritual strength, and the links between (words indistinct). Israel came out of the test of fire stronger than before, trustworthy, and looking with confidence to the future. With the help of God, Israel will (words indistinct).

Permit me, Mr. Chairman, with a few sentences to say that now I am standing before you feeling not as a partisan, not as a representative of the largest party in the Knesset, but as a prime minister of a government which (word indistinct) the war and its success. The victory may bring a new era of values and relations. A victory in the battle and victory (words indistinct) stable peace. May we see great days and may we be fit for them. Let us always think of all the people and not only of individuals. The days which have passed were (words indistinct). (?Remember) the day we went out for the great battle. We thought that Israel (word indistinct). We sat, every man under his roof and in his corner, in silence and security. We gave ourselves more than what was necessary to take. A new era is ahead of us. It is full of difficulties. We have so far won in the battlefield, but we have not (?won) the political and economic battles. I believe the days which passed will (words indistinct). The Arab states should give of their (words indistinct) to increase our ability and our number (words indistinct) in the country.

# ARAB AMBASSADORS SET UP COMMON WAR FUND

Algiers Domestic Service in Arabic 2300 GMT 12 June 1967--L

(Excerpts) The Arab ambassadors to Algeria continued their meeting to discuss the latest developments in the situation resulting from the treacherous aggression against the Arab nation. They saluted the Arab heroes who fell on the field on honor sacrificing themselves for the Arab homeland and defending Arab dignity, and saluted sister Algeria and its president, government and people for its heroic stand expressed in the historic speech by Boumediene. They have unanimously agreed on the following:

- 1) The necessity of continuing the mobilization and the state of alertness of the Arab people, and the concentration of all their strength and moral and material potential for the long battle between the Arab nation and Zionism and imperialism until victory is achieved for the Arabs.
- 2) Condemnation of imperialism, led by the United States and Britain and the states that consolidate the Israeli aggression; expansion of struggle against them and freeing our resources of their exploitation; elimination of their interests; continuation of the embargo on sending oil to them; and withdrawal of deposits from their financial establishments.
- 3) The necessity of establishing an Arab common fund in which capable Arab countries will participate with their resources and financial establishments, and which will be consolidated by friendly states for the purpose of financing the continuous Arab struggle in its battle of destiny.

## Messages to De Gaulle, Saragat

Algiers Domestic Service in French 1308 GMT 12 June 1967--L

(Text) Flying over French territory, President Boumediene sent a message of greetings to President de Gaulle: At the time of flying over France, the President of the National Council of the Revolution says in his message, I wish to tell you that Algeria has taken note with real satisfaction of the remarkable position of the French Government in this grave issue of the Middle East, which might make even more precarious peace and the security in the world. Therefore in the name of the Algerian people and in my own personally, I wish to convey to Your Excellency sincere wishes of happiness and prosperity for yourself and for France. I express also my wish for the consolidation of the links of friendship and cooperation between our two countries.

In another message addressed to Giuseppe Saragat, president of the Italian Republic, Houari Boumediene states: Flying over Italian territory, it is my particular pleasure to send you in the name of the Algerian people and in my own the expression of the high regard and the wish for happiness and prosperity and through your person to the Italian people.

ECONOMIC SOLIDARITY OF ARABS IS IMPERATIVE

Cairo MENA in Arabic 1816 GMT 13 June 1967--M (FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

(Text) Cairo--The General Secretariat of the Arab Economic Unity Council has issued the following statement:

In view of the Arab nation's current decisive battle against imperialism, Zionism, and their aim of enslaving the Arab people politically and economically and of depriving them of their right of sovereignty over their economic resources by occupation or exploitation, the General Secretariat of the Arab Economic Unity Council believes it is time for the economic solidarity of all Arab states so as to leave no gap in the economic boycott regulations against the imperialist tool (Israel--ed.) and the states supporting it.

To be an effective economic weapon in our current battle, the boycott regulations should be applied to all trade and economic dealings and all relations with the enemy including its oil, trade, and other interests in the Arab countries, imports and exports, and Arab deposits in its banks.

PACHACHI: ARABS MUST STOP PETTY DIFFERENCES

Baghdad Domestic Service in Arabic 1900 GMT 13 June 1967--M

(Excerpts) Foreign Minister Adnan Pachachi has said that Iraq approves of all attempts being made to coordinate and unify Arab efforts. He added that Iraq is ready to respond to every call to achieve this aim, including an Arab foreign ministers meeting and an Arab summit conference. In a statement to the IRAQI NEWS AGENCY on the occasion of his return to Iraq after attending part of the U.N. Security Council meetings, Pachachi added: During its long history the Arab nation has faced worse catastrophes and calamities than the recent one and it has surmounted them. Thus, the important thing in these difficult times is never to give up our self-confidence and not to lose hope in the future of the Arab nation. Naturally, it is the duty of all Arabs now to unite and work for unity and solidarity. It is also their duty to abandon the petty differences which disunited us and exhausted our efforts and consequently helped the aggressors to harm us.

In reply to a question on the collusion of imperialism with Israel against the Arab states, Pachachi said: It has become clear that the United States, in particular, and Britain supplied Israel with a large number of planes and even pilots just before the aggression. Naturally, we should have anticipated this, because Israel was founded in the heart of the Arab homeland thanks to the support of these two countries. Also, their attitudes in consolidating Israel economically, politically, and militarily were clear from the beginning. Pachachi said further: This collusion can only be tackled by the unity and solidarity of the Arabs and their readiness to work and sacrifice. Political action not linked with power will not be successful.

In reply to a question on the effectiveness of using oil as a weapon in the battle against the imperialist states, Pachachi said: It is the duty of the Arabs to use all their resources to serve their sublime national interests and to confront the enemy. He added: We shall continue to coordinate and (review) our attitude on using oil as a weapon--the weapon which we have brandished in the face of the common enemy. We shall continue in this stand.

Replying to another question on the withdrawal of the aggressive forces behind the armistice lines, Pachachi said: I have already strongly criticized the cease-fire order issued by the U.N. Security Council. I have described it as complete surrender to Israel. Pachachi added: We shall demand the withdrawal of the aggressive forces. The Soviet Union has shown clearly that it supports this demand. We would have preferred to have included this demand in the cease-fire resolution. We laud the French Government's stand and hope that it will continue efforts to restore justice.

**PREMIER SAYS SUMMIT MEETING NEEDED IMMEDIATELY**

Beirut RNS in Arabic 1055 GMT 13 June 1967--M (FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

(Text) Amman-Jordanian Premier Sad Jumah has declared that "no postponement at all can be tolerated" in the holding of an Arab summit conference. In a statement today to RNS, Jumah pointed out that King Husayn "was the first to call for an immediate Arab summit conference to discuss the conditions resulting from the tragedy, prepare unified plans to confront the coming political battle, and unite Arab forces." He said the call was contained in the first appeal addressed by King Husayn to Arab kings and presidents on 8 June. Jumah added that Jordan is prepared to attend any Arab meeting at any level, "but he believes that any meeting at a level other than the summit will not achieve the desired result."

The Premier explained that topics to be discussed at the proposed conference are "clear, known, and definite. Therefore there is no need to prepare an agenda at a meeting of foreign ministers, as some sisterly states have suggested. We therefore insist that the sisterly states expedite a decision regarding this question, which cannot be postponed. The political battle of confronting the consequences of the Israeli aggression has already begun. It is our duty to meet immediately to coordinate our actions, to plan, and to mobilize."

**MINISTER CLARIFIES POLICY ON OIL SHIPMENTS**

Jidda Domestic Service in Arabic 2125 GMT 13 June 1967--M

(Text) An ARAMCO spokesman said in New York today that the company resumed operations in Saudi Arabia today and that all employees have returned to work. The spokesman added that oil tankers in Ras-Tanur are being loaded with oil. The ban on oil shipments to the United States and the United Kingdom continues, and the Tapline pipeline continues to be closed, he concluded.

Commenting on this, Mineral Wealth and Petroleum Minister ash-Shaykh Ahmad Zaki Yamani issued the following statement: In an effort to precisely apply the cabinet decision banning Saudi oil exports to countries which help the state of gangs, oil pumping was completely suspended the moment the decision was issued. Arrangements were made to insure that no oil reaches any state to which shipment of Saudi oil has been banned. In view of this, His Majesty's government has issued an order to ARAMCO permitting the resumption of oil pumping as of midnight Tuesday, 13 June, after making the necessary arrangements, which include the provision that the company, purchaser, and tanker captain involved pledge that the Saudi oil will not reach countries to which His Majesty's government has banned oil shipment.

The Mineral Wealth and Petroleum Ministry has assigned one of its senior officials to supervise implementation of the above-mentioned arrangements. Oil exports are being carried out according to the cabinet decision and with the complete cooperation of ARAMCO.

**URGENT MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS ADVOCATED**

Beirut RNS in Arabic 1945 GMT 13 June 1967--M (FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

(Text) Beirut--A Saudi Arabian spokesman announced here today that Saudi Arabia considers it necessary in the current circumstances to hold an urgent meeting of Arab foreign ministers to prepare for the proposed Arab summit conference and insure its success. The spokesman said that the holding of an Arab summit conference was King Faysal's main demand, which he repeated many times when the Arab states demanded postponement of the fourth summit in previous circumstances.

# AL-ATASI READS BATH PARTY STATEMENT ON WAR

Damascus Domestic Service in Arabic 0900 GMT 14 June 1967--M

(Statement by the Bath Party National Command read by Chief of State and Party Secretary General al-Atasi--live or recorded)

(Summary) Brothers, citizens, sons of our great Arab nation: Since the treacherous 7 May (as heard) Israeli aggression against the Syrian region, imperialist and Zionist plans began to become clearer, and the dangers of direct aggression against our people were intensified. Israeli leaders threatened to occupy Damascus, while the U.S. Sixth Fleet provided Israel with protection. "The date for launching the aggression was set for between 15 and 22 May. Several reliable sources confirmed this information to us. In our turn, we conveyed all the information we had to the sisterly UAR. Imperialism originally intended to attack the Syrian region alone. Therefore, the joint defense agreement with Cairo was put into effect, and the sisterly UAR sincerely stood by us to face the eventualities of aggression."

Soon the United States, Britain, and Israel began preparing the ground for aggression, using the UAR's implementation of its sovereignty in Sharm ash-Shaykh and Sinai as an excuse. The Arabs adopted a position of self-defense, but Israel launched a surprise air attack on all Egyptian airfields and waged an all-out attack on the Arab people, our forces entered the battle bravely while our air force bombed several enemy airfields. "The enemy's greater supremacy in the air became evident. This proved that in addition to Israel's force, other forces were taking part in the aggression. It was evident from the first day that efforts were concentrated on eliminating the Arab air force from the battle in order to leave the land forces without air cover and to leave the sky free for the enemy air force."

Despite the fact that a large number of enemy aircraft were shot down, the enemy's air force increased and continuously bombed our airfields and air force "in a manner which proves that the United States and Britain were participating with the enemy and that the enemy was being provided with a constant flow of supplies to make up for his losses. This was proved by Arab observation posts and the confessions of captured pilots." As a result the Arab forces had to defend the Arab homeland in an unequal battle imposed on us by the Zionist-imperialist alliance. The Western Bank of Jordan was occupied after a heroic fight by the Jordanian Army and the vanguards of the heroic Iraqi Army. The tripartite air forces operated against the Egyptian Army in Sinai, where heroic battles were fought by our brothers. "The heroic Syrian Army shelled enemy settlements and launched an attack inside the occupied territory. Part of our forces entered Jordan to fight the invaders side by side with our brethren in the Jordanian and Iraqi armies."

"In view of the supremacy of the forces of the tripartite aggression and of the great sacrifices made by the gallant Jordanian Army, Jordan accepted the Security Council's cease-fire order. Under the same difficult circumstance the fighting in Sinai was stopped. It was natural, therefore, that we should comply with the Security Council's cease-fire resolution on the Syrian front. However, the enemy was lying to the United Nations and to public opinion. We expected that after accepting the cease-fire the enemy would continue aggression and would throw more of his forces into the Syrian front. The enemy disregarded all international resolutions. The imperialist plot will thus continue to attempt to realize its aims."

June 14 Bath statement  
(cont'd)

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On 9 June the enemy resumed his all-out attack along the Syrian front with greater force. The attack, supported by continuous bombing from the air, was repelled by our forces, which destroyed the enemy's tanks. Our artillery shelled the enemy concentration, inflicting heavy losses on his artillery. The following day the enemy attacked again after reinforcing himself with fresh forces and a large number of tanks and heavy artillery. "After a concentrated attack by the air force and the use of napalm bombs, which are internationally banned, and with the direct participation of the U.S. and British air forces in the battle, the enemy was able to penetrate the front in the northern sector after several attempts had been foiled and four columns of advance tanks destroyed. After a fierce, brave fight by our forces, the enemy was able to occupy Al-Qunaytirah in the face of an honorable and unprecedented resistance by the military and popular forces." Our forces in the middle and southern sectors were able to foil the enemy's plan to encircle them by taking fighting positions on the second line of defense.

"Brothers, citizens: The military victory which Israel is claiming today is not of its own making. It was the result of a tremendous tripartite Anglo-American-Zionist plot involving international imperialism, which hates the people, in alliance with world Zionist forces with all their political influence, scientific abilities, capital, exploitative oil monopolies, and modern weapons. Today the Arab nation is faced with a severe and bitter setback. It is also facing decisive questions of destiny and is threatened with a Zionist-imperialist invasion. They have occupied new areas of the Arab homeland in addition to the part they already occupied in Palestine." This tripartite plot represents the "peak of conflict" between the resolute will of the Arab nation to build a modern, independent, and powerful state and between the vast imperialist interests in the Arab homeland.

It is also a chapter in the history of our people's struggle for progress and independence against the challenges of imperialist exploiting interests. Imperialism has resorted to many devious and treacherous ways and means to halt the people's march, but the people's will has always triumphed in spite of all setbacks. "The result of this long and continuing struggle was, in fact, a positive factor in favor of the people's struggle."

For this reason, after all its other means failed, imperialism found itself face to face with the advancing masses which occupy positions threatening its oil interests and threatening to eliminate its influence in the area. "Therefore, imperialism had to resort to a direct military clash and to traditional imperialist invasion in an attempt to dominate our homeland, to occupy new areas, to place us in its spheres of influence, and to wipe out all the domestic, national, and social gains realized by our peoples after many years of struggle."

"Through its imperialist alliance with world Zionism, U.S. and British imperialism carried out this invasion, using its bridgehead, Israel, and trying thereby to hide its crime from world public opinion and conscience. Our Arab people and all the struggling peoples in the world now definitely know that it was U.S. and British imperialism that planned and implemented the various stages of the aggression, and that Israel was a mere instrument." Imperialism commits aggressions whenever its interests are threatened, as happened during Suez in 1956 and after the 14 July revolution in Iraq. The new tripartite aggression aimed at achieving the following objectives: 1) to stop the Arab progressive trend and to weaken Arab popular struggle to build a modern Arab state; 2) to return the Arab homeland to the zones of direct imperialist sphere of influence and to insure imperialism's oil interests; 3) to destroy the Arab armed forces because of their growing threat to the enemy; and 4) to realize Zionism's expansionist plans, entrench Israel in the region and liquidate the Palestine question.

June 14 Bath statement  
(cont'd)

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The setback must not prevent us from seeing the dimensions of our historical and fateful battle against the forces of treachery and tyranny. Everything confirms that the Arab people will triumph in the end over all these conspiratorial forces. During World War II, Nazi Germany swept through most of Europe, but that quick military surge did not achieve any real and final victory over any of the peoples of Europe. The struggle continued under the most difficult circumstances until the invaders were crushed and victory was achieved. Our people should keep these historical facts in mind while continuing their firm and stubborn struggle. The first few days of the battle have already shown that the Arab masses are united. "These enthused and determined masses have already gone into action to destroy the interests of imperialism and to uproot its political and economic existence in the Arab world."

Moreover, the direct participation of brave Algeria, with all its material and moral resources, in the battle has added strength to the Arab national struggle, which will effectively influence the historic Arab march and speed its inevitable victory. "The battle has also shown that the Arab nation has enormous energy and effective weapons which, if used in the service of the Arab cause, can win the battles for the Arab people. Foremost among these is oil, which is already being used to good effect against the countries supporting the aggression to throw them into confusion and paralyze their economies and their industrial and war machines. The Arab oil-producing countries' financial assets, which form the backbone of British economy, constitute an effective weapon which should be put into immediate use in the battle."

The Arab people's firm resistance against the forces of tyranny has won the respect and appreciation of all the freedom-loving peoples of the world. These friendly peoples have condemned the criminal aggression and consider our people's struggle against imperialism as an essential part of their own general struggle to liquidate colonialism and imperialism. "This moral support is evident from the stands adopted by the friendly states in Asia, Africa, and Latin America and by the bloc countries, whose leaders met in the USSR and issued a statement supporting the Arab people, condemning Israel, and severing their diplomatic relations with it."

We thank all the states, peoples, and world organizations that have extended a hand of friendship to our Arab people in their present ordeal and that have given them material and moral support. "We affirm here that our Arab people, while carrying out their historic role in resisting the most ferocious imperialist and Zionist forces in one of the most dangerous spots in the world, covet more effective aid and backing from all the freedom-loving peoples in the world. The Arab people further reject the campaigns of doubt led by the U.S., British, and Israeli agents to undermine the relations of friendship and cooperation between the Arab people and the socialist countries, particularly the Soviet Union."

The setback we are facing today and which is directed against our people's very existence prompts the Arabs to mobilize all their potential to win the battle for their existence. We must maintain fully our revolutionary vigilance, firmness, and faith to deal with the following:

"1--The removal of all traces of the aggression through the adoption of various means and methods and absolute rejection of any attempts to impose solutions on the basis of the new fait accompli regardless of what forces back the aggression or how great the sacrifices may be;"

"2--Confrontation of the aggression which requires the reconsideration of our defensive ability in the light of the outcome of the recent battle;"



# TERMS OF BOYCOTT AGAINST U.S., U.K. OUTLINED

Damascus MENA in Arabic to MENA Cairo 1215 GMT 13 June 1967--M (FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

(Excerpts) Damascus--The commissioner general for the boycott of Israel, Muhammad Mahmud Mahjub, has called for application of the boycott principles and regulations to states which backed Israel militarily and economically, primarily the United States and Britain. In a statement issued today, Mahjub said that contacts are taking place in this regard between the main boycott office and the regional offices. The statement says the relevant view is that the 25th conference of boycott officers, scheduled to be held early next month, should discuss boycotting these states on the following terms:

1--Application of the boycott of Israel regulations to the two aggressive states, the United States and Britain; this means that it is not permissible to deal directly or indirectly with the two states or with their public or private establishment and companies;

2--Enforcement of the ban on dealings with these two states until they understand the stupidity of their involvement with Israel and their submission to world Zionism and until they begin to work for the removal of the traces of the tripartite aggression, pledge officially that they will not offer military aid in the form of equipment, experience, or human effort to the aggressive state, and refrain from giving it any financial aid or permitting the collection of funds on its behalf;

3--Application of the ban on dealings with Israel to every foreign state which works to strengthen Israel's war effort or economy through the sale of arms, offer of loans, or collection of funds on its behalf;

4--The ban on pumping or sale of Arab oil to any state which helped the aggression or supported Israel politically, economically, or militarily to remain in force until such state pledges officially to abide by the provisions of paragraph 2 of this statement.

## EAST EUROPEANS' BREAK WITH ISRAEL REGRETTED

Jerusalem Israel Domestic Service in Hebrew 2000 GMT 13 June 1967--M

(Text) This evening the Israeli Government published its reply to the announcements of Poland, Hungary, and Yugoslavia that they were severing diplomatic relations with Israel. A Foreign Ministry statement said that the Israeli Government received these statements with regret. The Israeli Government believes that even when there are differences of opinion between two states the severance of diplomatic relations does not help overcome such differences. The state of Israel, the statement said, has fought in a battle imposed on it by Egypt and its allies in order to defend its sovereign existence against those who rose against it to wipe it out. Israel is surprised that states which fought against the Nazi invader for their independence did not find it right to express reservations on the declared intention of the Arab states to destroy Israel, nor did they show understanding toward Israel's struggle.

In conclusion the statement said that Israel continually seeks peace. Israel hopes that relations will be resumed and that these states will show a more balanced attitude toward it, thus contributing to guaranteeing peace, stability, and progress in the region.



# SINAI FRONT COMMANDERS HOLD PRESS CONFERENCE

Jerusalem Israel Domestic Service in Hebrew 2100 GMT 12 June 1967--M

(Press conference held by Israeli Commanders on the Sinai Front Brig. Gens. Yesheyahu Gavish, Yisrael Tall, Abraham Yaffe, and Ariel Sharon; individual speakers are not identified in most cases)

(Text) Question: I heard that there were indications that the Egyptians intended to wage a war with gas. Can you give us information on this matter? A second question, which I think has already been asked: What about rocket bases, having not only surface-to-air rockets but also surface-to-surface rockets?

Answer: We have not yet completed searching the area. This will undoubtedly take weeks. Meanwhile, we have discovered two places where there are gas laboratories, and it seems there was also gas packed in containers. I do not yet know the details. Only after a strict laboratory examination will it be possible to determine what is there.

Regarding the rocket bases, so far we have discovered one rocket base with ground-to-air SA-2 rockets. The base is between Mitla and the Suez Canal. It is a self-contained base with launching pads, rocket conveyers, and an instruction room with all its documents. At this base we found six rockets prepared for launching; another apparently had been launched. There was another launching pad which apparently had been hit by our air force. In addition, we found three rockets mounted on conveyers for transport to Suez. It appears that the Egyptians tried to move them quickly to Suez. So far we have not found other rocket bases. We have found no surface-to-surface rockets.

Question: Perhaps you can sum up the Soviet military doctrine as applied by the UAR in Sinai and what conclusions have been reached about it.

Answer: I can relate to you a nice conversation I had with a certain prisoner of war--a colonel. I had a talk with him yesterday on Soviet doctrine. I asked him if he could explain it to me. The only explanation he could give me was that the British-American doctrine was better. Nevertheless, I asked him to tell me what the Soviet doctrine was. His reply was that it was a question of manpower. I will explain to you now. The Egyptians (?changed) the Soviet doctrine into the tactic of digging trenches to a tremendous length, and it is possible to find these all along the Sinai desert, everywhere. The trenches are not deep. I would even say that they were not dug very well. They are in three lines--one, two, and three--at distances of (words indistinct) between the first and second trenches.

But in my opinion this doctrine was not (?fully) understood since the flanks were exposed. There were only insignificant forces on the flanks in the trenches, and if they were attacked from the flank they collapsed. An outstanding example is the attack of (?Tallik) on the Seventh Division. We (?attacked) it from south to north with a small force. This doctrine has another obvious disadvantage. Owing to the width of the trenches, wherever you attack the trench, even from the front, you have only a small force facing you. You can decide the battle by concentrating forces and breaking through the lines. We found this in Abu-Uwayjilah. However, the doctrine has an advantage in standardization, in uniform thinking, and in the introduction of large army forces into simple (?installations). They know where to keep the tanks and they know when to stage a counterattack, but this also needs a Russian head. The Arabs still have an Arab head.

Israeli Commanders June 12 1967 (cont'd)

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Question: Perhaps General Tall can add some explanation of this question of Soviet doctrine.

Answer: I think that the doctrine is good and that it is absolutely suitable to an army such as the Egyptian army. I could not have given them a better formula. (laughter) I am not joking. I am serious. That they could not stand against us is, in my opinion, not because of the doctrine but in spite of it.

Question: All the commanders spoke about the fighting spirit and the boldness of the soldiers and officers. Could you relate some cases in which men distinguished themselves in outstanding actions on the Sinai front?

Answer: In the engagement we had in the armored battles, when the enemy tanks began to burn and explode at a high rate the crews of the enemy tanks fled. There was not a single incident in which our tank crews left their tanks, even when the tanks on their right and left were exploding, as often happened. There were cases in which, although the tank commander had been killed in the tank, the tank crew continued to fight without a commander. The tank (word indistinct) gave orders to the gunner and to the driver. Only after the end of the fighting would the force commander find out that a certain tank crew had fought without a commander. The force commander would not notice that the tank commander had been killed. The same goes for a battalion commander or a company commander who might be killed in a tank. Such cases were numerous. It is said that the percentage of losses among the commanders was very great.

Question: Will anyone be recommended for a citation? Will you submit a list of troops who will be recommended for citations?

Answer: Definitely. The Israeli Defense Forces are an army which fights well. But when it comes to organization this is a long story, particularly regarding the reservists. But I am sure that gradually we shall be able to record stories of heroism in this fighting and we shall recommend citations for the heroes.

Question: In your summation you mentioned that the death toll among the enemy forces was between 7,000 and 10,000. You did not state the number of wounded. You spoke about the large number of war prisoners or potential prisoners who are on their way. But knowing that the force massed was about 100,000 soldiers, perhaps you can explain the difference, or what has happened to these 100,000 soldiers.

Answer: I want to explain that this was a very fast battle with deep penetrations. The immediate objective was to initiate battles with the armored force. Naturally, the outcome was that we did not completely search the targets we captured. In other words, we did not fight in trenches to annihilate all those found in them. We did not attack every position on the road, and we left many forces surrounded in the rear. Only two days ago we discovered a complete brigade of tanks in the middle of the desert with their crews missing. The tanks were intact under nets. Since our forces were trying to make contact with the enemy armored forces, they moved from one target to another. The result was that many hundreds of Egyptian soldiers were left in Sinai without being dealt with and without being taken prisoner. Therefore they took the initiative and began to move and are still moving today. The truth is that we have no interest in rounding them up, mainly the soldiers. Instead of our returning them, we will let them return by themselves.

Question: How many tanks do you estimate were left in the area and how many artillery installations that you did not capture?

Israeli Commanders' June 12 Press Conference  
(cont'd)

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Answer: I said that we estimate there are 500, 600, or perhaps 700 tanks in Sinai today. Up to yesterday we had counted 420, but we have counted only a small number of the small tanks. I estimate that when we complete the counting, including the brigade we discovered, we will reach this number.

Question: One of the agencies reported that fragments of rockets destroyed by the Israeli Army were found on the canal banks. Is this true?

Answer: No. We did not destroy any rocket bases. The air force may have attacked rocket bases. I do not know. We are searching for them. We want to find them intact.

OPERATIONS AGAINST JORDANIAN FORCES DESCRIBED

Jerusalem Israel Domestic Service in Hebrew 2100 GMT 13 June 1967--M

(Text) At a press conference with military correspondents, central district commander Brig. Gen. Uzi Markiss and three brigade commanders who fought on the Jerusalem front spoke about the fighting in their sectors. The three commanders are Jerusalem district commander Col. Eliezer Amitai, armored brigade commander Col. Zvi Ben-Ari, and paratroop brigade commander Col. Mordechai (Motah) Gur.

Brigadier General Markiss said that the Jordanians suffered 8,000 casualties in his sector and that his forces annihilated two complete Jordanian brigades, one in the Mount Hebron area and the other in the northern part of the triangle. A complete tank battalion and part of an armored infantry battalion of the 60th Jordanian Brigade in the (Emek Hayarden--phonetic) valley were also destroyed. Markiss also said that Iraqi forces tried to advance in the Jerusalem area, but one brigade withdrew after being hit.

Our losses among the three brigades whose commanders spoke this evening are over 180 dead.

Col. Eliezer Amitai spoke about his brigade's battle to capture the Commissioner's Palace, Sur Bahir village, Bethlehem, and the Mount Hebron area.

Armored brigade commander Col. Ben-Ari explained how his brigade captured the radar installation and other positions near Ramallah and how it advanced to Ramallah itself and later captured Jericho.

Paratroop brigade commander Col. Mordechai (Motah) Gur described how his men fought in a developed area a type of combat to which the Israeli Defense Forces had not previously been exposed. The fighting was filled with acts of unprecedented heroism, skill, and boldness, he said. He praised the fighting spirit of privates and unit officers and spoke about the continuous fighting which went on for four hours the first night. He described the fighting of the paratroops in the area of the police school in Jerusalem, in the Shaykh Jarrah quarter, the capture of Augustan Victoria (Hospital--ed.) near Mount Scopus, and the entry into the old city through the Gate of Lions.

(Editor's note: The same radio at 0600 GMT 14 June adds the following: "In addition to armored losses, the Jordanians lost 36 of the 90 105-mm. and eight of the 16 155-mm. artillery pieces they had in the sector. The air force destroyed 22 Jordanian Hunter planes--more than 90 percent of all the aircraft of this type in Jordan--and seven transport planes--about 90 percent of the Jordanian Air Force's transport airplanes.")

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**CABINET TAKES STEPS TO MEET PRESENT CRISIS**

Baghdad Domestic Service in Arabic 2100 GMT 14 June 1967---M

(Text) Minister of State for Presidential Affairs Ismail Khayrallah told the IRAQI NEWS AGENCY that at the special session held at noon today under President and Premier Abd ar-Rahman Arif, the cabinet adopted important decisions consistent with the current phase through which the Arab nation is passing. He said that these decisions are connected with Iraq's domestic, foreign, economic, oil, information, and financial policies, the rebuilding of Iraq's national unity, and the mobilization of the masses.

Khayrallah added that the cabinet heard a report by Foreign Minister Pachachi about the development of the Arab question at the U.N. Security Council and the attitudes of various states on the question. The cabinet also reviewed the course through which the Arab nation is passing and which was caused by the Anglo-American-Zionist aggression, in order to mobilize the people's potential for national security, preserve the Arab nation's rights, and remove traces of the aggression.

Following a debate, the cabinet decided in the political field:

1--To sever diplomatic relations with all countries which participated in the aggression and consolidate relations with those which supported and will support the Arab nation in its current stand;

2--To expedite the convening of an Arab summit conference; in this respect the cabinet adopted important decisions which will be submitted at the conference; Khayrallah described these decision as very important measures which would insure the pride, honor, and security of the Arab nation.

In the domestic field the cabinet decided:

1--To mobilize public opinion, achieve national unity, and observe closely reactionary and imperialist elements;

2--To strive to implement military training for the masses and restore the squads (katayib) and futuwwah systems in order to create a strong youth that would face danger with firmness, determination, and strength;

3--To reorganize the administrative department and assign loyal competent elements to it;

4--To end the vestiges of abnormal conditions in the north as soon as possible and to restore local administration to the area.

Regarding foreign trade, the cabinet decided to boycott all goods imported from the United States, Britain, and West Germany, and to declare a policy of complete austerity in everything except foodstuffs and medicines.

Concerning oil policy, the cabinet stressed the Arab oil conference resolutions and Iraq's adopted decisions banning oil shipments to the aggressive imperialist states.

DECLASSIFIED

June 14 Iraqi Cabinet  
decisions (cont'd)

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On financial policy the cabinet decided:

- 1--To draft a national defense tax law;
- 2--To draft a law on savings;
- 3--To reconsider some allowances;
- 4--To expand office hours in government and semiofficial departments one hour daily.

In connection with the information policy, the cabinet decided:

- 1--To draft a publications law, guiding the press in a national manner consistent with the interests of Iraq and the Arab nation in the battle which we are waging;
- 2--To boycott U.S., British, and West German films and ban them in theaters and on television;
- 3--To ban films which might have a bad effect on the public;
- 4--To guide public opinion in the interests of Iraq and the Arab nation, to familiarize it with the dangers it faces, and carry out an enlightenment campaign in this regard.

Under the leadership of the President, the cabinet decided that cabinet members will contribute a quarter of all wages to the war effort.

Concluding his statement, Khayrallah said that the cabinet adopted other extremely important decisions to preserve the security of Iraq and the Arab nation.

REFUGEES SET AT 150,000; CAMPS BEING BUILT

Beirut RNS in Arabic 1120 GMT 14 June 1967--M (FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

(Text) Amman--Reconstruction and Development Minister Ismail Hijazi has said that the reason for the influx of people from the Western Bank of Jordan to the Eastern Bank was the indiscriminate and relentless Israeli air raids over all areas. The unarmed civilian population became frightened and fled with their children to safety.

Hijazi, who was speaking to the press, said it is difficult at present to give an accurate figure on the number of refugees from the Western Bank, but it is certainly no less than 150,000 people, of whom one-third has been living in refugee camps since 1948. Hijazi, who heads a government committee supervising relief work for the new refugees, said that three camps are being set up in Jordan for these refugees and that these camps will be provided with such essentials as water and electricity.

ARAB COUNTRIES SEND EMERGENCY AID TO JORDAN

Abd an-Nasir Cable

Amman Domestic Service in Arabic 1900 GMT 14 June 1967--M

(Text) The JORDANIAN NEWS AGENCY learned that last night His Majesty King Husayn received a cable from President Jamal Abd an-Nasir expressing admiration and appreciation for Jordan's heroic stand under the leadership of His Majesty the King in the battle of duty and sacrifice. The President also said he is donating 1 million dollars in hard currency as emergency aid to meet the circumstances resulting from the battle.

Saudi Aid

Amman Domestic Service in Arabic 2100 GMT 14 June 1967--M

(Text) Saudi Ambassador in Amman Shaykh Ahmad al-Kuhaymi stated that he delivered a check for 3 million dinars donated by the Saudi Government to Jordan. He added that two Saudi planes arrived in Jordan today carrying 40 tons of drugs and various medical equipment. He said that the Saudi people are showing extreme generosity in their donations to their brothers in Jordan.

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RIYAD: ISRAEL MUST WITHDRAW BEFORE CANAL OPENS

Paris AFP in English 1720 GMT 14 June 1967--E (FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

(By Jean-Pierre Joulin)

(Text) Cairo--The Suez Canal will remain closed as long as the Israelis are on the eastern bank because their presence there constitutes a threat to navigation, Foreign Minister Mahmud Riyad told an AFP correspondent in an exclusive interview here today. Our position can be summarized in a few words: to prevent the aggressor from acquiring advantages through the use of force, he said.

Israel must withdraw its troops behind the armistice lines. If all the countries of the world accept the principle, Israel will be obliged to comply, he added. He said the forthcoming Arab summit will take up the problem of a joint Arab stand against Israel and relations between Arab states and the powers that have helped Israel. This was Riyad's first press interview since the end of hostilities with Israel.

That a country which has just committed an aggression against another and seized territories by force should now talk about peace is sheer nonsense, he said. If the international community accepts a situation in which the aggressor may acquire advantages by force, it will mean that it agrees that international relations are based on chaos. Israel has made a new mistake which adds to its earlier mistakes; in 1948 it aroused the hatred of a first generation of Arabs; in 1956 it aroused the hatred of a first generation of Arabs; in 1967 it is doing the same with a new generation.

The minister went on: By their repeated aggressions, the Israelis are creating an atmosphere of hatred among them. Moreover, they are responsible for the deterioration of relations between Arab countries and some Western powers which helped Israel. We are, first of all, defending a principle. If this principle is not accepted in its entirety, peace will always be threatened in the region. Israel has expansionist ambitions. It will always commit aggressions to fulfill these ambitions. If an end is not put once and for all to such acts of aggression, Israel will do it again and again and will remain a menace to peace.

Referring to the U.N. debates on the Middle East situation, Riyad states: It is necessary that Israel withdraw its troops behind the armistice lines. If all countries of the world accept this (as a principle), Israel will have to comply. But there is a problem. President Johnson has declared that the United States cannot permit any country to annex territories through an aggression. But instead of conforming with this principle as spelled out by Johnson, the United States is helping Israel. It is providing aid to enable Israel to keep territories taken by force. This is clear, but nevertheless the U.S. delegate at the Security Council has refused to recognize the principle elaborated by Johnson, and is playing on words to help Israel.

Riyad said Egypt and the Soviet Union (words indistinct) (are bound) by a very strong and very close friendship. The (present) lightning trip to Moscow by Algerian President Houari Boumedien had been decided during one of his frequent contacts with President Abd an-Nasir, he said.

The foreign minister also voiced the hope that France will defend the principle that the aggressor cannot acquire advantages by force and must withdraw its troops behind the armistice lines.

# SOCIALIST CAMP DID ITS DUTY AT ARABS' SIDE

Damascus Domestic Service in Arabic 1630 GMT 14 June 1967--M

(From "Voice of the Arabian Peninsula")

(Excerpts) Brother citizens, ATH-THAWRAH has submitted certain basic issues we are facing in these decisive days to brother Khalid al-Jundi, the chairman of the General Federation of Syrian Trade Unions. Regarding an evaluation of the battle and a definition of the imperialist aims in the Anglo-American-Israeli invasion campaign, and regarding an evaluation of the balance of international powers, Al-Jundi says: The recent aggression aimed not only at winning a lightning military battle by throwing all Anglo-American strength into the battle, but also, and mainly, at striking at the strategy of the Arab revolution. The most important point of this strategy which the aggression sought to destroy was the inevitability of meeting and cooperating with the socialist camp.

From the first moment of the aggression, voices tried to exploit the peoples' emotions and to cast doubts on and denounce the stand of the socialist camp, particularly the Soviet Union's stand. The fact is that the socialist camp carried out its duty during the battle. The firm stand toward the aggression in the Security Council, the Soviet warning, the severance of diplomatic relations, the socialist camp's and communist parties' determination that the imperialist and Israeli aggressors must return to the positions they occupied before the aggression, and other material and moral support irrefutably prove that the socialist camp, and particularly the Soviet Union, stood at our side during the battle. They also prove that the only way to destroy imperialism and its leader, the United States--the most bitter enemy of the Arab national and international liberation movements--lies in solidarity and cooperation among the socialist and revolutionary forces. It also lies in solidarity and cooperation among the socialist and revolutionary forces. It also lies in their waging a unified battle against imperialism.

Regarding the role the Arab working class played during the battle, Khalid al-Jundi says: The Arab Workers Federation was the first broad front of the masses to resist the imperialist aggression. During the aggression the Arab workers proved they are the vanguard of progressive forces. The banner of the Arab working class was raised high in the skies of Morocco, Libya, Algeria, Qatar, Kuwait, Baghdad, Khartoum, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, the Arab gulf emirates, the UAR, Syria, and Beirut. Oil pumping stopped. The Suez Canal was closed. A siege was laid on the imperialist military bases. The Arab workers stopped loading and unloading Anglo-American ships. They prevented Anglo-American planes from landing on Arab territory. Thus, the Arab workers dealt a crippling blow to the imperialist economic war machine.

Regarding the evaluation of the role of the Palestinian Arab working class plays in the occupied territory in the Gaza sector and the Western Bank, Khalid al-Jundi says: Our call to our Palestinian Arab comrades in occupied Palestine, the Gaza sector, and the Western Bank is to stand fast behind their barricades in the towns and villages and to wage every possible form of armed resistance, along with obstructing and destroying the economic war machine of the occupying Israeli gang. They should make stability impossible for the Zionists in the Western Bank and Gaza. They should know well that every worker who tries to leave the occupied territory for any neighboring Arab country, whatever the circumstances may be, helps the enemy to consolidate:



Regarding the lessons which could be learned from the battle, Khalid al-Jundi says: The first lesson is that we should avoid demagogery in the struggle against imperialism and Zionism. If this struggle is not fortified by scientific methods it will not be effective, and the Arab masses' movement will not accept it. The second lesson is that we should not depend on classic warfare as the only means of destroying Israel. We should primarily depend on the popular liberation war, not to destroy Israel but also to liberate the entire Arab homeland and to destroy the oil monopolies and the destroy the oil monopolies and the imperialist military bases.

The third lesson is that we should adhere more than ever to the Arab revolution strategy. The reunion of all Arab progressive forces forms the cornerstone of this strategy. Arab unity can be achieved only under a progressive concept: It should be mass unity under the aegis of a progressive economic system, the system of scientific socialism. The Arab working class will have the honor to share with the world working class in liquidating the world imperialist system and in bringing down the banner of the U.S. imperialists in particular. The Arab working class will carry out this historic role.

#### ESHKOL: UNIFIED JERUSALEM TO REMAIN CAPITAL

Paris AFP in English 1555 GMT 14 June 1967--E (FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

(Excerpt) Tel Aviv--Prime Minister Levi Eshkol has said that unified Jerusalem, including the captured Jordanian sector, will remain Israel's capital, it was learned today. Eshkol, talking to Israeli soldiers somewhere in the Sinai Peninsula yesterday, also said that free navigation through the Tiran Strait at the entry to the Gulf of Aqaba has to be properly assured.

The prime minister made these statements when soldiers asked him what Israel would want to keep of the conquered Sinai territory--a question he sidestepped. Eshkol met the soldiers when he made an inspection flight over the Sinai Peninsula yesterday, taking in the Israeli-held shore of the Suez Canal.

#### EBAN LAUDS DEFEAT OF PROPOSAL FOR WITHDRAWAL

Jerusalem Israel Domestic Service in Hebrew 0400 GMT 15 June 1967--M

(Text) Foreign Minister Abba Eban yesterday said that the U.N. Security Council has acted justly and reasonably in turning down the Soviet proposal for withdrawal of forces to former positions. He added that political activities should be continued and strengthened to acquaint the world with the facts in our region and with Israel's efforts for security and peace--efforts which continued for weeks before the fighting as well as afterward.

(By Bernard Ullman)

(Text) Jerusalem, 14 June--Foreign Minister Abba Eban said today that he considers it unlikely that the Soviet Union and the Arab states would be able to persuade a majority of the U.N. General Assembly to condemn Israel. In an exclusive interview, Eban also stressed the necessity of direct--and hastened--negotiations between Israel and its Arab neighbors.

Commenting on recent French policy, he deplored the fact that France had not affirmed with its traditionally clear voice Israel's right to exist and had not condemned Egypt's blockade in the Gulf of Aqaba. He expressed the hope that the French Government, in the diplomatic phase now opening, would "use" its influence to facilitate a fruitful dialog between Israel and the Arab nations.

A dominant theme of his comments was that negotiations between Israel and the Arab states must be bilateral. Discussing the convening of the General Assembly, he emphasized that the Security Council had previously exhausted its means of action in the Middle East crisis. He described as "contradictory" the Soviet position on the General Assembly meeting, since it had always insisted before that the Security Council preserve a monopoly of action in crises.

Questioned about the intentions of his government toward the territories occupied by Israel, Eban said two important steps must be taken rapidly before any decision. These steps, he said, are: full implementation of the Security Council resolutions on the cease-fire; and--the decisive move--the opening of peace negotiations. He asserted that negotiations cannot be imposed from outside but must be the result of a patient and realistic effort undertaken by the neighboring peoples of the Middle East.

With regard to the possibility of establishing a federation grouping Israel and an Arab Palestine, including the West Bank of the Jordan River, the Gaza Strip, and perhaps Transjordan, Eban said that his government is not now considering a precise authorized project of that nature. We find ourselves with problems that were unexpected only 10 days ago, he explained. He said that his government first has to determine the viewpoints of Arabs in West Jordan and the Gaza Strip and that this inquiry is now underway.

As far as Egypt is concerned, he said, any discussion with the Cairo government must deal with all existing problems--including free navigation in the Suez Canal and the Strait of Tiran and the future of the Gaza Strip. He added that the artificial union of Egypt and the Gaza Strip had never been confirmed by Egypt. The Egyptians, he said, had never considered the Gaza Strip as really coming under their sovereignty. Discussing his views on prospects in the Middle East, the foreign minister said he is convinced that there are some realistic minds throughout the Arab world. Perhaps Abd an-Nasir himself will reexamine the statements he has made many times about Israel, he added with a smile. He said that the old Arab slogans about Israel's fight to exist (words indistinct) must disappear.

Some new possibilities exist, he said, but there must be no repetition of the errors of 1957, when Israeli troops evacuated the Sinai and were replaced by U.N. units.

He deplored the action of the Soviet Union and several East European nations in severing relations with Israel, but attributed this to Moscow's need to make a gesture of solidarity toward the Arab world, which felt abandoned. But the rupture of relations, he said, could only be temporary, because actions of this nature have never eased the solving of international problems.

## HAYKAL: CIA CONCOCTED U.S.-ISRAELI COLLUSION

Cairo MENA in Arabic 2300 GMT 15 June 1967--M (FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

(Text of AL-AHRAM chief editor Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal's weekly article entitled, "The extreme degree of violence--the beginning of a long discourse on the crisis in the faint light cast by the details of the events")

(Text) At times of great affliction--and there are many afflictions on the road to the construction of nations--there are moments when a writer feels he is not writing with ink, but with his own blood. This is how I feel now. But despite anything and everything, such a feeling must be set aside because there are now more important things.

It is now most important to determine clearly and with complete understanding what has really happened regardless of the intensity of our emotions. We must be honest with ourselves no matter how strongly we are inclined to seek justifications. Although emotions and the tendency to provide justifications are human characteristics, our Arab nation under its present circumstances requires us to rise even above nature itself.

What exactly has happened? What is the significance of the devastating storm which swept over the Arab world from 5 June to 10 June 1967, leaving debris and many remnants on many parts of the Arab nation's homeland? How and why? And where are we heading now? We say truthfully: What we saw during these five dreadful days was the extreme degree of violence in the clash which raged between the Arab nation and the U.S. Government, the interests it represents, and the policies of domination and force it practices. This is the real subject. Anything else represents transient features on the surface of events and does not reflect the core of their reality.

Some weeks ago, I busied myself with a long discourse about the numerous phases of the conflict between what the United States represents and what the UAR represents. I cited four phases of this conflict, the last of which was the stage of violence. I left that discourse as the phase of violence was reaching its climax. We must now relate events chronologically in the dim light shed by their details. We must also realize that a long time will pass before all the mysteries unfold. Let us remember that 11 full years followed the Suez events before all the masks fell off. Anthony Nutting, Eden's secretary of state for foreign affairs in 1956, made his testimony to history only in 1967 exposing as he did the obnoxious and disgraceful defects of Britain's collusion with Israel.

I believe we shall wait a long time this time because it was an intelligence machinery and not a state machinery that directed and planned the collusion. It was the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency that directed and concocted the plot of U.S. collusion with Israel. As reliable U.S. sources themselves testify, the annual budget of the CIA exceeds 10 billion dollars. The CIA orients and controls all the facets of U.S. policies.

The events that have occurred draw the following picture: With the beginning of 1967 the trend to use violence against Arab nationalism began to manifest itself increasingly in U.S. policy. There were campaigns of economic and psychological pressure backed by successive waves of secret terrorist operations. But all this did not seem effective enough. Moreover, there appeared signs of important changes favoring Arab nationalism.

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(cont'd)

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The most important of these changes was the fact that the revolution of the people of the occupied south entered a new and decisive stage. A joint defense agreement was signed between Egypt and Syria.

In view of the indications of these important changes, there were only two possibilities left to the U.S. policy of violence: either it could retreat--and such a withdrawal would endanger its position and interests--or it could escalate violence to the maximum. The scales were tipped in favor of this second possibility on the grounds that this adventure might keep open a door which was about to be completely closed. When the decision was made to escalate violence to its highest degree, the first operation was aimed at Syria. At that time there was the idea of an Israeli invasion of Syria to deal a devastating blow to Damascus. Then followed the well-known and famous threats against Syria along with preparations for carrying them out.

The assessment of the situation--and it was logical from the American-Israeli point of view--was that the UAR would be left with one of two options. It could watch Syria being invaded and remain silent. The UAR would then have been smashed. Along with the UAR any effectiveness would also have been crushed and the movement of Arab nationalism would have collapsed internally and would have been shattered. On the other hand, the UAR could move to attack Israel thus taking part in the defense of Syria. In this case it would have been easy to present Egypt as an aggressive state and the U.S. Sixth Fleet would have intervened against it in implementation of the promise of defense made to Israel and of the open protection given it.

At this stage, in order to enable Israel to attack Syria, the shipments of U.S. arms to Israel, particularly for the armored forces and the air force, exceeded all conceivable limits. No less than 400 new tanks were sent to Israel between March and May. The air force with which Israel was hastily equipped could not have had less than 250 planes, not counting Israel's own planes.

It had been estimated that Israel did not possess more than five armored brigades. Nevertheless, on 5 June Israel was using eight armored brigades in the assault on the Egyptian front alone. It was also believed that Israel with no more than 200 planes could not deal the first blow from the air to any Arab country. Nevertheless, on the morning of 5 June Israel used 500 planes in its first blow at the Egyptian front alone.

At the beginning of May several sources discovered the magnitude of the troop concentrations that were ready to invade Syria. This was discovered by Syrian intelligence, several Egyptian quarters, and by the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union confirmed the existence of these concentrations to the Egyptian parliamentary delegation which visited Moscow in the first week of June. This was reported by President Abd an-Nasir in his recent speech to the nation explaining the developments in the crisis. With this discovery Egypt decided to move.

It seems that Egypt's move came as a surprise. The American-Israeli strategists believed that Egypt was preoccupied with Yemen and that its national obligations might override its obligation to its nationalist (qawmi) duty. Also, Egypt's wish to insure its regional security might take priority over its understanding of the requisites of general Arab security.

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Egypt's swift move had its subsequent results, including the termination of the mandate of the U.N. Emergency Force (UNEF). Then followed the problem of navigation in the Gulf of Adaba. A few hours later the condition of the entire Arab world had changed in a manner that ran completely counter to the objectives of the American-Israeli plan.

Again there were two possibilities for the U.S. policy of violence: withdraw and face calamity to its stands and interests or to escalate violence to the degree of explosion. Israel insisted on escalation and its effective influential media in the United States advocated escalation for reasons pertaining to the philosophy of Israel's security. I explained my views in detail on this matter before the devastating storm broke.

Late in May following the developments in the Middle East, a number of political amendments to the American-Israeli plan were introduced. The most important of these amendments was to change the target of the first operation from Syria to Egypt. U.S. policy had begun to carry out the biggest operation of distorting facts and of deceit in all modern history.

1--The United States approached the Soviet Union, the closest and strongest friend of the Arabs, with the idea that there was no need for a limited war between the Arabs and Israel to develop into an unlimited war between the United States and the Soviet Union and that both Washington and Moscow could exert common efforts to solve the crisis peacefully.

The U.S. lies and hypocrisy toward the Soviet Union reached such an extent that when Cairo officially announced that two U.S. reconnaissance planes bearing U.S. insignia had been detected over the area of the canal and Sinai on the day of the terrible tank battle in the Mitla Pass, U.S. President Lyndon Johnson immediately contacted Aleksey Kosygin personally and asked him to inform President Jamal Abd an-Nasir that two U.S. planes had flown over the canal zone on their way to investigate an accident involving an American vessel that had been attacked by Israeli torpedos. Thus, through Aleksey Kosygin, President Jamal Abd an-Nasir received an excuse from President Johnson for the flight of U.S. reconnaissance planes over the canal zones and the Sinai.

2--President Johnson appealed to Egypt and Israel for self-restraint so that neither would be the side to open fire first. The theatrics of the calls for self-restraint were perfectly staged to the extent that UAR Ambassador in Washington Mustafa Kamel was called to the U.S. State Department to meet with President Johnson's adviser Walt Rostow who told him: "I am speaking to you now while Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban is meeting with Secretary of State Dean Rusk. They say it is you who will begin the attack on them tonight. Although, we have assured them that we have no information indicating that this might take place, President Johnson believes that under any circumstances no chances should be taken. Therefore, he would like you to contact President Jamal Abd an-Nasir and to emphasize the need for self-restraint so the United States will not find itself compelled to intervene against Egypt."

At the same time U.S. President Johnson was in contact with Soviet Premier Aleksey Kosygin telling him that Israel had information concerning a UAR attack and asking him to offer his good offices with Cairo to avert the attack.

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On the same night that President Johnson's message to ~~ro~~ was delivered to UAR Ambassador Mustafa Kamil, on that very same night at 0300 hours, the Soviet ambassador in Cairo contacted President Jamal Abd an-Nasir's office and asked for an immediate interview because he had a message that could not wait until the morning. President Jamal Abd an-Nasir woke up and received the Soviet ambassador at 0330 hours. He received Premier Kosygin's message calling for self-restraint.

3--The United States carried out wide-scale political activity before cameras and microphones suggesting that its efforts were directed toward seeking solutions other than an armed clash.

4--The U.S. Sixth Fleet continued its movements to show that at the time these movements were just part of an open war of nerves.

5--Behind all this the preparations for the real plan aimed at killing were being completed in a speedy, accurate, and terrifying way. In the light of the small part of events that has become clear, we can now say with a certainty based on facts beyond any shred of doubt that the phases of the plan were as follows:

A--From the very beginning the United States officially pledged to Israel that if Israel entered the battle and things went in its favor nothing would harm it either outside or inside the United Nations. However, should the battle turn against Israel the United States would immediately intervene in implementation of a pledge that was announced in the name of President Johnson himself and which said that "no matter what the circumstances, the United States guarantees the territorial safety of all the states involved in the Middle East crisis."

B--American intelligence rushed 200 additional American planes to Israel. These planes arrived in Israel at the same time as approximately 1,000 volunteers. All these volunteers were military pilots and navigators. They all came from U.S. Air Force units in the United States itself or from units in Europe. The amazing thing is that Israel announced the arrival of these volunteers and said they had come to work on farm tractors and on the machinery of various factories because the general mobilization in Israel had absorbed all persons capable of work. The thing that attracts one's attention is the fact that during certain air battles the messages exchanged among the enemy pilots were in English while in the past all such messages were usually in Hebrew. Perhaps the real aim behind the rumors recently spread by Israel propaganda alleging that the Israeli forces had captured a number of Russian experts at Syrian posts--rumors which have been proved false--was to cover up the participation of American pilots in the aerial battles on the side of Israel.

C--The mission of the U.S. aircraft carriers in the Mediterranean was to provide protection for Israeli skies during the battle. This achieved the following two goals: the entire Israeli Air Force could be devoted to the attack, and there would be no fear of an American plane being shot down during any operation outside Israel thus revealing the collusion.

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(Cont'd)

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D--American U-72 planes, which are famous for their espionage activities at very high altitudes, would undertake the mission of reconnaissance against Egyptian air defenses and would themselves define the safe corridors which the Israeli Air Force could use during a sudden attack against the Egyptian Air Force. It had been decided that the Egyptian Air Force would be the target of the first blow of the battle.

E--The Americans would form a complete aerial ring at least for observation, reconnaissance, and guidance. The U.S. Sixth Fleet's aircraft carriers were actually operating in the Mediterranean from the north while the U.S. Wheelus base in Libya was operating from the West, and the U.S. aircraft carrier "Intrepid" was in contact with the operation from the east after passing through the Suez Canal on its way to the southern Red Sea.

F--In addition to all this, which in itself is too much and very serious, a unit of the U.S. Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean was to jam the Egyptian radar network.

G--The CIA espionage ship "Liberty" was assigned to take up a position quite close to the Egyptian shore of Sinai and to pick up all signals transmitted by the Egyptian commands' operations room and to decipher them by using an electronic brain capable of decoding any cipher in a few minutes and to compute millions of possibilities in one hour. This ship and its role were exposed when it was hit by an Israeli torpedo boat which mistook it for an Egyptian naval unit.

Israel dealt its first blow at 0900 on Monday, 5 June, against the Egyptian Air Force. In all truth I cannot say that we did not make mistakes in our precautions. But we can truthfully say that in 1956 Israel came to us. Two days later Britain and France followed. In 1967 Israel came to us. But the United States had come at least two months earlier.

I have not said anything in detail in this article about Britain's role, which has been the same in this plot as that which Britain is now playing in all world affairs--a satellite of U.S. policies. Nothing remains of the old British lion but its tail, which the American cowboy sometimes used to chase away flies. At other times the American cowboy lashes with this tail as if it were a whip in his hand.

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CAIRO DETERMINED NOT TO NEGOTIATE WITH ISRAEL

Paris AFP in English 1552 GMT 15 June 1967--E (FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

(By Jean-Pierre Joulin)

(Text) Cairo--A high-ranking official in the Egyptian regime today rejected any prospect of his nation negotiating with Israel on free navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba or the Suez Canal. We cannot compensate the aggressor, said the official, who made anonymity a condition of the interview. We have suffered a military defeat but this will not stop us from defending our rights by all means.

In a vigorous denunciation of the Israelis, the official deplored what he said was Israel's use of napalm, its bombardment of hospitals, and a number of atrocities aimed at forcing Palestinian refugees to flee from occupied zones. His remarks apparently presage his government's determination not to hold direct negotiations with Israel. This could mean that the Suez Canal will be closed for a long period. Israel has insisted that direct negotiations must precede any withdrawal from the occupied territories. At the same time, Egypt maintains that the Suez Canal will not be reopened as long as the Israelis remain on the banks of the canal--in the Sinai. The officials' remarks also illustrate the postcombat strategy of the Egyptians--an effort to sway world opinion against the Israelis through debate at the U.N. General Assembly and other diplomatic contacts. In recent days most of the ambassadors in Cairo have been received by Egyptian Foreign Minister Mahmud Riyad. The Egyptian interviewed today specifically hailed the neutrality of France during the hostilities. Egypt will never forget what France did for it, he asserted. France remained neutral. It did not aid the aggressor as the United States did.

Turning to domestic politics, the official stressed that the balance of forces in Egypt has not changed and that the army remains one of those forces. He reaffirmed that President Jamal Abd an-Nasir had momentarily withdrawn his resignation and that presidential elections would be held when events permit. But he declined to indicate if Abd an-Nasir would be a candidate in these elections. He remarked that Abd an-Nasir had personally requested that Egyptian newspapers no longer use his photograph. Abd an-Nasir today held his second meeting in 24 hours with Soviet Ambassador Dimitriy Pozhydaev. No details on the talks were given.



INTERIOR MINISTER ORDERS WATCH OF SUSPECTS

Baghdad Domestic Service in Arabic 1500 GMT 15 June 1967--M

(Text) The interior minister today issued the following statement: Tribulations and afflictions renew the determination of nations, arouse their resolve to stand fast, and awaken their patriotic and national feelings to confront the dangers which surround their destiny and existence. Our great Arab nation today faces the challenges and plots of the biggest imperialist-zionist alliance--an alliance which desires annihilation for the Arab nation while the Arab nation insists on living.

It demands that the Arab nation acquiesce to its plans and remain a sphere of influence. But the Arab nation clings to an honorable life, to complete sovereignty over its territory, and to legal control over its resources. This nation, whose steadfastness in confronting difficulties was testified by history, today insists on continuing the holy battle--with all its eventualities and at all levels--with a confrontation more profound and comprehensive than ever before, and with a bold and conscious view of our coming struggle and its new methods.

Our battle today is with the states which created Israel and encouraged it to aggress. This identification of the true enemy means that all of us--officials and masses alike--must reject suspicious persons such as the agents and lackeys of the oil companies in Iraq and closely observe their behavior, speech, and movements.

We urge the struggling people to inform the responsible authorities of any person or group that has agreed to serve foreign interests and that has disavowed nation and homeland.

Under the powers vested in me I have issued instructions to the departments concerned to direct all their efforts to observing suspicious activities closely and to collaborate with loyal citizens in exposing their hiding places and movements.

It is with our cohesive national unity and with our United Arab front that we will destroy imperialist aggression rout the aggressors, we shall annihilate the imperialist plots and agents inside and outside Iraq. Long live our great nation! Long live free Arab Palestine! Long live our holy war to crush the usurpers!

(signed) Interior Minister Abd as-Sattar Abd al-Latif.

#### ISRAEL SAYS JORDAN BLAMES NASIR FOR LOSSES

Jerusalem Israel in Arabic to the Arab World 2030 GMT 15 June 1967--M

(Text) The Jordanian Government has accused Egyptian President Jamal Abd an-Nasir of causing the complete destruction of two Jordanian armored brigades. Reports reaching London state that Abd an-Nasir sent a note to King Husayn on 6 June in informing him that the Egyptian Air Force was attacking military targets inside Israel after the Egyptian planes had repelled an Israeli air attack.

In his note Abd an-Nasir said it was very important that Jordan should prepare its armored forces for an attack in the Hebron area. On the basis of this the Jordanian staff command ordered the 40th and 60th Jordanian armored brigades to leave their posts, where they were immune to aerial attack. When the two Jordanian armored brigades proceeded to their new posts, they were surprised by a fierce attack by Israeli planes, which completely destroyed them.

#### Charges Denied

Amman Domestic Service in Arabic 2100 GMT 15 June 1967--M

(Text) Premier Sad Jumah has commented as follows on the news broadcast by the Israeli radio about the charges which--the radio of the enemy has alleged--have been leveled by the Jordanian Government at UAR authorities to the effect that UAR authorities caused the destruction of two armored Jordanian brigades: It is well known that Arab unity and the fraternal agreement to attain their national goals and their common national aspirations are most disturbing to Israel and the Arab nation's enemies.

It is not surprising that Israel and our enemies are striving to sow intrigues between Arab states, forgetting or ignoring the fact that the solidarity of the Arab nation, its united stand and unified efforts, and the Arab nation's belief in its common destiny are above all slanders and evil and sinful attempts.

Jordan and other Arab states stood heroically and firmly against the cruel Israeli aggression against the Arab states. Together with the Arab states, Jordan paid the price of that stand in innocent blood and pure souls. It was for such a stand that His Majesty King Husayn had prepared our armed forces. It is for the defense of the Arab world in that manner that Jordan, under the leadership of its King, will continue to make all sacrifices until our nation is victorious and our just cause wrests glory and triumphs.

ALGERIA, SYRIA DISCUSS 'ARAB SITUATION'

Algiers Domestic Service in Arabic 2000 GMT 15 June 1967--L

(Excerpts) The Algerian-Syrian talks, which began this morning, continued this evening in the People's Palace. It has been learned from an authoritative source in Algiers that the talks have enabled the two delegations to effect a complete unanimity of views. The final meeting was held this afternoon.

The Algerian side was represented by President Boumediene, Foreign Minister Bouferrika, Ahmed Medeghri, minister of interior, Minister of Finance and Planning Ahmed Kaid, Chief of Staff at-Tahir az-Zubayri, commander of the First Military Region Commandant Said Ubayd, Col. Abbas, a member of the staff, and Algerian Ambassador to Syria Ali Kafi. President al-Atasi and Ibrahim Makkus attended the talks, the talks lasted for a few hours and ended at 1830 today. They covered the international situation in general and the Arab situation in particular.

Al-Atasi Thanks Algeria

Algiers Domestic Service in Arabic 2000 GMT 15 June 1967--L

(Syrian President Al-Atasi statement to the Algerian people--recorded or read by announcer)

(Excerpts) Brethren, sons of the Arab nation in Algeria, I frequently reiterated that the decisive stage of destiny, through which our Arab nation is passing, demands very little talking and much action. But what has made me speak to you is your Arab feeling and the great role which Algeria, Arab Algeria, heroic Algeria, is carrying out in this decisive stage. Algeria has been the hope of all Arabs and a motive for the Arab nation to remain steadfast in face of the dangers threatening it. Our Arab nation derives today, from the history of Algeria, from the heroism of Algeria, from the sacrifices made by Algeria, from all this derives their determination and resoluteness against the tyrant forces. The sincere effective aid which the Arab people in Algeria have given in this battle was one of the effective and positive elements which led the Arab nation to stand firm and to make sacrifices.

Our Arab nation is today subjected to the most dangerous kind of imperialist invasion, is subjected to a war of annihilation in which the violation of all values of mankind has become permissible, in which the violation of the (rights) of mankind has become permissible, executed by Zionism and its gathered gangs under the leadership of imperialism. Our Arab nation is subjected to a war of annihilation, but it always remains steadfast and will always remain defending its dignity, its existence and threatened fate, prepared for further sacrifices.

The round which we have lost as a result of the imperialist U.S.-Zionist treachery is to mark the opening of a new era, an era in which all the able Arab states will muster for the protection for Arab existence and entity.

ABD AN-NASIR RECEIVES HUSAYN CABLE OF THANKS

Cairo Voice of the Arabs in Arabic to the Arab World 1030 GMT 16 June 1967--L

(Text) President Jamal Abd an-Nasir has received the following cable of thanks sent to him by King Husayn:

We have received with immense gratitude and appreciation the generous material which you kindly transferred to us and which we turned over to the war effort. This generous initiative by Your Excellency, at a time when sister Egypt is, like us, suffering from the affliction of the setback as a result of the treacherous Zionist aggression, has had a most moving effect on us all. I take this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency our pride in the heroic stand of the armed forces of the UAR under your bold leadership, and our unshakable belief that through cooperation and coordination and by regrouping and mobilizing in all spheres and fields, sacrificing our lives and everything we possess for the sake of our Arabism and religion, we will reorganize and rebuild with determination and resolution without abandoning a single iota of our homelands or any of our rights. May God lead us on the right path and support us. Best greetings and wishes to your esteemed person.

REPORTS ON ADMINISTRATION OF WESTERN BANK

Jordanian Returnees

Jerusalem Israel Domestic Service in Hebrew 2100 GMT 15 June 1967--M

(Text) A special transport service for Arab civilians who want to be transferred from the Old City of Jerusalem to Jordan began operating today. This was announced by the Western Bank headquarters. People who want to leave for Jordan are carried from Nabulus gate to Jericho by special buses. From Jericho they cross the Jordan River to the eastern bank. Similar arrangements were also made for Arab population centers in other areas on the Western Bank.

Brig. Haim Herzog, commanding Israeli forces on the Western Bank, explained today that no attempt has been made to exert pressure on people to cross the Jordan. He said the announcement about arrangements for people who want to cross is mainly intended for soldiers of the Jordanian Arab Legion, who threw away their uniforms, concealed themselves in houses, and want now to return to their families. The same arrangements are also intended for inhabitants of the eastern bank who were staying on the Western Bank at the time of the fighting and who want now to return home.

#### Freedom of Worship

Jerusalem Israel Domestic Service in Hebrew 0800 GMT 16 June 1967--M

(Text) The director of the civil government in the Western Bank, Brig. Gen. Haim Herzog, has reiterated that Israel will see to it that absolute freedom of worship is observed at the religious places in the Western Bank. At a meeting with Moslem men of religion in the Old City, he said that Jewish holy places, synagogues, and cemeteries in the Old City had been demolished and desecrated. He stressed that the war was not waged on our initiative and that peace has not come yet.

Brigadier Herzog expressed the hope that Moslem men of religion will cooperate with the authorities for the restoration of normal life. Mufti of Jerusalem Shaykh Said al-Alami declared that the Moslem men of religion will cooperate with the Israeli authorities and submitted a number of requests for help and assistance. In his reply, Brigadier Herzog said the requests will be examined and if they do not involve security problems he will do his best to meet them.

#### Banking and Currency

Jerusalem Israel Domestic Service in Hebrew 1400 GMT 15 June 1967--M

(Text) The Bank of Israel is considering granting to Israeli banks the right to open branch offices in the Old City of Jerusalem. This was learned by our Jerusalem correspondent. The military government headquarters in the Western Bank announced that some banks in the Old City will be opened in the next few days, but that various problems must still be solved to make this possible.

Maj. David Shoham, in charge of economic affairs at Western Bank headquarters, said that not all bank managers are cooperating. When the situation of the banks was examined it was found that their liquid assets are very small, constituting less than 10 percent of deposits. This makes it doubtful that the banks can meet their obligations toward account owners. This situation was created as a result of large withdrawals by clients and also because the banks granted many loans in Amman, where the head offices of most banks in the Old City of Jerusalem are situated.

It has been decided that for the time being all commerce on the Western Bank will be carried out in Jordanian dinars. It will be recalled that the official rate of exchange was fixed at 7.5 Israeli pounds to 1 Jordanian dinar.

#### Shops Ordered To Open

Jerusalem Israel Domestic Service in Hebrew 1200 GMT 15 June 1967--M

(Text) The Western Bank command today will publish an order concerning the opening of shops and business premises aimed at preventing creation of a black market, profiteering, and hoarding of commodities. This was reported to our Western Bank correspondent by (word indistinct) Lieutenant Colonel Ofer. Business owners who do not open their shops may be considered absentees. There is a decision to confiscate Jordanian Government property in the Western Bank area.

# MINISTER SAYS HOLY WAR DEPENDS ON ARAB UNITY

Baghdad Domestic Service in Arabic 1100 GMT 18 June 1967--M

(Text) Interior Minister Abd as-Sattar Abd al-Latif has stated that the nature of the treacherous Anglo-American-Zionist aggression against the Arab nation has clarified the aggressors' conviction that any attack by Israel alone will fail despite all the support and guidance given it. The minister was replying to a question about his view on the defeatist allegations--in implementation of the new imperialist plan in the psychological war against the Arabs--that the Arabs would not be able to confront Israel despite the great difference between the material and strategic forces and the manpower reserves of the two sides. The interior minister added that from the beginning of the recent aggression it became clear that the aggressors planned that Israel should be a base for a big international grouping representing world capitalistic and monopolistic interests, expressing the role of neoimperialism in the area, and reflecting neoimperialism's aims, which are hostile to developing nations and progressive-revolutionary regimes in the Arab homeland and the third world.

Therefore, it is not strange that it should become clear from the first moments of the aggression that the Arab nation did not confront purely Israeli aggression but found itself faced with an Atlantic-Anglo-American invasion which included all imperialist states that consider their continued interests in the area subject to the preservation of Israel as a strong state on one hand and the continued existence of the Arabs as a divided nation (words indistinct) and whose affairs are not steered by centralized organization, planning, or action on the other.

In reply to a question on the lesson which the Arab nation learned from its recent experience with the imperialist forces of capitalistic and monopolistic interests, the interior minister added: Our recent battle with the enemy confirmed that Arab division was one of the basic factors which the aggressors took into account. Since we are determined to continue the holy war for the restoration of the Arab territory, no matter how huge the sacrifice, we must admit to ourselves, our masses, and our Arab armed forces that independent regional and territorial confrontations are incapable of bringing about the defeat of the greatest international imperialist grouping in history, a grouping which links the vestiges of old imperialism and the forces of neoimperialism. On the basis of this objective appraisal of the enemy's and our current positions, our forthcoming confrontation and our new methods in the holy struggle must emanate from a unified Arab strategy and from a strong unified approach to the problem of Israel and its effect on unified Arabdom.

Today, we--people, government, and leaders--are working in a unified rank and on a close domestic front to (words indistinct) of Arab unity acceptable to or proposed by our brethren in the other Arab countries, foremost of which is the UAR. We stress that any serious confrontation with the illegitimate Israeli existence and the world imperialist-Zionist alliance begins with a unified country, people, army, and struggle.

## HUSAYN URGES SUMMIT MEETING, DEPLORES DELAY

Beirut RNS in Arabic 1110 GMT 18 June 1967--M (FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

(Text) Amman--King Husayn has appealed to Arab kings and presidents "in the name of Arab generations and future battles of destiny" to declare immediately their agreement to hold an Arab summit conference. In a cable sent yesterday to the kings and presidents, King Husayn proposed that the conference be held in Khartoum or in any other Arab country, provided the conference is convened by next Saturday. King Husayn's cable, which was released today, says:

"We have already proposed that a summit conference be held as soon as possible to discuss the situation in the area following the Israeli aggression and to draw up a unified Arab policy to confront the political battle and to prepare for the coming battles on new bases and new thinking compatible with the dimensions of the Arab nation's recent setback." The King added: "I regret that my call and similar calls by some of my brother Arab kings and presidents are still moving slowly between Arab capitals, either being ignored, being subjected to procrastination, or brushed aside by holding conferences and meetings at other levels. We believe such meetings are absolutely useless under present circumstances, particularly since the U.N. General Assembly will meet on Monday at the request of the Soviet Union. Had an Arab summit conference been held a few days ago, as we had hoped, it would have been possible to prepare for that meeting through a unified and considered policy."

In conclusion, King Husayn said: "I appeal to you in the name of future Arab generations and the coming battles of destiny to declare immediately your agreement to hold an Arab summit conference. I propose that it be held in Khartoum, since Sudan was the first Arab state to send invitations and since some Arab states have already accepted. Or, it could be held in any other country agreed upon by all the fraternal states, provided the meeting begins by next Saturday."

## SYRIA TOLD OF DESIRE FOR IMPROVED RELATIONS

Damascus MENA in Arabic to MENA Cairo 1216 GMT 18 June 1967--M (FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

(Excerpt) Damascus--Jordanian Charge d'Affaires in Damascus Ahmad al-Atiyat has informed Syrian authorities that Jordan wishes to open a new page in relations between the two sisterly countries. Al-Atiyat told the MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY that this desire is based on shelving all previous disputes for the sake of confronting the Israeli aggression within the framework of unified Arab action and joint Arab struggle.

(Editor's note: Amman Domestic Service in Arabic at 1200 GMT 17 June reports the cabinet has decided that "immediate economic talks will begin with Syria and Lebanon to facilitate trade exchange between Jordan and the two fraternal countries.")

## Talks With Syria

Beirut RNS in Arabic 1610 GMT 17 June 1967--M (FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

(Summary) Amman--Secretary General of the Syrian Economy Ministry Dr. Haydar Ghaybah announced today that the talks which began between a Syrian delegation, led by himself, and a Jordanian delegation, led by Finance Ministry Under Secretary for Customs and Excise Affairs Ali al-Hasan, aim at "remedying economic relations between Syria and Jordan by facilitating trade and transportation between the two countries."

SEVEN NEW REFUGEE CAMPS TO BE CONSTRUCTED

Beirut RNS in Arabic 1905 GMT 18 June 1967--M (FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

(Text) Amman--Finance Minister Abd al-Wahhab al-Majali announced in Amman today that the Western Bank Refugees Committee has decided to build seven refugee camps in various parts of Jordan in addition to the one built earlier. He added that these camps will have every facility and the necessary public services.

The authorities have requested that refugees who live with their relatives in the Eastern bank and those who live in centers not belonging to UNRWA to go to UNRWA centers for registration so they may be offered aid and the census carried out at these centers on Friday may be completed. Official sources have estimated the number of refugees at not less than 150,000.

REFUGEES BEGIN TO RECEIVE TRAVEL DOCUMENTS

Beirut RNS in Arabic 1505 GMT 18 June 1967--M (FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

(Text) Amman--The director of the General Passports Directorate, Muhammad Salim al-Junaydi, stated here today that yesterday the directorate began to issue travel documents to Western Bank refugees who applied for such documents. He added that some refugees have complained that the Israeli authorities impounded their passports before they left. Al-Junaydi went on to say that a special committee is now studying the question of changing Jordanian passports because some had fallen into the hands of the Israelis and might be used improperly. He pointed out that the committee will submit a report to the government in this connection on Wednesday.



# Difference of Views

Beirut RNS in Arabic 1015 GMT 18 June 1967--M (FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

(Excerpts) Kuwait--At their meeting last night, which continued into the early hours of the morning, the Arab foreign ministers agreed to reaffirm the Arab oil-producing countries' decision to stop oil supplies to states which back Israel. Sources at the conference said there was a difference in the views of a number of states when the question of cutting off oil was discussed during the six-hour meeting. They added that four states--Algeria, the UAR, Syria, and Sudan--insisted that oil pumping from the fields be suspended on the basis that it is "the sharpest weapon" in the hands of the Arabs during this delicate stage. However, the oil-producing states said they have decided to stop oil pumping to the states which have supported and still support Israel. They expressed the belief that oil revenues could be used to purchase arms for the Arabs and said that this is why they do not support the idea of suspending oil pumping from the fields. The oil-producing states also said that oil revenues will help revive the Arab economy in general.

Conference sources said that Syrian Deputy Premier and Foreign Minister Dr. Ibrahim Makhus spoke at the meeting about Syria's losses in the war with Israel. He said: "We have lost much. The oil-producing states must therefore cooperate with us and stop the oil pumping from the fields." He was backed by Algerian Foreign Minister Abdelaziz Bouteflika, Sudanese Premier and Foreign Minister Muhammad Ahmad Mahjub, and UAR Foreign Minister Mahmud Riyad. The sources added it was finally agreed to reaffirm the oil-producing states' decision to discontinue oil supplies to states which back Israel.

The same sources also said Bouteflika stated that the Soviet Union promised Algerian Premier Houari Boumediene, during his recent visit to Moscow, to compensate the Arabs for the arms they lost in the war with Israel. However, he declined to reveal any details.

A number of ministers demanded the withdrawal of Arab states' deposits in Britain. The sources said that Kuwaiti Foreign Minister Sabah al-Ahmad as-Sabah declared that Kuwait's deposits in Britain amount to 140 million pounds sterling. Sabah denied reports that Kuwait's deposits in British banks amount to hundreds of millions of pounds.

UAR Foreign Minister Mahmud Riyad launched a vigorous attack on the United States. He said: "It is the one which planned the Israeli aggression." He added that it has proved that the United States supplied Israel with aircraft, volunteers, and pilots. Riyad also accused Britain of "collaboration and collusion" but said that it has now become "a fourth-rate power." Riyad also said that the United States deceived the Soviet Union and that the U.S. role "was obvious and very clear." He affirmed that the Suez Canal will be opened only "after the aggressors evacuate the territory they have occupied."

A source here has revealed that Tunisia is now mediating between the UAR and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to solve the Yemeni problem. The source added that the Tunisian delegation to the Arab Foreign Ministers Conference has left Kuwait for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for this purpose.

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EBAN: WE MUST PREVENT A SOVIET-U.S. FRONT

Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0800 GMT 17 June 1967--M.

(Interview given by Foreign Minister Abba Eban to radio correspondent Yoram Ronen--recorded)

(Excerpts) Question: Mr. Eban, you said we will not waste the achievements of the military victory. Will we propose a positive plan for security and peace?

Answer: I think it is still too early to determine the course of our tactics (in the U.N. General Assembly--ed.), but I believe that the situation is not different in principle from the situation which existed at the Security Council. I do not think that a body of 127 states will be able to discuss the fate of various areas or detailed security arrangements.

We are convinced that there is only one useful way which would lead to an arrangement: negotiations between the sides concerned. Our timetable is as follows: 1) to strengthen the cease-fire and to prevent its infringement; 2) to prevent a deterioration in world public opinion toward a request that we return to the former positions; and 3) negotiations between Israel and every Arab state concerned so that we can set up ties with every state, and ties of coexistence. To attain this aim it is desirable that outside elements intervene as little as possible in a matter which in the final analysis must be decided by the states of the region themselves.

The U.S. stand is the result of various factors, including the consultations and close contacts we had with the United States during the last week in May. Had it not been for that effort, we might have faced today the same situation we experienced on 8 November 1956, when the U.S. President and the Soviet Premier jointly asked, or at least asked in an identical manner, the Israeli Premier for a pledge of withdrawal.

They received the pledge on the same day. Throughout this crisis, before and after the fighting, this memory was before my eyes. My main aim was and still is to prevent the formation of a Soviet-American front at the expense of the vital interests of the state.

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MINISTERS EXPLAIN ISRAEL'S POLITICAL STAND

Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0605 GMT 17 June 1967--M

(Excerpts) Public information forums were held yesterday in various parts of the country at which ministers explained Israel's stand in the political battle expected after the six-day military battle. Minister Yisrael Galili said in Beersheba that it is impossible to separate the problem of peace from the border problem. Until a permanent peace is established we have no alternative but to keep the areas liberated with the blood of our sons. He added that the general assault on Israel by the Arab states erased the era of cease-fire agreements. He said the war which was imposed on us was to a large extent the result of the passivity of world political elements, which did nothing to stop it after seeing 100,000 soldiers and 800 tanks massed in Sinai. Galili said: Fortunately we had been constantly building our defense forces and thus were able to face the danger.

Minister Menahem Begin said in Tel Aviv that the starting point of a settlement with our neighbors should not be a cease-fire or any other arrangement but a peace agreement which would clearly guarantee that the state of Israel would not be under a threat anymore. He added that we should insist that, without a peace agreement, we would not move out of any area captured by our defense forces. Mr. Begin then appealed to the French people to renew the friendship alliance between the Jewish people and the great France and even to strengthen this alliance. He asked how the French President can declare neutrality between the Egyptian dictator, who planned to annihilate Israel, and a small nation which wishes to live in peace on the land of its forefathers. As for the Soviet Union, he said that just as the Russian people today are ashamed of Stalin's acts, the day will come when they will be ashamed of Fedorenko, the Soviet representative at the United Nations, who is obviously a student of Stalin or Bogdan Khmel'nitskiy (17th century Ukrainian statesman--ed.).

Jerusalem Domestic Service in English 1100 GMT 17 June 1967--M

(Text) Speaking last night in Ascalon, Health Minister Barzilai said that the Soviet Union should work toward negotiations between Israel and the Arabs rather than call for a return to the former situation, which led to hostilities. Moscow is well aware of the fact that it was not Israel that refused to recognize the Arab states, which threatened their destruction, or that sent terrorists against their civilians. Despite this, the Soviet Union for years built up the Arabs' military might against us, he said.

Barzilai stressed that Israeli security required changes and assurances that would prevent the shelling of settlements in the north, the formation of terrorist centers near our borders, the closing of international waterways, the massing of troops in the Sinai desert, and threats to the security of Jerusalem. We are offering all our Arab neighbors an honorable peace settlement which will respect the sovereignty and rights of all countries in the area.

The fact that Israel is offering its neighbors a mutual agreement for peace was also stressed by Minister Without Portfolio Yosef Sapir at a meeting in Petah Tiqva. Sapir said that we must now stand firm in our demands for peace and mutual coexistence that would complete our military victory. The peace-loving countries of the world, Sapir said, have never had a greater challenge to solve human, political, ethnic, and economic problems. He added that with the establishment of peace it would be essential for the masses of Jews in the Diaspora to settle in Israel.

## BEN-GURION PROPOSES PALESTINIAN ARAB STATE

Paris AFP in English 1958 GMT 17 June 1967--E (FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

(Text) Tel Aviv, 17 June--By Bernard Ullmann--If UAR President Nasir agrees to talks with Israeli leaders, Israel should give up the Sinai desert, David Ben-Gurion, Israeli premier during the 1956 Suez crisis, told me today at his Tel Aviv villa. I have great respect for Nasir, he said. Nasir is a patriot who wants to do something for Egypt. We should make an effort to talk with him. If Nasir agrees to talk we should give up the Sinai.

But Ben-Gurion doubted whether Israel would succeed in achieving bilateral talks with each of the Arab states, as the government proposed. Without Egypt, no other Arab state will talk, he said.

The 80-year-old veteran politician, who was in good form and as dynamic as ever, said he was speaking as a private person, since he left the premiership in 1963. He suggested an independent Palestinian Arab state on the western side of the Jordan River occupied by Israeli forces, with economic links with Israel. The proposed state should also have an outlet to the Mediterranean. The Israeli Army should remain on the Jordan, with King Husayn keeping only his sovereignty over Transjordan. Ben-Gurion recalled that he had several times put forward the idea of a federation between the Israeli state and Arab Palestine, before Israel was formed. This was suggested by the United Nations but rejected by the Arabs, he said.

Asked what he thought of the official French attitude during the latest conflict, he said: I can hardly understand it. Recalling earlier meetings with General de Gaulle, he added: I cannot imagine he has changed; I do not understand. He doubted whether France could get talks going between Israel and the Arab states. I doubt even if the United States and the USSR together could bring the Arabs to talks with us, he said.

The former premier and defense minister said he was never in any doubt about the Israeli victory, but the swiftness of it surprised him. He said the Israeli Armed Forces were obviously much better now than in 1956. He added with a laugh: This superiority is greatly due to French equipment, especially the planes.

## REPORTED EXPULSION OF WEST BANK ARABS DENIED

Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 2200 GMT 18 June 1967--M

(Text) A Foreign Ministry spokesman has denied as unfounded the fabricated reports regarding the expulsion of the Arab population from the Western Bank. The spokesman stressed that there was no pressure on Arab citizens in the areas under military government to leave their places of residence. The Israeli Government will continue to endeavor to insure for the Arab population all necessary conditions for a peaceful life and will do everything to restore life to normal.

The Foreign Ministry spokesman pointed out that despite appeals by the Israeli Government to Jordan not to join the Egyptian aggression, King Husayn chose war. The fighting which broke out as a result of this caused suffering to the population of both sides. Civilian life in the Western Bank was very badly hit following the defeat of the Jordanian Army.

During the fighting there was a certain movement of Arabs from the western to the eastern bank. But the extent of this movement has been deliberately and greatly exaggerated. Nevertheless, the spokesman continued, there was also a movement in the opposite direction.

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Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1200 GMT 18 June 1967--M

(Text) The West Bank command is reducing curfew hours in the bank. The curfew in municipal areas will be from 1800 to 0600 and in rural areas from 1800 to 0400 so villagers can complete their field work.

West Bank inhabitants will be allowed to move freely in all parts of the bank. The bank command has also made special arrangements for free access to mosques. Access to the Holy Sepulcher will also be permitted.

Beginning tomorrow, registration of the population will begin in the West Bank. About 800 employees from Israel and among bank inhabitants will complete the registration.

Tomorrow government stores will begin to supply fuel, rice, sugar, and flour to West Bank inhabitants. Within a few days cigarettes, alcoholic drinks, and oil factories will be reopened. It has also been decided to open West Bank schools beginning 1 September. The Education Ministry has decided to make arrangements for the reopening with the assistance of the education director in the bank command and with the cooperation of Arab educators. The bank command has also issued instructions to insure that the needs of the 500 orphans in an Old City orphanage are met.

In the meantime, the chief of staff has ordered that all vehicles and private cars be returned to bank inhabitants to facilitate traffic and restore life to normal.

#### HEBRON MAYOR SEES ARAB-ISRAELI COEXISTENCE

Jerusalem in Arabic to the Arab World 1130 GMT 18 June 1967--M

(Text) Hebron Mayor Shaykh Muhammad Ali al-Jabari has praised the behavior of the Israeli Defense Forces' commander and soldiers in Hebron and its suburbs since the entry of the Israeli forces into the city on the morning of 8 June. He was speaking at a press conference attended by foreign journalists from all over the world.

Al-Jabari said that to solve the Arab refugee problem it is necessary to hold a conference between representatives of the refugees in both the eastern and western banks of the Jordan. He also said that he thinks that Arabs will live peacefully side by side with Israel. He added that the coming days will be days of calm and happiness for all since we all desire peace with Israel.

Al-Jabari denounced the Voice of the Arabs radio from Cairo and the propaganda of Abd an-Nasir, who sent Ash-Shuqayri to Jordan to poison the minds of the Arabs there. He added that he is certain that all Hebron residents are disgusted with the lies the Voice of Arabs reiterates concerning the war between the Arabs and Israel, because the people of Hebron wish to live in peace.

#### ARAB BANK TO OPEN JERUSALEM, GAZA BRANCHES

Jerusalem in Arabic to the Arab World 0930 GMT 19 June 1967--M

(Text) The Bank of Israel has agreed to the request of the Arab Bank in Israel to open two new branches, one in the Old City of Jerusalem and the other in Gaza. Immediately after receiving the Bank of Israel's approval, the Arab Bank in Israel began looking for suitable places in Jerusalem and Gaza to open the new branches.

## REPORT ON 19 JUNE HUSAYN PRESS CONFERENCE

Amman Domestic Service in Arabic 1600 GMT 19 June 1967--M

(Text) His Majesty the King held a press conference today during which he spoke frankly on matters concerning Jordan and the Arab nation in view of recent developments. The King stressed that what took place will be a turn for the better in the life of the entire Arab nation. King Husayn also stressed the need to hold an Arab summit conference, which will adopt a new unified Arab policy to tackle the future. The press conference was attended by Crown Prince Amir Hasan, Premier Sad Jumah, the King's personal representative Bahjat at-Talhuni, Chief of the Hashimite Royal Cabinet Sharif Husayn Ibn Nasir, Information Minister Salah Abu Zayd, Royal Court Minister Akram Zuaytir, and a large number of newspaper correspondents and representatives of Arab and foreign radios, television, and news agencies.

His Majesty began the press conference with a brief statement welcoming the journalists. He then gave them the opportunity to ask questions. Asked if Jordan can live without the Western Bank, His Majesty said: The Western Bank is an important part of Jordan. It is part of our soil and country and also part of the Arab homeland. The question is not whether Jordan can live without the bank, but what is right. As far as we are concerned the two banks of Jordan form one homeland and will continue to do so. Asked his opinion on the setting up of an Arab-Jewish federal state, His Majesty replied: Although we were dealt a severe blow in Jordan and the Arab homeland, we are determined to make what took place a turning point for the better in the life of the nation. Palestine has been and will continue to be a question concerning the entire Arab nation. Palestine concerns us now more than at any time in the past and we are doing our best to convene an Arab summit conference to adopt a new Arab policy and stand.

On Jordan's attitude toward the countries which supported Israel in the aggression, Husayn said: This country, represented by its armed forces and people, has repeatedly warned against emotionalism and the dangers posed by Arab division and the continued lack of sound coordination militarily and otherwise. This country has made enormous sacrifices in defense of Arab honor and is proud to have freely sacrificed its sons in opposing the aggression. The answer to this question and to other aspects of the question and related developments will be dealt with at the Arab summit conference, which I hope will be held soon. His Majesty the King expressed his admiration for and appreciation of our Iraqi brothers, who honorably, faithfully, and resolutely fought with us.

Asked how many persons were forced to leave the Western Bank, Husayn said: Over 100,000 refugees have crossed over from the Western Bank. As for the policy applied to our people who have not left their lands and homes in the Western Bank, the future will reveal the enemy's intentions. Israel tries to make the world believe that it is concerned about the results of its military aggression. It has also misled the world by alleging that it has not forced anyone to leave his land and home and that it has given refugees the opportunity to return to the West, when what it is doing is completely the opposite. Arab citizens are forced to leave the Western Bank, and they are not allowed to go back.

June 19 Husayn press conference

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(cont'd)

Asked about Jordanian Army losses, His Majesty King Husayn said: The losses in lives and equipment were heavy. Nevertheless, our soldiers fought with rare bravery and courage, and they did so in the most difficult circumstances and continuous and under concentrated air attacks. Citing an example of the army's heroism, His Majesty said: One of our tanks bearing the name of Husayn was hit and destroyed in the battle of Janin, but our officers and soldiers fought around this tank and brought it back to Amman so the name it bore would not be lost. Such a demonstration of heroism makes me proud of the Jordanian Army, proud to be a soldier in this army forever. We were not defeated. A defeated person is one whose morale has been broken. We lost lives and equipment, but our morale has not been weakened.

Replying to another question, His Majesty said: A major factor in the recent aggression was the enemy's massive air power, which was more than we knew he had and more than we expected of him, besides, Jordanian radar indicated that we faced not only Israel and its forces, but also other large-scale forces. We are not here to accuse anyone, but there is the possibility. We have supplied our U.N. delegation with everything connected with this subject. When the complete truth is known, and we are determined to know the truth, that will be a turning point for Jordan and the entire Arab nation.

(Editor's note: Amman Domestic Service in Arabic at 2100 GMT 19 June repeats its report on King Husayn's press conference, replacing the passage beginning, "besides, Jordanian radar . . ." and ending, ". . . entire Arab nation," with the following:

(Jordanian radar showed that a number of those planes took off from sea-level positions. Many explanations were given for this. Since a radar cannot identify planes, we have sent all the evidence available to us to our delegation at the United Nations. It will be at the disposal of any international quarter which seeks the truth. We are determined to learn the truth. We do not want to accuse anyone before learning the complete and glaring truth. Once the truth is established--and we are determined to get to the truth--that will be a turning point for Jordan and the Arab states with regard to Israel.)

Asked his opinion of the use of napalm bombs in war, His Majesty said: We did not use napalm bombs, but they were used against us. Napalm bombs are destructive weapons whose use must be denounced everywhere in the world. Asked whether he actually participated in the fighting and if it is true that he was wounded, His Majesty said: I have done my best. I carried out my responsibilities, moving between Amman and various parts of the kingdom. I was not wounded. Whatever happened, we resisted as men and did our level best. We still stand firm with hope and confidence. We will continue to shoulder our responsibility in the interest of the Arab nation and its causes, His Majesty said he was proud of the Jordanian Arab people, who confronted the crisis as a single family and sacrificed the results of many years of continuous work and effort.

Asked if Jordan will request the intervention of the United Nations or any other organ to expel Israel from the Western Bank, His Majesty said: This setback concerns the Arab world and affects its present and future. I hope the Arabs will meet at the summit to adopt a unified policy to deal with what has taken place and what is to be done in the future.



June 19 Husayn press conference  
(cont'd)

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Asked about the attempts to turn the Middle East crisis into an East-West conflict, His Majesty said: This is not my policy, and I do not believe in such a policy at all. The setback was suffered by the Arab nation, and it behooves the Arab nation to adopt a unified policy on what is to be done. What takes place in the future must be the result of a unified Arab policy.

Asked if the strafing of the Royal Palace and his residence by enemy planes was meant to kill him, His Majesty said: My life is always and forever devoted to my country and people. I was the target of enemy attack like every other Jordanian citizen. The meeting hall and my private office at the Royal Palace were strafed by enemy planes, just as many other places and houses were subjected to enemy air attack. I am one of the people; I was the target of the aggression just as my people were. Concerning the other Arab forces which fought in defense of the Arab homeland, His Majesty said: The fraternal Iraqi forces fought with us in the most difficult circumstances, under continuous and concentrated air attack, a UAR unit also fought at our side.

His Majesty continued: The Iraqi Air Force fought with our brave Jordanian air force. When all our planes were destroyed, Iraqi planes were placed at the disposal of Jordanian pilots, who, along with Iraqi pilots, achieved positive results. Our brothers in Iraq did their utmost to reach the battlefield in time and under the most difficult circumstances. They shed their blood side by side with their brothers in the Jordanian Army. As for the fraternal Saudi forces, they arrived late.

Asked about the aid Jordan needs to help the refugees, King Husayn said: "We have received aid from several countries, but we still need more aid--clothing, food, medical supplies, and doctors. Most of our hospitals in the Western Bank were destroyed. We also lost some of our doctors in the fighting. After answering this question, His Majesty read out a press dispatch quoting a statement by Ben-Gurion which said Israel needs more tanks, jet planes, and heavy equipment. His Majesty said: The future will make everything clear. Israel has not implemented all of its plan. On the other hand, the Arab summit conference will define the unified Arab reply.

King Husayn asked the journalists to tell their readers and the peoples of the world that we were the victims of aggression and that the millions of people in the world are themselves victims of false Zionist propaganda, the Zionists, the King said, prepared world public opinion to support the Zionist falsehood. I am sure that many people will eventually learn the truth. Those who lost their lives, property, homes, and rights are victims, and those who support falsehood are also victims. They must realize the truth and return to what is right and correct.

**INFORMATION MEDIA FAILED IN WAR WITH ISRAEL**

Beirut RNS in Arabic 1630 GMT 19 June 1967--M (FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

(Text) Kuwait--Information media in most Arab states were bitterly criticized by a number of Arab foreign ministers during and after the conference which ended yesterday. Conference sources pointed out that these media failed in the fields of (word indistinct) and guidance during the Arab-Israeli war. Some went to the extent of saying that what these media reported "was on many occasions harmful to the Arab cause." They gave as an example reiteration by the media of reports on the movements of Arab forces.

A number of the ministers criticized certain Arab radios for continuing their campaigns attacking certain Arab states and their governments until a few days before the fighting began. These sources added that in their private and individual meetings during the conference, the ministers were almost unanimous on the need to review information policy. A number of the ministers promised to propose that their governments take this issue into consideration and reorganize these media so they can "portray facts to the Arab people and mobilize these people on a realistic and scientific basis, not on a sentimental basis."

The first minister to raise this question frankly inside and outside the conference was Sudanese Premier and Foreign Minister Muhammad Ahmad Mahjub. Mahjub warned against a continuation "of the gross mistakes of the past" in the field of information. Maintaining his frankness in a press statement, Mahjub said the Kuwait meetings "did not achieve as many things as had been hoped for." He went on to say, however, that he hopes the Arab foreign ministers will be able to draw up a practical agenda for the forthcoming summit conference while they are in New York.

More than one Arab foreign minister said before leaving Kuwait that after today the Arab situation must be reevaluated and future policy defined "because the issue is not simply the loss of a piece of land but also the preservation of what is left and the rescue of anything that can be rescued." The ministers affirmed that the internal stability of each Arab country "will undoubtedly help us to work and stand firm in the forthcoming fateful stage. Therefore the work to liquidate the traces of the war should not divert our attention from strengthening the internal fronts in the Arab countries."

#### ESHKOL READY TO MEET ARAB RULERS AT ANY TIME

Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1700 GMT 20 June 1967--M

(Text) Prime Minister Levi Eshkol today declared that he is ready to meet each of the Arab rulers and to discuss with them the subject of permanent peace. He said that such talks would not be held from a position of strength but with the aim of forgetting the past and of working jointly in the interest of the entire region. Eshkol made this statement at the Gulf of Solomon (presumably Gulf of Aqaba--ed.)

He added that he was ready to meet President Abd an-Nasir, King Husayn, and any other Arab leader at any time, at any place, on land or sea. He said that the hands of the clock will not be turned back and that Israel will do all it can to achieve a viable peace and security. Israel does not intend to return to the era of cease-fire or armistice--the lessons of which Israel has learned in the past 19 years. Israel desires to establish concrete conditions to insure its security.

Eshkol arrived this morning at Sharm ash-Shaykh in an air force plane. He toured the area in a navy torpedo boat and visited Ras Nasrani and At-Tur. He was accompanied by Deputy Chief of Staff Brig. Haim Bar-Lev and Navy Comdr. Shlomo Erel.

#### DAYAN VISITS OLD CITY, TOWNS IN WESTERN BANK

Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 2000 GMT 19 June 1967--M

(Text) Defense Minister Moshe Dayan today visited the Old City of Jerusalem; Ramallah, Nabulus, and Janin. He met with heads of the Moslem, Armenian, and Christian communities there. The defense minister inspected the measures being taken to return life to normal and dealt with arrangements to speed this up.

Among other things, the defense minister ordered that Western Bank citizens be exempted from the need for travel permits in all parts of the bank; that vehicles for the transportation of vital supplies, for vital services, and for the transportation of passengers be returned; and that attempts be made to move army units outside city limits and to transfer them to army camps and police buildings.

The town mayors expressed readiness to cooperate and to accept administrative responsibility in the towns and adjacent areas.

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KARAMI DELIVERS SPEECH ON PROPHET'S BIRTHDAY

Beirut Domestic Service in Arabic 1100 GMT 20 June 1967--M

(Statement by Premier Rashid Karami to the NATIONAL NEWS AGENCY--recorded)

(Summary) On the occasion of the Prophet's birthday I wish to convey my greetings to our Moslem brothers and to all the citizens of Lebanon. I wish to speak about the Palestine issue and its developments. I am going to deal with the question from three aspects--the international front, the Arab front, and the local front.

In reply to a question regarding my impressions about the situation on the international level, particularly the United Nations, I say: "Our cause is increasingly becoming clearer to world conscience. Our cause is gaining followers and supporters every day. This affirms that right will triumph in the end." The aggressor and usurper will inevitably be exposed and defeated by the upholder of right.

"On the international level, we have various duties and a great role which we must carry out to defend our fate, cause, and rights. In this area Lebanon carries out its role with complete sincerity, courage, and determination. We are exploiting our various resources and are depending on the international standing we enjoy and on the friendship that binds us with various states of the world. We are confident that, through cooperation and solidarity with all Arab states and with friendly states, we shall realize our aspirations."

I now wish to speak about the Arab front. Here I must stress that sincere cooperation among Arab states assures final victory. "The battle is long and continuous. None of us can refrain from carrying out his duties in any stage of the battle." Cooperation will increase our determination to work for our great goals. "We have received a number of lessons from the setback. We shall benefit from these lessons to reassess our situation so that we may, in the light of all this, be able to draw up our present and future policy and plans. We shall do this by using all we can to unite Arab ranks around our common goals and principles and to march united toward the consolidation of our causes, countries, and peoples."

"On this occasion I must say that Lebanon has announced its agreement to attend any conference which the Arab states decide to hold anywhere and at any time. We have responded to the call for a summit conference. We pray God to grant success to the Arabs in realizing everything that will bring prosperity to them and enable them to liberate their countries from the various difficulties and bases which constitute an obstacle in their struggle for prosperity and dignity. At this point I must proudly refer to the total response of the Chamber of Deputies, which has always unanimously stood by the side of the government in its various decisions."

## RIYAD LETTER TO THANT ON PALESTINE REFUGEES

Cairo MENA in Arabic 2030 GMT 21 June 1967--M (FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

(Text) Cairo--UAR Foreign Minister Mahmud Riyad has sent the following letter to Secretary General of the United Nations U Thant:

His Excellency U Thant, United Nations, New York:

I have the honor to inform you that at 1300 today, Israel drove 405 Palestinians across the armistice line in Al-Qantarah. Israel has also said the number will reach 1,000 by the end of the day and that it will expel thousands of others at the rate of 1,000 a day.

This measure is a flagrant violation of resolutions which the U.N. General Assembly adopts year after year with regard to the refugees' right to return to their homes, and the last of which was the General Assembly's resolution No. 21/2154. Moreover, Israel's recent measures are taking place within a week of Security Council resolution No. 237 issued on 14 June 1967 and with complete disregard and disrespect for this resolution.

In view of the fact that the General Assembly is now convened in an emergency session to consider the Israeli aggression against the Arab states, no explanation can be ascribed to Israel's recent measure of expelling Palestinian refugees by force other than its contempt for and disregard of the prestige and authority of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

**PREMIER'S WARNING TO WESTERN BANK CITIZENS**

Amman Domestic Service in Arabic 1900 GMT 21 June 1967--M

(Text) His Excellency Premier Sad Jumah has made the following statement:

The Government of the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan is following with extreme vigilance and interest the attempts of the aggressive Israeli authorities, as an outcome of the alien rule which these authorities have imposed on the Jordanian people in the Western Bank of the kingdom, to induce world public opinion to believe that some groups of our people in the bank have agreed to cooperate with the Israeli authorities and to implement their plans.

Whereas it affirms its determination to foil the enemy's plans and renew Jordan's faith, voiced by His Majesty the Exalted King, that the Western Bank is an integral part of the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan and that Jordan is resolved to recover it as soon as possible, the Government of the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan warns all people in the Western Bank against the enemy's attempts, its machinations, and its propaganda. While it reminds each of them that he is still and will continue to be a Jordanian citizen, the Government of the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan announces that it considers cooperation by any citizen with the enemy and his serving the enemy's aggressive and expansionist objectives an act of treason which will forever disgrace the perpetrator and make him a traitor who will soon be punished severely.

JORDANIAN OFFICIAL STRESSES NEED FOR SUMMIT

Damascus MENA in Arabic to MENA Cairo 1900 GMT 21 June 1967--M (FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

(Text) Beirut--King Husayn's personal representative Bahjat at-Talhuni declared at a press conference in Beirut this evening that the Arabs have lost a battle and not a war. "There was no question of defeat," he said, "because defeat means weakness morale, and Arab morale is still high." The whole thing, he added, was a mere setback for the Arab nation from the ocean to the gulf. At-Talhuni stressed the need to hold the summit conference, proposed by King Husayn, before Saturday so that the Arabs can adopt a unified stand with regard to the current debate at the U.N. General Assembly.

He said that President Charles Hilu and Premier Rashid Karami of Lebanon have told him that Lebanon agrees to the holding of the summit conference on the date set by King Husayn. He expressed the hope that the conference will take place as scheduled and said that Libya and Kuwait have already given their approval.

At-Talhuni pointed out that in case the summit conference does not take place as proposed by King Husayn, Jordan will have to follow a policy inspired by the Arab summit conferences, Arab commitments, and bilateral agreements.

Jordan's new ambassador to Lebanon, Umar al-Madani, who also attended the press conference, said that Israel is now conducting a campaign of pressure on Arab dignitaries in the Western Bank to give their support to the idea of a truce between the Arabs and Israel. Israel, Al-Madani said, has begun to expel Arab citizens from their homes by force and to rob people, even foodstuffs and women's jewelry. The ambassador cited an incident where Arab citizens in Qalqilya, 15 kilometers from Tel Aviv, were forcibly expelled from their homes. Israel's statements and activities in the Western Bank are meant to mislead world public opinion, he concluded.

**KNESSET DEBATE ON PEACE PLAN IS POSTPONED**

Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1200 GMT 21 June 1967--M

(Text) During a debate in the Knesset today, Prime Minister Levi Eshkol said that for the time being there is no point in a general debate on a peace plan. At the recommendation of the Prime Minister and with the approval of Knesset member Shmuel Mikunis of the Israeli Communist Party, who proposed the discussion, the vote on the proposal will be postponed for one month. Knesset member Uri Avneri, editor of the weekly magazine HAOLAM HAZE, also agreed to postpone for one month voting on his proposal so that the subject could be reviewed in committee.

In reply to Mikunis' proposal, the Prime Minister said that he hopes a change in the Arab states' stand will take place now and that they will be ready to reconcile themselves to the existence of Israel, thus making it possible to reach a solution agreeable to both sides. He stressed once again that we are ready to sit at the conference table with all of our neighbors and seek a solution to common problems. Israel, Eshkol said, is ready to make its contribution to a joint effort with states of the area to develop area resources for the benefit of all citizens.

Eshkol also spoke about the Soviet Union's hostile campaign against us. He said that the Soviet Premier's speech at the U.N. General Assembly, a speech in which he reiterated the (word indistinct) comparison between us and the Nazis, was dreadful and shocking. It is desirable, he said, that the Soviet Union check its policy, calculations, and sources of information on our area and influence the Arab states to adopt a realistic policy to advance peace.

Knesset member Shmuel Mikunis had proposed that the Knesset discuss a just peace plan agreeable to both sides, one which preserves both sides' just rights. He said that this peace plan should not call for a return to the armistice borders but that permanent borders should be determined on the basis of direct negotiations.

**ESHKOL DEPLORES PERSECUTION OF JEWS BY ARABS**

Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1500 GMT 2 June 1967--M

(Text) Prime Minister Levi Eshkol today expressed shock on behalf of the Israeli people, the Knesset, and the government over reports regarding the current persecution of Jews in the Arab countries. He said in the Knesset that present conditions restrict Israel's ability to defend Jews in Arab countries, but he stressed that Israel is doing all it can to prevent the continuation of bloodshed.

Eshkol was replying to two motions for the agenda by Alignment member Asher Hassin and Gahal member Shlomo Perlstein. Both urged that international establishments be called upon to act against the unruly attacks. On the Prime Minister's proposal and with the approval of the two initiators, the subject was referred to the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee.



EBAN: UNITY OF JERUSALEM SHOULD BE MAINTAINED

Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0800 GMT 23 June 1967--M

(Text) The Israeli delegation at the United Nations has announced that at a meeting between Foreign Minister Abba Eban and South American representatives at the United Nations yesterday morning, Eban said international interest in Jerusalem extends only to the holy places, not to the city itself, whose present unity should be maintained. Eban reiterated the Israeli Government's readiness to insure that the holy places are properly safeguarded.

This clarification was made in reaction to a UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL report from New York that at his meeting with South American diplomats at the United Nations, the foreign minister agreed that the holy places should be internationalized.

ISRAEL IS CHARGED WITH RAZING ENTIRE TOWN

Beirut RNS in Arabic 1530 GMT 21 June 1967--M (FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

(Text) Amman--Jordan has accused the Israeli authorities of blowing up Qalqiliyah and of forcibly evacuating its inhabitants. Jordan has requested its permanent delegate to bring the matter to the attention of the Security Council so that the council will investigate it and order the Israeli authorities to stop this action immediately. The charge is contained in a cable the acting Jordanian foreign minister sent today to Muhammad al-Farra, Jordan's permanent delegate to the United Nations.

As published in Amman, the cable reads: "Reliable sources have brought it to our attention that on 7 June 1967 the Israeli authorities occupied Qalqiliyah, forcibly evacuated its inhabitants to the mosques and schools of Nabulus and the olive fields surrounding it, and blew up all buildings there. The destruction of buildings was still in progress on 20 June 1967, and all kinds of mines and explosives have been used. The aggressive authorities have sent tractors to raze buildings and to remove the debris in order to erase all traces of the town. A total of 12,000 inhabitants of Qalqiliyah are still homeless in the mountains and in olive fields. They are without shelter, clothing, or foodstuffs."

## PRESS STATEMENT ON PODGORNYY-NASIR TALKS

Cairo Domestic Service in Arabic 1415 GMT 24 June 1967--M

(Press statement released on 24 June on Soviet President Podgornyy's visit to the UAR and his talks with President Abd an-Nasir)

(Text) President of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet Nikolay Podgornyy paid a friendly visit to the UAR from 21 to 24 June 1967 at the invitation of UAR President Jamal Abd an-Nasir.

The President of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the delegation accompanying him were received with the hospitality and friendship which reflect the cordial feelings the UAR people harbor toward the people of the Soviet Union. Podgornyy expressed his deep thanks for the friendly reception.

Many meetings and talks took place between President of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet Nikolay Podgornyy and UAR President Jamal Abd an-Nasir. A spirit of mutual fraternal understanding and traditional friendship between the two countries prevailed during these meetings and talks.

The Soviet side was also represented in these discussions by Marshal of the Soviet Union Zakharov, the chief of staff of the Soviet Armed Forces, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Adam Malik, Soviet Ambassador in Cairo Dmitriy Pozhidayev, and head of the Middle East department at the Soviet Foreign Ministry Aleksey Shchiborin. The UAR side was represented by Vice President Zakariya Muhyi ad-Din, Vice President Ali Sabri, Foreign Minister Mahmud Riyad, and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces Gen. Muhammad Fawzi.

The two sides discussed certain matters connected with the situation in the Middle East and the Israeli aggression against the UAR and other Arab states as well as the measures necessary to erase the traces of this aggression. Matters pertaining to the strengthening of the amicable relations and the fraternal cooperation between the Soviet Union and the UAR were also discussed. The two sides exchanged views regarding a number of principal international problems of joint interest.

It has been noted with satisfaction that the visit of Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet Nikolay Podgornyy to the UAR will contribute to increasing, strengthening, and developing the relations of friendship and complete cooperation between the two states in the interest of the peoples of the Soviet Union and the UAR and in the interest of the peace and security of all the world's peoples.

**BAN ON ECONOMIC DEALINGS WITH WEST PROPOSED**

Cairo MENA in Arabic 0655 GMT 24 June 1967--M (FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

(Text) Cairo--The main office for the boycott of Israel at the Arab League has held important contacts with Arab governments and proposed a positive plan banning commercial and economic dealings with the states which assisted the Israeli aggression militarily, economically, or politically: that is, America, Britain, and West Germany. The main office has also sent a report to all regional offices for the boycott of Israel in Arab states explaining the facts of the situation. The report contains 14 articles which if implemented precisely and unanimously should compel the three states to correct their attitudes.

The report says there are four reasons which made it necessary to draft this plan to be presented to the boycott conference on 15 July. These reasons are:

1--The Israeli aggression against Arab territory was given direct and indirect military support by America, Britain, and West Germany. The boycott office has confirmed the following:

A--America and Britain provided Israel with pilots and specialists in tanks and artillery a few days before the aggression began on the pretext that they were American and British Jews who had volunteered to help Israel in civil service. This was announced by the Israeli radio itself a week before the war began. All these volunteers were officers and noncommissioned officers of the armed forces of these two states. These officers are given leave to go to Israel.

B--America and Britain put Israeli insignia on a large number of their bombers and fighters at their bases and aircraft carriers near the Middle East area. These planes were piloted by the Americans and Britons whose arrival as Jewish volunteers was announced by Israel. These planes participated in the destruction of Arab planes on the first day of the battle and gave Israel a protective air cover. This fact was confirmed by a Turk working at the American base in Turkey.

C--It was proved on the basis of documents found on captured pilots in the UAR and Syria that America and Britain had previously defined the positions of Arab airports and forces by means of espionage planes and provided Israel with detailed maps of these positions.

Arab League Boycott Office, Mena broadcast June 24 79  
(cont'd)

D--American, Britain, and West Germany cooperated against the Arabs shortly before the aggression and supplied Israel with a large number of tanks and various kinds of guns free of charge, as well as submarines and destroyers. The best proof of this is the thanks Israel's chief of state gave West Germany after military operations ended.

2--American and British opposition to a Security Council resolution condemning Israel and compelling it to withdraw its forces from the Arab areas and continuous pressure on the states revolving in their orbit to adopt a similar attitude. This prevented the Security Council from adopting a resolution against Israel.

3--The offer of 900 million dollars annually to Israel since 1952 to assist its aggressive preparations. These funds took the form of donations and aid from the United States and West Germany. Some took the form of arms gifts in addition to other arms deals. Undoubtedly these large sums paid annually to Israel enabled it to carry out its aggression, which received military and political support.

A partial boycott of U S., British, and West German companies has, therefore, become insignificant, especially since the sums paid by America, Britain, and West Germany to Israel are part of the huge oil profits, the profits from exports to Arab markets, and profits from the use of Arab funds deposited in those countries' banks.

4--The ban on Arab dealings with America and Britain and the withdrawal of Arab funds from their banks must be followed up with unanimous action by the Arab states to erase the traces of aggression and recover the rights of the Palestinians. To achieve this purpose, the main boycott office has drawn up the following plan to be issued by the Arab League:

A--No individual in the Arab countries should conclude an agreement--commercial, financial or other--with any American, British, or West German organization wherever it operates.

B--American, British, and West German goods should be banned from Arab markets.

C--Arab goods including oil should not be exported to these states.

D--All oil establishments should be placed in government custody to prevent the export of oil to these states.

E--All planes belonging to these states or to their companies should be banned from landing at Arab airports or passing through Arab airspace. Dealings with air navigation companies and foreign tankers allowing their ships to enter Eilat harbor should be banned.

F--All funds deposited by public and private Arab organizations in the banks of these states should be withdrawn within three months after this plan is approved.

G--All these provisions should be applied to all foreign states supporting Israel's war and economic efforts.

KING HUSAYN SPEAKS BEFORE DEPARTURE FOR U.N.

Amman Domestic Service in Arabic 1900 GMT 23 June 1967--M

(King Husayn's address to the nation preceding his departure for the United Nations--live or recorded)

(Summary) Brother compatriots, brother Arabs everywhere: "It pleases me to talk to you today, at this moment, as we are combining our efforts in all fields for leading our country and our Arab world out of the setback inflicted by destiny in the wake of the recent Israeli aggression." The historic and valiant stand of our country--its armed forces and citizens--against the criminal invaders has been our sacred offering to our Arab nation. "This stand has also been my consolation for all the harm and evil that has befallen us. But its memory shall live forever in my heart as an inexhaustible source of pride and of relentless determination and faith."

Brothers, our wound, no matter how grave it is, will not prevent us from continuing our progress with stronger determination. Our overwhelming sorrow will not bend our will, which is to serve our nation with great determination. "The first thing I would like to tell you is that our armed forces, with the valiant Iraqi forces on their side, are standing firm in their positions. More than ever before, they are eagerly awaiting death for the sake of their homeland and Arabism." They have vowed to defend you and the greater Arab homeland.

"Brothers, a few days ago I called my brother Arab leaders to an urgent meeting to study our affairs and unify our plans for confronting the traces of the Israeli aggression. All of them have kindly accepted our invitation. But circumstances have precluded the realization of this reunion as early as we wanted it to take place. The matter has been left for agreement, God willing, in the near future.

"Since the question of the criminal aggression against the Arab nation is being seriously discussed at the United Nations, I have deemed it fit, brothers, that the least I can do to serve our cause is to go myself to the U.N. Headquarters, to raise from its rostrum the voice of the wounded Arab right and to submit on behalf of the Arab nation its just and one cause to the conscience of the world everywhere. On my way to the United Nations and on my way back from it, I shall devote my time and efforts to meeting with the leaders of several countries striving to win more support and backing for my country and my nation alike."

As I depart, I am convinced that unity of Arab ranks, efforts, and action are our means for eliminating the traces of the Israeli aggression and for determining our place among the world's peoples. It is also our way for safeguarding the Arab nation against its enemies and for determining our destiny for several generations. I bid you farewell, but my heart will remain with you all in the army's trenches and in the homes of our cherished Jordan. I shall return to you in a few days and we shall all continue our struggle against this setback and its traces.

June 23 Husayn speech  
(cont'd)

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A final word to our brothers in the Western Bank: Let them know that my heart is with them and that I am going abroad for their sake. "Until this gloom is dispelled--and it will be dispelled--and until this black cloud passes by--and it will pass by--I want them to remain in their homeland and not to leave it, because the enemy cannot wish more than for them to leave their homeland." They are all above fulfilling the wishes and hopes of our enemies. It is unacceptable for any one of them to fall easy prey to our enemies' machinations against us and against our nation. I want them to stay in the land of their forefathers and homes near Al-Aqsa Mosque, and the sepulcher of Christ, and in Jericho, and the plains of Janin. Farewell my nation in the western and eastern banks of Jordan and from the Arab Gulf to the Atlantic Ocean. God be with you. Peace be upon you.

Cable to Arab Leaders

Amman Domestic Service in Arabic 1600 GMT 24 June 1967--M

(Text) Before leaving for New York this morning, His Majesty the King sent the following cable to Arab kings and presidents:

Sincere greetings. We had hoped that circumstances in all fraternal Arab states would enable them to respond to our call for holding a summit conference at the earliest possible opportunity. However, this seemed impossible to some of our brothers. We still feel that a summit conference should take place at a time to be agreed upon by all of us. We have decided to proceed immediately to the U.N. General Assembly to present our just common cause and to defend the sacred right of our nation on the international rostrum and at every opportunity that may present itself.

May God grant us success and guide our steps in eliminating the effects of this distress. We are looking forward to meeting with all our brothers. We send you our greetings and best wishes.

(Editor's note: Amman Domestic Service in Arabic at 0800 GMT 24 June reports that King Husayn met at Amman airport with Algerian Finance Minister Ahmed Kaid, who presented the king with a check for 20 million French francs "as an Algerian contribution to help Jordan bear the burdens of the setback.")

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**PREMIER SAD JUMAH DISAVOWS UNILATERAL ACTION**

Amman Domestic Service in Arabic 1700 GMT 23 June 1967--M

(Text) Premier Sad Jumah has stated that the Arab nation's voice must be raised conspicuously at the United Nations in submitting the Arab cause soundly and comprehensively as a national Arab cause not belonging to any Arab country alone but related to the present life of all Arabs and defending the features of their future as a nation and depicting the aspects of their common destiny.

He added: "Jordan will not take any unilateral stand, and no other single Arab state will adopt a unilateral attitude toward our present cause. Over the past years the highest Arab interests have persistently dictated to all Arabs that they must close ranks and unify their plans. This fateful phase in the Arab nation's life means that all Arabs--leaders and compatriots--must act in unison and share the same faith in order to confront the dangers threatening them."

The premier also said: "I believe that no Arab can ever sit with Israel at the same table to negotiate or discuss matters with it, because the cause of Arab rights is clear. All those who cherish world peace must cooperate in order to force Israel to revert clearly, decisively, and immediately to the conditions prevailing before 5 June."

Jumah said in conclusion: "The Palestine question is a multilateral issue, and no Arab quarter has the right to take a unilateral stand on it. Therefore, under the direction of the exalted Husayn, Jordan calls the attention of all Arabs to the need for unified Arab action founded on unwavering faith in the common Arab destiny."

**WESTERN BANK RESIDENTS TO RECEIVE FOOD AID**

Amman Domestic Service in Arabic 1700 GMT 23 June 1967--M

(Text) Premier Sad Jumah this morning presided over an urgent two-hour cabinet session. Afterward, Information Minister Salah Abu Zayd stated that the premier called for this meeting, although today is an official holiday, to consider some important subjects and to study some urgent cases stemming from the present situation. Premier Sad Jumah submitted to the cabinet report stating that as a result of several arbitrary and inhuman measures by the aggressive authorities in the Western Bank, an urgent need exists for helping our brethren and compatriots there by giving them the foodstuffs they require.

In light of these reports, the cabinet has decided to extend this aid, even though Jordan needs foodstuffs, because we all belong to the same family and we are living and will continue to live as one family in our country. This fact makes it incumbent on us to deprive ourselves of part of our much needed food in order to meet the needs of the wounded half of our family until the traces of the Israeli invasion are erased and until the Western Bank of Jordan is reunited in determination and faith with its eastern bank.

Salah Abu Zayd said in conclusion: "Premier Sad Jumah immediately contacted the International Red Cross committee and notified it of the government's readiness to send food through the committee to our compatriots in the Western Bank to save them from the calamity of starvation brought about by Israel's aggressive crimes, which run counter to ethical and humane values."

INFORMATION MINISTER HOLDS PRESS CONFERENCE

Damascus Domestic Service in Arabic 1140 GMT 24 June 1967--M

(Editorial Report) The radio carries a recording of Syrian Information Minister Muhammad az-Zubi's press conference at the radio and TV building in Damascus 24 June. The minister made an opening statement saying in part:

"Eshkol's 9 May statement that he would occupy Damascus to topple the Bath regime and then his threat to topple the regime in the UAR have a deep and profound meaning with respect to the future of the Arab nation. This statement proves that these regimes represent a real danger to Zionism and the imperialist interests in the area. But Eshkol forgot that such a statement would cause the Arab masses to rally around these regimes and adhere to their slogans and their strategy more firmly than ever and cause them to be more insistent on continuing their march and seeking the assistance of the masses in deepening and developing the march."

He added: "What has happened must be a severe and basic lesson to the Arab revolutionary movement." "We do not claim to be faultless, because only God is faultless; nor do we absolve ourselves of mistakes. But with constructive and sound criticism and with practical scientific criticism, we will always overcome all obstacles and close all gaps, large or small."

The minister concluded: "Comrades, what I have said stems from our belief that the battle favors our side and that the future must be in our favor. The waging of a suspicious blitzkrieg in certain international circumstances known to everybody cannot be considered a victory." "The battle is no longer merely for the return of the Palestine refugees to their usurped territory, and it is no longer a matter of the establishment of a meager foreign state on our territory. It is a struggle for survival between the Arab liberation movement and the imperialist-reactionary-Zionist tide. The battlefield now is the entire Arab world from the ocean to the gulf. Those who will lead the battle today, tomorrow, and in the future are the Arab peoples--the 200 million Arabs who will be converted into 100 million fighters to defend right and the just cause of the nation."

The minister then replied to journalists' questions. In reply to a question as to the situation on the frontlines, he said: "Undoubtedly there were several rumors and undoubtedly also some efforts of a fifth column and the Zionist-imperialist propaganda to misconstrue what happened in the last days, particularly during the battles waged by our heroic Syrian army."

He added: "Our valiant forces were able to destroy a large number of enemy tanks and mechanized forces before they could penetrate the northern sector." "Our losses in lives were relatively minor because of the wise plan implemented by the command. Our losses in all battles were 20 officers and 125 martyred noncommissioned officers and other ranks. There were 98 wounded officers and 1,500 wounded non-commissioned officers and other ranks in addition to 300 people burned by the internationally prohibited napalm bombs used by the enemy. The number of prisoners is difficult to calculate now."



June 24 press conference of Syrian Information Minister 84  
(cont'd)

"Enemy positions and settlements were burned and destroyed 20 kilometers behind the front. Many enemy tanks and armored cars were destroyed. Enemy losses in lives are unknown, but the states which sent volunteers to Israel can calculate the number of those who remained of these volunteers in order to assess the losses sustained by the enemy."

Commenting on Arab unity and whether Al-Atasi's visit to Algiers and Cairo was linked to it, the minister said: "The attitude of the revolution, the party, and all the Arab people toward unity is clear and known. The party's National Command statement clearly outlined the attitude in the present circumstances." "Al-Atasi's visit to Algiers and Cairo was for consultations to find all practical ways to unite Arab efforts. Perhaps another delegation will proceed to Baghdad soon to coordinate Arab unity efforts."

Regarding the attitude of the Soviet Union, the minister said: "The Soviet attitude to Arab questions and the Arab struggle is known to everybody. It is a positive and honorable one. Its attitude to the recent battle is indicated by the declarations announced officially and by those implemented in practice."

"We express to the Soviet Union and socialist countries, the CPR, and all friendly states profound thanks and gratitude for their firm support of the Arabs at the United Nations and elsewhere."

Regarding the proposed summit conference, the minister said: "Surely we are for unified Arab action and unified Arab efforts, especially now that the Arab nation and Arab existence face a complete invasion operation and complete annihilation. Naturally, the reply should correspond to the challenge and be an example of Arab unity."

In reply to a question about volunteers, the minister said: "The applications of volunteers among the youth of friendly countries to help the Arabs will be accepted, not to support Arab power, but for their supreme humanitarian meaning."

Regarding Maj. Salim Hatum, the minister said: "Hatun conspired against the revolution on 8 September. After the failure of the conspiracy he continued his plots in different ways. During recent events Hatum infiltrated from the rear and in darkness, accompanied by others. He thought that the people could pardon him. He was arrested, investigated, and committed to trial. He was tried and the sentence will be announced soon."

## COMMENT, REPORTAGE ON JOHNSON-KOSYGIN TALKS

## Eban Pessimistic

Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0800 GMT 24 June 1967--M

(Report by Radio Correspondent Zvi Gil from New York)

(Excerpts) Before the meeting between Johnson and Kosygin, I asked Foreign Minister Abba Eban how he evaluates prospects for the Middle East. Eban said the meeting between the two great powers which bear the responsibility for world peace is in itself important. But he pointed out that the gap between the stands of the two is so great that it will be very difficult to bridge. This is because in his speech, Johnson spoke about the possibility of building a new Middle East in which lasting peace would prevail, while Kosygin spoke about the need to reconstruct an old Middle East and to restore the conditions which prevailed before the conflagration.

Accordingly (recorded excerpt of Eban's statement--ed.), "I doubt very much that these talks will have a practical influence on the course of events. So far I have seen no signs of change in Soviet policy, which will be needed if the Soviets want to exert a positive influence on the course of life in the Middle East."

## ESHKOL: ISRAEL INSISTS ON TALKS WITH ARABS

Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1830 GMT 25 June 1967--M

(Text) Prime Minister Levi Eshkol said today that after 20 years of threats and aggression against Israel's existence, the latter now firmly insists on peace negotiations with its neighbors as the only solution for the crisis in the region. Eshkol also expressed the hope that with the establishment of peace and cooperation between the peoples of the region, there will be prospects for international and regional settlement of the refugee problem.

The prime minister noted with satisfaction that world public opinion is increasingly calling for peace. He stressed that it is inconceivable that the principles of the U.N. Charter that disputes should be solved by peaceful means should not apply to the Middle East. He expressed the hope that the U.N. General Assembly will apply this principle in the Middle East for peace among the people of the region and for the good of the United Nations itself. Prime Minister Eshkol made these remarks during a government meeting at which he reviewed the discussions of the extraordinary session of the U.N. General Assembly and the contacts made by Israeli representatives in the United Nations and world capitals.

The Prime Minister also reviewed the political situation the area under the military rule. He refuted false reports published in a number of foreign newspapers regarding the poor conditions in areas under military rule. He stressed that life in these areas is quickly returning to normal. He emphasized that the Israeli Defense Forces deserve credit and thanks for their responsible behavior toward civilians during and after the war. The prime minister reasserted that the holy places in Jerusalem are now open to members of all faiths without discrimination. He also said that the Israeli Government will continue to maintain watch on the holy places and to safeguard their religious status and universal character through consultations with the heads of the religions. He added that he will objectively consider any proposal submitted by religious leaders regarding the safeguarding of religious places.

Following the prime minister's statement, Defense Minister Moshe Dayan reviewed developments in the areas under military rule. He reported that life is returning to normal. He also gave details of the activities of the military administration which are being carried out in consultation with the civilian population. After a debate on the two reports, directives were adopted to speed up as much as possible the normalization of conditions in the areas under military rule.

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Az-Zubi Statement on Visit

Cairo MENA in Arabic 2200 GMT 26 June 1967--M (FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

(Excerpts) Baghdad--In a statement to the MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY, Syrian Information Minister Muhammad az-Zubi said that Premier Yusuf Zuayyin's visit to Baghdad is linked with the visits which Dr. Nur ad-Din al-Atasi made to the UAR and Algeria to exchange views on unified Arab action and the coordination of Arab efforts in view of recent events.

Asked if any unity plans were discussed, Az-Zubi said: "We are for Arab unity in principle, and the recent circumstances confirm the need for such unity. Naturally, our talks with the Iraqi side will cover all subjects now of interest to the Arab masses, especially the subject of coordinating the Arab economic, military, and political effort." The significance of these meetings, he added, lies in reaching a definite unity formula among the UAR, Algeria, Syria, and Iraq. Speaking about the role of oil in the battle, Az-Zubi said: "Oil must be cut off completely and decisively from the imperialist powers which took part in the aggression." Concluding his statement the Syrian information minister affirmed that the Arab masses will not allow anyone to circumvent the decision to suspend the oil flow.

HUSAYN: PRESENCE OF FOREIGN BASES 'UNNATURAL'

Cairo MENA in Arabic 0750 GMT 26 June 1967--M (FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

(Excerpts) Cairo--King Husayn of Jordan has released a statement to ROSE AL-YUSUF magazine about current questions and expectations with regard to the U.N. resolutions. The statement was published by the magazine today. The King said that the first lesson of the recent battle has strengthened the belief in Arab unity and the common Arab destiny. He stressed that Arab policy must be reconsidered in the light of the recent bitter experience without allowing this experience to prevent us from seeing the future clearly.

In reply to a question about the use of Arab oil as a weapon in the battle, the Jordanian King said: The Arabs have many weapons but the most important is oil. The Arabs must employ this weapon accurately and consciously. Answering another question about foreign bases in the Arab states, the King expressed the opinion that the presence of such bases in any Arab country is unnatural. He then emphasized that the attitude of the Arabs toward states supporting the enemy must be the main topic of debate at the Arab summit. The Arab will is too strong to be affected by any hostile foreign psychological influence, the King concluded.

PREMIER JUMAH OUTLINES POLICY TOWARD REFUGEES

Amman Domestic Service in Arabic 1200 GMT 24 June 1967--M

(Excerpts) This morning Premier Sad Jumah received the U.N. Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) chief and the UNRWA Amman branch chief in the presence of the acting foreign minister and the ministers of development and social affairs. The Premier told them that the government policy toward Jordanian citizens deported by Israeli authorities from their homes in the Western Bank of Jordan and who are now called refugees is based on the following principles:

1--Most of the new refugees are citizens who had lived in refugee camps in the Western Bank. UNRWA should seek to return them immediately to their homes and camps where they had previously resided.

2--Other refugees are also Jordanian citizens who have been forcibly expelled from their homes and property. They too should return to their homes as soon as possible.

3--The government will not approve any efforts to resettle these refugees; it will completely reject such efforts. The Jordanian government is now simply carrying out its national duty of temporarily relieving their human tragedy pending their return to their homes.

4--The Premier drew UNRWA's attention to the recent Security Council resolution urging the return of the new refugees to their homes, and to the Israeli delegate's declaration that his government agrees to the resolution. He pointed out that the Israeli authorities however still forcibly prevent the return of any of these refugees.

5--UNRWA should investigate the conditions of Jordanian citizens in the Western Bank, who are suffering from hunger and poverty under the yoke of the intruding forces. The Premier also expressed Jordan's complete readiness to supply foodstuffs for the relief of its citizens in the bleeding Western Bank of Jordan.

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#### INFORMATION MINISTER IS INTERVIEWED BY CTK

Prague CTK International Service in English 1342 GMT 23 June 1967--L

(Excerpt) Damascus--"The Israeli aggression of 5 June was part of a widespread imperialist conspiracy in which Israel was merely the military tool of the wider political aims of the imperialists," Muhammad az-Zubi, Syrian minister of information, told CTK today. Az-Zubi said the conspiracy against the Arab states was aimed primarily at overthrowing the progressive Arab governments by damaging their political and military base, and at lowering the prestige of the socialist countries, especially the (USSR), in the Arab region. They also strove to bring the entire region back under Anglo-American influence by creating reactionary regimes with rightwing tendencies, and to support the Israeli "lebensraum" expansionist policy, which is the same as that which Hitler used against Czechoslovakia.

There is no doubt, Minister az-Zubi continued, that the attempt to alter the map of the Middle East failed because the Arab people know about this plan and are ready to oppose it, and also because we are strengthening our ties with the socialist countries. Asked by CTK about the possible results of the current U.N. emergency session, Muhammad az-Zubi, Syrian minister of information, said that Syria expects the assembly to pass a resolution condemning Israel for aggression and demanding the withdrawal of forces behind the armistice line of 1949.

If the U.N. General Assembly does not fulfill these Arab demands, the Arabs states will strive to liquidate the effects of Israeli aggression by all methods and means and will resolutely refuse to accept any attempt to make them bow to a decision based on the conditions created by the Israeli aggression. Az-Zubi said that the Arab states will "further strengthen their defensive and offensive forces, utilizing the experiences of the recent fighting, and will devote all their energy to this aim. The Arab governments will further intensify the boycott of British and American products and will increase their measures connected with the complete oil embargo to Britain and the United States. They will use all the means at their disposal to change the Arab region into a battlefield, regardless of the results, he said.

"The enemy of the people has always used and still uses the fifth column, but what has been said about the activities of the fifth column in our country is exaggerated," Muhammad az-Zubi told CTK. He was answering a question on whether fifth column activities influenced the recent fighting to the extent claimed in some newspapers here. "I think the fifth column was just making itself a bit of extra publicity," he added.

Asked about the possibilities of the creation of a national front in Syria embracing the Bath and other progressive political parties, Az-Zubi said the cohesion and solidarity of the progressive Arab forces was fully proved before, during, and after the fighting. All progressive forces took part in the national fight in a manner giving rise to admiration, he said. Any thought about this question cannot be taken outside the basic line of the increase in cooperation between all progressive forces in the Arab world.

GALILI ADDRESSES MEETING OF KIBBUTZ COUNCIL

Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 2200 GMT 23 June 1967--M

(Text) Information Minister Yisrael Galili this evening said the government is firmly determined to maintain its hold on all occupied areas to strengthen Israel's efforts to reach a peaceful solution. Addressing the opening session of the United Kibbutz Movement Council at Ramat Hakovesh, Galili said the aim of the government efforts in the international arena is to attain peace agreements based on conditions which will insure Israel's security and existence. He said such conditions have territorial implications.

Speaking about the Soviet Union, he said it is undertaking a terrible responsibility by helping in the rehabilitation of Arab war machinery, and it is our duty to condemn this before the whole world. On domestic matters, Galili said that today there is a wish for the unification of labor movements. There are signs of a great desire and interest among all Zionist labor parties to stand together to face the current problems.

SPECIAL ENVOY IS INTERVIEWED IN W. GERMANY

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL 26 June 1967--G

(Interview with Israeli Special Ambassador Shimon Peres)

(Text) Question: Israel has defeated the Arabs. Arab losses in war materiel are now being replaced by the Russians. Must not Israel buy new weapons now? Is this the real reason for your tour?

Answer: Israel must buy weapons in several countries, but this is not my task. I came to Bonn on orders of my government to present a true picture of the Israeli position. We certainly do not wish to again lose at the conference table what we have won on the battlefield. We think the Russians made a mistake, and we should not like for them to now convert this mistake into a political success. Israel is not keen on war but wants friendship with all the world. I think the Russians will realize that there is a limit to which a major power can apply pressure on a small country.

Question: You had a long talk here in Bonn with your old friend, Mr. Strauss, and he is now in charge of the money.

Answer: I did not meet with him because he is now in charge of funds but because he is an old friend. We spoke more about politics than about defense problems.

Question: Do you not think the agreements reached two years ago at the beginning of diplomatic relations between Bonn and Jerusalem on the procedure of German arms deliveries to Israel should be revised under current circumstances?

Answer: I think we now need political and economic support above all. We should not refer to any special past agreements. An entirely new situation has developed in the Middle East, and most of the old agreements and concepts are nonexistent as a result of dramatic changes in the situation.

Question: How, then, will Soviet arms deliveries to the Arabs be balanced?

Answer: We shall certainly approach Western countries in the interest of reestablishment of a military balance in the Middle East.

June 26 Peres interview  
(cont'd)

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Question: Israel captured great masses of war materiel of Soviet origin during the war against the Arabs. What is the value of this booty?

Answer: The approximate value is 2 billion dollars. The greater part of it is of course damaged. Yet, the Israeli Army may be able to make use of some of it. However, the crux of the Middle East problem is not armament but politics. We now want peace negotiations with our Arab neighbors. Above all, we want to change the policy from which up to now the threat originated.

Question: In which way could Germany help your country most effectively?

Answer: Israel highly assesses public reaction in the Federal Republic to the threat to which we are exposed. DER SPIEGEL for example, published an article entitled, "Israel Will Live," which evoked a great response. In an emergency like ours, moral support is also valuable. What we need now is political, moral, and economic support in that order.

Question: Do you think the events of recent weeks have had a positive influence on relations between Germans and Jews?

Answer: I think they were a very satisfactory test of relations between Germany and the Jewish world. I do not speak of a particular action. I mean the interest of the German public in Israel's problems. It will strengthen the bridge between the two nations.

#### SPEEDY MERGER OF MAPAI, AHDUT AVODA DECIDED

Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1700 GMT 26 June 1967--M

(Text) Representatives of the Mapai and Ahdut Avoda parties met today in Jerusalem and fixed steps for the merger of the two Alignment parties. It was agreed that a union should be set up on the basis of the Alignment platform and on the agreements emanating from it. During the meeting, views were exchanged regarding the joint platform of the two parties and organizational (?matters). It was agreed to take the needed steps to speed up as much as possible arrangements for quick implementation of the union.

Two subcommittees were elected during the meeting. One of these six-member subcommittees will draft the merger charter of Mapai and Ahdut Avoda, and the other will determine the organizational framework of the united party. The Mapai and Ahdut Avoda representatives will meet again over the weekend to approve the conclusions of the subcommittees. Next week the recommendations will be submitted to both parties for approval. The representatives will arrange for the official merger ceremony, which will be held in Jerusalem.

#### REPORTAGE ON AFFAIRS IN WESTERN BANK, SINAI

##### Entry Permits

Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1200 GMT 25 June 1967--M

(Summary) The validity of entry permits for areas under control of the Israeli Defense Forces will be cancelled as of 27 June. New individual entry permits will be granted only to persons traveling on business.

## Dayan Press Conference

Jerusalem in Arabic to the Arab World 2230 GMT 25 June 1967--M

(Text) Defense Minister Moshe Dayan held a press conference last night at which he said that Israel does not encourage Western Bank inhabitants to leave for Jordan but provides all the necessary means for those wishing to leave. He called on journalists to personally assure themselves of this. He added that the government is working to restore normal life to the Western Bank through the local authorities. It also helps by securing public services, reviving economic life, and reducing curfew hours.

The defense minister said that the inhabitants of the village of Qalqiliyah who wish to return to their village will be allowed to do so beginning tomorrow, Tuesday, and the government will aid in repairing the half of the village houses destroyed during the battles. The defense minister explained that Qalqiliyah is located on a main communications point between the area of Sharon and Jerusalem. He added that the Israeli armored forces were compelled to crush all resistance in the village.

Regarding the Gaza sector, the defense minister said the government is now studying the question of enabling refugees living in the Gaza sector to visit their relatives in the Western Bank. He added that it is probable that they will be allowed to stay there for longer periods and that this matter depends to a great extent on UNRWA cooperation.

## Gaza Arms Collection

Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1200 GMT 23 June 1967--M

(Text) The Israeli army commander in the Gaza Strip and north Sinai, Lt. Gen. Moshe Goren, stated today that despite appeals by mukhtars in Gaza for the collection of weapons, large quantities of arms remain in the hands of civilians. Israeli Defense Forces authorities are trying to collect them. He said that much progress has been made in returning life to normal, particularly in Khan Yunis, Dayr al-Balah, and Rafah, where the job was easier because they are smaller than Gaza. Additional relaxed measures will go into effect on Sunday in Gaza.



AS-SALLAL: ARABS ABLE TO PUNISH AGGRESSORS

Cairo Voice of the Arabs in Arabic to the Arab World 1810 GMT 27 June 1967--L

(Address by President Abdallah as-Sallal of the Yemeni Arab Republic--live or recorded)

(Text) In the name of God, the merciful, the compassionate: The Arab people, in this decisive stage of the history of their long and laborious struggle, while suffering from the setback and seeing the traces of the new tripartite aggression against their land, are alone responsible for removing the traces of the aggression. The potential, resources, and energies they possess impose on them all--peoples and governments--the responsibility to start removing the traces of the aggression and erasing them completely from the surface of the Arab land. The tripartite aggression, which aimed at the destruction of the Arab revolution and eliminating it, met and will meet the fate of aggression--this aggression led by Washington under the slogan of the so-called state of Israel against the Arab nation and the Arab homeland.

The United States has revealed itself in more ways than one. Now it thinks that political maneuvers in the corridors of the United Nations will liquidate the cause and leave the aggressors unpunished. The international organization will, at its emergency session, arrive at a result which will undoubtedly be the condemnation of the aggressors and adoption of measures to remove it; and this is after the effectiveness of the Security Council, where the aggressive imperialist forces had control, was paralyzed. The effectiveness of the international organization will certainly (word indistinct). We hope that the organization will establish its existence and effectiveness.

The Arab people, firstly and foremost, are capable of removing the traces of the aggression and punishing the aggressors with the means they possess and with the (?force) they depend on. They will pay the price of their freedom and sovereignty, as they have done more than once. Their expected attack against their enemy will crown the stages of their struggle (word indistinct) imperialism, headed by the forces of the new tripartite aggression. The Arab people are capable of wresting their right from any sinful aggressor. Sons of the Arab people you are defending your land and sanctities, the battle imposes general mobilization on all of us. In our hands are the weapons for the battle; among them are the huge natural resources being exploited by imperialism and U.S. monopolies in our homeland. We have faith in God granting us victory; with us are all just, (word indistinct), peace-loving peoples. God willing, we will be victorious.

#### INFORMATION MINISTER DISCUSSES IRAQ VISIT

Damascus Domestic Service in Arabic 1515 GMT 27 June 1967--M

(Text) Following his return to Damascus Information Minister Muhammad az-Zubi made the following statement on the results of his visit to Iraq: Our visit to Baghdad was one of those which the command decided to make to some Arab countries to review the situation and its elements and to coordinate Arab efforts and resources to repel the aggression and eliminate its effects.

When we were in Baghdad, the government and people of that fraternal region showed us great hospitality. We also had official talks with President Arif and his government. At these talks, each side submitted its viewpoints and the gist of its experience. The two sides affirmed that these Arab meetings are important and useful. They asserted that it is necessary to coordinate Arab military, economic, and political efforts in the service of Arab causes, particularly the Palestine question.

Az-Zubi stated in conclusion: The two parties to the talks reviewed the positive and negative aspects of the Arab people's battle against the imperialist-Zionist aggression. They stressed that it is necessary to take all practical measures to surmount negative factors and to promote the positive ones.

Jidda Domestic Service in Arabic 1815 GMT 29 June 1967--M

(Text) Ahmad Zaki Yamani, minister of petroleum and mineral wealth, has made a statement to the newspaper AL-MADINAH AL-MUNAWWARAH on the suspension of the pumping of Saudi oil to the states which backed the perfidious Zionist aggression against the Arab nation. The minister said: Acting on the basis of Arab solidarity, His Majesty's government decided to suspend oil exports to certain countries in implementation of the resolutions adopted at the Arab oil ministers conference in Baghdad.

The pumping of oil was suspended completely for six days, during which the kingdom's loss was 59.26 million rials. Pumping was partially resumed for 12 days, during which our loss was about 35.1 million rials.

#### Eshkol Statement

Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1830 GMT 27 June 1967--M

(Text) Prime Minister Eshkol stated today that as long as our neighbors continue in their policy of belligerence and prepare plans to destroy us, we will not return the areas now under our control. These areas are necessary for our security and self-defense. However, if the Arab states agree to discuss peace with us, there is no problem that cannot be discussed through direct negotiations for the good of all. Eshkol was speaking at a meeting with foreign correspondents.

Eshkol also said that the prospects for direct negotiations are now better than at any time in the past 20 years. He pointed out that past experience has taught us that third-party mediation is of little value. If the Arabs are ready for peace, there is no reason why they should not speak to us about it. However, if they do not want peace, third-party mediation will only be a screen behind which the Arabs will continue in their nonrecognition and belligerent policy. He stressed that a comprehensive solution to the Middle East problems through direct negotiations will also lead to a settlement of the refugee problem.

The Prime Minister also pointed out the excellent treatment accorded Arab prisoners in Israel, treatment which he himself witnessed during his visits to the prisoners.

#### Proposed Organization Bills

Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1500 GMT 27 June 1967--M

(Text) The government submitted three bills to the Knesset today to legally solve a number of problems created after the liberation of areas in the six-day war. Justice Minister Yaaqov Shimshon Shapiro said that the three bills amount to three stories of a single building. One bill is meant to organize government and justice in the areas held by the Israeli Defense Forces, the second bill is meant to organize local administration, and the third bill is meant to legally organize the safeguarding of holy places.

Deputy Minister of Interior Dr. Ben Meir submitted to the Knesset a bill to amend the municipal law to allow expansion of the boundaries of a municipality or a local council. He said the bill will lead to normalization in municipal affairs. It will enable the interior minister to add members to a local council from among the citizens of an area held by the state.

Minister of Religious Affairs Dr. Zerah Warhaftig submitted to the Knesset the bill on the guarding of holy places. He said that the government has fixed three principles in regard to the safeguarding of these places: to guard well and to prevent desecration of places holy to any of the religions, to insure free access to the holy places, and to provide for internal administration of the holy places by an authorized council of the religion to which each place is holy.

The Knesset decided to debate the three bills collectively.

#### Financial Transaction Orders

Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1500 GMT 26 June 1967--M

(Text) The commander of the Israeli Defense Forces in the Western Bank, Brig. Uzi Narkis, today issued an order banning land transactions in the Western Bank without official approval. Violators will be liable to five years imprisonment or to a fine of 1,500 dinars.

Brigadier Narkis issued another order regarding the control of currency, securities, and gold. It says that anyone in possession of foreign currency should exchange it at the authority concerned and receive in its place dinars at the rate of 1.12 dinars for each pound sterling. The order also bans bringing in or taking out of dinars of foreign currency from the Western Bank.

The income tax and property tax laws in force in the Western Bank prior to the occupation will remain in force until further notice.

#### Jordanian Currency Exchange

Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0800 GMT 28 June 1967--M

(Text) Beginning at 0900 this morning Jordanian dinars within the new municipal borders of Jerusalem will be exchanged for Israeli currency at the official rate of 7.5 Israeli pounds to 1 Jordanian dinar. This rate was fixed by the finance minister and the governor of the Bank of Israel.

The Bank of Israel announced this morning that six exchange stations have been set up equipped with cash boxes and appropriate facilities for the speedy implementation of the order. The currency exchange will continue for three days.

This action by the Bank of Israel is being carried out on the strength of the government and law bill adopted by the Knesset yesterday and the government order issued this morning under which justice and the jurisdiction and administration of the state of Israel will apply to the area fixed by the interior minister as the Jerusalem area of jurisdiction. It includes all the region from Qalandiyah airport in the north to Sur Bahir in the south and Silwan in the east.

Beginning at 0900 this morning all inhabitants have been instructed by radio and leaflets to take the Jordanian currency in their possession to the six exchange stations opened by the Bank of Israel. The three-day exchange operation will be carried out between 0900 and 1500 daily.

The six exchange stations are located in Sur Bahir in the shop near the mosque, in the Musa Uthman Cafe in Ras-Amud, in the central post office near Herod's Gate, in the Hotel Commodore in At-Tur near Wadi al-Jawz, in the curiosity shop in Shayk Jarrah, and in the agricultural training station in Shufat.

#### Administration of Holy Places

Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 2000 GMT 27 June 1967--M

(Text) The Prime Minister today met with Moslem and Christian religious leaders, mainly from the Western Bank, in the presence of the minister of religious affairs and the chief rabbis. Eshkol explained to them that the Israeli Government will entrust the administration of holy places to the leaders of each religion. He stressed that the government has established as its principle the safeguarding of holy places and their sanctity and the guarantee of the right of free access to the holy places for all.

The Moslem and Christian leaders expressed their thanks for the Israeli Defense Forces' good attitude toward the holy places. The mufti of Jerusalem, Sad ad-Din al-Alami, requested that the remaining minor restrictions in regard to Moslem prayer ceremonies in Jerusalem be removed. The minister for religious affairs promised to take care of that.

#### Transfer of Evacuees

Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1500 GMT 27 June 1967--M

(Text) The Arab families who were evacuated from their homes near the Western Wall and in the synagogues in the Jewish quarter of the Old City of Jerusalem are now being transferred to permanent quarters in the villages of Silwan and Al-Ayzariyah. This was stated by the military government of the Jerusalem area. Trucks were provided to transport the evacuees' belongings, and the operation is being carried out smoothly. About 25 families were transferred today. Many of the evacuees received new houses which are much better than those they occupied in the Old City of Jerusalem.

#### Qalqilyah Inhabitants' Return

Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0800 GMT 28 June 1967--M

(Text) Inhabitants of Qalqilyah who left their town when the fighting broke out began returning this morning. Defense Minister Moshe Dayan and Central Area Commander Brig. Uzi Narkis were present in the town. Within one-and-a-half hours about 2,000 inhabitants arrived on foot from the surrounding villages and from Nabulus.

Dayan met with town mayor Haj Husayn Sabri, who thanked him for permitting the town's inhabitants to return. Sabri told him he is preparing a detailed list of places which need speedy repair in order for civic life to return to normal. Dayan told the mayor that if there is a lack of housing he will supply the town with tents.

It should be recalled that a large number of houses were destroyed in Qalqilyah during the fighting. Cars carrying bread and water were brought this morning from Kefar Saba to supply the immediate needs of the returning inhabitants.

ARIF: WAR WITH ENEMY WILL BE LONG AND BITTER

Baghdad Domestic Service in Arabic 1530 GMT 28 June 1967--M

(Speech by President Abd ar-Rahman Muhammad Arif at the opening ceremony of the International Confederation of Arab Trade Unions held at Al-Khuld Hall in Baghdad--live)

(Summary) In the name of God, the merciful and compassionate, it pleases me to see your conference held in Baghdad, the bastion of Arabism. You are among your own people and relatives. You are welcome. Brothers, the Arab nation is now facing a difficult period and a fierce imperialist plot which aims at "seizing our resources, usurping our freedom, and annihilating our brothers in a most dear and sacred part of our great Arab homeland to replace them with a gang with a criminal record." Imperialism wants to turn the Zionist gang into a tiger to dominate this area, its resources, and its strategic position. "Imperialism is now throwing all its weight into strengthening this gang in order to safeguard its communications, secure its markets, and obtain its raw materials." Whenever imperialism observes some sort of advance and prosperity in this area, it resorts to moving Israel to cause anxiety and disturbances.

"Israel has been forced on our homeland and is a foreign body. Imperialism has established it and has armed it with the most destructive weapons." Imperialism draws plans for Israel, finances it, and supplies it with manpower and equipment it allows it to do what it wants and to provoke without fear of retaliation. "Imperialist methods will not mislead anyone any more." The recent setback which beset the Arab world was the result of Jewish trickery and deception. "The Jews have deceived and misled the U.S. President. Thus, he has asked the Arabs to exercise self-restraint and not begin the war. We agreed to that and we gave our pledge. We did not know that this request was a trick and a deception."

Does Johnson hear the groans of wounded people and the weeping of women and children? Does he see the houses which collapsed on their owners and the burning houses and fields? Does he see the masses of refugees dragging themselves under the burning sun, leaving their houses and wealth, not knowing the fate of their own relatives? "Does Johnson know that his request has cost the Arab and Islamic nations tens of thousands of dead and wounded and the Arab nation a great historic loss? Do the United States and its President know that their backing of Israel has created a deep wound in the hearts of the Arabs and Moslems which can never be forgotten?"

"Johnson should not have been misled; it might have been done with his knowledge. Why has Johnson not requested from the Jews what he has requested from the Arabs? If Johnson's request was made with an honorable intention, he would have intervened immediately to stop the Zionist treachery. His nonintervention clearly indicates that he was the victim of their treachery and deception. He was very badly exploited by Zionism, which has written his name on a black page of the history of humanity. I do not doubt that Johnson was misled and that he was the victim of world Zionism and of his Zionist representative at the United Nations. His conscience would have severely punished him had he seen this tragedy and the great crime which Israel committed with the support of the United States. If the American

June 28 Ari' speech  
(cont'd)

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people were able to destroy the mask which Johnson's representative at the United Nations has placed on their faces, they would have done so and they would not have remained masked for one day."

Citizens, we are facing a treacherous and merciless enemy. He knows more about us than we know about ourselves. He works in the dark and conceals his secrets. All we know about him is that he strikes like a coward and then flees for protection through others. In this instance imperialism is the best protector. "The treacherous enemy has won the first round, but the war with him will be long and bitter. The Arab nation must bear this in mind and look at the future with more realism." Our forces, who were surprised, stood firm in the battle. Our forces inflicted heavy losses on the enemy.

We must rally our efforts in our own territory in order to secure victory for our valiant soldiers on the borders. You must double your efforts in order to double the volume of production. Rally your ranks in order to provide the best support for the soldier in the battlefield and for our markets in the country and elsewhere. The enemy has been planning for this battle for a long time while we were busy raising slogans and fruitless arguments. Be aware that world Zionism aims first of all "at eliminating the Arabs and Moslems. It is the enemy of religion. The Korean is the archenemy of the Jews. Zionism wants to obliterate the religion--the Islamic religion--from existence. The Jews stood in Jerusalem and said: We have avenged (Khaybar--phonetic). This is a deep hatred that indicates the bad intentions of the Jews and what they have in mind for us. We must adhere to our religion. The Islamic world must learn about the intentions of this gang. Once the Arabs are united and Arab ties with the Islamic states are strengthened, I am sure that Zionism will not live in our homeland and will not continue to exist no matter how much support it obtains from imperialism."

Citizens, many tragedies and calamities have befallen our homeland. They have been overcome. We must study the dimensions of the setback and its causes from all aspects. We must prepare to remove its causes.

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Oil Official's Statement

Cairo MENA in Arabic 1340 GMT 28 June 1967--M (FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

(Text) Baghdad--Oil Under Secretary Abdallah Ismail has announced that the resumption of oil shipments to France and Turkey has not begun yet. He said that oil will not reach these two countries before they conform with the strict conditions concerning the prevention of Iraqi oil from being directly or indirectly shipped to hostile countries. He said that when shipping begins the Oil Ministry will make public the guarantees it has received to prevent the oil from reaching the countries which participated in the aggression against the Arab countries.

Information Minister Iddih

Beirut RNS in Arabic 1700 GMT 28 June 1967--M (FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

(Excerpts) Beirut --Commenting on Israel's decision to annex Old Jerusalem to the Israeli part of the city, Lebanese Information Minister Michel Iddih said: "Under no circumstances will Lebanon agree that Jerusalem will fall under Israeli control. It is emphasized that like all other Arab states, Lebanon does not in any way admit the existence of Israel."

Iddih described Israel's decision as "the biggest act of trickery by Israel to achieve its religious and racial objectives and to mislead world public opinion, which will not be misled in this way. World public opinion will support us against Israel in defending Jerusalem and keeping it as it was before."

Iddih added: "I am confident that even the states which have relations with Israel will object to and resist Israel's measure regarding Jerusalem."



TRANSPORTATION INFORMATION--Israeli Railways general manager Avraham Zwick on 27 June told the radio correspondent that the Israeli Railways will begin operating the Al-Qantarah ash-Sharqiyah-Bur Tawfiq railroad line along the Suez canal. It is now possible for ships to transit the Tiran Strait at night since a lighthouse to guide the ships has been erected. The Israeli ship Mira was the first to transit the strait at night on 26 June and it did so without delay. The Communications Ministry has informed navigation companies and shipowners of the possibility of using the strait at night. (Jerusalem Arabic Arab World 1530 GMT 27 June 1967--M) Beginning the first week of July EL AL Airways will increase the number of its flights to the United States in view of the expected increase of tourists and volunteers from that country. (Jerusalem Domestic Hebrew 0800 GMT 28 June 1967--M)

#### ISRAEL BLAMED FOR CONTINUED CLOSURE OF CANAL

Paris AFP in English 0016 GMT 29 June 1967--E (FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

(By Jean Pierre Joulin)

(Summary) Cairo, 28 June--"The Egyptian Under Secretary of State at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Hasan Al-Fiqi, today blamed Israel for the continued closure of the Suez Canal. He said: Israeli aggression, which still has not ended, prevents a return to normal navigation. The minister said the closure is one of the consequences of Israeli aggression and that that country has sunk a number of ships in the canal.

"In an interview granted to French television Al-Fiqi explained why Egypt asked the United Nations to withdraw its emergency force. He stated that Egypt wanted to give the world the chance to put pressure on Israel to prevent its aggression. No result was obtained, he added. Israel began its flagrant aggression on 5 June. No responsibility for this conflict falls on the United Arab Republic or on any Arab country. The entire responsibility falls on Israel, on the United States--which encouraged Israel--and on all the countries which aided Israel."

"The minister said the UAR had the greatest esteem for the French Government's attitude in the crisis. General de Gaulle's statement that Israel was the aggressor in the Middle East was regarded as a valid estimation of the situation based on complete understanding of history and of the facts in the Middle East. This statement aims first at safeguarding peace and world security. President Abd an Nasir described this attitude as honest in a statement to the press.

"Al-Fiqi said there had been contacts with France to find a solution of the crisis. Through exchanges of views, France knew the results of Egyptian contacts with the USSR and with the United States and the results of U.N. Secretary General U Thant's visit to Cairo." Al-Fiqi then argued that the statement proposed by some big powers on the disputed issue of the Gulf of Aqaba, followed by pressure on friendly countries, aggravated the conflict. The minister said that on 4 June, the eve of the aggression, he had several exchanges of views with the French ambassador in Cairo. They discussed the possibility of an appeal to all the parties concerned to avoid hostilities. Egypt, he stressed, was very much in favor.

# PREMIER DEFENDS JORDAN'S RULE IN JERUSALEM

Amman Domestic Service in Arabic 1200 GMT 29 June 1967--M

(Statement by Jordanian Premier Sad Jumah--read by announcer)

(Text) In close cooperation with the sisterly Arab governments, the Jordanian Government is following with extreme attention developments in the situation in the Western Bank of the kingdom and all other Arab areas occupied by the Israeli forces as a result of the recent sinful aggression, and denounces most strongly the measures adopted by the authorities of aggression to usurp the Arab Holy City in an evil attempt to consolidate authority over it.

The adoption of these measures at a time when the whole Middle East crisis is being discussed at the U.N. General Assembly meetings is nothing more than new evidence of the Israeli authorities' defiance of world public opinion and a new, extremely insolent aggression which these authorities are committing against the Christian and Islamic holy shrines to which millions of hearts in various parts of the world cling. Jerusalem has been and will remain an Arab city. The care and protection given by the Jordanian Arab government to the holy shrines have been cited as an example of the freedom, reassurance, and amity accorded to all believers. While some are unaware of the sectarian conviction motivating Israeli thinking and the religious, despotic fanaticism regulating Israeli life, all the world is aware of and remembers the testimony given by His Holiness Pope Paul VI to the Jordanian Government and His Holiness' profound appreciation for the affection, indulgence, and care accorded by His Majesty King Husayn to the holy places.

The Jordanian Government raises this grave issue before all who believe in God and calls upon them to save the Christian and Moslem holy places. The government declares its categorical rejection of the aggressive Israeli measures concerning the Holy City. The government also affirms that this country and all the Arab nation cling to the Arabism of the Holy City. This country insists on the withdrawal of the forces of aggression from all the Arab areas they have occupied and is prepared to sacrifice the last drop of the blood of its sons for this purpose.

## Information Minister's Statement

Amman Domestic Service in Arabic 1900 GMT 29 June 1967--M

(Text) Information Minister Salah Abu Zayd has sent the following cable to his Arab counterparts: I convey to you my sincere greetings and appreciation for the valiant effort made by the information media in your fraternal countries following the evil aggression on our nation and our great Arab homeland. The recent hostile measures adopted by the Israeli authorities to impose their domination in Jerusalem and the holy places are the subject of our fraternal governments' concern and care. The aim of the official campaign carried out by the Arab governments calls for a general information and enlightenment campaign of the local, Arab, Islamic, and world public opinion. I am confident that you will not spare any effort in organizing this campaign as soon as possible. May God grant us all success in removing the effects of the treacherous aggression on our country and to realize the aspirations and great aims of our nation. Please accept my greetings, appreciation, and respect.

# CABINET DISCUSSES REFUGEE PROBLEM SOLUTIONS

Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1700 GMT 29 June 1967--M

(Text) The government decided today that the changes which have taken place in the area have created conditions which permit a comprehensive solution of the refugee problem without delay through regional and international cooperation. The government also decided that there is no truth to charges voiced in the U.N. General Assembly by anti-Israeli elements regarding the expulsion of citizens and refugees from the Western Bank. There have been no expulsions and no pressure for or encouragement of emigration from the Western Bank.

The Prime Minister and the director general of the Foreign Ministry reviewed at the cabinet meeting today the debate in the U.N. General Assembly and the contacts Israeli representatives have had in various capitals.

Regarding false rumors about expulsions, the government decided that movement from the western to the eastern banks of Jordan will be permitted to persons requesting this of their own free will in writing and with the confirmation of their mayor, head of their village, or any other local authority.

Talks on the refugee question will begin tomorrow with the participation of representatives of the International Red Cross. The cabinet today authorized the defense minister to represent Israel.

Regarding the Holy Places, the government decided that in addition to the law on safeguarding holy places, consultations will continue with authorized representatives and religious elements in Israel and the world to insure their religious and universal character.

The Prime Minister reported to the cabinet on the meeting he had the day before yesterday with religious leaders in the country.

Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0500 GMT 30 June 1967--M

(Text) Defense Minister Moshe Dayan said yesterday at a Rafi Party meeting in Tel Aviv that Israel will not withdraw from areas held by the Israeli Defense Forces as long as peace agreements are not concluded.

Dayan warned that Israel is just now entering its most difficult battle--not against Egypt and the Arab states but against their ally. He added that after the Arab states' debacle on the battlefield the Soviet Union will not accept another defeat, and that it wants now to prove that the modern arms it is providing the Arab states are not inferior to those in Israel's hands.

The defense minister believes that we are in the first part of the political battle and the first stage of the military battle, which he does not think has ended yet.

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AAPSO EMERGENCY SESSION OPENS IN CAIRO 1 JULY

Abd an-Nasir Message

Cairo Domestic Service in Arabic 1130 GMT 1 July 1967--M

(Text) Cairo--President Jamal Abd an-Nasir has addressed the following message to the emergency session of the Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organization (AAPSO) conference which opened here today:

To brothers struggling for freedom in Asia and Africa, to honest and free men throughout the world working to establish lasting peace based on justice: Your meeting today in Cairo--the base of struggle for freedom, justice, and equality--sheds a ray of hope on the gloom of injustice and aggression and represents the voice of justice rising above the misleading shouts.

This is not your first meeting in defense of freedom and dignity, nor will it be the last. Your meeting on the road of struggle began after imperialism began to aggress on those peoples demanding the right to a free and dignified life. We have fought together the battle of Algeria and the battles of freedom in Africa. We stood with the Vietnamese people in their bitter war against savage U.S. imperialist aggression. Today we stand together to face another battle with imperialism in its aggression against the Arab nation, which aims at depriving our nation of the right to life and progress and at weakening its ability to stand with you in the battle against imperialist injustices.

The treacherous aggression which the imperialist forces committed in collusion with their agent, Israel, was only a link in a chain of long and fierce battles between imperialism and the struggling peoples on the three continents. The aggression in itself was a crime which imperialism committed against the Arab nation, a crime which began with the planting of Israel in the heart of the Arab nation like a dagger. This dagger is causing it to bleed. It has deprived it of security and rendered the people of a cherished part of the homeland, a mass of dispersed refugees whose homes and legal rights are denied to them.

The large-scale aggression which was planned and implemented by forces much larger than their agent Israel was able to provide has proved beyond any shadow of a doubt that Israel has an aggressive nature and that it is imperialism's major base in the Middle East. It has also proved that Israel is an integral part of imperialist strategy in this vital part of the world.

All Arab countries have shown self-restraint and an attitude of self-defense in the face of Israeli provocations in order to protect their sovereign rights both in their territory and in the sea. However, with the obvious connivance of imperialism Israel launched an aggression proving once again that it does not respect the values of the international community or the rights of peoples.

If imperialism has been able to collude and join hands in order to deal to us one blow after another, we with our solidarity are capable of returning its blows and of extracting our rights from it. Although imperialism has been able to win one round there, the solidarity of the people who uphold right is capable of defeating it and achieving final victory. Your victory is a victory for the peoples, for right and justice, for peace based on justice, and for security based on equality. Brother strugglers and free men, I welcome you on behalf of the people of the UAR and hope that through you justice and peace will be realized.

#### Al-Atasi Banquet

Damascus Domestic Service in Arabic 2200 GMT 1 July 1967--M

(Text) Chief of State Dr. Nur ad-Din al-Atasi tonight gave a banquet in honor of Soviet President Nikolay Podgornyy and the accompanying Soviet delegation. The banquet was attended by members of the Bath Party national and regional commands.

In a speech welcoming the Soviet guest, Dr. al-Atasi said: The Soviet delegation's visit emphasizes the friendship based on our common struggle against imperialism, Zionism, and colonialism; our struggle to establish a progressive socialist society (opposed) to their aggression against the Arab homeland, imperialism and Zionism aimed at destroying the strong bastions which obstruct the implementation of their plans. But our Arab people will firmly resist all these attempts. We are fully confident that the people will attain victory. As we wage this battle against imperialism and Zionism, we realize that the rabid attack against the progress of our masses was meant to strike at our great accomplishments and our economic development experiment, which already challenges imperialism.

In conclusion, Dr. al-Atasi hailed Arab-Soviet friendship and expressed the hope that the good relations between the two countries would be further strengthened.

In reply, President Podgornyy voiced his thanks for the warm welcome and hospitality accorded the Soviet delegation and for the fine words spoken about the Soviet Government and people. He said: Like you, we well know Israel's aims and its role in the service of imperialist plans. We know that imperialism is not happy to see the Arab states confront its interests and prevent it from stealing the riches of the Arab people. Had it not been for this, this aggression against the Arab nation would not have occurred. But things will not go according to the wishes of the imperialists; they will totally backfire against the interests of the imperialists despite all their efforts to change conditions in the area. No one can defeat a nation which fights for its freedom. In saluting the Syrian people, we salute all Arab people for taking these firm stands.

Podgornyy added: The Soviet people, government, party, and Central Committee expressed their views about the aggression before it began and again during its first hours. All the conferences and meetings held on the occasion of the Zionist aggression had one slogan: Hands Off the Arabs. Concluding, President Podgornyy lauded Arab-Soviet friendship.

Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1600 GMT 2 July 1967--M

(Text) In a note to the U.N. Security Council, Israel accused Egypt of having resumed the acts of aggression and of having committed a grave violation of the cease-fire agreement. Israel's chief delegate at the United Nations, Gideon Rafael, handed the note to the current president of the council, Makonnen of Ethiopia. Our representative asked that the violation of the cease-fire agreement by the Egyptians be brought to the attention of the delegations in the U.N. Security Council and the General Assembly. Israel did not demand convocation of the Security Council.

Egypt has also sent a complaint to the Security Council.

DAYAN: USSR ARMS AID TO ARABS MAY RENEW WAR

Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0800 GMT 1 July 1967--M

(Interview with Defense Minister Moshe Dayan by radio correspondent Yoram Ronen--recorded)

(Excerpts) Dayan: I do not have the slightest doubt that, whatever the (Palestinian Arabs--ed.) pronouncements, deep in their hearts the majority of the Western Bank Arabs wish to be linked with Palestine, although they know that this may mean, in one way or another, that they would be within an Israeli framework. I do not want to use the word loyalty in the sense of meaning loyalty to Israel, but I must say that they would not carry out sabotage attempts or try to shake the rule.

Ronen: Let us now pass to the question of Soviet arms now reaching Egypt. How serious do you consider the new supply of Soviet arms?

Dayan: I do not know exactly what or how much is arriving there, but I believe the Soviet, Egyptian, and Syrian statements, which say the same thing--that they are not prepared to agree to two things. They are not prepared to sit with us to discuss peace--not only not agree on peace, but even to sit and discuss it--and they are not prepared to accept our remaining in the areas we hold. If they do not want either this or that, which I believe they do not, then what they are likely to do is to expel us from there. If they do not want to conclude peace or to see us there, then they want to expel us by nonpeaceful means. I think they are working toward that aim, and for this they need arms. Hence, all these planes are bringing arms because the Arabs do not want to make peace or see us near the canal, and for that they need arms.

Ronen: And is this the (word indistinct) you meant when you said that the military or physical struggle has not ended?

Dayan: Yes, but I think this must be considered only within a general and hypothetical assumption. I do not think the war will be resumed tomorrow, or the day after, or even in the next few weeks. But I think we should take into consideration that, if in the long run there is no change in Arab preparedness for peace, or in their opposition to our being where we are, or in the strong Soviet opposition to our presence there, then the military struggle might be renewed if the Russians continue to send such arms to the Arabs or to extend other aid to them.

#### OBJECTIVES OF INFORMATION PROGRAM EXPLAINED

Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1100 GMT 3 July 1967--M

(Text) At a press conference in Jerusalem today, Minister Yisrael Galili gave details about the objectives of Israel's information activities after the war. He said that the objective of information activities will be to explain Israel's hope for peace and the connection it sees between peace and the border situation. Israel objects to the evacuation of captured areas without a peace treaty. The state will also explain its humanitarian outlook and its desire to solve all problems requiring comprehensive settlement, such as the refugee problem.

In regard to the holy places, Israel will stress that it will insure their religious and universal character.

Within the framework of internal information, there is an intention to foster the trends for unity in the Israeli society, to strengthen the nation's stand against pressures and threats, and to prevent the expansion of a mood of hatred following the victory over the Arab states. Galilee stressed that the nation's morale during the war was high and that this gave the government freedom in adopting its decisions. He added that it is necessary to use modern methods of dissemination, such as television. He also said that a full-length film on the war is now in the advanced stages of preparation.

In regard to the committee for the coordination of all information factors, which the government established yesterday, Galili said that this committee will have initiative and not coordination work alone.

#### HUSAYN REVIEWS CALL FOR ARAB SUMMIT MEETING

Amman Domestic Service in Arabic 1900 GMT 4 July 1967--M

(Text) His Majesty King Husayn held a press conference yesterday afternoon at the house of Jordanian Ambassador Madhat Jumah in London. He answered questions asked by world press, radio, and television correspondents, including the correspondent of the Lebanese paper AL-ANWAR. The latter asked His Majesty a number of questions on the Middle East crisis.

Concerning the results of his trip to the United States and Britain, His Majesty said he was able to present and explain the Arab case in general and to form a clear opinion of the U.S. and British attitudes.

His Majesty affirmed that the holding of an Arab summit conference as soon as possible to discuss all matters and to adopt a unified attitude is in his opinion the most ideal way of handling the Palestine question and the Israeli aggression. A summit conference, he said, is more necessary now than at any time in the past, and Arab leaders should discuss all Arab conditions and try to solve all their problems and differences. Only in this way can they overcome their difficulties, meet the challenges, rebuild their homeland, and achieve their objectives.

Referring to the present situation in Jordan and the Middle East, King Husayn said: It is very serious in every way. We have in Jordan now 120,000 to 150,000 refugees. We appreciate all the aid we receive (until) these refugees return to their homes on the Western Bank. The Israelis through napalm bombs, murder, and indiscriminate looting forced them to move to the eastern bank.

Answering a question by the AL-ANWAR correspondent, King Husayn said: Any settlement of the problem cannot succeed unless it is based on justice and dignity. Any settlement should be for the entire Palestine question. Asked his opinion regarding the Soviet Union's role in the Arab region, His Majesty said: What concerns me is the future of the Arab nation and the Arab people--a future insuring a free, dignified life with social justice, regardless of the role of any foreign state.

His Majesty reaffirmed his absolute rejection of Israel's annexation of Jerusalem. Concerning his meeting with Syrian Chief of State Dr. Nur ad-Din al-Atasi, Husayn said: It was a good meeting, like all meetings of Arab leaders.

#### ISRAELIS CHARGED WITH LOOTING BANKS, STORES

Damascus Domestic Service in Arabic 1115 GMT 4 July 1967--M

(Text) The Jordanian Embassy in Damascus today announced that Israeli authorities have looted the branches of Jordanian banks in the Western Bank towns of Jerusalem, Nabulus, Hebron, Janin, Ramallah, and Al-Birah following the recent aggression. Embassy sources said that according to official information received from Amman, force was used to break into the Western Bank branches.

The Israeli authorities have also looted the big commercial stores in the Western Bank. These sources said that a Jordanian note in this respect will be sent to U.N. Secretary General U Thant to expose the actions committed by the aggressor forces.



#### U.N. INACTION, 'PARTIALITY' IN PAST RECALLED

Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1845 GMT 3 July 1967--M

(Statement by Minister Yisrael Galili at a press conference in Jerusalem on 3 July--recorded)

(Excerpt) Whatever resolution the U.N. General Assembly may adopt, we shall not treat the United Nations with contempt. But we shall remember well our experience when the United Nations did not help us against the fedayeen and Al-Fatah. It did not give us access to the Western Wall. In many instances the United Nations showed partiality toward the aggressor. We know one thing: that any one-sided demand on Israel which disregards Israel's security needs and the need for peace cannot be binding on Israel and has no binding moral or political force.

#### DAYAN TALKS TO REFUGEES AT ALLENBY BRIDGE

Jerusalem Israel Domestic Service in Hebrew 2100 GMT 3 July 1967--M

(Text) Defense Minister Moshe Dayan today went to the Allenby Bridge to talk to refugees waiting to cross the Jordan River. He wanted to hear from them what had induced them to leave and to examine the arrangements made at the spot. Many of the people told him that they were crossing into Jordan to meet members of their families and that they intended to bring their women and children back to their former places of residence. Many others said they were going to Jordan to withdraw money from banks in Amman. They had deposited their money in banks of the Western Bank, but as soon as the fighting broke out they transferred their money to Jordan.

A large number of families, who were taking furniture and household equipment with them, said they wanted to cross into Jordan to join heads of families who have jobs in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Because these states do not permit the transfer of money to Israel, these families are leaving for the Eastern Bank. Several young men told the defense minister frankly that they were going to Jordan to ascertain whether they could find jobs there. If they could, they said, they preferred to live under Arab rule.

The defense minister, who spoke to the people in Arabic and English, expressed satisfaction with the arrangements made at the bridge to provide drinking water and first aid. Dayan suggested that improvements be made on the temporary bridge set up to permit refugees to cross. If possible, the improvements will be made with the assistance of the authorities on the other side of the river. However, he stressed that this will not be done to encourage people to cross to the other side.

## JUMAH OUTLINES POSTWAR PALESTINE POLICY

Amman Domestic Service in Arabic 1240 GMT 5 July 1967--M

(Statement by Premier Jumah at meeting 5 July at the National Assembly building attended by former premiers, members of the Senate and Chamber of Deputies, government officials, religious, business, and labor leaders--recorded)

(Excerpts) The surprise attack on 5 June achieved victory for the enemy. Commentators all over the world stressed this point. They said that three hours after their dawn attack on 5 June the Jews had achieved an overwhelming victory over the Arab air forces. In fact the fate of the war was determined at that time. It was obvious who was winning the war.

I am not disclosing a secret if I say that His Majesty King Husayn, on the basis of the intelligence reports and information we received, had warned Arab leaders that the enemy's first strike would be directed against Arab airfields--UAR airfields in particular, since the UAR Air Force was bigger than those of the other Arab states surrounding Israel. Also on the basis of information we received, His Majesty the King had warned that the Jews would carry out their aggression between 5 and 6 June.

His Majesty the King repeatedly appealed to his Arab brothers for Arab solidarity and Arab unity as the only way to confront the enemy. Unfortunately, the Arab nation remained divided. We hurled insults at each other while our enemy worked in secret. Unfortunately, even our intelligence services could not provide us with accurate reports about the enemy's power. All the information made available to us and to our brothers about Israel's power was false. It became obvious during the fighting that Israel had four times the power we had estimated.

I do not wish to put the blame on any side here. Our duty is to face the facts. Whether Israel fought alone or with the help of others is beside the point. The Arabs should have thoroughly surveyed their position, learned about their enemy's designs, considered the outside forces backing the enemy, and acted accordingly. Therefore, we are fully responsible for the mistakes committed.

Despite our knowledge that the enemy, through its treacherous air raids in the early hours of 5 June, was able to destroy the air strike force of our brothers--the force we had hoped would provide air cover for our forces--we threw all our forces into the battle. As you already know, our forces fought with great courage and bravery. There were many rumors about our losses, especially the lives lost. I take this opportunity to disclose to you for the first time the correct and accurate figures about our losses in lives during the recent fighting. I have here a publication issued by the general command of the brave Jordanian Army indicating that our losses were 6,094 dead and missing, 762 wounded, and 463 taken prisoner. Many of the prisoners who were recently repatriated were wounded. This clearly shows that the Jordanian soldier did not run away, but challenged death.

The brave Iraqi forces played their role in the battle. They backed our forces and were also exposed to intensive air attack. The Iraqi forces took part in the various battles and suffered heavy losses. Iraqi blood mixed with Jordanian blood on the mountains of Nabulus, the plains of Jerusalem, and the valleys of Ramallah and Al-Birah.

July 5 Jumah statement  
(cont'd)

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These are the bases of Jordanian policy toward the Palestinian question. Perhaps these same bases prompted His Exalted Majesty the King to go to New York to explain the Arab right. You have all heard His Majesty's speech. It was a significant landmark in the history of this nation. As many political commentators note, it has gained for us a large number of voices among the nations which were reluctant to give their votes. You have also heard that the Pakistani resolution denouncing the enemy's measures to unify the administration in Jerusalem received overwhelming support. The enemy alone voted against it. Jerusalem is part of us. It is part of our religion and structure. We cannot abandon our holy shrines.

The battle of Jerusalem does not concern the Arab nation alone. It concerns the entire Islamic world. No Moslem in the world will allow his holy places to be trampled upon by the Jews. Many pictures of the battle have been published. The Israeli flag flies over the walls of Al-Qasa mosque. The Israeli soldiers drink wine to celebrate their victory in the square of the Holy Dome. No Moslem in the world will accept this.

Some 200,000 new refugees came over from the Western Bank as a result of enemy coercion. The enemy says he has not forced anyone to leave. Coercion does not necessarily mean force or violence. Coercion can mean constant pressure, starvation, denunciation, and injury to one's dignity. There are various means of coercion.

By tomorrow evening or the day after we will have accommodated all the refugees who have come to us. I wish to thank the Jordanian citizens for their understanding and unity. They have demonstrated admirable self-control, patience, wisdom, and understanding; and this deserves our thanks and gratitude. They felt the tragedy of the refugees was their own tragedy, and no one hesitated to help government authorities give them shelter. I also thank all foreign organizations which supplied us with food, clothing, and money to tackle this difficult problem and tragedy. We thank everyone for this.

Two days ago, enemy authorities issued a statement broadcast over the radio that Israel would work through international organizations to facilitate the return of all refugees to their places of residence. I take this opportunity to appeal to all brother refugees from the dear Western Bank who have left their homes and towns to return. Their return will frustrate the enemy's plans. Their return will facilitate our efforts to achieve a final solution, rejoining the two banks, God willing. I appeal to them to take the national viewpoint, even at the cost of discomfort for some, and to return to their homes. The Jews will not be able to rule areas which are three times the size of their weak state. This tragedy will soon pass and the Jews will withdraw from the areas they occupy. This is our right as human beings; this is our legal and international right. No invading army through a treacherous battle can occupy areas of other countries and later declare that it will stay in these areas. This is contrary to all humanitarian, moral, and international laws.

While we appeal to the world public to put an end to this tragedy, we do not for a moment hesitate to make all kinds of sacrifices to restore the usurped areas. For this reason, the King has appealed for an Arab summit conference. This appeal was made, I have told you, because the battle with the enemy has revealed that, while it is a battle between right and wrong, it is also a battle between ignorance and knowledge.

July 5 Jumah statement  
(cont'd)

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This is one picture of the battle. If I have to add anything, then I will say that about noon on 6 June when the dimensions of the battle had become clear, as I have already explained to you, the Arab command in Egypt ordered the Jordanian command to withdraw from the western command because its continuation in the battle meant (word indistinct) martyrdom. The dimensions of the battle had been determined. Orders were issued by the unified command in Amman to some of our army units to withdraw from the battle. I will reveal here for the first time that some of these units refused to comply with the orders issued to them. Our soldiers wanted to fight until they had fired their last shot.

Gentlemen, where are we heading after these new calamities? Jordan's policy has been and will continue to be based on the following points:

1--The Palestinian question concerns all Arabs. No one Arab state has the right to take any unilateral action toward settling this question. The Palestinian question concerns not only me as a Jordanian. It concerns the Iraqis, Syrians, Egyptians, and all other Arabs.

2--Our cause, the Palestinian question, does not have a specific international character. Our cause is not the cause of Russia, the United States, or Britain. It is my cause and yours. It is our cause as Arabs. The entire Arab nation should act on this basis. If we allow the Palestinian question to enter the market of international bargaining we will not be serving the welfare of our nation. Our cause should be held more sacred than this. It is an Arab cause. It is the cause of all our past and recent martyres. We must build, like our enemy does, on scientific bases. The battle is one of science, of technology, and of sound tactics, of understanding, brains, and ideas. It is not a battle of anarchy and of war by radio broadcasts.

3--The entity of Jordan--with both banks--is sacred. We believe in it in the same way we believe in our God and religion. We will never agree to abandon this sacred unity. The Western Bank is dear and precious and a twin of this (east--ed!) bank.

I have the pleasure to state that our sons in the occupied bank are aware of the dimensions of the setback and the tragedy. They are now living under the coercion, force, blusterings, and occupation of the Jews. However, they will not abandon their faith in the integrity of the two banks. I received letters this morning from some of our brothers in the afflicted bank saying that their morale is high, thank God, and that all the enemy's attempts to arouse their greed and to intimidate them and compel them to adopt a policy conflicting with the integrity of the Jordanian entity have failed. The only exceptions are a few fainthearted people who do not deserve to be part of us. They can be counted on the fingers of one hand. The hearts of our brothers in the Western Bank are with us, and our hearts are with them. They await the time when they will be rid of the (slavery) of the Enemies and return to the motherland. In their letters, which I received this morning, they said that the enemy is doing its level best to convince or compel some of the landlords in Jerusalem to sell their property. Some of our vigilant youth contacted all the landlords and warned them that the sale of one grain of the soil of Jerusalem will be punished by death, even though the one who exacts this punishment knows he himself may be killed.

July 5 Jumah statement  
(cont'd)

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If the Arabs do not consider facts loyally and honestly, if they do not try to study the extent of the setback differently than in the past, and if they do not draw up the correct scientific plans for the new mobilization for the coming battle, we will not score a victory. The King continues to call for a summit conference. What use is a conference on a lower level? This state of affairs should not continue. The call for a summit conference is a national, moral, and humanitarian one to which we adhere, and on which we insist. We hope the Arab leaders will become aware of the dangers still encircling them. The enemy has long-term plans. The battle we have waged with him will not be the last. The enemy has treacherous, expansionist ideas. If the Arab rank continues in its weakness and disunity, the enemy will occupy the Arab states one after the other and impose on them his tyranny and arrogance--which no Arab national feeling can endure.

The political battle is still being waged; it has not ended yet. The United Nations has failed to vote for either of the two resolutions before it, but this will not end the problem. It is the duty of the Arab nation and the Arab states as well as the human conscience to be aware of the case of the displaced persons and the refugees--refugees for the second time--and to draw up an early solution embodying their return.

We have great hope that the nearly unanimous world opinion in support of the Arab right regarding the necessity for the withdrawal of the invading armies to the area they came from will soon be given practical effect. As I said, the battle concerns us before anybody else. We must appear before the world as one solid rank, and we must give up the deception with which we have lived for 19 years.

There are several examples of this attitude. I do not wish to mention names. Today I support the new efforts of my colleagues in the Arab states to unify ranks. But I wish to tell you that we ourselves have been giving ammunition to the enemy. Before the battle he was able to unify world opinion against us. I do not wish to accuse or attack anyone, but I bitterly and painfully state that we ourselves reveal our vulnerable spots to the enemy. We gave them the information which they exploited to mislead world opinion.

World opinion believes that Israel is a small country in the midst of a hostile Arab world which is always seeking to throw it in the sea. World opinion sides with the underdog. All major information media in the United States are under Zionist influence. The three national television networks are owned by Jews. The major dailies--the NEW YORK TIMES, WASHINGTON POST, and the HERALD TRIBUNE are owned by Jews. During and after the battle the Jews have dominated and manipulated world opinion. Regrettably, we help them, give them the excuses, and provide them with the means which insure the success of their propaganda campaigns.

The unified Arab command was created by the summit conferences to build and plan on a scientific and technical basis. Our battle with the enemy is one of armies, as has been proved. It is a battle of technology, aircraft, and airspace. How can we expect any results if we think of a popular war of liberation in the face of the huge enemy air fleets? It is only through reunion, solidarity, unity, military strength, and advanced technology that we can hope to achieve good results. We cannot achieve any gains over the enemy without all this. If we seek the welfare of our nation, we must face the facts. The battle is one of soldiers, wars, commanders, and armies. The final victory is for those who have faith. What harmed the Arab nation is its abandonment of its faith--its Islam and religion.

July 5 Jurnah statement  
(cont'd)

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The government works day and night to achieve unity for our brothers, the citizens. The government had done its level best to carry out its duty in the best manner. Rumors will not dishearten anyone. Some of the sons of our country spread rumors to divide ranks at a time when we must stand united.

As for the political situation, I declare that right is on our side. Each one of us is prepared to die fighting for our rights. We will never abandon our rights. The political situation is good. It is in fact excellent. The citizens are vigilant. But the group which is not vigilant is the one which spreads false rumors. They say the Arab army did not fight well in such and such a place, as though they took part in the battle themselves. They also say that such and such an officer was defeated. This is a spiteful campaign. It is easy to criticize others. But only the person who lived through the battle has the right to criticize.

If we are good citizens, we must dress our wounds and seek the correct way to lead us to our rights. It is our duty to call for Arab unity, the mobilization of all Arab resources and capacities. We must call for a meeting of Arab leaders. The Arab people must insist, press, even force Arab leaders to sit down together to work and plan. The question is one of science. The states on the inner ring--militarily speaking, the states surrounding Israel--must prepare themselves militarily and technically. But these states cannot make such preparations if the states on the outer ring, particularly the petroleum states, do not place their resources in the service of the states on the inner ring. This is what the Arabs should plan.

We have very huge resources. If we had been able to convince the states on the outer ring to place all their resources in the service of the states on the inner ring, I assure you, the battle would have gone differently. The only thing the Jordanian Army lacked was air cover. Had this air cover been provided, our forces could have reached Tel Aviv. I am sure of this.

There was no defeat. We lost a battle because the Arab nation did not make the right assessment. It did not organize its ranks properly. But we place great hope in the future.

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**MINISTER FEARS ISRAEL WILL HOLD JERUSALEM**

Beirut RNS in Arabic 1830 GMT 5 July 1967--M (FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

(Text) Beirut--Lebanese Information Minister Michel Iddih affirmed this evening that the struggle for the sake of Jerusalem "will be difficult because the Zionists will not abandon their prey." Iddih was commenting on the resolution adopted by the U.N. General Assembly last night on the illegality of the annexation of Jerusalem to Israel.

He said: "The beneficial effects of this decision have been completely obliterated by the painful feelings aroused by the shameful maneuvers and bargaining and the subsequent U.N. rejection of the draft resolution calling for the immediate withdrawal of Zionist forces from Arab territory." Iddih declared that the resolution on the illegality of the annexation of Jerusalem to Israel "makes one believe there is still hope to appeal to the world conscience to work to rescue Jerusalem and to force the United Nations to refuse to accept the crime committed by the Zionists against the Holy Land." Iddih went on to say that it is feared that this resolution "will not be applied and will meet the same fate the many previous resolutions have met because Israel refuses to abide by them."

Once again, Iddih explained that the political battle with Israel has just started and that the Arab states must be aware that Israel "uses every means, particularly the huge financial means at its disposal, to win this battle." He asked the Arab and world peoples to realize "the seriousness of the Zionist aggression and the extent of the horrible danger to which the Holy Land is exposed."

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ESHKOL GRANTS INTERVIEW TO WEST GERMAN PAPER

Hamburg DIE WELT 5 July 1967--G

(Exclusive interview with Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol)

(Excerpt) Question: Are you prepared to accept U.N. help in the solution of problems stemming from the current situation?

Answer: This depends on what problems you have in mind. I believe that the past 20 years have proven that the United Nations has not been successful as a peace preserving mediator in the Middle East. It did not prevent elements for infiltrating across Israel's borders and committing acts of sabotage and murder. The United Nations was unable to influence Egypt to desist from the illegal blockade of the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aquaba. Special units of U.N. troops which had temporarily played a role in preserving peace on the Israeli-Egyptian border and maintaining free passage in the Gulf of Aqaba in the end proved to be a dummy which Abd an-Nasir was able to remove with one fell swoop. Over night he pushed the entire Middle East to the brink of war.

The 1949 armistice agreements did not amount to much either. From the very beginning, the Arab states refused to recognize their fundamental prerequisite, that is, the fact that these agreements were intended to serve as a transition to peace between Israel and the Arab states. On the other hand, there are regions, including the Middle East, where the United Nations has essentially contributed to economic progress and people's welfare and can continue to do so to a great extent. In this connection, I have in mind the settlement of refugees. Today, as before, Israel is ready to contribute its share to an international fund and thus to solve this problem once and for all. Actually, it is much less a financial problem than a matter of genuine good will on all sides to cooperate in achieving a solution that would be in accordance with the interests of the refugees themselves.

Question: What specific proposals to you have to offer the Arab people in territories now occupied by Israel?

Answer: It is still too early to speak of specific proposals. At the moment, it is our aim in administering territory inhabited by Arabs to restore normal life as quickly as possible. As foreign newsmen and other visitors have been able to see with their own eyes, this aim is being accomplished. Vital services, such as the supply of water, electricity, bread, and milk, were restored immediately after the termination of hostilities in cooperation with local officials. All public services are again fully operative. Most shops and trade enterprises are open. Churches and holy places are again accessible to visitors and worshipers. During the fighting, Israeli troops had strict orders to make absolutely certain that religious shrines were not damaged in any way.

Question: You stated in a speech to the Knesset that a new situation had been created which could lead to direct negotiations with the Arab states. What basis do you suggest for these negotiations? Are you ready to talk with everybody, including President Abd an-Nasir?



July 5 Eshkol interview  
(cont'd)

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Answer: Israel has not changed its attitude toward this question. I am willing to meet with any leader of the Arab world, including President Abd an-Nasir and King Husayn, to begin negotiations without preconditions. Recognition of our right of existence must not be viewed as such a precondition. I am convinced that events in the Middle East will prove me right, namely that such direct negotiations between Israel and the Arab states offer the only hope of escape from a seemingly hopeless dead end.

Question: In recent times, you repeatedly pointed out that in the beginning the Soviet Union was among those that had supported Israel. Do you believe an atmosphere of mutual understanding will develop between Israel and the Soviet Union?

Answer: Yes, I have always been an optimist. An atmosphere of mutual understanding between Israel and the Soviet Union is possible as soon as the Soviet Union decides to work toward achieving harmony among countries of the Middle East instead of encouraging certain Arab states to wage war against Israel. That a change in Soviet policy is conceivable is proved by the fact that the present Soviet foreign minister at the U.N. Security Council meeting on 21 May 1948 called the Arab attack on Israel of 15 May 1948 a "threat to peace aimed at suppression of the national liberation movement in Palestine."

DAYAN: GAZA STRIP WILL BECOME PART OF ISRAEL

Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1830 GMT 5 July 1967--M

(Text) Defense Minister Moshe Dayan announced today that steps will be taken to turn the Gaza Strip into a part of the state of Israel. He said that beginning next week Gaza inhabitants will be allowed to move freely inside Israel under permits granted by the military government and that there will be regular transportation to and from the town of Gaza. The defense ministry today toured Gaza town and other places in the strip. He made his statement at a press conference after this tour.

Asked about curfew arrangements, the minister said that because a large quantity of arms remains in Gaza and because Egyptian soldiers and fedayeen are still among the inhabitants, abolition of the curfew would have a negative effect. General security conditions in Gaza are satisfactory, he said. Economic and social life is still partially paralyzed but will be restored gradually.

Asked about the travel of Gaza inhabitants abroad, he said a solution to the passport problem will be found for anyone who wishes to travel and who receives a permit to do so. Regarding welfare problems, he said the Israeli welfare office will help Gaza inhabitants just as it helps other inhabitants of the state. As for shops, most of which are still closed, he said they will be opened in due course as their owners decide to resume business.

Dayan said the removal of barriers between Gaza and other parts of the country will revive the town. The Gaza Strip is Israel, he said, and it should become a part of the body of the state.

## Further Report

Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 2000 GMT 5 July 1967--M

(Text) Defense Minister Moshe Dayan announced today that beginning next week Gaza Strip inhabitants will be able to visit the Western Bank with permits which will be granted without any difficulty. As of next week, he said, bus and taxi services will run between the Gaza Strip and the Western Bank.

Minister Dayan made this statement at a meeting with notables from Gaza and Khan Yunis during his tour of the strip today. He also said that as of next week banks will start operating in the Gaza Strip and funds will be transferred to make economic activity possible. Curfew hours will be reduced to the time from 1900 to 0400 and might be further reduced. Fishing activities, which were stopped during the war, will be resumed during the daytime.

In his meeting with notables, mukhtars, and representatives of Gaza Strip refugees, Minister Dayan said Israel would welcome the continuation of financial aid received by many inhabitants of the strip from relatives in other Arab countries. But he expressed doubt that the Arab states would allow the transfer of such funds to Israel. Continuing his tour, the defense minister met with members of the Taza and Khan Yunis municipal councils. They briefed him on their problems. He advised them to open shops in the towns as soon as possible and to restore economic life to normal.

The defense minister also met U.N. Relief and Works Agency and CARE representatives. They expressed their thanks for the cooperation of the Israeli Defense Forces, which had made it possible for them to continue their activities. They promised to participate in the effort to revive economic life in the Gaza Strip. Among other things, they said they would be ready to supply food rations to needy persons who were not among those previously receiving assistance.

## GOVERNMENT CONDEMNS ISRAELI WAR CRIMES

Baghdad Domestic Service in Arabic 1500 GMT 5 July 1967--M

(Summary) The Iraqi Government issued the following official statement today:

"The Zionists and their aggressive army continue to commit brutal and inhuman crimes against innocent Arab civilians in the Arab lands that have been exposed to the treacherous aggression." The Zionists carry out indiscriminate collective murders. They violate sacred places, use internationally banned weapons such as napalm bombs, and force citizens to leave their homes and seek refuge in neighboring Arab states.

"The brutality of these acts surpasses that of the fascist crimes and barbaric acts committed by Nazi war criminals. The brutal torture and undignified treatment of the prisoners of the treacherous aggression indicate that the army and authorities of the Zionist aggression openly violate the Geneva Convention and all international charters and obligations." This affirms the criminal and aggressive spirit of the Zionists. It shows that the Zionists do not abide by international charters.

"The government of the Iraqi Republic condemns these criminal and barbaric acts and calls on the International Red Cross and all international organizations that believe in humane principles to intervene with determination to put an end to these crimes that are being committed against innocent people." The government calls on these organizations to carry out their duties toward the victims of the aggression and to take the necessary steps to prevent the violation of international conventions.

Bombay PTI in English 1237 GMT 6 July 1967--B (FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY) 118

(Text) United Nations, New York--UAR Vice Premier Mahmud Fawzi has said that Arab states would be willing to recognize Israel if Israel ended its aggression and, after a U.N. supervised plebiscite among 1 million Palestinian refugees, took back all those who wanted to go back to their own homelands in Palestine, from where they had been expelled 20 years ago.

Talking informally to Indian newsmen yesterday, Fawzi repeatedly paid tribute to India for its support to the UAR and other Arab countries not merely on grounds of friendship but on grounds of principles and international morality.

Fawzi said there were only two possibilities for the Middle East: one was the approach based on common sense so that "we would all together, with everybody around without exclusion, cooperate in such a way and to such an extent that we could all together honorably build things up instead of tearing things down." The other alternative was the possibility that things might explode and get out of hand and out of the reach of everyone.

In a frank talk, during which he replied to questions, Fawzi said the Arabs should not be expected to accept the principle that the Israelis had the right to come back to Palestine after thousands of years, while the Palestinian Arabs, 1 million in number, could be driven out of their lands by the Israelis and not be allowed to go back there after 20 years. At the outset, Fawzi said he wanted to express how much the Arabs and the UAR appreciated the "wise, moral and farsighted cooperation of India, Indian leaders and government, and Indian diplomats."

"We appreciate it more, particularly because we are aware of the difficulties India is encountering. Despite these difficulties India did not hesitate even one minute to sustain principles of proper behavior in international relations. We shall never forget it. We are particularly heartened by our clear understanding and feeling that the Indian support for our stands does not flow exclusively, welcome though it is to us, from the fact of our friendship, but is solidly and morally based on India's conviction that we are right and our stand is based on proper principles."

Fawzi said in its immediate setting the outcome of the U.N. General Assembly debates so far was "suffocating," but in the sweep of history it was encouraging. He said the Arabs were bearing heavy burdens today. They could no doubt easily become economically and materially much better, but this was not worth anything if they lost their independence and dignity. The UAR vice premier was asked whether it could ever be envisaged that the Arabs would accept Israel and recognize it.

Fawzi said there were many "misconceptions" in this matter. It was first said that tiny Israel's security was being threatened. However, what had been shown in the last 20 years was that if there was any insecurity it was that of Arab states and peoples and not the other way round.

Noting the U.S. arguments that Arabs must recognize Israel, Fawzi said the United States had not recognized China even though it accounted for one-fifth of humanity. This was the United States' sovereign right to do so. What the Arabs could be told was not that they should recognize Israel, but that they must not commit "aggression" on Israel. They had not done so and, as facts showed twice in 10 years, it was Israel which had committed aggression.

On the question of ending "belligerency," Fawzi said the practical way for this was for Israel to end its aggression. Asking the Arabs to end the belligerency now would really mean that they should expel 1 million Palestinians, deprive them of their property, and so forth. This no Arab state could do. The UAR and the Arabs did not want their area to be one of strife but of peace. But this must be based on a modicum of acceptance of international morality and law, he said.

TEXT OF PARIS INTERVIEW WITH KING HUSAYN

Hamburg Domestic Television Service in German 2118 GMT 5 July 1967--G

(Interview by German correspondents with King Husayn--recorded in Paris, in English with simultaneous German translation)

(Text) Question: Jordan falls within the sphere of influence of Syria, Egypt, and Israel. Hence my first question, which I also asked the Israeli foreign minister. Your majesty, Israel has won the war, and your country has been affected most adversely. Do you believe that a new war will be necessary in order to create lasting peace in the Middle East?

Answer: Another war will probably not be necessary. This war would not have been necessary had the Palestine problem been justly solved. Justice is a prerequisite for peace. It is now our hope that when the situation which existed before 5 June is restored and traces of the conflict are removed with the support of the entire world, we can then find a beginning for a just and honest solution of the Palestine tragedy and, consequently, for peace.

Question: There has again been shooting at the Suez Canal. Do you consider the continuation of Soviet arms deliveries to Egypt and Syria a new aggravation of the Mideast situation?

Answer: For some time I have not been precisely informed about developments outside of Jordan. I am doing everything possible to convene a meeting of Arab heads of state. This is extremely important now. In order to make decisions for the future, we need to very thoroughly analyze recent tragic events. These events, in my opinion, were caused by our own faults and errors. We did not properly represent our case to the world. Whereas we Arabs in 1948, 1956, and 1967 have retreated under pressure, the world unfortunately considers us to be sabre rattlers who intended to endanger not only the existing situation in the Middle East but also world peace. These are some of our past errors. Of course, losses must be made good. However, our precise future steps must be determined at an Arab summit conference. We must maintain and not lose the identity of the Arabs after all that has happened.

Question: Some days ago Israel permitted Jordanian refugees to return. Do you consider this a conciliatory gesture, or otherwise? If you are informed on this matter, what effects do you think it will have?

Answer: Since 5 June I have repeatedly appealed to my fellow-countrymen on the Western Bank of the Jordan to remain in their homes and on their land and to endure hardship and difficulties. They left under pressure during the fighting. Many of their cities, villages, and houses were destroyed. The Western Bank was sacked. Famine and fear prevailed. We tried to induce some or all of them to go back, but we did not succeed. We tried through the International Red Cross. I now learn that our people may return to their houses and country. This is (only right.). I welcome this new development and hope that it will be successful.

Question: Do you believe that the Arabs and Israelis will remain tied to the big-power interests of Washington and Moscow for a long time to come, or that they will soon be able to follow their own road?

Husayn interview  
(cont'd)

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Answer: This interests me a great deal. In fact, this was one of the reasons why I wanted an Arab summit immediately after the fighting had ended. Thus we would have been able to go to the United Nations, which, after all, is an organization to which people turn to present a case and seek justice. We would have been able to present Arab interests and our opinion. I hope that we shall be able to do so in the future, to be more specific, that we shall be able to do so before the world. I also hope that we in our part of the world can remain what we are, able to cope with future problems and our responsibility. What I hope for following recent events is a new Arab world, a new perspective, a better future. However, our problems... (sentence not rpt not finished--ed.). We need help and support from all other peoples of the world. We need friendship. However, we need support for an attitude in which we believe and which we determine in the Arab world.

Question: Do you believe that direct talks between the Arab states and Israel, as suggested by Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban, should be held, or would you prefer mediation by the big powers?

Answer: I would like to make one thing very clear. At the present stage, I consider it extremely difficult to contemplate negotiations as long as the results of what took place in June remain as they are--as long as there is still occupation of Jordan, Syria, and other places in the Arab world. A prerequisite, a first step, must be the guarantee of a swift return to the situation which existed prior to 5 June. Furthermore, I am willing to do my best to insure that the Arab world and its leaders, when they meet very soon, will outline their policy and thus be able to face the difficult task as well prepared as possible. I do not know exactly how contacts will be established during efforts to find a solution to the entire problem. This is very important. Another point is that we must not only deal with 5 June but with the entire problem and its human aspect. It is a tragedy which began in 1948 and continues today. Only when we, as a group of Arab states, cannot agree on pursuing a joint policy will the responsibility remain with Jordan alone or with each individual Arab country. In the interests of the Arab world and its future, I am fully convinced that we must succeed in developing an all-Arab policy with which we can solve the difficult tasks we face.

Question: Will the Islamic world be able to accept the loss of Jerusalem? Do you think that it will be possible to give this city international status? What is your opinion in general about the future of the holy places?

Answer: Jerusalem, Arab Jerusalem, the Western Bank of the Jordan, is part of our country. We live there. It is also an entrusted property of the Moslems which has been in Arab hands for more than 1,000 years. It is the place which attracts all those who believe in God. Had there been no state of war or injustice and had a just peace and an honorable and acceptable solution for the Palestine problem been possible, it would have been easy for the three great religions to meet in Jerusalem, as had been the case for centuries. We shall do our best to recover Jerusalem. We hope that there will be a just and honorable solution to the entire problem and that we shall in the future, too, enjoy the privilege of guarding the holy places for the world and mankind.

Husayn interview  
(cont'd)

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Question: It has been suggested in Israel that an Arab buffer state be set up west of the Jordan. This would demand a territorial sacrifice by you. Would this idea be acceptable to you if it were linked with close economic cooperation between Israel and Jordan?

Answer: The western and eastern banks of the Jordan are one and the same. It is one country and one people which developed into one family. We built it from ruins, and it is now in ruins again. However it is a single entity and will remain as such. We shall not agree to any other solution.

Question: Would Jordan not be in a better position today if it had abstained from concluding the pact with Egypt shortly before the outbreak of war?

Answer: The pact was, in fact, within the framework of the defense agreements which encompassed all Arab states. We regarded Israel as a bridgehead which was about to expand. In the past, Israel had repeatedly attacked Jordan for what had originated in Syria, as it claimed. In its clashes with us, Israel was always in the position of striking with all its force in one direction and then, after it had turned around, of operating in another direction. Up to now there had been no solution to the Palestine problem. At some places we were only 12 kilometers from the sea. We had made mistakes in the Arab world, and it was therefore certain that the war would come. We saw it coming. It was our duty to do everything possible, not only for ourselves as leaders but for our people as well.

In view of the imminent danger we had to coordinate our moves at least in order to avert disaster, if at all possible. However, if the worst were to come, we would at least have been able to meet it in such a manner that the damage would be kept to a minimum. The Arab world was not prepared for the war. It was badly prepared even for defense. This is the tragedy about which the world never knew. Unfortunately, nothing functioned, and a gigantic catastrophe took place from which, we hope, something good will result.

Question: Israel regards its territorial gains as pawns. How do you believe Israel can be induced to give back this territory?

Answer: I do not know. If Israel further claims that it wants peace, the way to achieve it is certainly not for Israel to be further present in our countries--in Jordan, Syria, and the UAR. We are not defeated. We fought under extremely difficult conditions. However, as things are now, Israel is not interested in peace. It may perhaps be that all of us shall die in the struggle for our rights in the very near future. Under certain circumstances, there would be no other course or choice for us, and we would not be the guilty ones. Perhaps we shall be successful in reconquering our homeland, perhaps we will die in the effort. I do not know. However, if we continue to live, we shall do so in honor and dignity or not at all. We cannot recognize as final what took place this time.

Question: Is it your opinion that the United Nations is the appropriate instrument for the establishment and safeguarding of a new order in the Middle East?

Husayn interview  
(cont'd)

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Answer: As a result of this crisis, the United Nations is facing a very difficult problem. It is a question of whether it will be the body where people can or cannot obtain justice. I seriously believe that the failure to solve the Middle East conflict would mean that might ranked above justice and mankind had returned to the laws of the jungle. In this case, it would be very difficult to support and even to live in our world. What has taken place in the United Nations could become a very dangerous precedent. I hope that the United Nations will continue to exist and always be the place where people can find justice and look for ways and means of solving their problems.

Question: In the long run, do you see a possibility of peaceful coexistence in the Mideast between Arabs and Israelis?

Answer: I believe that this depends on several factors. One is of course the Arab attitude. I hope that we shall be able within a short time to present a positive case, which will at least represent us to the world as we really are. As for the other factors, above all Israel, its inhabitants, and their plans and the world as a whole, which side will they take? Will they work for justice or what? I believe that if there were to be a just and honorable solution to the entire Palestine tragedy, the situation would normalize and stabilize, and we would be able to concentrate our efforts on establishment of a better future for all people living in the Arab world and our entire area.

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INFORMATION MINISTERS MEETING--Information Minister Salah Abu Zayd has cabled the Arab League Secretariat Jordan's approval of an emergency conference of Arab information ministers at any time and date agreed upon by the sisterly states.  
(Amman Domestic Arabic 1600 GMT 6 July 1967--M)

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INTERVIEW WITH FOREIGN MINISTER ABBA EBAN

Hamburg Domestic Television Service in German 2055 GMT 5 July 1967--G

(Interview with Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban--recorded in New York, in English with simultaneous German translation)

(Text) Question: The military blitzkrieg is now followed by an all-out diplomatic campaign to reshape the Middle East. It is an open question which of the campaigns will prove more difficult. You yourself have said that Israel, after having won the war, must now win the peace. How do you plan to accomplish this?

Answer: Israel's successful resistance to the threat was only the first step on the road to final victory. We waged a defensive war, but we have not yet won the peace. The next step must be negotiations. We see the issue in three phases--a cease-fire, which has been accomplished, negotiations; and peace. In other words, the effect that the confrontation of our armies had on the Arabs and our thinking should make both of us realize that peace is necessary.

Question: A world reaction is slowly developing against Israel's territorial expansion at the expense of the Arab countries. What does Israel actually want to retain?

Answer: I am not certain that there is a real volume of opinion in favor of the former status quo. It was disclosed at the General Assembly that most of the states which did not side with the Arab states from the very beginning, in other words, neither Arab nor communist states, feel that we should establish a new system of relations and not return to the old. The Security Council and influential opinion within the General Assembly are against a return to the former system. Thus our objectives are peace and security. Sometimes this may include territorial changes. Sometimes peace and security can be achieved without territorial changes. I do not now intend to explain our territorial proposals. However, if we were able to negotiate with our Arab neighbors, we would submit moderate, justified, practicable, and honorable proposals that would take into account the requirements of both sides and the need for a common peaceful future in the Middle East.

Question: Do you believe the United States and the Soviet Union should gradually withdraw from the Middle East politically and militarily? Or do you proceed from the view that Israel is, and the Arabs will remain, pawns of the antagonistic interests of these two big powers for a long time to come?

Answer: I do not feel any military presence of the two powers in the Middle East. When we were in serious danger in late May and early June, we failed to see any possibility of intervention in our favor, and I do not believe intervention against us is possible. I feel that in wide parts of the world the opinion is gathering ground that the parties involved should solve the problem of their coexistence.



The big powers could exert a moderating influence in the direction of peace. They could do much to prevent a war. However, to achieve peace, the sovereign will and interests of the parties involved should become active. For this reason, I welcomed President Johnson's statement at the opening of the special General Assembly session, because he said that the parties involved are themselves primarily responsible for the establishment of conditions of coexistence.

Question: What are the motives for the unfriendly attitude of General de Gaulle toward your country?

Answer: I would not use that word in describing President de Gaulle's attitude toward us. For the first time in many years, there are differences of view. We have often had such differences with friendly countries. In each case, they were overcome within the shortest possible time. For example, in 1956 there was a profound contradiction between the concepts of the United States and Israel. At the time, however, I also never spoke of an unfriendly United States. Within a short time, U.S.-Israeli relations were returned to their previous good standing. I hope this will also be the case this time with France.

The actual problem is obviously that President de Gaulle hoped we would rely on a four-power meeting instead of defending ourselves. This is what he said to me in Paris on 24 May. I recall his words: "The four must coordinate their policies." At the time I doubted this, and today there is all the more reason for doubting that all the powers desire a coordination of policy. It is a fact that Premier Kosygin has shown total disinterest in any meeting and has not even mentioned actions within a four-power framework. The differences in view can be traced to the fact that President de Gaulle believes diplomatic means existed within the four-power framework, whereas we believed at the time when we were besieged, blocked, threatened with impending destruction, and nearly ruined by the concentrated hostility of our neighbors that we had only one way open, namely to resist. I am absolutely certain that at the time we acted in Israel's interests, just as President de Gaulle would have acted in France's interests, had France been besieged, threatened, and subjected to a blockade of force along its entire southern coast.

Question: Is internationalization of the old part of Jerusalem acceptable to the Israeli Government?

Answer: In our thinking and policy, we have always separated territorial problems from the problem of the holy places. We have always said that we recognize a universal interest in the holy places, and since 1950 we have pointed out different ways of solving this problem. This is still our view. Taking international religious interests into account, we wish to prepare a system of agreements that would satisfy both sides. This concerns the inviolability and sanctity of the holy places and free access to them. The former regime--do not forget this--the Jordanian regime, which had taken possession of its part of Jerusalem with the claim of a conqueror, never offered any sort of international guarantee for maintenance of the integrity of the holy places. The former regime failed to permit free access to all religions save two. It practiced religious discrimination at the holy places and turned Jerusalem into a military border territory and battlefield. This will not happen again. Jerusalem is now united and not divided. Jerusalem now has peace and not a frontline. There is now access to the holy places for all religions and not just for two.

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(cont'd)

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Question: You just spoke of this, but permit me to refer to it again. What is actually your program for direct peace negotiations with the Arabs? Do you have minimum demands, such as, for example, demilitarization of the Sinai Peninsula or the Syrian border area? Or are there further demands which are inevitable as far as you are concerned?

Answer: It is very unusual for a foreign minister to negotiate in public, and this, if I understand it right, is no private conversation. In general, I would like to state that we demand peace of every Arab state, which means a peace treaty. It is a matter of course that the countries involved have in a peace treaty an interest in avoiding the direct confrontation of armies. It is thus a constructive idea to keep Sinai free of troops. If we regard our relations with Egypt now from the standpoint of peace, freedom of navigation in the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba are certainly a consequence of peace. The problems emanating from an Egyptian-Israeli peace settlement are thus not very involved. The following must be guaranteed: separation of our armies so that they will not confront one another, in other words, demilitarization of the Sinai Peninsula, internationalization of the waterways, and the maintenance of normal relations.

Question: Do you believe the Glassboro summit between President Johnson and Premier Kosygin has already influenced political detente in the Middle East, that is, a political settlement of the crisis?

Answer: The Glassboro conference was useful only in one respect: It disclosed that there are clearly contradicting concepts between the United States and the USSR. The Soviet Union obviously proposed an automatic return to the situation that had provoked the war, in other words, a recipe for new hostilities. On the other hand, the United States proposed to regard the question of a troop withdrawal within the large framework of a general regulation. These are the views explained to the United Nations by the two governments. As far as I could learn, nothing happened in Glassboro that could bridge these two differing views. When the General Assembly resumed its sessions after the Glassboro meeting, there were no obvious changes in the attitudes of the two powers.

Question: Do you regard continuation of Soviet arms deliveries to Egypt as a new aggravation of the Middle East situation?

Answer: This is indeed one of the main reasons for current tension and anxiety in our country. The Soviet Union is to a considerable extent responsible for the Middle East crisis, because in 1955 it began an enforced arms race that led to destructive results. Following the cease-fire, the Soviet Union is again delivering enormous quantities of weapons to Egypt instead of helping to strengthen the armistice. Perhaps it is doing this to encourage Egypt to resume hostilities. For this reason, I deemed it necessary to tell the General Assembly that whereas one cause of tension is the hostility of the Arab states toward Israel, the fact that one of the big powers, instead of pursuing a well-balanced policy, is identifying itself with the militant policy of the Arab states vis-a-vis Israel is another cause which is just as serious as the first. This was clear to us prior to the resumption of the arms deliveries. However, the enormous arms deliveries again show that the Soviet Union still fails to use its influence in favor of peace and still speculates on tension in the Middle East.

Eban interview  
(Cont'd)

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Question: Can we proceed from the fact that Israel intends to establish an Arab buffer state west of the Jordan perhaps with the aim of a confederation between this autonomous region and itself?

Answer: I know of such arguments by many of my friends in Israel. I can only state in this respect that the Israeli Government has not adopted any such decision. To us, relations with Egypt and Syria are much less of a problem. Relations between Israel and Jordan and the question of the Western Bank of the Jordan are much more complicated. The idea mentioned by you is one possible way of tackling the problem. There are other problems. For example, new negotiations concerning relations with the King of Jordan and the Jordanian Government. This time, however, such settlement must lead to peace. For this reason, the borders for which we are striving should be lasting borders and not fragile armistice lines.

Question: You are known throughout the world as a moderate politician. To what extent are you in agreement with your colleagues in the cabinet, particularly with General Dayan?

Answer: By calling me a moderate politician, you have not actually done me a good service. Everything at the right time as the prophet says. At times one must fight and at other times not. I have never thought dogmatically in this connection. I am in full agreement with the defense measures introduced by my government. Despite reports to the contrary, Mr. Dayan and I have had no divergent views in any discussion or in any vote since his appointment to the cabinet.

Question: Are you able to tell us and clearly define what aggression means in the Middle East? There are so many people who maintain that Israel was the attacking country, while others say that the Arabs are to be blamed for everything.

Answer: What happened during those three weeks in May? The Egyptian Government was the first to concentrate troops in Sinai. It gave orders to attack Israeli airports, proclaimed that it regarded itself as being in a state of war with Israel, declared that it was seeking Israel's destruction by physical force, imposed a blockade of Israel's southern coast, concluded agreements with other Arab states and asked them to participate in the slaughter of Israel, daily undertook reconnaissance flights preparatory to bombing our airports, and on 5 June attacked us by air and on the ground. How one can have any doubt at all about Egypt's responsibility for this aggression I can hardly imagine. Just imagine that you are peacefully sitting at home and some one comes in, closes all doors and windows, disrupts the telephone line, holds a machinegun to your throat, and announces that he will pull the trigger at the first opportunity. When you push the machinegun aside, you would be rather surprised if you were accused of aggression.

Question: Do you believe that the East European countries support Soviet Middle East policy without reservation?

Answer: We have evidence that not all of them do so. At U.N. Headquarters I had talks with the Rumanian Premier and foreign minister. The Premier spoke at the U.N. General Assembly. All this shows an absolutely deviating attitude. The Rumanian Government advocates settlement through direct negotiations and did not join in the Soviet Union's sharp condemnation of Israel.

Eban' interview  
(cont'd)

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We previously had very cordial relations with other governments in East Europe which were expanding each day. It is my impression that many of these governments adopted the Soviet position under the pressure of relationships within the Warsaw Pact. I do not believe that they in their hearts accept the doctrine that Israel is the aggressor.

Question: Would the United Nations be a suitable instrument for safeguarding peace in the Middle East?

Answer: This question faces us with the problem of the United Nations itself. It functions through various organs, notably the Security Council. Here, the Soviet Union applies an automatic veto to any resolution directed against the Arab cause. I have in mind the vetoes thus far. An innocuous irrigation project--vetoed by the Soviet Union. An expression of regret over the Suez Canal blockade--vetoed by the Soviet Union. Some mild criticism of Syria because of the killing of Israeli farmers on Israeli territory--vetoed by the Soviet Union. A very cautious and moderate condemnation by the majority of Security Council members of Syrian terrorist acts committed on Israeli territory--another veto.

In other words, the Security Council has been and continues to be in a state of paralysis. With its one vote in the General Assembly, Israel faces a Soviet-Arab bloc with at least 30 votes. This is in no way a balanced tribunal based on justice. The United Nations can hardly play a role this way. The only alternative would be for it to support a dialog and contacts among the countries directly involved. The question is: What is the United Nations? an instrument for solving conflicts or an arena for waging them?

Question: What will happen in the Middle East when, in one or two decades, 3 million Israelis are confronted with 200 million Arabs? Do you see better opportunities in the future for a reconciliation than now exist?

Answer: We do not accept the quantitative judgments of the relative balance of power. However, we are after all now 2.7 million Israelis against 100 million Arabs. By the time you mentioned, we shall be 4 to 5 million against 200 million. We have demonstrated that an assessment of the balance of power must take into account other factors as well--resolve, technical capabilities, and the desire to live. I do not believe our fate is influenced by arithmetic. However, I do say that we have a vital interest in establishing a harmonious coexistence with the Arab world in which we live.

In order to demonstrate one's desire for coexistence, one must first prove one's ability to exist. We have accomplished half of our task. We have demonstrated that Israel is a reality which must be taken into account. I believe that Arab thinking must be impressed with the strength and tenacity of Israel's existence. As the next step, we must proceed from the demonstration of our existence to the coexistence which we desire. We can do this, I believe, with the support of the world public by erasing from Arab thinking the illusion that Israel is a transient phenomenon. We are not transient. We are a part of the Middle East, a part of its past, a part of its present reality, and a part of its future destiny.

ESHKOL EXPRESSES VIEW ON SOVIET ARMS FOR UAR

Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1100 GMT 7 July 1967--M

(Text) Prime Minister Levi Eshkol has said that the political battle has not yet ended and there is still much to be done. Israel will have other serious struggles in the international political arena and should remain alert. In a special interview published today in YEDIOT AHARONOT, the Prime Minister added that if the Soviet Union continues to rearm Egypt, Algeria, and Syria with large quantities of the best weapons, the French embargo will have serious and dangerous implications. If the embargo continues unilaterally, Israel must look for other ways to strengthen itself, Eshkol said. The Prime Minister pointed out that the refugee problem is now undergoing intensive study. He said a committee composed of experts in various fields is now engaged in preparing a comprehensive plan to solve the problem of refugees living in territories under Israel's authority. He said he has no objection to Israel's considering this problem even before peace with the neighboring countries is achieved. What can be done now, Eshkol said, should be done immediately. He stated that the committee's work will take several months. He added that first and foremost Israel must find out how many refugees are there.

Asked about the possibility of certain supervision of the churches over the holy places, the Prime Minister said if this is the Vatican's request, Israel will probably agree to it, at least to prove its willingness and readiness to maintain the sanctity of the holy places according to the Vatican's outlook. Eshkol said Israel has no interest or need to supervise holy places which are not ours. We shall respond to the wishes of the different religions. Commenting on the U.N. General Assembly debate the Prime Minister expressed satisfaction with the results achieved and said that the battle which took place in the assembly has proved that the world conscience has emerged victorious. The Prime Minister expressed the hope that the Soviet Union will reconsider its attitude toward the Middle East and added that, unlike the Soviet Union, the Rumanian Government has acted according to conscience in a manner appropriate to socialist countries. The Prime Minister praised the stands of the United States and Britain during the Middle East crisis and noted in particular the attitudes of President Johnson and Harold Wilson.

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HUSAYN SAYS SUMMIT CONFERENCE NEEDED NOW

Amman Domestic Service in Arabic 1900 GMT 9 July 1967--M

(Speech by King Husayn on his return from abroad--live or recorded)

(Text) Compatriots, brother Arabs: Greetings to you. I am pleased to be back. I am also proud of your truly courageous stand and correct awareness which you have manifested in the past few days everywhere in this country and on both banks of our beloved Jordan. Our valiant armed forces nurse their wounds but still hold their weapons to defend you and our Arab nation in the greater Arab homeland.

Two weeks ago I left for U.N. headquarters to address the General Assembly on your behalf and on behalf of our Arab brothers about the new tragedy which befell the Arab rights as well as right and justice everywhere. My mission was not confined to raising our nation's voice from the international rostrum, but went beyond that. I contacted the public in every country I visited through its information media and made the best use of those media. Moreover, my mission included several discussions with officials in the countries I visited. I clearly explained to these officials my country's and nation's stand on that iniquitous aggression and its effects. There is no need for me to describe to you the pain which my nation's injuries have caused me. I carried this pain with me to all the countries I visited and all peoples I met. For two long weeks I was grieved and sad. My only consolation was my confidence in you and in your nation. Everywhere I went, people expressed their appreciation, love, and respect for this country. The heroism of our armed forces and our brave Iraqi brothers who fought on our side was the talk of every meeting, and this increased my confidence and faith in a better future and a new dawn.

Everybody knows, brothers, that our mistakes were one secret which we managed to keep for a long time. If it is regrettable to see these mistakes dragging us to this situation, the worst thing that could happen to us today is to overlook these mistakes and not examine them among ourselves in a brave, manly, and sincere manner. Therefore we have called for a meeting of Arab leaders, hoping that such a meeting will be the occasion for frank discussion and will also serve as a turning point in our entire Arab life and as a new starting point for an earnest, unified Arab march. It was obvious that we entered the war without first preparing the means which would insure our victory. It was also obvious that we were negligent at home and abroad. In fact, we were so negligent that some of the weapons in the enemy's hands were of our own making.

July 9 Husay Speech  
(cont'd)

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Nothing but an Arab summit conference will save the situation, especially as time is no longer on our side in this country or in any fraternal Arab country. Brothers, we have rejected every idea of dealing with our problem as a Jordanian problem, and we shall continue to do so as long as there is a ray of hope for success of our efforts to convene a summit conference. However, speed in convening this meeting is one of the most important and greatest necessities. We exert our utmost effort to unite our nation's ranks and unify its actions and aims. We fully hope that all concerned will rise to the level of the responsibilities they are shouldering.

Our cause is the cause of the entire Arab nation and its success does not depend on us alone. It depends on the joint effort of all our brothers. More than in any previous period, these days represent a great test that we must face with calm, friendship and cooperation. This is the test by which we shall either enter history through its widest gates or disappear into the night of oblivion.

Brothers, I have taught you never to know weakness and despair. I promise you that my hope in you, my confidence in your nation, and my belief in the future are greater and deeper than ever before. Although the setback had its effects on our spirit, these effects should prompt us to reshape ourselves and to remold our life with determination, hope, and resolution. Life has never meant more to me than the service I can give to my country, my people, my nation, and my great homeland. While leading this country and this people--on both banks--my life today means only work to help our nation proceed toward a better future and a nobler life in which Jordan will remain the Arabs' throbbing heart and their great hope.

Brothers, in the past I made great sacrifices and suffered a lot. Today I am prepared to sacrifice the last drop of my blood rather than accept half solutions, either in my country or in the greater Arab homeland. Husayn has been and will always remain a soldier for his country and his nation, inspired by the sublime Arab interest and dedicated to the mission of Arabism and to advancing its cause in the world. Peace be with you and God's mercy and blessings.

ABBA EBAN RETURNS FROM U.N., REVIEWS ACTION

Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1700 GMT 7 July 1967--M

(Text) Foreign Minister Abba Eban said that after the discussions at the U.N. General Assembly, all that is left for the Arabs is to strive for peace. Eban thus summed up the discussions at the general assembly when he returned to Israel this afternoon. The foreign minister stressed, however, that we are only at the beginning of the political struggle and that we must not relax the pressure. Eban told our correspondent Mikha Limor that the representatives of the Latin American states promised him yesterday they would persist in their stand that an Israeli withdrawal from the conquered territory ought to be made only when the state of belligerency ends and discussions between the sides take place.

Eban was welcomed at the airport by Minister Galili; Mapai Secretary Mrs. Golda Meir; senior foreign ministry officials; and the dean of the diplomatic corps, the Liberian ambassador. Before leaving for Israel, Eban told correspondents in London that Israel is ready to sit down immediately at the conference table with the Arabs and that Israel has valuable and worthwhile proposals to make. As to the six-day war, he said that this was the first war in history after which the victors sought peace while the vanquished demanded unconditional surrender.

Report to Government

Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1700 GMT 9 July 1967--M

(Text) Foreign Minister Abba Eban today told the government that the resolutions adopted by the U.N. General Assembly and their repercussions in the world reflect support for Israel's stand that an end to Arab belligerency in all its manifestations is an indispensable condition for any change in the deployment of forces as determined at the time of the cease-fire resolutions. Summing up the U.N. General Assembly discussions at today's cabinet session, Eban stressed that the general assembly refused to condemn Israel's defensive war and refused to approve evacuation of the territory acquired unless the Arab states effect a fundamental change in their attitude toward Israel.

Eban also noted the U.S. president's firm stand against Soviet arguments and said that this constitutes an important international fact which played an important part in the work of the general assembly. Eban also pointed out the firm insistence on principles by the group of Latin American states at the general assembly. The leaders of this group repeatedly stressed that they would not support any deviation from the stand they had adopted and would not cease to argue that an Israeli withdrawal from the territory in question must be linked with substantial progress toward peace. The foreign minister expressed his appreciation for the attitude of these states. In his opinion this stand is a key to prospects for peace in this region.

The foreign minister also noted the extent of support and understanding which Israel won in Africa, especially in view of the pressure which Arab states and certain European nations exerted on the African countries. Eban also said that most European and British Commonwealth states showed deep understanding for Israel's position and problems. The foreign minister added that the government's decisions, which reflect humane concern for the inhabitants of the Areas for which Israel is responsible, made a strong impression at the final decisive stage of the struggle. But Eban declared once more that this is not the end of the political battle.

Before the foreign minister began his review, the prime minister congratulated him on his work in the U.N. General Assembly. At the foreign minister's request, Israeli Ambassador to Rome Ehud Avriel today reported to the government of his contacts with Vatican representatives regarding the question of the holy places. Among other things, he reported on his talk with Pope Paul VI and on the mission to Israel of papal representative Msgr. Angelo Felice.

The defense minister then reported on the incidents which occurred in the Suez Canal Zone in recent days. In this connection the foreign minister reported on the security council session on this issue and on the U.N. Secretary General's proposal to assign observers to determine the cease-fire line in the canal zone, as was done in the north.



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Paris AFP in English 0224 GMT 8 July 1967--E (FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

(Text) Tel Aviv--Prime Minister Levi Eshkol today publicly buried the often repeated claim that the Egyptian air and land forces attacked Israel before it launched its devastating lightning offensive on 5 June. In an interview published by the independent YEDIOT AHARANOT the prime minister for the first time officially recognized the fact that Israel, in a move of (?legitimate) defense, had decided to act itself on that day. Defending this decision, Eshkol reaffirmed the Israeli view that a state of belligerence existed from the day when President Abd an-Nasir imposed the blockade of the Tiran Strait, commanding the entry to the Gulf of Aqaba and the Port of Eilat, Israel's only outlet to the Far East.

In the interview, the prime minister set out in detail his views on a whole range of major problems now facing his government, including the responsibility for the war, the problem of Palestine refugees, and the status of the holy places. But observers here thought the interview largely reflected the prime minister's own views rather than those of his coalition cabinet.

For Eshkol, in hardly veiled terms, made it clear that Gen. Moshe Dayan, the one-eyed hero of the 1956 Sinai war, was no longer needed as defense minister in his cabinet. He said the prime ministership and the defense portfolio should be held by one man. Eshkol was himself in charge of both portfolios until his coalition was enlarged last 2 June, when Dayan joined the cabinet. Eshkol, however, also said he felt the national union government must continue.

Observers nevertheless saw his statement as a discreet warning to the ebullient general, who obviously embarrassed the government earlier this week by affirming that Gaza and the Western Bank of the Jordan River are both Israeli territory. An official denial later alleged Dayan had been misunderstood. Eshkol today also gave the credit for (words indistinct) victory to the chief of staff, Gen. Itzhak Rabin, and to the government, which prepared the army for its task--which meant that Eshkol, as defense minister since 1963, claimed the honors for himself rather than for his 11th-hour successor.

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#### REPORTAGE ON AFFAIRS IN GAZA, WESTERN BANK

##### Denial of Dayan Statement

Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1830 GMT 6 July 1967--M

(Text) A defense ministry spokesman has made the following announcement: when he was visiting Gaza on 5 July, the defense minister agreed, in response to requests by notables of the Gaza Strip, to grant various privileges to the inhabitants, including the possibility of travel outside the strip, a reduction of the curfew hours, permission to resume fishing, and similar relaxations. However, the defense minister did not speak about the annexation to Israeli territory of the Gaza Strip or any other area and he did not hint at any intention to do so.

##### Trade Restriction

Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0930 GMT 7 July 1967--M

(Excerpt) The committee of general directors in charge of civil affairs in the Western Bank and the Gaza Strip has decided that trade in these two areas should not be free to Israelis and that restrictions should be imposed. Committee spokesman halperin told the radio correspondent that every Israeli citizen who receives a permit to enter either of the two areas will receive foreign currency to buy personal goods in noncommercial quantities.

The allocation will be up to 5 dinars per day to Western Bank visitors and up to 10 Egyptian pounds per day to Gaza Strip visitors. No Israeli citizen will be allowed to buy goods in the Western Bank or the Gaza Strip with Israeli pounds. Likewise, Israelis will not be allowed to sell goods in these areas except through the Central Marketing Company established recently.

## Utilities, Mail, Banks

Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1600 GMT 9 July 1967--M

(Excerpts) The restoration of civilian life in the Western Bank continues at full speed. A post office opened in the town of Hebron today. Post offices will soon open in the other central towns of the Western Bank. At the ceremony in Hebron, Mayor Muhammad al-Jabari called on the neighboring Arab states to facilitate transfer of mail to inhabitants of the Western Bank and in the opposite direction. It was reported today that the governor of the Bank of Israel gave permission to three Israeli banks to open branch offices in eight towns of the Western Bank. The banks are the Bank Leumi of Israel, the Discount Bank, and the Israeli-Arab Bank Ltd.

The municipal electricity network in the town of Qalqiliyah is again operating at full capacity. The local welfare office distributed blankets and flour to needy people. It is reported from Nabulus that repair work is in progress on the water main, which was damaged during the fighting. The supply of gas has also resumed.

## Jerusalem Council Meeting

Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 2000 GMT 9 July 1967--M

(Text) The Jerusalem Municipal Council this evening held its first session in its capacity as the council of unified Jerusalem. In the course of the session, Mayor Kollek called on the government and the city's population to work together for the integration and development of the city. Kollek announced that an advisory council will be formed on behalf of the inhabitants of the Old City to give advice on their special problems. This is in addition to the council members who will be added to the municipal council to represent the inhabitants of the Old City.

In cooperation with the ministry of education and culture, the municipality will soon open Hebrew language study centers for the Arab inhabitants.

## Return to Western Bank

Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1700 GMT 9 July 1967--M

(Excerpts) Persons who were inhabitants of the Western Bank before 5 June and who crossed to the eastern bank between 5 June and 4 July may submit applications through the Red Cross to return to their places of residence. The applicants must attach to their application a Jordanian passport or identity document or any other official document which proves that they were really inhabitants of the Western Bank. The applications must also prove that their return will not constitute a security or crime risk. The Red Cross will return approved applications to the applicants.

Official crossing points on the Jordan River by which the applicants and their families will return will be established. The returning inhabitants will be subject to customs and health regulations. Applications must be submitted by 10 August. Western Bank inhabitants who traveled abroad before 5 June and who want to return to their places of residence can do so in accordance with the principles for the reunion of families, as has been permitted up to now. They must apply to Israel's diplomatic and consular representatives abroad.

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TEXT OF ESHKOL DER SPIEGEL INTERVIEW

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL 10 July 1967--G

(Interview with Premier Eshkol by DER SPIEGEL publisher Rudolf Augstein in Jerusalem; no date mentioned)

(Text) Question: Mr. Premier, Israel had a good press in the world as long as it fought and was victorious. How satisfied are you with the course of the debate in the U.N. General Assembly?

Answer: To tell the truth, I am one of those people who believe that there are also morals in politics, perhaps because I am new in politics and because I was finance minister and occupied myself a great deal with economy and agriculture. Seen from this attitude, I am not too satisfied.

I at least know what our targets here are and what they were 50 years ago. The Zionist movement in general was built on moral foundations. If you had the time to look at literature published some 60, 70, and 80 years before Herzl, you would understand that we were convinced that we were really to return to that place where we were born as a people, and that we would live in peace with the Arabs. When I came here there were approximately 250,000 Arabs in Israel. In my heart I have a strong affection for the Arabs. We believed that we would live in this greater Palestine--I mean west of the Jordan and of Transjordan--and that there would be a possibility of opening up the land with some Jewish knowledge and Jewish money. We hoped that the Jewish world would support us financially, which it did, as a matter of fact. So the whole thing was built on the moral principles of "back to the soil" and "back to nature." When I therefore see what is now taking place in the United Nations, I have the feeling that these questions are not being dealt with morally.

Question: The moral aspect applies, above all, to Jerusalem.

Answer: Especially for religious Jews.

Question: Jerusalem is also a morally important place for other religions and peoples. Annexation of the Jordanian part of Jerusalem has also caused criticism among countries friendly toward Israel, because Israel has created accomplished facts prior to the beginning of any peace talks and without a referendum. Is it still possible to cancel the annexation?

Answer: To tell the truth, I believe that if you had seen--and I wish you could have seen--how the Jewish places had been treated under the Turks--it was during the time of the Turks that I came here--(you would have realized that--ed.) it was horrible for Jews--and not only believing Jews. Three weeks ago, when I was at the Wailing Wall for the first time, I saw--permit me to say it--latrines which had been built deliberately near the wall where a people had lamented for 4,000 years, where it still laments, and where it will continue to do so. If you had seen this, you would realize that we have the right to ask the world to entrust us with the care of the holy places of all religions.

Eshkol Der Spiegel interview  
(cont'd)

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When I came here in 1913--at that time I was employed as a worker in the area of Jerusalem--I went to take a look at a synagogue which allegedly had been built to resemble the Holy Temple. I am not antireligious today, but at that time I believed, although not very much. The synagogue was really worth seeing. It is not rpt not there now. Everything is destroyed, even the walls. In some places you see heaps of debris. I therefore believe that we have the right to ask the world to entrust us with the care of the holy places of all religions. They are not rpt not only sacred for us but also for Christians, Moslems, and several other sects.

Question: It seems as if the Catholic countries of South America are influenced by the Pope's attitude. What is Israel's attitude toward the Pope's efforts?

Answer: I am convinced that when we negotiate with them they will not demand internationalization of Jerusalem. They know that this is impossible. They know that Jerusalem is the heart of the Jewish people in its present rebirth. It is David's town, King David's town, and not Ben-Gurion's. It seems that many South American states have worked against the Yugoslav suggestion which wanted to force us to withdraw. They see that it means something to us. They know us. We are close friends. Some of them had already helped us previously together with Gromyko, with Moscow, when the United Nations approved the founding of Israel.

I can say only this: Israel without Jerusalem is an Israel without a head. Tel Aviv is a nice city. It has trade, it is new, but it is without tradition. Do not print this. Otherwise, they will throw me out of Tel Aviv.

Question: Does this mean that even in the event of a two-thirds majority decision by the United Nations it would hardly be possible to induce Israel to withdraw from Jerusalem?

Answer: You know that it is a Jewish habit to answer a question with a question, but I will not answer with a question. I would like to answer that I had seriously hoped that such a suggestion from the Yugoslavs or others would not be accepted by an assembly of 120 people, that the world would not commit such an injustice. Therefore I would not rpt not like to say that we would absolutely refuse to abide by the resolution, although our Foreign Minister Abba Eban did make a statement to this effect in New York.

If, God forbid, such a resolution were passed against Israel, this would be opposed by the will of the people so wholeheartedly that no Israeli government could exist with it, no matter how ready, how morally, or how willing it might be to abide by U.N. decisions. To think at this point of returning the ancient part of the city! If I were to ask the people in a plebiscite whether they prefer this tiny territory of the Holy city to hundreds of thousands of acres in Sinai or Syria, the people would reply give away the land in Sinai or Syria. . .

Question: . . .which does not belong to you anyway?

Answer: . . .but preserve for us that small place which was once the Holy City, the city of David, and so forth. Even for the nonreligious, for the impious, this is a national matter.

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Question: What would happen if a peace treaty with Jordan could only be signed by your surrender of the Holy City?

Answer: They would not ask that. I think that I know the Arabs. Our relations date back quite far. On the eve of our 1948 independence war, our Golda Meir went to King Husayn's grandfather, Abdullah, disguised as a man. He was very upset. He was extremely sorry and said: "Madame, I have reached the point of no return." He feared his neighbors. I do not think that negotiations will fail because of this question. We would find a satisfactory way out.

Question: Your government suggested negotiations between Israel and the Arab countries. Would you conduct negotiations with Jordan alone if the other Arab states were not ready to do so?

Answer: Yes. I am not only saying this now. I said this two weeks ago when I went to Sharm ash-Shaykh and Sinai. After all, we do come from Sinai. Moses and the Ten Commandments came from Sinai, and therefore I wanted to visit it too. Then and there, I said to myself that I am now closer to Egypt--please understand me--and I addressed Nasir, Husayn, and the kings and presidents of our Arab neighbors and said: "Do not believe for one minute that I am here to speak from a position of strength, because I said the same thing two and three times two or three years ago in our Knesset, and I do not say this now because we are the victors. I turn to you and extend my hand. Let us sit down at a table, all of us together or each by himself!"

If you ask me, yes, we would be ready to negotiate peace with Jordan and Egypt, as well as with Lebanon. We have not had any conflict with Lebanon, and why Husayn allowed himself at the very last minute to be used for their purposes and why he signed a treaty to encircle Israel from all sides and strangle it is really strange.

Question: Perhaps he considered Israel lost?

Answer: Perhaps. We are between him and Egypt, and I am certain that Egypt--if Egypt is to be identified with Nasir--Egypt wants to annex Jordan and perhaps even to destroy Israel. At any rate, it wants to annex Jordan.

Question: King Husayn does not give the impression that he wanted to or could negotiate the handing over of territory at the present time. Of course, Husayn thinks of his grandfather who was murdered here in Jerusalem. Would you insist that you keep the territory rather than negotiate with him?

Answer: That is a difficult matter which would be called a 64,000 dollar question in America. We must study the problem. Apart from Jerusalem, to take over that part of Western Jordan that had been annexed to eastern Jordan would also mean to take over several hundred thousand Arabs. We know this to be a difficult problem, and we have not yet decided what we are going to do about it. There are many among us who believe that we would be able to find a way out--that we could find a way of coexistence, that we could find a political structure, that we might give western Jordan access to the port of Haifa, and that we might even give that to the other part, that is, the eastern part of Jordan.

We, that is, a commission consisting of approximately 100 to 150 people, technicians and physicians, are preparing a program to settle those refugees who want to stay in west Jordan in the future.

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Do you know that Israel represents only 20 percent of Palestine as it was when the League of Nations gave England its mandate? When you look at the map of Israel you will see that it is in a ridiculous geographic situation. In Germany you may call it "strange." As things are after our third war, I believe we are entitled.

Question: But, Mr. Premier, it does not look as if east Jordan could exist as an independent state without west Jordan. Is it wise to treat that country most harshly whose king has been the least hostile of all the Arab neighbors? Why do you want to condemn east Jordan to a slow death?

Answer: I do not understand the "why". If it should happen--if, because it cannot be done today--that we, Israel, take over the other part, then, I believe, one should open up this part and resettle the refugees.

(Eshkol has a map brought in--DER SPIEGEL)

Question: You could surely master all that technically. But politically?

Answer: By the end of the century we intend to increase our population to 4 to 5 million, including our Arabs and our own offspring. The increase in the Arab population is greater than the increase in our own. As far as Jews from Arab countries are concerned, the natural increase in population is similar to that of the Arabs. The European growth rate is less, but on the whole the growth rate is not bad. I hope that by the end of the century, 500,000 Jews or perhaps a somewhat smaller number will come from other countries. There are still 100,000 Jews living in underdeveloped countries, and for them Israel is the only solution. We have better relations with some Islamic countries, but relations which are not "across the table". You know: "Do not say hello to me under the linden." (spoken in German--DER SPIEGEL) I am rather certain that we shall get young people, boys and girls, students from prosperous countries, the United States, South America, and Europe. In Europe there are 1.5 million Jews.

You know that in the non-Jewish world there are assimilated Jews. In Russia this assimilation has been enforced. However, where Israel is concerned they say that is my old homeland, there are my roots, Abraham, Isaac, Rebecca and so forth; they stem from here, the book of books, their religion, their monotheism.

We are now trying to establish seminars and to sponsor--and they do that themselves--the training of teachers to teach Jewish history and Hebrew. They considered Yiddish a degradation. They considered German a language, but Yiddish a Jargon, although Yiddish has a rich literature and has been spoken for a thousand years. I say it again, German is bowdlerized Yiddish. Our Yiddish has been bowdlerized.

I am convinced that it is possible to open up Jordan with its much greater area, even if you consider that the present standard of living is not high. I am not delighted with our standard of living, which is too high. We government people always argue with our people and explain to them that we do not owe our income to our soil. We must tighten our belts somewhat more. Nevertheless, it will take generations for the Bedouins--and they are Husayns's support--to reach our standard of living.

Question: What will become of the Gaza Strip?

Answer: The Gaza Strip must remain with Israel. We assume a heavy burden. There are not only the people born there, but also 250,000 refugees. We must draft a plan to incorporate them again into society. We have accommodated 150,000 Jews from Iraq, who were expelled by the Iraqi Government, and we have incorporated them. This is an exchange of population groups. Why should Iraq not take 100,000 Arabs? They have more land than they need and plenty of water, but we are not going to rely on that. For this, it would be necessary for us to have genuine peace with all Arab countries. If that cannot be accomplished we know that we in Israel would assume the obligation, because there are the refugees.

Question: Speaking of Syria, you have occupied a 30-kilometer-wide strip northeast of Lake Gennesaret. Is Syria also to renounce this territory when it concludes peace with Israel?

Answer: I understand the question. It is a very important question, but it makes me somewhat uneasy to answer it, since we are now facing negotiations. When you look at our kibbutzim in this area--there were Syrian guns, some of them with a range of 20 kilometers--then you will see that there are settlements which are completely destroyed. Nothing could be done. We were deep down in the valley and they were over there on top. I do not want to commit myself and say that I shall not demand soil or land, since it depends on the negotiations.

Question: Will Israel insist that it not only be given free passage through the straits of Sharm ash-Shaykh--which is understood--but also through the Suez Canal?

Answer: Now, here is my question as a Jew: Why not? Are we entitled to fewer rights? Why not?

Question: The Soviet Union and China will continue to compete as protective powers of the revolution. Will it be possible to oppose U.N. majority decisions?

Answer: I do not believe that the United Nations will make such an unjust decision. But if it should, God forbid, I would only like to remind you of Finland's fight against Russia, the great Russia. I said it here on this very spot. One day Russian ambassador Chuvakhin appeared here and said: "You are going to--I think he said 15--line up 15 bridges or divisions against Syria in order to overthrow the Syrian Government."

Question: Did you speak Russian with him?

Answer: Yes, Russian. I said: "Mr. Ambassador, where did you get that information? Take your car and I will ride along with you, or take my car directly from here without anyone knowing about it. Let's take a look at this." (rendered in German--DER SPIEGEL) Then he tried to worm his way out. I said: "We have nothing whatsoever to do with the governmental forms of our neighboring countries. The Syrians may choose what they wish. We know how we want to live." In addition, I said to him: "You speak of socialism. I consider myself a better socialist, and here in this small country there is more socialism." I have visited that part of Syria which is now in our possession, and I have seen the conditions. I have seen how the officers and aristocracy and the ministers live, and how the poor live. All one has to do is compare it with the situation here.



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I said: "If Nasir receives hundreds of tanks and planes from Russia and wheat from the United States, what can we do? This is life, if I may say so with a slight bit of genuine socialism. I say slight because no one can actually say what socialism is or how a new society should be built. We are a new society and wish to develop something new.

Well, here is my answer: Will we be able to resist such a U.N. decision? In the first place I do not believe there will be such a decision. And all there is, God forbid, we will fight. Because, in a word, this is our only and last position as a nation--not as Jews scattered throughout the world, but actually as a nation.

Question: Now we have a concluding and bold question in this complex: Is Israel willing to renounce every cession of territory by the Arab states if it obtains peace in return?

Answer: First, we exclude Jerusalem: this is the soul of this accordance with a cabinet decision--let us assume that we have a genuine peace treaty with all our neighbors, that we will achieve this, then we will be willing to discuss everything.

But now comes the question that bothers me: What is a guarantee in this 20th century? Who is able to guarantee? I once asked the president of the United States this question when we pointed to the arms build up and demanded again and again that a maximum limit be established, that all weapons in this part of the world be eliminated.

He stated: "Do not fear, the Sixth Fleet will be there." Then I said--this was prior to recent events--Mr. President, I am convinced that the Sixth Fleet is a very beautiful and powerful fleet, but today, as we can see, it can be eliminated within one or two days. If the Egyptians attack us and we send you a telegram, Mr. President, you may be busy in Vietnam, and then you will say: 'Just a moment I will have to send somebody to see what happened and who fired the first shot.' As if Sharm ash-Shaykh were not the first shot. "Or, Mr. President, perhaps you will be somewhere on a hunting trip, or in Texas, or sick. One or two or three days are enough to destroy Israel. So, what is the guarantee? Or you may say that you have to ask the Senate."

Question: Without the spirit of understanding and reconciliation, which for the time being is not evident on the Arab side, an understanding, peace, is not possible, of course not.

Answer: That is just it. You see, if someone spoke with Nasir--Nasir is a master of speaking with anyone in the language of the guest. When he talks with liberals or socialists he is as charming, as gentle, and as sweet as he can be, and meanwhile he is preparing for war.

Well-meaning people must draw the conclusion that we cannot tolerate a situation in which we fight a war every 5 or 10 years. If well-meaning people meet and discuss guarantees and security, then, after all, when we have 3 million people, or 4 or 5 million, they will have 60 million. Someone asked me why we failed to advance as far as Damascus. I replied: "What shall we do with 7 million Arabs?" So, the question is that of a genuine guarantee with a conviction deep in our hearts that we will someday not be destroyed or driven into the ocean as Nasir wanted thus far, sometimes twice a week.

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Question: What do you think will be the further course of events if none of Israel's neighbors is willing to take part in peace negotiations?

Answer: If this is the case--although I personally believe, I cannot prove it, that one or two parties will appear--it will be dangerous for them. I would only like to find the first party; I already have the second and third who wish to make peace. Moreover, as you know, there have been divisions among these 13 Arab nations.

Question: Indeed, but perhaps there will not be many changes if another person takes over in Egypt.

Answer: But if a man--without mentioning names--for example, Zakhariyah Muhyi ad-Din who thinks more in economic terms . . . .

Question: Just like you . . . .

Answer: If such a man appears, there might be a change. Of Egypt's 30 million people, 25 million are living on pittah, the flat wheat cake. Nasir can easily say now that they will live on half a pittah. Half a pittah can be divided and redivided, but there will be an end.

Question: The Americans will supply food.

Answer: If the world is this stupid, let it be this stupid. There will then be no way out other than war.

Question: How many Arabs are presently living under Israeli occupation, and how many of these are former refugees?

Answer: Up to the recent war we had in Israel nearly 300,000 refugees, 30,000 of whom are Druses, with whom we have very good relations. Among the Arabs are tens of thousands of Christians, they are also different. And then there is a group of Mohammedan Arabs, with whom we have quite a good relationship. Now, in this new part of Jordan, if the Jordan River becomes the border and the Gaza Strip remains with us--I do not know the official figure--we will get between 1 and 1.1 million new Arabs, 800,000 in Jordan and 300,000 in the Gaza Strip.

Question: No more than this?

Answer: I guarantee that there are not even 300,000 in Gaza. As you know, no deaths have been registered during the entire 20 years. It is a country of miracles. No Arab deaths are being registered at the refugee camps.

Question: Not because of U.N. rations. Allegedly it also takes two years until the newborn are registered.

Answer: Throughout the world it is known that only first- and second-generation refugees exist, and no more. Here the third generation is also being registered as refugees. People should also consider that we have taken over 300,000 or 700,000 Jews from Arab countries, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Egypt, and North Africa.

Question: Well, if the Arabs were more efficient they could also give shelter to refugees.

Answer: There is space for them. They could have their houses, their homes.

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Question: What is to be done with the refugees in the Gaza Strip? Will some of them resettle in west Jordan?

Answer: I call this, if peace is ever possible, a population exchange. Nevertheless, we are making preparations now. We are working on a plan on the supposition that there will be more water, aware of the fact that we have 1 million more Arabs. We wish to develop more industry.

First, we must industrialize Israel, and in the United States we have people with the required knowledge. What we need is an industry based on science. We do not have natural resources. We would be unable to set up heavy industry for tanks and guns, but we have, for instance, our diamond industry with 15,000 workers.

Question: We have read in our newspapers that Ben-Gurion reportedly suggested settling Jewish immigrants in west Jordan. He spoke of 15,000 or so.

Answer: Apparently he spoke of Hebron and perhaps Bethlehem. In Hebron we had a sort of religious university at which everyone was slaughtered in 1929. Perhaps he meant this. Yet this would also be no real obstacle. If they want to accommodate more people in this section--even Jews--they would be free to do so.

Question: You would not force them to accommodate more people from other regions, say from the Gaza Strip?

Answer: We would force nobody. However, if we transported water to a particular spot and found unpopulated country, we would present a plan. If we are asked, as you are asking, what we intend to do with the refugees, we would say: Look here, this country is nearly unpopulated because it needs more water, the climate is hot, hence more water is needed; bananas can be grown here. If we proposed such a project, saying that we could bring water here and there, that settlements could be made here and there, why not? And politically this region could belong to the Arab section.

Question: What status will an autonomous west Jordanian state have? Will its armament, its political freedom of movement be curtailed? Will it determine itself whether or not Arabs from other regions will immigrate?

Answer: Yes and no. According to one of the plans recommended to us, the territory would be entirely autonomous, it would have real autonomy. It should not simply be able to fight against us, that is the only thing. It is impossible to allow them to buy airplanes and spend money for this. Tomorrow they could again make peace with Jordan and Nasir. We again return to the question of peace and real guarantees.

Question: May Arabs who fled to Jordan after the outbreak of war return, even after 10 August? You set this deadline.

Answer: If you ask me, they went to Jordan voluntarily. We were asked why--and some people claimed--they were being forced to emigrate. We thus decided that everyone had to sign a petition. Yet it is not enough to sign a petition. We demand that the village elders or the municipal authorities countersign, certifying that the person really wants to emigrate. Besides, in the event anyone claims we forced the people or that they were afraid, we are now saying: "We will give you one month. Think it over. If you decide to return, then return."

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If you ask me if one month is the limit, I would say: Yes, indeed. We must also be able to plan our life. There is a time limit. We are aware that perhaps camouflaged legionnaires were among them. There were perhaps Shuqayri people among them who have good reason to escape. We were told that there were people who have money in the bank over there, or whose relatives work in Kuwait and who are afraid that Kuwait might dismiss these relatives unless true peace exists with all our neighbors. Nevertheless, we gave them one month. One month should be more than enough, and it is now more than one month. It is nearly five years. We, too, must be in a position to plan.

Question: How do 2.2 million Jews, who thus far have ruled over a minority of 300,000 Arabs, intend to rule in the future some 1.5 million Arabs, that is, cope with a minority who will always consider themselves second-class citizens? Having the rule a very strong minority can weigh very heavily.

Answer: This is true, but they can have their own parliament and their own education system. Even our Arabs are educated the Arab way, and they are represented in parliament.

Question: However, there are too many vocations with security implications in which the Arabs stand no chance.

Answer: Such as?

Question: An Arab cannot become a higher official in the Ministry of Agriculture.

Answer: Tomorrow there will be difficulties with the Arabs, and they will complain because they cannot be soldiers. Why do they need an army if they truly want to live in peace with us.

Question: We have learned from Sartre's writing that Arab secondary school graduates do not have adequate career prospects in Israel, that they are not allowed to form their own fraternities at the universities.

Answer: Without any doubt we are giving them the opportunity to enroll at universities. It is true that the Arab students currently enrolled in a university complain occasionally. Sometimes their complaints are justified, sometimes not. Wherever there is true peace there are no dangers. We have personally seen to it that the Arab students attend special seminars in order that they might enter government service. I have said before: Boys, you have your own villages and cities, become physicians and serve your people, become engineers and plan your villages. It is a transition period. When there is really peace matters will proceed faster. We know today that they watch Egyptian television, on which Nasir is still shown as a hero. Naturally, under such circumstances there is friction and, hence, fear.

Question: French Military expert General Gallois in an article arrives at the conclusion that Israel presumably will have to build the atom bomb for the sake of its own security. What do you say to this?

Answer: Recently, a paper quoted one of my statements made in a discussion with a very influential American representative two or three years ago. At that time I said we would not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into this area. Please, fix an armament limitation, I said. Please, do not deliver any more weapons, neither you nor the Russians! We are even ready to destroy some of our weapons.

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First, enormous finances are necessary to purchase nuclear weapons; we are not rich enough for that. Second, I could raise the counterquestion: Provided that we introduce nuclear weapons, who then will guarantee that Russia or China will not give the same nuclear weapons to the other side? It is much more difficult to supervise Egypt than Israel, because Israel is a small country. Egypt, with its desert, could produce nuclear weapons without anyone's realizing it. International inspection is ineffective. Two or three scientists are assigned to a certain region, but it is very easy not to permit them to travel in critical areas under the pretext that there is some danger, infectious disease or something. We are far from even thinking of nuclear weapons.

Question: There is one Arab fear which is not imagined but which really exists. The Arabs say that Israel is so endangered geographically and ethnically that it cannot be more than a bridgehead, that it must enlarge itself at the expense of its neighbors. Husayn said something to this effect before the United Nations.

Answer: Yes, I have been confronted with such a question several times before. My answer is that our population is presently about 2.5 million. We have 3.5 million Jews forceably assimilated in Russia. Provided Russia gives its permission, I hope that about 1 million come here. All these calculations are based on Israel's industrialization, even though I thought when I came here as a young man that all of us would work in agriculture. Presently about 15 percent of our people work in agriculture, the rest work in industry, transportation, "know-how" sales to all the world, and trade. Industry thus provides our basis. This is our answer today, when Israel's agriculture is so intensive that one farmer can produce food for 15 families.

Question: Is it true that at the height of the crisis you wanted Labor Minister Allon in the Defense Ministry rather than Moshe Dayan?

Answer: At any rate we--his party and my party--are talking about uniting. Each of us has his own character. Every minister president wants to have the right to make his own choice, even though this is somewhat difficult in the case of a coalition government. We cannot do what the British apparently can do. When Alee was prime minister he came here to visit, and in answer to a question from a friend: "What do you do if you want to replace a minister?" he said: "This is very easy: I summon him and tell him that I would like him to resign. If he asks why, I tell him that there is no 'why'; I just want him to go." With a coalition government this is much more complicated. But as a matter of course, every premier would like to make his own choice, he prefers a man with this or with that character.

But I feel I have not directly answered your question. Look, we could have waged and concluded the war with the old government. But there was a general cry to create a national unity cabinet. In the critical period of the need was felt to expand the basis of the government. Allon was already a member of the government, and the expansion was carried out in a way that Dayan had to be included in the cabinet.

Augstein: Mr. Premier, we thank you for this discussion.

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**GOVERNMENT AGREES TO U.N. OBSERVERS AT SUEZ**

Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0930 GMT 11 July 1967--M

(Text) Israel has agreed to the stationing of U.N. observers at observation points in the Suez Canal area to supervise the cease-fire agreement.

The radio's political correspondent reports that in a note sent to U.N. Secretary General U Thant this morning the Israeli Government announced that it agrees to respond to the Security Council appeal for observing the cease-fire agreement. The government is prepared to discuss with Gen. Odd Bull acceptable arrangements for the stationing of observers to supervise implementation of the cease-fire agreement. The government's approval is conditional on the establishment of observation points on both sides of the cease-fire line--the Israeli and the Egyptian sides.

**U.N. RESOLUTION ON JERUSALEM REJECTED**

Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0800 GMT 11 July 1967--M

(Text) Israel has submitted to the U.N. secretary general its reply regarding the U.N. General Assembly resolution of last week calling on Israel to cancel all steps taken in Jerusalem. In its reply Israel expresses reservations about the resolution, which calls for rescinding the municipal unification. Correspondents at U.N. headquarters in New York say Israel's reply is in fact a rejection of the General Assembly resolution.

In his reply, Foreign Minister Eban states that world public opinion will welcome the prospect that Jerusalem--the ancient and historical metropolis--will flower and prosper through unity, peace, and spiritual elevation. In his note to U Thant, Eban describes the development of disturbances which brought about the present situation and stresses in particular that the advantage of free access to the holy places of all faiths was not granted during the Jordanian rule. He also points out that Jewish holy places had been desecrated. The Foreign Minister then gives details of the steps taken by the Israeli Government on 27 June for the municipal unification of Jerusalem--steps aimed at safeguarding the holy places, insuring municipal cooperation between the two sectors of the city, and providing municipal services to the old city.

These steps, the Foreign Minister stresses, have brought about constructive cooperation in place of hostile separation; peace in place of the permanent danger of violence; and readiness to reach arrangements with world religious bodies regarding the holy places in place of unilateral control.

**ESHKOL: STATEMENTS ON PEACE TERMS INACCURATE**

Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 2000 GMT 11 July 1967--M

(Text) Prime Minister Eshkol has said that many statements have been made and many assumptions put forward outside the country regarding the peace conditions which Israel will demand. However, he wishes to stress that our conditions in their exact, full, and official form will be submitted only at the table of peace negotiations, and not before. He said that everything published on this subject so far is not accurate, complete, or official.

Eshkol said this in an interview with a group representing the American television company NBC. The interview will be broadcast in New York this evening.

Eshkol said that we need the discussion at the United Nations to prove that the major part of the world will not agree to a return to conditions of aggression, terror, boycott, and blockade. The prime minister stressed that we do not address our Arab neighbors as victors, but as neighbors in the area. We hope that we will be partners in a common destiny in the future.

## BOUMEDIENE SPEECH ON ARRIVAL OF DELEGATION

Damascus Domestic Service in Arabic 1625 GMT 11 July 1967--M

(Speech at Damascus guest palace--live)

(Text) In the name of the delegation I am leading, in the name of Algeria, and in the name of Algeria's fighters, I greet you and thank you for the unprecedented enthusiasm with which you have received us in this Arab city of Damascus. (applause) I am pleased to express Algeria's solidarity and the Algerian people's practical solidarity with the Arab nation in this ordeal and in this difficult battle which our nation is fighting for its honor, survival, and immortality.

Honorable brothers, we have before us only two roads. One is the road of submission and of accepting the fait accompli. I do not think the Arab masses will accept this road. (applause) The second road is the road of victory. (applause) That is the road of continuing the battle regardless of how hard it is or of the price we will have to pay. This is the road to victory and this is the road chosen by our masses both in the Arab west and the Arab east. (applause)

On this basis our preparation should be complete. We should be prepared to make sacrifices because we have no choice. We must choose between the road of humiliation and submission to Zionism, the Americans, and their allies, and the road of continuing the struggle and the battle until victory. Victory in this battle is inevitable.

Perhaps we have suffered a setback. In fact, we have suffered a setback. However, it should not lead to worse setbacks. On the contrary, it must be transformed into a sweeping force leading us to victory. (applause)

This, dear brothers, is the stand of your brothers in Algeria. It is the stand of all the Algerian people. (applause) In the name of the Algerian people and revolution, I pledge that we shall stand with our brothers in the frontline of future battles. Our blood will mix with the blood of all Arabs. This will be the best guarantee to surmount future obstacles.

I convey the greetings of the Algerian people and revolution to the masses in our Arab Damascus and Arab Syria. Peace be with you.

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#### ARAB STATEMENT EVALUATES ARAB SITUATION

Interviewed by AL-AHRAM

Cairo MENA in Arabic 0850 GMT 13 July 1967--M (FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

(Text) Cairo--AL-AHRAM correspondent Zakariya Nil met Iraqi President Abd ar-Rahman Muhammad Arif, now visiting the UAR, and discussed the important coming stage in the evaluation of the Arab situation. The President said that the situation is not linked with a regional status, but includes the entire area because the danger threatens Arab destiny. He pointed out that the battle extends beyond the Israeli existence. This has been proved by the role played by the United States at the United Nations after having supplied Israel with war materiel. The following is the text of the report of the President's statement:

President Abd ar-Rahman Arif stated that the Arab situation has now entered a serious stage of military, economic, and political evaluation. He said that the evaluation is not linked with a regional status but includes the entire Arab area because the danger threatens the whole Arab destiny. Things are now very clear and responsibility falls on all Arabs without exception. Explaining this, he said the more the United States gives to and instigates (Israel--ed.) the greater the danger will be. For this reason, like the heads of other realistic Arab states, I consider that the battle goes beyond Israel's borders.

In view of its unique geographical and military position, the Arab area with its huge wealth is the target of the United States, which wants to impose its domination on it and place it within its sphere of influence in order to free the monopolistic and exploitative forces in it. Foremost of these are the Zionist forces, who have always been in the service of imperialism and its agents (words indistinct). He added that imperialism and its loyal agent, represented by world Zionism, and its main tool, Israel, will then share the wealth and exchange the benefits. Therefore, the whole question is very clear. They cannot achieve their goals without striking the liberation bases and toppling every liberated regime in the area, foremost of which is the UAR--the main base of Arab struggle.

President Arif went on to say that the battle has other dimensions which are reflected on us, the Arabs. The Arabs are good people who respect their word and pledges. We were all misled when we imagined the Americans were honest people when they asked us to observe self-restraint. The second thing which the Iraqi President considers to be within the dimension of the battle is that the Arabs did not take into consideration the deceptive attitude of a people well-known for their deception, treachery, and dishonesty. These are the Israeli gangs, who have a long history of treachery and deception.

The AL-AHRAM correspondent asked: From this very point the U.S. stand in the battle has been defined and its role has been explained. How do you explain what you have heard about the Saudi King's statement that it is not evident to him that the United States and Britain took part in the battle, thus exploiting this as an excuse to pave the way for supplying them with oil?

President Abd ar-Rahman Arif said: First of all, we want to define the significance of U.S. participation in the battle with Israel. Is it necessary for the United States to participate in the battle by dispatching regular army units to fight? If that were the case, the whole thing would have been in our interest and in the interest of our prestige. But what happened was quite different. What happened was a deceptive, dishonorable operation.



Arif statement  
(cont'd)

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At the time when the U.S. President wrote the UAR President, in order to go ahead with more deception, and at the time when it was declared that the U.S. Vice President would be sent to meet the UAR President, the United States was throwing its weight behind Israel. It offered it funds, tanks, armored cars, and unlimited numbers of planes. Later it supplied Israel with napalm bombs, with which the United States chose to kill the Arab people, deform them, and destroy their strength through sending men under the guise of "volunteers," for whom a role in the war had already been assigned. This role was significant in the air force operations attributed to Israel.

President Arif went on to say: Is it necessary to produce written documents to prove the role the United States played in securing all the war materiel for Israel? Let us suppose for the sake of argument that the United States had no role to play in the war--a matter which facts prove wrong, which was denied by Israel itself, and which was proved false by the spy ship "Liberty" and its connection with U.S. spy planes. Who has led the political battle against the Arabs at the United Nations? Was it not the United States, which insistently stood for political defeat of the Arabs? Has it not always taken the initiative to oppose or strike down any resolution or decision condemning Israel and asking for immediate withdrawal? This is very clear and does not require argument. This has been confirmed further by the fact that the United States alone refused to approve the decision concerning the city of Jerusalem, for the sake of Israel. Hence, both the United States and Israel abstained from voting on the resolution. What other proof do we want?

Asked about the plan to confront our enemies, President Arif said: Our enemies are now belittling the value of our weapons and the value of the measures we shall use against those who have betrayed us and who have aggressed against us, including cutting off oil supplies and withdrawing our enormous assets from their banks. Our enemies are now trying to build up positions of strength by sowing dissension in the structure of the Arab nation. I can affirm that we have no alternative but to stand firmly with all material resources against these attempts. Yes, we shall sacrifice and we shall lose materially; but we shall gain honor and we shall erase the shame.

Our present situation can no longer bear domestic political maneuvers, nor can it accept any more statements and excuses. The Arabs have suffered a calamity and a loss. We know our mistakes and the responsibility falls on all Arab rulers without exception. Arab morale and honor urges us to be loyal and to set aside all other considerations so that we shall enter the battle against our enemies, who have occupied our land and who threaten our independence, existence, and united destiny.

President Arif released this statement to AL-AHRAM while his son, Qays, an officer with the Iraqi forces now serving in Egypt, was sitting beside him. This was the first meeting between the President and his son since the arrival of the Iraqi forces in Egypt.

ARIF ADDRESSES IRAQI ARMED FORCES IN UAR

Baghdad Domestic Service in Arabic 2100 GMT 12 July 1967--M

(Summary) Cairo--At about 1430 today Iraqi President Abd ar-Rahman Arif visited Iraqi forces stationed in the UAR. He was met by the commander and officers of the Iraqi units and by a number of senior officers of the UAR Armed Forces.

Arif statement  
(cont'd)

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Addressing the Iraqi forces, President Arif said: I convey to you greetings from your brothers in the Iraqi Army "in Iraq and in Jordan." You were the first contingent to respond to the national call of Arabism to join your brothers in the UAR "to defend the Arab homeland, restore the usurped territory, and strike against the aggressors.

"Brothers: The setback that befell us is not a new one. The Arabs have suffered many setbacks before but thanks to their faith and patience they struggled until they restored their rights in full." The Romans, the Crusaders, and the Tatars were defeated and our homeland was liberated. We must now be constantly prepared. "We have learned many lessons and facts from the setback. When we realize the truth and the facts and begin to combat the mistakes, neither the Zionists nor their imperialist Anglo-American supporters can stand before us." Only through collaboration and solidarity will we defeat our enemies. Despite their small number, the Arabs have defeated and liberated their homeland from the foreigner.

"We will not remain idle in the face of what has befallen us. With patience and endurance we will achieve our objective. Our victory is inevitable. We cannot live without freedom or without the restoration of our land and full rights. Life is meaningless without these objectives. We will not allow a group that wanders throughout the world to usurp our resources and dominate our territory."

Brothers and sons: You are a symbol of Iraq and Arabism. You are in your Arab homeland. The enemy will realize that there is no difference between an Iraqi, Jordanian, Algerian, or a Kuwaiti. This became evident when we were subjected to the treacherous aggression. We will always be united as one man, one voice, and one destiny. President Arif returned to the republican palace in Al-Qubbah at 1630. He was accompanied by members of the Iraqi delegation and senior officers of the UAR Armed Forces.

Petroleum Minister's Statement

Beirut RNS in Arabic 1630 GMT 12 July 1967--M (FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

(Excerpts) Beirut--Saudi Petroleum and Mineral Wealth Minister Ahmad Zaki Yamani has stressed that Saudi Arabia still adheres to the decision banning the export of Saudi oil to Britain and the United States. In reply to questions asked by the REGIONAL NEWS SERVICE, the minister said that his country adheres to the resolutions adopted by last month's Baghdad conference of Arab oil-producing countries which provide for the halt of oil exports to countries that support Israel in any aggression against the Arab states.

Yamani strongly denied recent reports that his country has resumed the pumping of oil to Britain and the United States. He said: "What could be the motives behind such rumors?" He said that the Saudi Government's decision to ban oil exports to Britain and the United States is still in force today. He emphasized that "the question of resuming the pumping of oil on the grounds on which the resolutions of the Baghdad conference were made have not yet" been raised for discussion by the Saudi cabinet.

The Saudi petroleum minister arrived in Beirut from Jidda last night on his way to Kuwait to attend the meeting of the Kuwait-Saudi oil policy coordination committee due to be held this week.

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ARIF 14 JULY ANNIVERSARY MESSAGE SCORES U.S.

Baghdad Domestic Service in Arabic 1900 GMT 13 July 1967--M

(14 July anniversary message from President Arif--read by Education and Guidance Minister Malik Duhal al-Hasan)

(Summary) The 14 July revolution is one of the revolutions which our great homeland launched against imperialism to get rid of Western domination. With the revolution we marched toward progress and prosperity. Imperialism felt the danger threatening its interests in the region and so created the Zicnist base.

"You all know that former U.S. President Truman recognized Israel minutes after Britain handed it over to the Zionists." Imperialism has been helping this base ever since. When the UAR wanted to restore its legitimate sovereignty over its own territory, imperialism and its agents lost their head. "The Sixth Fleet stood in Arab territorial waters supporting Israel in its aggression." As a result of this treacherous conspiracy barbaric crimes have been committed; U.S. policy supported this crime. U.S. criminal support to this gang has meant grief for many millions of Arabs and Moslems. The United States bought the animosity of these people in return for a group of Jews who are hated by all people all over the world."

You all know the part played by Anglo-American imperialism at the United Nations. "The U.S. delegate at the United Nations, the Zionist Goldberg, played his part and used various means of pressure. Supported by Britain, he succeeded in defeating every draft resolution based on logic and justice." The U.N. failure was clear proof that imperialism backed the aggression. "The United States, Britain, and their allies are trying to turn this organization into a worthless organization and an imperialist (organ) working according to their wishes."

We shall not drop our arms or surrender one inch of our territory to the treacherous enemy. God is with us because right is on our side. Treachery may succeed once or twice, but not the third time. I appeal to you to coordinate your efforts and to sacrifice for the sake of our glory and dignity. We must save and avoid luxuries. Each one of us is responsible for the dignity of this country. This can only be achieved through hard and serious work.

## BEN-GURION TALKS OF SOVIET MIDEAST INVOLVEMENT

Jerusalem Domestic Service in Russian 1415 GMT 13 July 1967--M

(Text) Knesset Deputy David Ben-Gurion has stated that we cannot be absolutely certain that the six-day war was the last war in our area. Ben-Gurion said this in his speech to a seminar organized by the Universal Federation of the Workers of Israel for the representatives of Jewish communities of the United States. The seminar is being held in the agricultural settlement of Tsofit.

He said that not only are the Arab states involved in the Middle East conflict, but also the Soviet Union which supplies them with arms. I do not believe, he stressed that the USSR is interested in destroying Israel. However, it is aware that the arms it supplies to the Arab countries are directed against Israel. He added that the last war showed the Soviet Union clearly that one cannot rely on the personnel of the armies of the Arab countries. It is not clear what conclusions will be drawn by the Soviet Union from this, he noted.

He stressed further that the victory achieved in the last war by Israel's defense army is unexampled in the history of the Jewish people. Speaking about the tasks which our country is now facing, Ben-Gurion noted that we have to colonize Jerusalem and its outskirts and colonize and industrialize the Negev.

## GOVERNMENT, VATICAN DISCUSS JERUSALEM PLAN

Paris AFP in English 2037 GMT 13 July 1967--E (FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

(By Bernard Ullmann)

(Text) Tel Aviv --The Israeli Government proposed that control of all the Christian holy places in Jerusalem and Bethlehem should be transferred to a committee made up of representatives of the various Christian communities, Catholic sources said here tonight. This proposal was discussed at length in the talks held in Jerusalem between Msgr. Angelo Felici, special envoy of the Vatican and Israeli (?leaders) including Premier Eshkol. The Vatican accepted this idea as a basis of discussion, dropping its former insistence that Jerusalem should be internationalized, the same source said.

In theory, the holy places in Jerusalem belong to two Moslem families in the Old City, and for several generations the various religious communities have only had the use of them. The government in Jerusalem is prepared to pass a special law transferring this property to the Christian churches.

However, Catholic sources say that the drafting of a formula which would be acceptable to all Christian denominations would give rise to many difficulties. Such a move might well be opposed, for instance, by the Russian Orthodox Archimandrite in Jerusalem. He is attached to the Patriarchate in Moscow, and may bring up political rather than religious considerations in opposing any agreement which might seem to give the Israeli Government control of the Old City of Jerusalem.

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DAYAN: ISRAEL READY TO MEET JORDAN ANY TIME

Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1830 GMT 14 July 1967--M

(Text) Defense Minister Dayan announced that Israel is ready to hold a meeting with Jordan's representatives at any time in Israeli or Jordanian territory or at one of the bridges over the Jordan River to discuss any subject whatsoever. Dayan also announced that Israel is ready to make a good will gesture and permit inhabitants of the Western Bank, in special instances, to return immediately to their homes. Dayan told this to the president of the Red Cross, Samuel Gonard. Dayan asked the Red Cross representatives to determine who among the inhabitants of the Western Bank are especially grave cases and to bring them to one of the Jordan bridges. Israel will readmit them even before the distribution of the questionnaires to those who want to return to the Western Bank. The questionnaires will be given to Red Cross representatives on 16 July. Dayan announced that out of consideration for the inhabitants of the Western Bank and the Gaza Strip, Israel will not object if relatives submit money to them from abroad. He asked the Red Cross representatives to inform the governments concerned of this. Upon request of the Red Cross representative, Dayan agreed to permit the former minister of justice in the government of Jordan, Dr. (Besiqsu--phonetic), to return from the Gaza Strip where he was detained on his way to his country.

Dayan again pointed out the shortage of water in Al-Qantarah, which is exposed to Egyptian shelling. The Egyptians have stopped the water supply for this town. The defense minister asked the Red Cross representative to negotiate with Egypt to find a solution to this problem.

The Red Cross representative thanked Dayan for the cooperation of the Israeli authorities.

Jerusalem Israel Domestic Service in Hebrew 1700 GMT 13 July 1967 -M

(Text) Finance Minister Pinhas Sapir announced today that Israel will soon begin exploiting the oil wells in the Sinai Desert. Talking to correspondents in Haifa, Sapir said that at this stage the oil will serve to meet Israel's own requirements, which amount to approximately 3.3 million tons annually. At the same time, the import and use of crude oil from the Heletz oilfields will continue. Our correspondent reports that tests and necessary arrangements for refining oil from the Sinai wells have already been completed at Haifa refineries.

In reply to another question the finance minister said that the cost of holding the Western Bank and the Gaza Strip far exceeds estimates, and that the Israeli taxpayer will have to cover part of these expenses. At the same time, Sapir stressed that there are no plans at present to increase taxation.

However, the price of gasoline, which increased when the fighting began, will remain at this higher level. The finance minister added that the 250 million pounds allocated for the defense loan constitutes only a small part of the costs of the war and its consequences.

# NO DECISION MADE ON SAUDI OIL FOR U.S., U.K.

Jidda Domestic Service in Arabic 1242 GMT 16 July 1967--M

(Text) AL-BILAD has published a statement by Oil and Mineral Wealth Minister Ahmad Zaki Yamani concerning Saudi Arabia's stand on the question of resuming oil shipments to the United States and Britain. The minister said: The Saudi Arabian Kingdom has not yet decided to resume oil pumping to the two countries in question.

## SAUDI OIL MINISTER CONCLUDES VISIT TO KUWAIT

Kuwait Domestic Service in Arabic 1000 GMT 14 July 1967--M

(Excerpts) Saudi Oil and Mineral Wealth Minister Ahmad Zaki Yamani and the delegation accompanying him left Kuwait for home via Beirut this morning at the end of a two-day visit to Kuwait. The minister has announced that Saudi Arabia will never stop adopting all measures and using all weapons that will enable the Arabs to restore their rights and destroy their enemy.

In reply to questions asked by AR-RAY AL-AMM chief editor Yusuf al-Masaidn, he said that Saudi Arabia participates with the other Arab oil-producing states in boycotting the states which supported the Zionist aggression, and that the decision to implement the oil boycott is still being enforced.

The minister said: As a result of suspending the pumping of oil from Saudi Arabia, some losses were inflicted on the country's economy. This made us reconsider the remaining part of our current budget. We will be compelled to suspend a number of projects and to reduce some of our expenditures. We may also be compelled to impose a temporary tax to make up the losses. He said that Saudi Arabia has always been among the first to use oil as a weapon in our battle against the Zionists.

His Excellency said that during his visit he discussed with Kuwaiti officials many subjects, most of which were technical subjects connected with joint investments in the neutral zone.

## New Exchange Rate

Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0800 GMT 18 July 1967--M

(Text) Effective tomorrow there will be a change in the rate of exchange of the Egyptian pound in the Gaza Strip and north Sinai. The new rate will be six Israeli pounds to one Egyptian pound instead of three to one as has been the case up to now. The decision was adopted jointly by the finance minister and the governor of the Bank of Israel on the recommendation of the (word indistinct) committee headed by Dr. Arnon. The committee handles civil questions in the territories held by the Israeli Defense Forces. The finance minister and the governor of the Bank of Israel explained that they adopted this decision to speed up the normalization of the economic life in Gaza and to facilitate the economic activities of the Gaza inhabitants. They pointed out that the practical implication of the decision is that the area inhabitants will have more Israeli pounds in their hands. The prices in Gaza are lower than those in Israel and the decision will bring the price level in the Gaza Strip up to that in Israel. It will increase the purchasing power of the Gaza Strip inhabitants and will enable them to buy outside the strip.

The finance minister and the governor of the Bank of Israel said that from the viewpoint of the Egyptian pound rate in world markets there was no need to double the exchange rate because its true value fluctuates around three pounds.

## Warning on Canal Navigation

Cairo Domestic Service in Arabic 1130 GMT 18 July 1967--M

(Text) The UAR's chief delegate at the United Nations, Muhammad Al-Quni, delivered a note to U.S. Secretary General U Thant informing him of a new Israeli attempt to put nine Israeli boats into the Suez Canal from the eastern side.

The UAR delegate informed U Thant that the UAR forces will have no choice but to open fire if the Israelis attempt to place their boats in the canal. He said the UAR has informed Chief U.N. Observer Lt. Gen. Odd Bull about this aggressive Israeli act. The UAR delegate said an attempt to put the Israel boats into the Suez Canal will have serious consequences for the safety of foreign ships anchored in the Bitter Lakes and that Israel will bear the responsibility for any damage that might be caused to these foreign ships.

## CONFLICTING REPORTS ON WEST BANK REFUGEES

## Damascus Embassy Statement

Cairo MENA in Arabic 0920 GMT 17 July 1967--M (FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

(Text) Damascus--Jordanian authorities expect the first group of refugees to be repatriated to their homes in the Western Bank tomorrow through the U.N. Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) and the International Red Cross. This was announced today by the Jordanian Embassy in Damascus. This operation, the embassy added, is mainly aimed at reuniting families which were separated by the recent Israeli aggression against Jordan.

The Jordanian Embassy said its government, in a joint effort with UNRWA and the Red Cross, will make final arrangements for the repatriation of refugees to the Western Bank. The embassy said the government has also taken measures to provide adequate funds to Western Bank municipalities to enable them to carry out their services and projects, and has paid state and municipal officials in the Western Bank for the month of June.

It will be recalled that Israel has claimed that it is ready to allow return of refugees to their homes in the Western Bank but so far has done nothing.

## ESHKOL INTERVIEW WITH AFP CORRESPONDENT

Paris AFP in French 2020 GMT 18 July 1967--E (FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

(By Bernard Ullmann)

(Text) Jerusalem--Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol affirmed on Tuesday that Israel is anxious to have the principle of its ships' presence in the Suez Canal recognized as of now in order to establish our freedom of navigation for future reference. The cease-fire line passes through the middle of the canal, he declared categorically.

The Prime Minister indicated in an exclusive interview granted to AFP's special correspondent that this was also the reason why Israeli troops had shown so much zeal in reaching the canal during last June's hostilities. Recalling the Egyptian complaint concerning the presence of Israeli boats in the canal and Cairo's position that any attempt to have them circulate in the canal was a violation of the cease-fire, he stressed the fact that small Israeli boats brought across Sinai by truck had been floating on the waters of the canal before the arrival of the U.N. observers and that Israeli soldiers had been bathing in the canal ever since the end of the June fighting.

Eshkol deeply regretted that the first known results of the little Arab summit just ended in Cairo appear not to have foreshadowed the recognition by its neighbors of the existence and the permanency of the state of Israel. Declaring himself skeptical as to the value of a peace treaty with President Abd an-Nasir, who might regard it as nothing more than a scrap of paper, he murmured: Perhaps it is a great piece of luck that there is a desert between our two countries.

Eshkol said he is convinced that King Husayn pressed for a summit conference of the 13 Arab countries in order to get a realistic point of view concerning Israel adopted. Anxious not to reveal his cards beforehand, however, he declined to say what the eventual bases of negotiation with the Jordanian sovereign might be.

In connection with the political future of Transjordan Eshkol stressed the fact that no solution could be excluded in advance--particularly the solution of a confederation with the state of Israel, with a free port in the port of Haifa and access to the port through Israeli territory. All these problems--and particularly the problems of the security and the form of government--could be discussed, he said, with King Husayn or others, the prime condition in his eyes being that they sit together at a table, as he had advocated for many years.

Regarding the Gaza Strip he refused to add to or retract from the declarations he made recently to a West German periodical, DER SPIEGEL, to the effect that this territory must remain Israeli. On the other hand, the Prime Minister stressed, the question of Jerusalem after its reunification under Israeli administration is not negotiable. Questioned about the implications for his country of the presence and reinforcement of the Soviet naval squadron in Port Said and Alexandria, Eshkol opined that the USSR wished to have two feet in this part of the world. But I hope, he added, that there is a limit to their ambitions. I do not wish to believe that they seek to complete Hitler's work of annihilating the Jewish people. Why should they not advise their Arab friends to be reasonable?



Eshkol interview  
(cont'd)

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Once again Eshkol regretted France's maintaining its embargo on the export of arms to the Middle East--a blow which Israel had not merited, he said. He attributed President de Gaulle's attitude toward Israel to motives of world policy rather than to specific hostility, and added that France might become once again friendly with Israel. However, he pointed out, the refusal to deliver to Israel even spare parts for military materiel in use was an injustice.

Eshkol indicated in this connection that Israel must, in a few weeks or months rather than a few years, look elsewhere for the equipment France had refused to furnish it, if the embargo was maintained. However, many feelers have been put out, particularly in the United States. We do not wish to take any hasty decisions in settling on a single type of jet plane, he said . . . .

Regarding reports of his political differences with General Moshe Dayan, minister of defense, Eshkol said only: We do not always think alike.

Asked whether, if he had his way, he would choose General Dayan to succeed him at the head of the government, he answered smiling: I have every intention of staying where I am for a period for which I was elected. He said he had always favored a merger of the Mapai government party which he heads with the Rafi party of Ben Gurion and General Dayan.

Jerusalem Version

Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0500 GMT 19 July 1967--M

(Text) Prime Minister Levi Eshkol said today that Israel insists that from now on the principle of the presence of Israeli vessels in the Suez Canal must be recognized in order to determine for the future our right to freedom of shipping in the canal. The cease-fire line, Eshkol told a correspondent of the French news agency, passes through the middle of the canal. As for Cairo's claim that it would consider any attempt to sail our boats in the canal as a violation of the cease-fire agreement, the Prime Minister stressed that small boats were transported by trucks through Sinai to the canal and were sailing there before the U.N. observers set up positions.

The Prime Minister was asked his opinion about the conference of the leaders of the five Arab states which ended yesterday in Cairo. He said that for the time being there is no evidence that our neighbors are ready to recognize Israel as a state that is there to stay. The correspondent reports that Eshkol doubts whether a peace treaty with Abd an-Nasir would serve any purpose and fears that this would be merely a worthless scrap of paper.

Concerning the presence of the Soviet flotilla in Egyptian ports, Prime Minister Eshkol expressed the belief that the Soviet Union is endeavoring to plant both legs in this part of the world but he added that there is a limit to its aspirations.

Concerning the prospects of negotiations with Husayn, Eshkol said: When the Jordanian King visited Cairo it was obvious that he pressed for a realistic attitude toward Israel. But the Prime Minister has the impression that Husayn did not succeed.

Regarding all the conjecture about the future of the Western Bank, Eshkol stated that to begin with, Israel is not ruling out any solution. He mentioned among such solutions a federation with the state of Israel and the granting of a free port in Haifa. On Gaza the Prime Minister said he is not ready to confirm, deny, or add anything to what has been said in earlier statements, including his interview sometime ago with the West German weekly DER SPIEGEL.

In conclusion the French correspondent asked Prime Minister Eshkol to say something about President de Gaulle's attitude and the embargo on French arms. Eshkol said: The French President's attitude is a great injustice to Israel. The embargo is harming us. Obviously we are now examining the possibility of other sources.

## ARIF STATEMENTS ASSESS RESULTS OF CAIRO TALKS

## Statement to AL-AKHBAR

Cairo MENA in Arabic 0610 GMT 20 July 1967--M (FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

(Text) Cairo--Iraqi President Abd ar-Rahman Muhammad Arif has affirmed that the present conditions require unity of the Arab ranks because the setback does not concern just one Arab country but involves all of them. He added: We must depend on ourselves and our friends to remove the Zionist epidemic, which if left alone will harm everybody. This came in a statement which the Iraqi President released to AL-AKHBAR before his departure yesterday and which the paper publishes today.

Asked whether it is possible to say that the present and the future could be clearly seen in light of the outcome of the Cairo meetings and his visit together with Premier Boumedienne to the Soviet Union, President Arif said: "It is in our interest not to expose our cards. I would like to affirm that the Arab and socialist states stand together to remove the effects of the aggression and that the socialist states are open to us economically and in all the other fields."

Asked about the possibility of holding meetings soon on the same level as the Cairo meetings, he said: "Our meetings were not held as a result of a prior agreement."

Actually we came here to familiarize ourselves with the facts, the information available, and what each state needs from the other states. This is why we arrived at intervals. What prompted this visit and our meetings is our interest that every country should know the other country and that each one of us should realize what help is expected from him.

Asked his opinion about the need for quick action to bolster the Arab economy, diplomatic representation, and propaganda in a manner appropriate to the present stage, President Arif said: This is the aim behind the meeting of the foreign ministers. This is the objective behind the Iraqi Government's call for an emergency meeting of the Arab Economic Council. The foreign ministers will discuss the question of convening an Arab summit conference. The Iraqi President also said: As for the question of propaganda, it is my view that there should be new planning for Arab propaganda, particularly in Europe and America, as well as in all the continents. It is my opinion that there should be a unified plan to present the true picture in a new way to the outside world.

Finally, asked about the date of his reported visit to certain Arab states, President Arif said that nothing has yet been decided about such a visit and that he will not hesitate to visit any Arab country if it is in the Arabs' general interest.

## DAYAN SAYS 'NEW BORDERS' ARE EASIER TO DEFEND

Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1830 GMT 19 July 1967--M

(Text) Defense Minister Moshe Dayan said today that our new borders are easier to defend than the previous borders. He said that defending the borders is not only a military problem but is connected with the state's justified aims and demands--demands which we can defend. Our demands, Dayan said, are a revision of our relations with Arab states; a revision of our evaluation of international forces, because until now we were, more than any other state, dependent on the promises and actions of other states, and a revaluation of Israel's importance and status in the Middle East. The defense minister made this statement at a ceremony marking the conclusion of a course at the defense forces command and staff school.

## UAR Military Failures Noted

Paris AFP in English 1934 GMT 19 July 1967--E (FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

(Text) Tel Aviv--Defense Minister Moshe Dayan today warned the Arab nations that Israel's present positions are much better than before the recent war. We can hold them for as long as we wish, said Dayan, who was addressing a graduation at an Israeli war school somewhere in Israel. Discussing the Israeli victory, Dayan said Arab underestimation of Israel's forces was one of the main reasons for the Arab defeat.

UAR President Jamal Abd an-Nasir believed Israel's 1956 victory was only due to French and British help and not to Israel's own power, Dayan said.

Abd an-Nasir also overestimated his own forces because of the amount of Soviet equipment he had received and the successful handling of this material when no enemy forces were in opposition. The Egyptians failed to understand the rapid rhythm of modern warfare and failed to utilize it during the recent war, Dayan said.

## Security Council Authority

Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1100 GMT 19 July 1967--M

(Text) A spokesman at Gen. Odd Bull's headquarters in Jerusalem said today in reply to correspondents' questions that, from the viewpoint of the observers panel in the Suez Canal, there is no border between the Israeli and Egyptian forces. The spokesman said the observers are acting on the strength of the general agreement reached in the Security Council some time ago when it was decided that the entire Suez Canal sector is under the observers' supervision.

Asked if there was any possibility of misunderstanding, the spokesman said: We must act according to the authority granted to us by the U.N. Security Council, not on our own initiative. Our men are to observe what takes place and report on it.

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Assessment by Eban

Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0800 GMT 22 July 1967--M

(Foreign Minister Abba Eban statements to correspondent Zvi Gil in New York--recorded)

(Excerpts) In the second half of the General Assembly debate, we consolidated everything we had achieved in the first half. Although this time (?it was not proposed) to condemn Israel or to label it as an aggressor, strong, energetic, and continuous efforts were made to persuade the General Assembly to pass a resolution calling for the evacuation of the occupied areas. The Soviet Union led this battle and tried to use all its influence. It put great pressure on the delegations of all blocs.

During this session, there were some hours of concern, and on several instances we had to mobilize a greater effort to influence the friendly front lest it crumble and left cracks appear in it. The fact is, that the second attack failed like the first one, and the General Assembly refused to condemn Israel. It refused to (?yield to) the Soviet effort and to brand our war for existence as a campaign of aggression.

I have the impression that the Soviet Union attached great importance to the adoption of a resolution which would mainly call for the evacuation of the occupied areas. To this end, the Soviet Union was prepared to make a number of sacrifices on tactical (word indistinct). But it did not sufficiently take into consideration the Arabs states' extremism and fanaticism.

These states, in fact, denounced every resolution based on the idea of peace. Any resolution which even mentioned this (word indistinct) word would not gain their support. Hence, there was a sort of split, probably for the first time, between the Arab and Soviet policies and also between their tactics. (It would be--ed) premature to guess what the outcome will be in the long run in view of this new situation.

I have not the least doubt that the pressure against us will continue. I said on my return to Israel on 5 July that the political battle will be more protracted and not less (word indistinct) than the military battle. Hence, although it is impossible to erase the impressions of the political gains we achieved, we should not assume that the battle has ended. Hostile and (?grudging) elements have recovered from the blow that they suffered here in the General Assembly and earlier at the Security Council, and we will have to be alert and prepared for many weeks and months.

(Editor's note: The Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew at 1700 GMT on 22 July reports that "before leaving New York at the end of the U.N. General Assembly's emergency session, Foreign Minister Eban expressed satisfaction with the outcome of the debate in the General Assembly and said it proves that Israel's struggle for peace and security has won wide support in world opinion. Criticism is growing of those who believe they have the right to continue the state of war with Israel while demanding at the same time that we behave as if peace were already established." According to the report, Eban "stressed that the United Nations cannot solve problems for states that do not want them solved. In any case the settlement of the Middle East crisis should be the 'subject' of talks between the states of the region themselves.")

BOUTEFLIKA VIEWS REASONS FOR U.N. FAILURE

Algiers Domestic Service in French 1300 GMT 23 July 1967--L

(Statement by Algerian Foreign Minister Bouteflika on his return from the U.N. General Assembly session--recorded)

(Text) I think that I must say that the United Nations and the international organizations in a wider sense have not come out (?with credit) from the debates on the Middle East questions. It would perhaps be even more correct to say that the United Nations has completely failed to find a solution to this problem.

When the USSR appealed to the international community to convene an extraordinary emergency session, its attitude as a great power was undoubtedly at variance with the very doctrine of the great powers, which consists in examining among the members of the Security Council all the problems concerning the search for and preservation of peace, and this without the participation of the members of the General Assembly, who at all events are a true reflection of humanity today.

I personally, as a representative of a country of the third world, can only note that the people of the third world did not know how to use this exceptional opportunity to affirm the position of the General Assembly in the face of the Security Council and hence to share in giving it more responsibility, to make it more representative. The second thing that I would like to note is that when the USSR decided to convene this extraordinary emergency general assembly, Algeria there denounced all the shortcomings and manifestations of the powerlessness of the United Nations and the international organizations.

I must once again particularly stress the absence of the People's Republic of China. That is certainly a fundamental factor, and the United Nations will never fulfill its role as long as this great country is excluded from the international community.

I do not wish to dwell on the numerous contradictions and anachronisms which render and will always render international and United Nations organizations powerless. I wish only to say that if the United Nations has become solvent financially in these last few years, it is very difficult to say now, especially after the debates on South-West Africa and the Middle East--it is very difficult to say that the United Nations is politically solvent.

I would also like to stress that the allies and accomplices of Zionist aggression, those who masterminded this aggression, those who prepared this aggression both politically and materially, have followed a strictly logical attitude during this debate. They have contributed greatly to the failure of the efforts of the international community. We say indescribable and unspeakable pressures put on all delegations to make them adopt an attitude of complicity with the aggression--an attitude contradictory to the principles of the U.N. Charter.

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(Sentence indistinct) We are more than ever deeply convinced that these organizations, which have in any case been controlled by the great imperialist powers, are still controlled and will remain controlled by these powers as long as New York remains the center for the debates. But if the General Assembly was transferred elsewhere would the problem be solved promptly? I must say at once that the answer is no, since many problems are still to be solved. I have only pointed out a few. But there is no doubt that there would be a more moral, certainly more positive, and (?more consequential atmosphere).

I would also like to say that many countries supported the Arab cause in a spirit of strict observance of the U.N. Charter. There is no doubt that a very broad solidarity emerged within the third world, and a very broad solidarity in favor of the Arab cause emerged among the peace and freedom-loving forces in the world. What has happened is that the Arab countries have been the victims of aggression; that part of their territory has been occupied since 5 June. Plain commonsense has dictated that all freedom and peace-loving countries--I would even go so far as to say all the countries that believe sincerely in the need to put into practice the principles of the U.N. Charter--should have made an effective contribution to the success of the first Soviet proposal, that is, the unreserved condemnation of aggression. I at once ask the question: What would have been the position of certain countries if the Arabs had invaded Israel? I would not like to answer this question.

I simply say that all countries should have condemned the aggressor. The United Nations General Assembly should have demanded an immediate and unconditional withdrawal. Failing to do this, the world community will find itself condemned from now on to live by the law of jungle. The only arguments which could be valid now will be those of force.

I think I can also say that if the United Nations General Assembly, after long, painful, and depressing debate, could not find a solution, it means that its failure constitutes a striking victory for the third world--namely in the sense that the countries of the third world, although small, have been able, in the face of certain attempts to reach compromises meant to condemn fundamental principles--in the face of these attempts, these countries have demonstrated the greatness and loftiness of their thinking; have once again shown how much they are attached to the principles, that is, to peace and international security.

I can only salute their brave attitude. I can only pay ardent homage in the name of the Algerian Government to the moral probity that has characterized their steps and to their political courage, because at no time did they consider compromise or listen to the language of pressure.

I would like also to say that the Arab countries once again fought for a just cause. The United Nations was the scene of a great international manifestation, where an accord emerged when 98 countries agreed to an immediate meeting of the United Nations General Assembly emergency meeting. The accord emerged precisely around the agenda proposed by the USSR: 1) to condemn the aggression; 2) to bring about the immediate and unconditional withdrawal, 3) to give material compensation to the countries which suffered damage.

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I must say that the Security Council will not succeed in solving this problem any better than it did before we went to the General Assembly. Of course, now more than ever the Arab countries must rely on their friends, but in the first place they must rely on themselves. This is the case of all classes struggling for liberty; the case of all just causes. You have got to help yourself before other people start helping you.

This is what I wanted to tell you. I believe that the position of Algeria was very clearly right from the beginning, since on 19 June, to the people of Algiers, President Houari Boumediene said very clearly that Algeria did not expect anything exceptional from the extraordinary emergency session. This is what we have already said in friendly capitals. I can only regret that the prophecy was justified. But from the beginning we made our calculations coolly and sincerely. Nothing will shake our determination. We are certain that though the Arab world is now going through this trial, it is not the end. Victory is always on the side of justice, and our cause is a just one.



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Cairo Domestic Service in Arabic 1726 GMT 23 July 1967--M

(UAR President Jamal Abd an-Nasir speech at Cairo University Hall on the 15th anniversary of the 23 July revolution--live)

(Text) Brother compatriots: The 15th anniversary of the revolution of 23 July 1952 comes at a time when we are living through a crisis. We would not be exaggerating if we said that this is the most severe crisis we have faced in the history of our revolutionary work. At no times has our work been easy. We have always had to face all kinds of political, economic, and military dangers. Every victory we have achieved has come after difficulties and hardships, the brunt of which we have borne patiently.

The execution of the 23 July revolution was not an easy job for our people after 70 years of British occupation, for 70 years the British, in collaboration with the feudalists and capitalists, ruled this country with the backing of 80,000 British soldiers in the Suez Canal zone, nor was our people's resistance to the policy of pacts and zones of influence which others tried to impose on us an easy job at a time when the national liberation movement had not attained the present level of independence and nonsubservience.

Moreover, our people's acceptance of the challenge to build the high dam was not an easy job in the face of the arrogance of the United States, which thought that by withdrawing a Western offer to finance the high dam it could harm the Egyptian economy and reveal our people as incapable of assuming the responsibility of executing such a project, which is unequalled anywhere in the world. In fact, by its arrogance the United States wanted our people to lose confidence in themselves and to overthrow our revolutionary regime.

Nor was our people's endurance of the horrors of the Suez war an easy job. In 1956 our people were attacked by three states, two of which were big powers. The aggression has utilized the base that imperialism established in the heart of the Arab homeland to threaten and terrorize this homeland, once overtly and the second time covertly.

Our people's progress in the field of socialist reconstruction, self-dependence, and justice and their attempt to increase national wealth through the enormous process of industrialization, reclamation of vast lands, electrification of the entire country, restoration of all foreign interests, elimination of monopolism, capitalism, and feudalism; redistribution of land, provisions for education, health and social security services; and according the workers a share in the profits and administration of firms--all this, brothers, was not an easy job in this country where foreign and feudal interests once dominated the national resources. It was not an easy job in the heart of this Arab world which was dominated by foreign and feudal interests. Whatever happens in our country has repercussions in our entire Arab world whether we like it or not.

Our people's acceptance of the responsibilities of Arab solidarity, the common struggle, and of destiny was not an easy job. In exercising these responsibilities we opposed the 1957 attempt to invade Syria, accepted the consequences of unity and secession,



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supported the 1958 revolution in Iraq, backed the Algerian revolution from 1954 to 1962, and bolstered the Yemeni revolution and the revolution in south Arabia. The latest problem we confronted and are still confronting is the attempt to invade Syria.

Brothers, our work has never been easy. The road of struggle is strewn with dangers, the way to glory with sacrifices, and the way to great hopes with great sacrifices. Should the peoples fail to take this course they would face rigidity and backwardness. They would take no chances and would not face life--the sweet and the bitter. Those who do not shoulder responsibilities have no right to entertain hopes. Those who do not take chances become prisoners of fear itself because of their fear. This is not the quality of energetic peoples; it is not their nature or their course.

I have said that the crisis we now face is one of the severest we have faced in the history of our revolutionary action, for more than one reason. For one thing, this crisis which we are confronting, although it is not the gravest and most difficult we have faced, is certainly the most hypocritical and meanest thing we have encountered. Imperialism has benefitted--and we must admit this--from all its encounters with us and with the other peoples who have frequently been exposed to its raids. This time imperialism did not face us overtly as it did in 1956. But imperialism made an effort--and we must admit that it was skillful--to conceal its role and hide its collusion. In the end, perhaps, imperialism left nothing to incriminate it but its fingerprints. But this is one thing, and catching imperialism redhanded as we did in 1956 is something else.

For another thing, this is perhaps the first revolution anniversary that has found our homeland in the midst of a savage conspiracy. Despite their courage and insistence on confronting it, our people are at the same time undoubtedly experiencing deep sorrow and severe pain.

Brothers, perhaps Almighty God wanted to test us to judge whether we deserve what we have achieved, whether we are able to protect our achievements, and whether we have the courage to be patient and stand firm against affliction.

Brothers, perhaps Almighty God also wanted to give us a lesson to teach us what we had not learned, to remind us of some things we might have forgotten, and to cleanse from our souls the blemishes that have affected us and the shortcomings that we must avoid (applause) as we build our new society.

Whatever the Almighty's will may be, we accept his test as our destiny. We are fully confident that He is with us: He will protect our struggle should we set out to struggle, grant us victory should we be determined to triumph, and open the road of justice to us (applause), endow us with victory should we be determined to be the victor, and open the road of justice to us should we be able to place ourselves on His orthodox path.

Brother compatriots, I do not want to take you back to the circumstances which paved the way for this crisis. I explained some of these circumstances to you in my address to the nation on 9 June, right after the setback. Also I realize, and we must all realize, that what happened has happened and there is no use stopping to wail over the debris. Now it is more important to learn the lesson, overcome the setback, rise above it, and proceed triumphantly on our road toward the realization of our aspirations. (applause and cheers) I do not want any cheers until the end.

But I do believe that we must ponder certain important matters so that we may all be able to achieve the highest degree of clarity.

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The first thing which should be clear to us all is that we were not the ones who started the crisis in the Middle East. We all know that this crisis began with Israel's attempt to invade Syria. It is quite clear to all of us that in that attempt Israel was not working for itself alone but also for the forces which had gotten fed up with the Arab revolutionary movement.

The information we received about the invasion of Syria came from many sources. Our Syrian brothers had information that Israel had mobilized 18 brigades on their front. We confirmed this information. It became evident to us that Israel had mobilized no less than 13 brigades on the Syrian front. Our parliamentary delegation headed by Anwar as-Sadat was on a visit to Moscow, and our Soviet friends informed Anwar as-Sadat at that time that the invasion of Syria was imminent.

What were we to do? We could have remained silent, we could have waited, or we could have just issued statements and cables of support. But if this homeland had accepted such behavior it would have meant that it was deserting its mission, its role, and even its personality. There was a joint defense agreement between us and Syria. We do not consider our agreements with the peoples of our Arab nation or others merely ink on paper. To us these agreements are sacred, an honor and an obligation.

Between us and Syria, between us and all Arab peoples there was and always will be something far greater and more lasting than agreements and treaties: faith in the common struggle and the common fate. Therefore it was imperative that we take concrete steps to face the danger threatening Syria, especially since the statements of Israeli political and military leaders at the time and their open threats to Syria--as reported in the press and frankly noted at the United Nations--left no room for anyone to doubt any information or to wait or hesitate.

The second question: What we decided to move, our actions led to certain practical results. First, we asked for the withdrawal of the U.N. Emergency Force (UNEF). Then we reinstated Egyptian sovereign rights in the Gulf of Aqaba. This was one of the things our Arab brothers had always insisted on. It was natural that such steps had a great impact on the area and the world.

The third question: By moving and taking the initiative to repel the danger to Syria, we realized--particularly from an international viewpoint--that the question was whether we should be the first to deal a blow in an armed battle. Had we done this we would have exposed ourselves to very serious consequences, greater than we would have been able to tolerate. First, we would have faced direct U.S. military action against us on the pretext that we had fired the first bullet in the battle.

Here I would like to draw your attention to certain important points. The first is the U.S. warnings. Perhaps you have read about these U.S. warnings. President Johnson's adviser summoned our ambassador in Washington at a late hour at night and told him that Israel had information that we were going to attack. The adviser said this would put us in a serious situation and urged us to exercise self-restraint. They also said they were telling Israel the same thing so that it would also exercise self-restraint. We also received messages from President Johnson referring to the United Nations and urging us to exercise self-restraint.

The second point--which perhaps I have discussed before--is that the Russian ambassador on the following day asked to see me and conveyed to me a message from the Soviet Premier urging self-restraint. (The Soviet Premier--ed.) informed me about a message he had sent to the Israeli Premier and said that any action on our part would expose the world to great danger.

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The third point is that the entire international community was against the outbreak of war. President de Gaulle was clear when he said France would define its attitude on the basis of who fired the first shot.

The fourth point is that we were the victims of a diplomatic trick, a political deception in which we had not imagined a major power would involve itself. This political trick was played by the United States. It was represented in the U.S. President's speech, his appeals, his request that we cooperate with the U.N. Secretary General, and his offer to send the vice president to discuss with us ways to save the entire world from this crisis.

The U.N. Secretary General came here and we cooperated with him to the maximum. The Secretary General asked for a breathing space with regard to the Gulf of Aqaba and we agreed to this. He said he wanted this breathing space so that all concerned would have time to pause and deal with matters. The first thing we pointed out to him was that no Israeli ships would be allowed to pass through the canal (as heard, presumably the Gulf of Aqaba--ed.), that no strategic shipments would be allowed to pass, and, in the meantime, we would not search any ships. We accepted this and considered it a proposal by the Secretary General to the United Nations, providing breathing space for all to discuss the matter.

After that, an envoy of the U.S. President arrived here. The emissary suggested that a vice president go to the United States. I approved the idea with the understanding that the vice president would meet with President Johnson and explain our attitude to him. Then I sent a letter to the U.S. President telling him: We welcome the visit of the U.S. vice president, but at the same time I am prepared to send Vice President Zakariya Muhyi ad-Din to Washington to meet you and explain the Arab viewpoint to you.

Naturally, the next day I received the reply that they welcomed Zakariya Muhyi ad-Din's trip to Washington to meet with the American President, and they requested that we set a date. We set it for Tuesday, 6 June, and we all know that the aggression began on 5 June. What does this mean? It means that large-scale political and diplomatic activities were going on and it was our right in the light of these activities to think that the explosion would not occur soon.

The fifth point: In spite of all this, we were reassured about all these things. We knew that something was in the making and that it would not be long in coming. It was obvious that something was being planned against us. In fact, I had felt for two years that something would be prepared against us, since the cessation of U.S. aid and America's warnings to us not to arm or enlarge our army, nor to follow a course of technical development, nor to seek military development.

When we concentrated our forces, I estimated that the likelihood of war breaking out was 20 percent. Before we closed the Gulf of Aqaba, we convened a meeting of the Higher Executive Committee at my home. We discussed the closure of the Gulf of Aqaba. This meeting took place on 22 May. At this meeting I told them that the possibility of war was 50 percent. At another meeting I said that the likelihood of war was 80 percent.

At our meeting of the Higher Executive Committee it was obvious that our action would be defensive, that we would attack only if aggression was launched against Syria, and that we would be on the alert.

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At this meeting no one spoke at all of attacking Israel. There was no intention at all that we would launch an offensive against Israel. As I explained earlier, it was clear from all our analyses that any attack on Israel would expose us to great dangers. The foremost of these dangers would be an American attack on us in view of the statements America made saying that it guaranteed the borders of the states in this area. It was obvious to us that when America said it guaranteed the borders of the states in this area and would not tolerate any changes in this area, America did not at all mean the Arab states, but by this it meant Israel. It meant that if an aggression was carried out against Israel, America would implement the statement made by President Kennedy that America guaranteed all the borders in this area.

On this ground there was no discussion at all of launching an attack on Israel. But our entire operation at the joint command was defensive. As we estimated at that time, our concentrations were a different action so that Israel would not commit aggression against Syria.

On 23 May, we announced the closure of the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli ships. Then came the political changes in Israel at the beginning of June. As we followed what was going on there, the probability of war became 100 percent.

What does this mean? It means that we did not trust in the least all the political and diplomatic activities of the United States. We realized that something was being planned and that it would not take long.

On Friday, 2 June, I personally went to the armed forces supreme command headquarters. I participated in a meeting which was attended by all senior officers of the armed forces. At that meeting, I gave my viewpoint before listening to theirs. I said at that meeting on Friday, 2 June, that we must expect the enemy to strike a blow within 48 to 72 hours, and no later, on the basis of the indications of events and developments. I also said at that meeting that I expected the aggression to take place on Monday, 5 June, and the first blow to be dealt to our air force. The commander of the air force was present at the meeting.

What does this mean? It means that we did not underestimate the situation as a result of all the diplomatic contacts, the dispatch of the U.N. Secretary General, and Johnson's approval of a visit by Zakariya Muhyi ad-Din. It was quite clear by any political calculation that Israel was bound to take military action, especially after Iraqi forces moved and Jordan joined the joint defense agreements.

Question Number Six: After what has happened, we must faithfully and honorably admit that the military battle did not go as we had expected and hoped. It confirmed the proverb that precaution does not deter fate.

I do not want now to talk about the causes (of the setback--ed.), nor will I permit myself or this people, while the battle continues, to apportion blame. This is a matter for history and the struggle of our people. But I can say with satisfaction, good will and a conscience ready to give an account at any time, that first and last the responsibility was mine. I said this (applause, cheers, and unintelligible remarks from the audience)--never mind, never mind--I said this in my address to the nation on 9 June, and I say it now and will continue to say it, bearing all the consequences and accepting any judgment of it. Actually, this was why I decided to

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I do not want now to talk about the causes (of the setback--ed.), nor will I permit myself or this people, while the battle continues, to apportion blame. This is a matter for history and the struggle of our people. But I can say with satisfaction, good will and a conscience ready to give an account at any time, that first and last the responsibility was mine. I said this (applause, cheers, and unintelligible remarks from the audience)--never mind, never mind--I said this in my address to the nation on 9 June, and I say it now and will continue to say it, bearing all the consequences and accepting any judgment of it. Actually, this was why I decided to

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What did the Americans do? When the Israelis hit them they pulled themselves together, hushed up the story, and went to Malta to repair the ship. Had we attacked the U.S. ship, the Americans would have given us an ultimatum, because we are neither an American colony nor an imperialist bridgehead. Now are we in the U.S. sphere of influence.

There is another question: Why were there U.S. planes over our frontlines? On Wednesday, 7 June, two planes bearing U.S. insignia were seen over our lines. At first I did not believe it, but the information was certain. We then issued a statement saying that American planes had flown over our lines and over the front. We also said that we, therefore, believed the Americans were participating in the operation. We also spoke of the planes that were attacking Jordan and said there had been (an) Israeli air attack on Jordan. We broadcast a statement including details about the two planes we had observed in flight.

In the evening, I received a letter from President Johnson. He contacted the Soviet head of state and requested him to send us a letter, because at that time we did not have relations with him. He said it was true that there were two U.S. planes over our lines, but they were going to the aid of the USS Liberty, the spy ship.

The question arises: Were there other U.S. planes? A second question is: Is it possible that they would have admitted this had we not broadcast the statement? In fact, one asks oneself such questions about the things he knows.

What is the explanation of the U.S. attitude at the United Nations and after the end of the operations? The U.S. stand at the United Nations in the wake of the operations was to fully adopt Israel's point of view. The U.S. stand at the United Nations was for unconditional surrender by the Arabs. This was the U.S. stand at the United Nations after the operations had ended.

What does this stand mean? There is an appalling difference between the two U.S. attitudes--the stand in 1956, when America was surprised by the tripartite aggression against us, and the 1967 attitude when America was not taken by surprise. In 1956, America was surprised by the tripartite aggression against us. In 1967, despite the letters and the agreement to send Zakariya Muhyi ad-Din, America was not surprised by the Israeli aggression against us. When America was surprised, it stood steadfastly against the aggression and demanded that it be halted and that the aggressive forces withdraw. But when America was not taken by surprise, it supported the aggression and brought pressure to bear on any state which America could influence in any way, the result was the failure of the United Nations as we have seen.

It is certain that America was not taken by surprise. Stories began to be told. These days American papers abound in news reports saying that the issue has provoked discussions on the highest levels in America. U.S. papers and the American LIFE magazine said that Israel submitted to the U.S. President the viewpoint that it should launch an attack, saying that it felt superior. U.S. newspapers also say that the U.S. President sought the views of the U.S. chief of staff and the U.S. intelligence director and that they agreed. Therefore, Israel was allowed to launch the offensive and to perpetrate aggression.

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At the same time, Israel obtained guarantees from the United States that should the Arabs enter Israel, the Sixth Fleet would intercept them, and if Israel entered the Arab countries, America would support Israel. These stories were published in newspapers. Israeli Premier Eshkol has thanked the U.S. President for telling him: The Sixth Fleet is there for you and to help you. Eshkol replied in a coddling manner to the U.S. President and told him: I am afraid that when we become exposed to danger, you will be busy with Vietnam, or you may be spending the weekend at your Texas ranch. But the U.S. President affirmed to him and reassured him that the Sixth Fleet would protect him should the Arabs cross the borders into Israel.

These articles, statements, and all these stories were published in the papers. Therefore, America was not surprised by the aggression. Therefore there was collusion between the United States and Israel. One must ask himself questions about these subjects. Of course, the only convincing answer is that the United States colluded with Israel.

When the United States declared before the war that it adhered to Kennedy's declaration guaranteeing borders in this area, it meant Israel's borders. The United States reassured Israel about its borders but allowed it to violate Arab territory. The United States asked us to exercise self-restraint, to permit a breathing space; at the same time it allowed Israel to commit aggression.

I said before the fighting that we did not want to go to war with the United States. Some people may have criticized me for saying and repeating at the press conference I held before the fighting that the United States is the strongest and richest power in the world. This is an undeniable fact. Political stands cannot be founded on delusions or self-deception, but on facts. When we say that we do not want to go to war with the United States and cannot do so, I do not find this shameful or harmful. We do not want to fight the United States and cannot do so. But this does not mean that we are ready to forsake our freedom and revolutionary willpower, or our aspiration to build our own future in accordance with our own desires and in the interests of our people, no matter what the circumstances and pressure and no matter how tyrannical the United States is toward the national liberation movement and the national revolution.

Two years ago, I met the U.S. under secretary of state, who brought a message from Johnson. He told me: Since you have not met our requirements on the right of inspection--I have already told you the story. They asked for the right of inspection with regard to atomic activities and rockets in our country and the need to limit the power of the Egyptian Army. We rejected all these requirements. We said the United States had no right of inspection--Under Secretary of State Talbot came to me saying: Since you have refused these requirements, we feel that we are free to supply Israel with all the arms it requires. If you publicly announce that we supply arms to Israel, we will supply it with even more arms.

I told him: If you supply arms to Israel, we will purchase arms. We cannot possibly allow matters to proceed in this manner. At that time the United States decided to supply Israel with a number of tanks and planes. It is quite possible that the number they announced did not tally with the actual number they gave Israel.



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(cont'd)

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This was the U.S. threat. It was a clear threat that they would supply arms to Israel and support it in every way if we did not accept the right of inspection and their demand that we limit the power of the Egyptian Army.

Brothers, these were some of the circumstances and implications of what happened. A great deal about these circumstances and implications will be exposed in the future. But as I have already said, what is more important is that what has been done cannot be undone or denied. At the same time, we cannot remain stunned by the shock. As I have already said, the most important thing is that we should draw lessons from the setback. We should surmount the setback and continue the victorious march toward our objectives.

Brothers, I did not think for a moment that the masses of our people came out on the evening of 9 June despite darkness and enemy air raids to honor me personally. I considered this attitude to mean that they were determined to struggle. I have said several times that these people have given me more than I ever dreamed of. I have raised my voice several times in warning against reliance on individuals, because every individual has a role to play. (applause) It is the people alone who survive forever. Therefore, I have nothing to say on this matter. The attitude which our people took on 9 and 10 June was more than I deserve and more than any individual deserves. But to me this attitude has other meanings: That the struggle continues (applause), the popular struggle continues; that the people are prepared to pay the full price and to make all sacrifices; and that they are determined to resist and stand firm. Through this attitude the people have replied to the most important question that the events and the setback itself have asked them. This question is: What is to be done?

As I have said, the people replied through their determination, resistance, and preparation for all sacrifices and by standing firm. But this is not the end; it is the beginning, because, after this, we find ourselves facing the persistent question: Where shall we begin? standing before you here, and as all our people and our nation listen, I know that you would like to ask questions, and each of you has come to hear the replies to these questions. In houses and everywhere people want to know and want me to tell them where we shall start.

I tell you frankly and clearly there is no shortcut to what we want. Also, there is not just one course without substitute through which we can attain the goal. The road is long and hard. There are also other roads which we must take at the same time, regardless of obstacles, barriers, or difficulties.

The setback that has confronted us was greater than we expected. We cannot, therefore, leap over it. It is impossible. We cannot leap onto the first road we find without adequate preparation. But we must realize that it is necessary for us to reconstruct the popular and military forces of the Egyptian homeland. (applause)

The enemy we faced was not just Israel. Therefore, we say that we have before us several courses which we should follow simultaneously. There are Arab courses, political courses, economic courses, international political courses, propaganda courses, and military courses. The courses of struggle in this field are many. We have two clear choices before us: Either we surrender unconditionally, (shouts: "No Jamal!") or we struggle. (loud applause and cheers). Our nature, our system, and the things that we are known for in the world commit us to the path of struggle.



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I said we had two choices, but in fact we have only one. I know this, but I said we had two choices for the sake of objective discussion. We have two choices: Either we surrender or we struggle. But this is the objective view. In fact there are not two choices but only one. We have not surrendered, and we have struggled for a long time. We struggled throughout our history. Therefore we refuse the course of surrender. This leaves us one choice only, the course of struggle. (applause) Struggle at this stage is real, hard, and difficult. But it is a struggle for the sake of our principles, our aims, our freedom, our land, our social revolution--for the sake of the entire Arab homeland.

As I told you, there are many ways to struggle. There is political struggle. We never close the door of political discussions and contacts. When Dr. Fawzi went to the United States, I told him I had no objections to his meeting with Americans. In fact, he met with the U.S. secretary of state twice. There is struggle with political work.

There is also economic struggle. Now they say that the Suez Canal is closed, and, as a result, we lose about 10 million pounds every month--about 110 million pounds annually in hard currency. Our enemies today say that after five or six months we will starve. We say that we will struggle economically. (applause)

What does it mean to struggle economically? It means that we shall procure wheat; we shall not starve. We will do away with certain other things which are less essential than wheat. I would like to point out to you that before 1956 we did not make 110 million pounds, because they were taken by the French and the British who owned the Suez Canal Company. Before nationalization of the canal, we received only 1 million pounds annually. This year, we expected to receive 110 million pounds. Economic struggle means that we will make certain economic sacrifices. We are not the first country to do so. During the war, in England a person got one egg per week, just one egg.

We should recall how the English struggled during World War II, after their defeat at Dunkirk. War is not just one battle followed by surrender. Struggle is much greater than that; struggle can resist firmly and resolutely; it can achieve victory.

We have fought fierce battles before. This is not the first battle we have fought. The fierce battles we have fought have not affected the Egyptian people's determination to defend their freedom and independence. The political struggle is one way, and the economic struggle is another, to frustrate the imperialist objectives. Another way is military struggle--the reconstruction of our armed forces to make them capable, the establishment of popular resistance, and popular mobilization everywhere in order to resist aggression from village to village and in order to defend our country's freedom.

Every day we read about the people of Vietnam and what they, armed with light and anti-tank weapons--they have no tanks or planes--are doing to the Americans. They are inflicting heavy losses on them. We are no less than the Vietnamese people. We have always been a struggling people.

There were air raids on Suez. The first day the people were alarmed, of course. But by the second day, they were used to the air raids. The third, fourth, and fifth days were what is called in military language the immunization of the people to fighting.

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When one hears the sound of bullets for the first time he is afraid, but when he gets used to it, the sound of the machinegun does not frighten him.

I say that the military struggle is not only a matter for the armed forces, but for all the people. There must be popular resistance everywhere. (I have heard that some) say they were not given arms by the popular resistance and things like that. Never mind. There is no need for us to be critical of everything or to seek perfection. We are not America. We want popular resistance. Some do it with arms, some with knives, some with clubs, some with sticks. Popular resistance is within our potentialities. This way we can indeed have a large number in the popular resistance.

I ask the young men not to be disappointed when they see there are not enough arms for all the people. We will gradually obtain enough arms for all of them. A large number of people can be trained with a small quantity of arms. There are many methods and ways of popular resistance. When we speak of the military struggle we speak of our armed forces and our popular forces in every village and town, both men and women. There must be general mobilization. As I say, it is necessary for us to rebuild the popular and military forces of the Egyptian homeland.

I will begin by speaking about the rebuilding of the Egyptian structure, which, we must admit, is the basic foundation of the resistance and the steadfast front and vanguard of progress. First, the military aspects is important among the subjects I have spoken about, and perhaps, all of you expect me to speak about it today. I hope you realize that I cannot go into detail about it. All I can say is that we are reorganizing our armed forces and reinforcing their ability and effectiveness. I wish here to mention several points which are very important in the battle.

1--Our armed forces are the vanguard of the people in every battle. This is the role of the armed forces and will remain so. Therefore, the strength of the armed forces is the strength of the homeland, and their dignity and honor are the dignity and honor of the homeland.

2--The men of our armed forces have done extraordinary things and made unmatched sacrifices. They fought without air cover while the enemy had air cover and air superiority. If the circumstances of setback have not allowed the heroism of our men to be recognized sufficiently, I know for sure that many of them wrote with their blood honorable pages in the history of this nation for the glory of this nation.

3--Our armed forces cannot perform their role in the most perfect manner without full cohesion between the army and the people. This cohesion has never been as necessary as it is now.

I move to the popular side. I have taken over responsibility for the General Secretariat of the Arab Socialist Union (ASU). I understand that the political organization of the people will play a decisive role in the battle. Even during the battle itself we must rejuvenate the strength and activity of the popular organization. Before the crisis broke out, it had been decided to form the central committee of the ASU on the occasion of the 15th anniversary of the revolution. I do not think that the crisis should delay this decision; on the contrary it dictates accelerating it.  
(applause)

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It is more necessary than ever to expand the scope of the ASU command. If the ASU is the organization representing the alliance of all the people's forces, its command cannot be monopolized by a certain number of individuals. I therefore hope that the central committee of the ASU will be formed in a few days. I hope that the committee will include the best elements of leadership in this homeland. I also hope that the committee will perform its role of leadership in the best manner. This will release the vitality and activity of the people's working forces and give rise to leadership among them, thus ushering in a broader and deeper democracy of the people's working forces. This will cause the revolution to achieve a real and complete transfer to sound democracy as soon as the effects of the aggression are eliminated.

We have always aimed at setting up a sound democratic life. I said that political democracy can exist only alongside social democracy. There can be political freedom only through social liberty. I also said that the course to sound democratic life is the socialist solution, which makes the people their own masters and gives equal opportunities to all our compatriots. I have always believed that the greatest success which the 23 July revolution can score will be permanently confirmed in the Egyptian people's life when the revolutionary advance parties--which set out on 23 July and assumed the responsibility of staging the revolution--are absorbed in a wider civilian life. This will be the greatest success of the 23 July revolution.

Our generation has offered leadership during the great phase of transformation. Other generations must come forward to lead. It is most important that a democratic regime should exist which will guarantee the renewal of leaderships which always express the requirements of the people's working forces and their hopes and are able to understand and solve their problems throughout all phases of development.

But if our generation thinks that its leadership is for life, it will commit two great errors: First, it will take on more than it can faithfully and justly bear; second, it will hamper and impair the process of the healthy rejuvenation of the people's forces and leaderships. On the other hand, the process of popular reconstruction is necessary for victory.

Should we ask ourselves: What was the real purpose of the prearranged aggressive operation to which we have recently been exposed? Should we ask ourselves this question, the reply will be: "The real aim was to crush the socialist revolution in Egypt. Therefore, so that we can confront the aggression it is necessary to consolidate the social revolution in Egypt. This can best be achieved by mobilizing the forces of the masses and clarifying our vision.

What was the aim of the aggression and the entire operation? What was the aim of the collusion? The aim was to destroy the social revolution--the socialist revolution--which they have confronted with all means: assassination attempts, Moslem Brotherhood, plots, and the withholding of aid. But we stood fast, and all these failed. There remained only one solution--Israel. After the Israeli invasion a split was to have occurred in the (?regime). Naturally, the setback caused a split and left a trace. After this, they were to have concentrated on economic and political pressure; it is also possible that they would have concentrated on military pressure so that the revolution, which they could not touch for 15 years, subdued, or drag into spheres of influence, would collapse.

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The occupation of territory was not the real aim of the imperialist-Zionist aggression. The occupation of territory was only a partial objective which would help achieve the real aim--the liquidation of the Arab revolution in general. The aggression fulfilled the partial objectives, but it could not achieve its main objective. Our enemies, the guns that are directed against us, the big powers which stand against us, have not yet achieved their main objective. The aggression continues to seek to achieve its objective. Therefore, when we think and define our objective clearly, we can define our practical starting point in this stage.

Our direct target should not be only the elimination of the aggression; it should also be the protection and the entrenching of our revolutionary system and the consolidation of the Arab revolutionary movement. Does this mean that we must close our eyes to the Zionist occupation of our country and forget the military setback? Of course not. It means that our movement's basic policy should be revolutionary work, the consolidation of the internal front, the revolutionary mobilization of the masses, the expansion of the ties of struggle among the Arab revolutionary movement, and the strengthening of our military forces.

If we achieve all this and prevent the enemy from achieving its main objective; if we can protect the social revolution in Egypt and consolidate the comprehensive Arab revolution, we will be able to liberate the occupied territory.

Why do they want to destroy the revolutionary regime? It is because they know that this revolutionary regime will not be a submissive regime, but a struggling one. They, of course, want a submissive regime. How can they bring about a submissive regime? Every one of you can see the trends of the enemy's attack. The attack was first directed against our armed forces, but the attack against our armed forces was just a small part of the comprehensive attack against our people's working forces. The attack on the working forces in their capacity as the source of every power is the main enemy attack. The repulsion and defeat of this attack means the defeat of the main enemy attack. It means that we will be able to liberate ourselves and eliminate the effects of aggression.

The military aggression is over, and the attack on the masses--on you, on every member in this country--has begun. We see the foreign press and radios. The comprehensive psychological attack against the entire Arab nation aims to make it despair, forget its aims, and surrender. The enemy is attempting to break up the Arab masses in everything--in their sacred aims, their great achievements, the result of their sacrifices, the edifice of their structure, their self confidence, and their confidence in each other. This is the main battle we confront today.

This is the major battle we now face. The enemy did not realize its aim by occupying (the land). The enemy's aim is to crush the Arab revolution, to do away with Arab aspirations, and to place our countries within the sphere of its influence. The enemy occupied Sinai, but the revolution still exists. We said we would struggle and liberate our country. We shall liberate the Arab territory. (applause)

But our enemies say they opened a crack (in our structure--ed.) and struck us. We are not the first people to be struck. France was struck, Britain was struck, and the United States was struck at Pearl Harbor and had to withdraw. In Russia, the Germans penetrated to within 10 kilometers of Moscow. We are not the first people to have

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lost a battle. What is the difference? The difference does not lie in the military battle. Shall we surrender or go ahead with the struggle? This is the question. Today they want us to surrender. What surrender? Shall we despair?

They spread rumors among us to encourage despair. We already know about and hear their broadcasts and propaganda, meant to make us say: It is useless to fight. Israel is so strong and America is so strong, and so on. They know that we, especially the Egyptians, are a people who make fun of everything. You know about the series of jokes circulated in the past few days. I know our people and this is their nature. I did not take this matter seriously. I know the Egyptian people very well, because I belong to them and was brought up in their midst. Whenever one of us meets another he asks if he has heard the latest joke. If not he will relate it. (laughter) This is our way of life..

They also know us; they cannot harm us. A few jokes cannot affect our dignity as a people whose pioneers fought and died. Some people died, but we are not the first people to have lost a battle.. The Americans were struck at Pearl Harbor and fled. The British evacuated Dunkirk almost naked. They fled in fishing boats. France fell in 10 days. Some of those now standing against us, such as Holland, fell in a shorter time: Holland fell in one day, Belgium fell in one day, and the whole of West Europe fell in a short time.

We all recall the speeches made then. We recall Churchill's speech after Dunkirk. He said, we are a shellfish which has lost the shell protecting it, and therefore, must withdraw a little until a new shell grows. We recall how they suffered through the battle of Britain and the bombing of London, how they had no food, and the other stories. But they struggled and triumphed. An Englishman nicknamed Lord Haw Haw used to tell them on the radio every day: you are beaten and you are finished. (The Germans--ed.) destroyed London with air raids, and they destroyed England, and all the time Lord Haw Haw ridiculed the English. He was (word indistinct).

Why should we talk only about distant people? Here, in 1956, some 11 clandestine radio stations continuously attacked us to make us despair, to make our life hell. We never despaired in our life and we never surrendered. The Voice of Britain radio, which operated during the 1956 aggression used to say: We shall bomb! We shall bomb! And the people here were saying, we shall fight..

Then we came under economic pressure, and our funds were frozen in 1956. We had no hard currency. We resisted and stood firm and were able to succeed in our economic, political, and military struggle. The enemy has not been able to achieve its aim. The land is not its aim; it is not Sinai, or the West Bank, or the Syrian plains. The enemy's aim is you. Its aim is that we become desperate, lose hope, abandon our principles, and relinquish our social revolution, which they have been trying to crush by all means.

What do our enemies say? The Americans say, let us leave them like that for six months and they will collapse from within. The crack is there and they will collapse all by themselves. They will fail economically and they will despair. The whole Arab nation will despair. They imagine that this could happen. They imagine that we might despair, that we might doubt our principles and everything.

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All this imposes many duties on us. Every member of the entire Arab nation, not just in Egypt, but in every Arab country, should remain alert and cautious of the intrigues of imperialism and Zionism, which wants us to despair of and disavow our own ideals. We will not despair or disavow our own ideals and principles! When will we succeed? When every individual takes it upon himself to work against enemy objectives. We should not say that this is the task of the political organizations. This is not so. Every individual in the entire Arab homeland has a duty. He should not shift the responsibility to others. When everyone performs his duty, we will be able to defeat the aims of imperialism and Zionism. We will be able to achieve the results of our popular, political and military struggles, and will also liberate the occupied territory.

But if imperialism succeeds in making every individual doubt (the ability of the Arab nation--ed.), or in influencing 50 percent of the people, then it will have scored half the victory. Every individual has a responsibility. Every individual can contribute to this tough and bitter struggle against imperialism and Zionism. Every mother, every home, and every family in the Arab homeland should know that the war is not over with the end of the military battle. The war continues. The present struggle will be tougher than the military struggle. We must struggle everywhere so as to mobilize the Arab masses, and so as not to lose confidence in ourselves, despair, and doubt our objectives.

I repeat, we are not the first people to have lost a battle, or to have been defeated in a battle. I say this frankly. All the big powers have been defeated in war. But through determination and struggle the countries which mobilized and knew the right course managed to score a victory. We want to score a victory. We should never give the enemy the means to achieve its objectives. This is as far as the individual is concerned. But if every one of us shifts the responsibility to others then this will be a sign of indifference and as a result we will suffer many times more. Every citizen has a duty.

I also say that we have been rather indulgent in cracking jokes without realizing the harm we are doing our cause. These jokes harm the dignity of our people--our sons and brothers. I personally used to hear these jokes. And people used to come and say, have you heard the latest joke? Just as you crack jokes to one another. This is our Egyptian nature. I did not consider these jokes to have any true meaning.

But I know that the Egyptian people have been in existence for 7,000 years. The Egyptian people defeated all the invaders from (Kandis--phonetic) to Napoleon, and cracked jokes about them. The Egyptian people have their own philosophy. No one was able to divide the people. The people are united and strong. But they like to crack jokes. I consider this a good characteristic, because through jokes the people create a philosophy. But if our enemies try to exploit this characteristic to achieve their own objectives, then we should watch out. I cannot say that everyone should follow a certain political line. Everyone has a duty. Everyone should know that the enemy's objectives are to weaken our willpower, make us lose confidence in ourselves and make the armed forces despondent. If we are not careful, we help achieve the enemy's objectives. Our course is a tough one. Every one of us can contribute a great deal. The political organization should also be in the battlefield with the masses. It should lead through reality and not appearances or magnification of matters. It should lead from the rank and file. It should not dominate the people. In the past, those in positions of leadership dominated and looked down on others. If today's popular leadership does this they will immediately fall.

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Crisis more than other things reveal the true nature of people. This crisis has revealed the genuine disposition of our people. They are the people of a long and continuing civilization, which has never stopped.

Naturally, there were some waves of criticism. We are also speaking frankly. In a setback every one criticizes and talks and philosophers grow in number. We have faced a setback so things are said and philosophical views are expressed. In fact, I have heard all these things that have been said. There are many people who have sent me letters, loyal people. There are some citizens who want to struggle sacrifice, and die. I want to tell the truth. I agreed with the people on many of their points.

The people demand a serious and firm beginning conforming to the seriousness and firmness of the circumstances we are confronting. I agree with this demand of the people. All our work should be adapted to the circumstances we are facing. We are confronting war circumstances and our method of work must be adapted accordingly.

Each of us will adapt himself within the scope of his responsibility. Squandering must inevitably cease. There must be a limit to spending on appearances. It is inescapable that each of us perform his work, and this work should have yardsticks for deciding whether it deserves reward or punishment. (applause) There must be a task for every responsibility and there will be a reckoning for every task. (applause)

The people demand that the privileges which some people have unjustly acquired be terminated. (applause) I agree with the people. (applause) We are a people building our society, a society of socialism. This society does not belong to a privileged class, and by its very nature this society does not tolerate social distinction. It permits the distinction of work alone, and it is efficiency at work that will bring privileges for an efficient worker. But it is the privilege of efficiency and not a class privilege.

Perhaps I may tell you that in the past few days I canceled several privileges which had appeared during previous phases. This will be illustrated in the new budget. (applause) We must eliminate any remaining privileges which exceed the right of work and of its value to the service of society without any other considerations.

All the people request equality in offering sacrifices. I agree with them. (applause) Perhaps I am not divulging a secret if I tell you now that we shall ask the people to make new sacrifices imposed by the requirements of the battle. Other peoples in the Arab world--and some of them did not actually participate in the battle--have preceded us in imposing such sacrifices on the ground that they are required by circumstances. We have taken into consideration the fact that the heavier burden should fall on those capable of making the sacrifices we shall request so that there will be real equality. (applause)

The people demand revolutionary purity. I join the people in this demand. We must have revolutionary purity, and we must adhere to the values of religion. (applause) Brothers, many things have been said in the past one and one half months. We have all spoken. Every one of you talked. Every family spoke, and every office spoke, no one remained silent. This is natural. But I want to say that the self-criticism phenomenon through which our society passed in the wake of the



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setback is a healthy phenomenon. It is evidence of our people's vitality and strength. Naturally, I heard and was informed about the things that were said. In fact, I was trying, in the light of the criticisms and things which I heard, to find a way to achieve the things that were worth doing. There were things for which I could find no way.

About the radio: Some people sent letters telling me they were fed up with national songs; the radio was broadcasting them all day. They told me: We cannot listen to this station and we shall be compelled to tune in foreign radios. In fact, when someone comes home tired from work, he cannot go to bed. He switches on the radio and hears national songs and music. I received letters to this effect. I told the information minister: Change the broadcasts. I said, some countries were at war for five years in World War II. Did they broadcast national songs for five years? I asked the people who were in London. I asked Dr. al-Qaysuni who was in London at that time. He told me no. The radio was broadcasting as usual. Actually, it is illogical for somebody fighting for five years to broadcast national songs for five years. Impossible! Normal life must continue despite the war. There could be a popular mobilization and popular resistance. We could hear enthusiastic words and songs. But at the same time, normal life continues. The world has not come to an end. I told the information minister: Reduce the songs, because some people have complained to me and they say, we shall listen to foreign radios.

When he changed the tone of the radio, I received letters asking how is it that we broadcast sentimental songs while the battle is going on? (Nasir is heard laughing--ed.) (applause) In fact, I could not solve this question. Despite this, we must find the correct tune which will reconcile the first with the second. We must also control our nerves. It is our nerves that we need most now. We must bear with one another. Every one of us must have confidence in the others. The enemy's concentration on us and its fundamental goal, which it has not yet attained, is to make us lose sight of all this. We must understand that we are facing an important phase which makes it incumbent on us to build and fight. This is an old slogan of our struggle: We shall build with one hand and fight with the other. (applause)

Brothers, the new budget may be published tomorrow or in a few days. In the new budget we have been compelled to reduce the development plan. We shall postpone the steel combine for a year. But the budget provides for the continuation of work in industries, land reclamation, power, and the latest budget for the high dam. We have done this so that economic pressure brought to bear on us will be futile and so that we shall be able to spend the money we had wanted to spend on these things on the purchase of wheat and necessities.

Brothers, I move to the course of Arab action. In fact, we began this action from the first moment of the setback. We were in constant touch with each other all the time and with others in a bid to draw a true picture of the situation, in its Arab and international dimensions. Meetings took place in Cairo. Actually, they were not prearranged meetings. Premier Boumediene informed me that he was coming to Cairo the next morning. (applause) It was his genuine Arab feelings that made him feel he should come to see us in our difficult time. We received Premier Boumediene. When he came here, he told us that all of Algeria's resources and forces were at our disposal and that Algeria would give us anything we requested and that the battle was Algeria's battle. (applause)



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King Husayn also sent a message saying that he would like to come to Cairo. We told him he was welcome in our country and he came. A meeting also took place between Boumedienne and King Husayn and then they left. Brother Abd ar-Rahman Aref also found it his duty to visit us in the present circumstances. I did not know that he was coming to Cairo until one hour before his arrival. In fact, he left Baghdad without our knowing it. Then, President al-Atasi came from Syria and President al-Azhari came from Sudan. Thus, a meeting was held without any prior arrangements or planning. At this meeting we spoke about the possibility of cooperation in liquidating the effects of aggression. Does this conference preclude the possibility of an Arab action? I say no. We wish for the existence of an Arab action at this stage.

All the Arab peoples were shocked by the collusion and the aggression. All Arab peoples in all Arab countries demonstrated and expressed their feelings. Many sacrificed themselves and some were sent to jail. Some went on strike and lost their pay. The real Arab nation appeared in its reality (applause), the reality of its sons, workers, men, and everyone. This is the Arab nation. The Arab nation is the people. The rulers must act in accordance with the will of the Arab peoples in all Arab countries. (applause) Social relations should not be a reason for preventing a meeting, (presumably of Arab heads of state--ed.) because we are in a situation that calls for great action. The battle calls for the mobilization of every Arab rifle, every Arab piaster, every Arab individual, and every Arab effort.

I say that we must meet at the summit conference in order to face everyone with his responsibilities. Such responsibility is not just that some must only send telegrams of support or of condolences.

Some people would say that if we go to the summit conference after having previously rejected it, it would be construed by some as a derogation of our dignity. Never! This does not affect our dignity in any way. In the past, we have never considered the question of dignity when the national interest was at stake. Perhaps some people wonder: If you, Abd an-Nasir, go to the summit conference, you will perhaps meet people who rejoice at your misfortune. Never mind. We have done our duty. We took 10 years to build an army for the sake of the Arab cause and of the Arab homeland. We never failed in our duty. When Syria was threatened, we did not hesitate. We stood like men and said that we would stand with Syria. (applause) This is our nature. It is the quality of our people. We did not leave the others alone. Instead, we said that we are with them in the battle. We were defeated in the battle.

As I told you, people get defeated in battles. Major powers have been defeated. Major powers conspired against us with Israel. The collusion I have just explained to you is clear. Therefore, we have fulfilled an honorable mission in spite of the setback and of the occupation of our territory in Sinai. We have equipped our army and ourselves. We spent money on our army and never abandoned our duty. We stood like men, for such is the nature of this people.

Today, after the setback, Saudi Arabia is criticizing us. Its press and radio criticize us every day. When I spoke on 9 June, and said that I had received messages from Kosygin and Johnson, the Saudi papers, King Faysal's papers, asked: Why did you not attack first. He sat there in Riyadh, 5,000 kilometers away, failed to send a single soldier, and yet asks why I did not attack first and why I listened to Johnson and Kosygin's orders. Is it we who obey Johnson's orders?

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This was a contact between one state and another, and relations between one state and another are a customary thing. Moreover, we were involved in a crisis. He asks why you did not fight and attack first. This is what King Faysal's papers and radios ask. What did he himself do? How many soldiers did he send during the battle? Not a single one!

We do not like to begin altercations once again, yet we can answer them. It is easy to answer. But the problem is that no one reads their papers or knows what they say. When we publish something, all the world knows what we say. They say we attack Saudi Arabia. But no one knows that from the first day of aggression to this date, Saudi Arabia is attacking us. It is attacking us in its papers and over its radio. But suppose we begin attacking Saudi Arabia tomorrow. All the world will say that Abd an-Nasir has begun altercations and is now attacking King Faysal.

I say again that for six weeks, since the beginning of the aggression, the Saudi papers and radio have been attacking us. They are rejoicing at our misfortune. Nevertheless, I say that we have done our duty and men always carry out their duties. We did not flee from the battle. It is not a shame if we lost the battle, but it would have been a shame to run away from it. Had we run away, the people would have despaired and we would have lost all hopes for our principles. It would have meant that we were only repeating meaningless slogans. It would have meant that when I come here to speak to you and when you shout, all this is meaningless. It would have meant that all the things we say about our national problems are meaningless.

I have told you in the past that peoples must act if they are to progress. They must take risks if they are to triumph. Only fear will render them inactive. Despite what has happened, we say we are ready to attend a summit conference. Whoever wants to contribute to the battle can do so and whoever does not want to contribute need not. A small contribution will also be accepted. But we are the ones who will prepare for the battle and assume the responsibilities.

King Faysal's newspapers are contributing nothing but criticism. After the end of the fighting and the cease-fire, they probably sent (word indistinct) to Jordan. We are not against any Arab country. We do not want to change the social system in any Arab country. We are not against the influence of any Arab country. But we are against imperialism and imperialist influence.

We want every Arab country to be truly Arab, really Arab, and Arab nationalist. When the President of the Sudanese Republic proposes a summit conference, we want guarantees that it will succeed--hence the suggestion to hold a foreign ministers meeting in Khartoum.

Brothers, we must have an Arab front to face our enemies--Israel and those behind it. We must be able to recognize our enemy. We must be able to pinpoint those who helped and who stood on its side. We do not ask anyone to give more than he can. But we will not accept less than he is capable of giving.

While we are fighting the enemy, we are not prepared to engage in vituperations. This is not the time for vituperations. We will not answer the Saudi radio and press. I say this knowing that no one listens to Saudi Arabia's radio or reads the Saudi press. I tell the entire world that since the battle, the Saudi press and radio have been attacking us.

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In the international field, we must speak about the enemy and the friend. This leads us to the international situation. I want to say that despite the circumstances of the setback, the Arab nation takes everything into account and can distinguish between friend and foe. The Arab nation will make its enemies give account for their actions and will treat them equally.

Among the big Western powers, France alone maintained a moral stand. As for others--the United States and Britain--they supported Israel. The Soviet Union (long applause) stood on our side. It supported us politically, helped us economically, and endeavored to strengthen our armed forces. (long applause) Soviet President Podgornyy came here to Cairo. He spoke to us and he told us quite frankly that the Soviet Union--and I told him frankly (words indistinct) you remember when Hitler attacked you lost several battles. Do not think the Egyptian or Arab peoples want the Red Army--I mean the Soviet Army--to fight on our behalf. We have men who are ready to die and to die fighting. Our history speaks of men who fought for their country, and we now have men who are ready to die for their country.

Today, the West is waging an anti-Soviet campaign saying that the Arabs are angry because the USSR has not sent them Soviet troops. We have never thought of bringing Soviet troops to fight on our behalf.

We have been supported by many friendly countries. We all know the friendly countries that supported us. We were supported by India, Yugoslavia, Pakistan, Guinea, Mali, Tanzania, Zambia, and the Congo. All the socialist countries supported us. Outside the United Nations, we were supported by the CPR, North Korea, and North Vietnam. We were also supported by Turkey and Cyprus. Many countries supported us. We were supported by Greece and Spain. We have many friends. Some we thought to be our friends did not support us. Naturally, we treat everyone on the basis of his attitude.

Of course, on the international level we consider the U.S. attitude at the United Nations. You have all read about it in the newspapers. There is no need for me to repeat it to you or to tell you how it kept on pressing, threatening, and using aid as a bribe to achieve Israel's objectives. If the United Nations has failed to adopt a resolution calling for the withdrawal of the aggressive forces, the main reason was U.S. pressure.

Brothers, there is no brief or short way. The road is long. There is not one but many roads, and we must take them all to reach the same destination. I am confident that with God's help we will traverse the road, overcoming its difficulties and obstacles. I am confident that with God's help we will move along all the roads open to us and we will arrive at our destination.

Brother compatriots, when they talk about peace I say that no power can impose peace. The acceptance of imposed peace means surrender. They want us to surrender in the name of peace. Despite the setback and despite everything, the only road for us to take is that of safeguarding the rights of the Palestinian people, and we will never abandon these rights. This is the essence of the matter. We cannot possibly accept peace in the sense of surrender, and despite the setback and the occupation of Sinai, we cannot possibly abandon the rights of the Palestinian people. We will not despair or renounce our objectives. We will not lose our confidence in ourselves and in our nation and people. Brothers, I am confident that the coming generations will say of this period: This was one of the severest periods of their struggle, but they were up to the level of the responsibility and were loyal to the trust. May God grant you success. (applause)